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Admittedly, Debray does not go very far, but by simply reminding people of certain 
obvious facts in the face of the powerful, prevailing ideology, he performs what 
Foucault was fond of calling, a `cleansing operation'. ... It is, 
I concede, a simple and 
limited operation, but a truly materialist one. 
LOUIS ALIHUSSER, D FUTURE LASTS ALONG 'nNm 223-4 
(trans]. by Richard Veasey; 1994) 
We have too little theory in the law rather than too much, especially in this ... 
branch 
of study. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 
110 Harv. L. Rev. 991,1007 (1997) 
The remoter and more general aspects of the law are those which give it universal 
interest. It is through them that you not only become a great master in your calling, 
but connect your subject with the universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse 
of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law. 
Id. 1009 
The shortest way is always mined. 
Anon. 
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Introductory Note 
This thesis is a work written in the genre of the legal realist critique. Its main topic is the 
development of the new international legal regime relating to the treatment of minority 
communities in Eastern and Central Europe (ECE) following the end of the Cold War. ' 
The general methodological approach on the basis of which it was produced derives 
primarily from the traditions of American legal realism and the first-wave critical legal 
studies (CLS). z On a more fundamental level, the philosophical sensibility underlying this 
thesis's inquiry can be described as a combination of a non-Hegelian dialectical theory and 
historical materialism. 
What is this thesis about? 
The basic analytical project pursued in this thesis consists of two general investigative tasks 
each of which constitutes its own separate problematic. ' The first investigative task relates 
directly to the development of the new international law relating to the treatment of 
minority communities (ILTMC). Its main line of inquiry focuses primarily on that complex 
socio-historical transformation which has occurred in the ECE region in the last seventeen 
years and which has been marked on the plane of international law by the rapid emergence 
of the new ILTMC project. 4 
1 In accordance with the established convention, I treat the end of the Cold War as a rather short-lived 
historical process that began sometime in the mid-1980s and culminated by the end of 1989, with the fall of 
the Berlin Wall customarily representing the main symbolic point of reference. 
2 See further Chapter I, Section 3, below. 
3I use the term `problematic'' in this thesis in the same sense in which it was used by James Kavanagh in James 
H. Kavanagh, Marxism's Althasser: Toward a Politics of Literary Theory, 12 Diacritics 25,26 (1982): "the matrix of 
theoretical pre-suppositions that cohere a given field of thought, determining the visibility, or invisibility, of 
objects within the field - the forms in which allproblems must be posed, ' and, therefore, the possible solutions that 
can be generated. A word or concept cannot exist outside of a problematic, which sets or `articulates' its 
significance in a systemic relation of differences with other words and concepts; a problematic provides `a 
definite theoretical structure' for a discourse, its `absolute and definite conditions of possibility'. " NB: here 
and elsewhere, unless specified otherwise, all italics are copied from the original. 
4 In this thesis I use the term "the new ILTMC project' to describe that totality of mutually coordinated 
discursive activities which over the course of the last seventeen years have produced the new ILT IC re, gime 
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The second investigative task addressed in these pages relates to a somewhat more 
abstract subject matter. Its main line of inquiry can be preliminarily summarized in the 
form of the following question: "How should the general problematic of the new ILTMC 
project be investigated from the point of view of international taw? " 
What is the general relationsh p between legal realism, historical materzalasm, and the structural 
conjuncturaZ method? 
The theory of historical materialism practised in this thesis derives essentially from the 
works of the French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser. Despite the terminological 
parallels, it differs quite considerably from the similarly-named theories practised by the 
orthodox Marxist schools from the Second International onwards. In particular, it rejects in 
every form and guise all versions of Hegelian teleologism, which it considers to be a 
variation of ontological idealism, and adopts a position of extreme suspicion with regard to 
vulgar economism. 5 
In that context, for the purposes of the present thesis, the term "structural 
conjuncturalism" should be generally understood as the short name given to the basic 
analytical method developed in the framework of the historical materialist theory for the 
purposes of social sciences. ' Legal realism, in its turn, should be generally understood as 
the "local" variation of that method adapted for the specific purposes of juridical 
scholarship. ' 
and established a corresponding system of the nerv ILTMC discourse. See further Chapter I below. In 
chronological terms, the beginning of the new ILTMC project coincides with the end of the Cold War. Cf 
supra n. 1. 
5 See further Chapter II below. 
6 Id. 
7 See further Chapter I, Section 3, Chapter II, Section 2, and Chapter III, Section 1, below. 
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I 
Context 
Section One 
The New Conventional Wisdom 
Much has been written in recent years about the international law relating to the treatment 
of minority communities. ' A topic considered effectively dead less than a generation ago 
and "nearly obsolete" for the greater part of the preceding half a century, ' the "minorities 
question" has once again become one of the hottest items in the contemporary 
international law debate. No sooner had the dust settled on the ruins of the Berlin Wall and 
the last Soviet soldier crossed the Friendship Bridge across the river Amu than virtually 
everyone from the UN experts' to political theorists, ' international civil servants' to NGO 
consultants' discovered they had something urgent to say about politics, international law, 
1 For traditional book-length introductions to the subject, see, e. g., PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); CATHERINE BRÖLMANN ET 
AL (EDS. ), PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1993); THOMAS D. MUSGRAVE, SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997); ATHANASIA SPILIOPOULOU AKERMARK, JUSTIFICATIONS OF MINORITY 
PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (London: Kluwer Law International, 1999); KRISTINE HENRARD, 
DEVISING AN ADEQUATE SYSTEM OF MINORITY PROTECTION: INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS, MINORITY 
RIGHTS, AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2000); GAETANO 
PENTASSUGLIA, MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publications, 2002). 
2 See Josef L. Kunz, The Present Status of the International Law for the Protection of Minorities, 48 AJIL 282,282 
(1954); THORNBERRY, supra n. 1,5; PENTASSUGLIA, supra n. 1,26-27. 
3 See, e. g., Asbjorn Eide and Erika-Irene Daes, "Prevention of Discrimination against and the Protection of 
Minorities: Working Paper on the Relationship and Distinction between the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
Minorities and Those of Indigenous Peoples, " UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/2000/10; Fernand de Varennes, 
"Minority Rights and the Prevention of Ethnic Conflicts, " UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/AC. 5/2000/CRP. 3. 
4 See, e. g., WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); JENNIFER JACKSON PREECE, NATIONAL MINORITIES AND THE 
EUROPEAN NATION-STATES SYSTEM (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
5 See, e. g., WALTER A. KEMP (ED. ), QUIET DIPLOMACY IN ACTION: THE OSCE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON 
NATIONAL MINORITIES (-fhe Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998). 
6 See, e. g., Kinga Gal, "Bilateral Agreements in Central and Eastern Europe: a New Inter-State Framework 
for Minority Protection? ", ECMI IY/orking Paper No. 4., May 1999 (available from 
litti): / /www. ecmi. de/dow. nlozid/ working paper 4. pdt). [NB: allweblinks valid as of 30 September 2006] 
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ethnic conflict, and minorities. ' A whole new discourse seems to have emerged almost 
overnight, springing to life like Minerva out of Jove's head. Manifold as its faces have since 
become, numerous as its surfaces have since grown a single general structure can still be 
discerned behind its facade, a robust autochtonous principle, 8 an organizing logic that 
penetrates all its countless manifestations, bringing together its various strands into a single 
Frankensteinian whole. 
Whatever context we approach them in, declares' this logic, whichever way we look 
at them, whatever aspiration we entertain in their regard, the general problematics of 
minorities proteciton, ethnic conflict, and nationalism in international law must always be 
considered together and can never be resolved separately from one another. 1° It is only by 
taking on all of them at the same time, as a single package, that the international 
community can hope to address any one of them satisfactorily, realizing the ideals of justice 
and good governance and averting the horrors of ethnic war and genocide while preserving 
the existing institutional structure of the international political order. " 
7 In line with the established convention, I use the term "minorities" here to describe exclusively those 
communities that have been traditionally known as "national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities. " C£ 
Asbjom Eide, "Commentary to the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious, and Linguistic Minorities", UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/AC. 5/2000/WP. 1. 
8 Cf. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE & THE DISCOURSE ON LANGUAGE 15 et seq. 
(transl. by A. M. Sheridan Smith; New York: Pantheon Books, 1972). 
9I am perfectly aware of the dangers of personifying inanimate objects and abstract phenomena and crediting 
them with qualities and actions that can only be properly attributed to human beings. I have tried to resist 
that tendency as far as possible, but sometimes the sentences that came out as a result would look far too 
awkward to be accepted as reasonable. Choosing effectiveness over rigour, I have decided, consequently, to 
stick on this point with the traditional practice adopted in mainstream scholarship. On legal scholars' 
propensity to personify abstract phenomena and the dangers involved in this, see further PIERRE SCHLAG, 
THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 86-9 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998); James Boyle, Ideals and 
T/nngs: International Legal Scholarship and the Prison-house of Language, 26 Harv. Intl L. J. 327 (1985). See also more 
generally Georg Lukäcs, "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat, " in GEORG LUKACS, HISTORY 
AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS 83 (tranls. by Rodney Livingstone; London: Merlin Press, 1971). 
10 For exemplary illustrations, see, e. g., Stephen J. Roth, The CSCE and the New Increase of National Ethnic and 
Racial Tensions, 4 Helsinki Monitor 5 (1993); THORN BERRY, supra n. 1,1-5; Rein Mullerson, Minorities in Eastern 
Europe and the Former USSR: Problems, Tendencies and Protection, 56 MLR 793 (1993). 
11 "Although ... ethnic relationships ... often 
have a centuries old history, such conflicts very often have 
more immediate political causes. ... 
Preventing conflict requires that the net be thrown widely to include the 
political order, or disorder as the case may be, economic factors, and often highly political issues such as the 
5 
From the perspective of the classical social theory, the ideological implications of 
such a peculiar commitment to methodological holism, of course, should not be that 
difficult to identify. 
On the most fundamental level, there exist three basic approaches to the question 
of peace and order in contemporary social theory. The first approach, derived from the 
theoretical tradition most commonly associated with the works of Adam Smith, tends to 
emphasize the spontaneous ability of the unrestrained international intercourse to produce 
stable and lasting equilibria. 12 To secure the achievement of international peace and order, 
on this view of things, what the international community basically needs to do is deregulate 
every area of the international political process. Once every field of international relations is 
released from the shackles of the artificial institutional constraints, the spontaneous 
dynamics of the unrestrained intercourse created by its participants will begin to construct a 
stable and effective balance. Over a sufficiently long period of time, this will bring about 
the most secure and steady kind of international order possible. 
territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of borders.... The prevention of conflict in Europe in the 
long run requires building a viable democracy and its institutions, creating confidence between the 
government and the population, structuring the protection of human rights, the elimination of all forms of 
gender or racial discrimination and respect for minorities. It also requires the peaceful transition from a rigid 
state-commanded economic order to a flexible market-oriented system which increases prosperity while 
paying due regard to social justice. ... 
[C]conflict prevention requires a comprehensive approach which 
combines the various tension-generating factors in an overall strategy. ... 
While one should obviously not 
lose sight of immediate threats to peace and stability, it should also be understood that quick fixes cannot be 
real solutions. " (Max van der Stoel, "Political Order, Human Rights, and Development", in WOLFGANG 
ZELLNER AND FALK LANGE (EDS. ), PEACE AND STABILITY THROUGH HUMAN AND MINORITY RIGHTS: 
SPEECHES BY THE OSCE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON NATIONAL MINORITIES 71,71-6 (Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999). Cf. Thomas W. Simon, Minorities in International Law, 10 Can. J. L. & Jur. 507,507 
(1997): "The ideology of ethno-nationalism creates a new world disorder. States and international 
organizations must find a way to deal with group conflicts to prevent ethno-nationalism from transmogrifying 
into ethnic cleansing and genocide. Minorities need protection against harm. The problem of minorities 
dominates many political conflicts. " 
12 For illustrative examples, see PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS (10th edn.; New York: Macmillan, 1976); 
Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 
623 (1986); Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International L aw, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1113 (1999). 
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The second classical approach, derived from the traditions of Niccolo Machiavelli 
and Thomas Hobbes, in contrast, tends to emphasize the idea that every increase in the 
freedom of social intercourse tends to pave the way to the eruption of war, turmoil, and 
chaos. The more deregulated the social and economic processes of a given body politic 
become, the closer it moves to the original "state of nature" in which everyone acts as an 
enemy of everyone else, "continual fear and the danger of violent death" reign over every 
aspect of social life, "and the life of man [is] solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short. "13 If 
there can be found any hope to overcome this grim tendency, declares the second school 
of social theory, it is solely through the creation of a centralized Leviathan, a powerful 
despotic institution which through the sheer supremacy of its force and power can impose 
its iron will on the rest of the society so as to compel everyone by the simple "terror 
thereof" into general obedience and order. " 
The newly established conventional wisdom of the new ILTMC discourse 
emphatically rejects both of these approaches. Its starting premise explicitly accepts that 
the international community must never leave the questions of ethnic governance, 
minority-majority relations, and nationalism to the free winds of fate. Clearly, asserts the 
new ILTMC dogma, there can be no such thing as a spontaneously emerging peace in 
international affairs. One would have to be completely deluded to believe in the existence 
of a Smithian invisible hand that could bring a stable and long-lasting equilibrium into 
every area of social life. If left unattended, most ethnic tensions tend to escalate into open 
conflicts. Violence, chaos, and mayhem will ensue if the international community does not 
take continuous, systematic, and purposeful regulatory interventions. That said, it does not 
necessarily follow from this that the best way to accomplish that task would be to create 
some kind of an international Leviathan. 
It is not the philosophy of Hobbes and Machiavelli whose ideological spectre 
haunts the common narrative of the new ILTMC discourse most consistently. The 
background sensibility on which the new ILTMC dogma is based derives, rather, from a 
13 For illustrative examples, see HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
POWER AND PEACE (2nd edn., New York: Alfred Knopf, 1954); ARNOLD WOLFERS, DISCORD AND 
COLLABORATION: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1962). 
14 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 227 (London: Penguin, 1985). 
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completely different ideological origin. In the modern juridical environment it is most 
commonly known under the rubric of the Montesquieuvian "rule of law. " In historical 
terms, however, its genealogy goes back significantly further than this. It is essentially the 
ontological theory of the Platonic Judeo-Christian Logocentric tradition of the Word- 
become-God that underlies the doxic structures of the new ILTMC discourse and serves as 
the ideological bedrock of the new ILTMC project. " 
Follow the paths drawn by international law, observe the precepts of 
multiculturalism, resist the ideas of unrestrained nationalism, and peace and justice will be 
yours, declares the new ILTMC dogma. 16 Navigate through the turbulent seas of ethnic 
politics under the guidance of the international standards, and you will reap the fruits of 
stability and freedom. 17 Certainly, the challenges of nationalism are tremendous and 
formidable, but, rest assured, imparts the new conventional wisdom of the ILTMC 
discourse, a body of special expertise has already been produced, a toolbox of standards, 
15 Pierre Schlag explores this idea from a slightly different angle in Pierre Schlag, Lai) as the Continuation of God 
by Other Means, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 427 (1997). Further on the practical logic of the "rule of law" tradition, see also 
PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 7-18,36-90 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
16 "[B]ecause many peoples do not live in a clearly delimited geographical area, it is simply impossible to 
redraw the borders of our continent in such a way that state borders and ethnic borders would coincide. 
Inevitably, many states would continue to have national minorities living on their territories. Against this 
background it becomes even more important to oppose strongly any form of nationalism that does not 
respect the rights of minorities ... 
The only way to reduce tensions and to avoid conflicts concerning national 
minorities is to make them realize that they are free to develop fully their identity and that, even if they give 
up trying to create their own state, ways are open for them to fulfil many of their aspirations. No stable 
European order is possible without solving the problems of minorities and excessive nationalism. " (Max van 
der Stoel, "We Only Fully Realize the Full Significance of Human Rights When We Have Lost Them", in 
ZELLNER AND LANGE, supra n. 11,35,37. ) 
17 "[O]nly the recognition of the rights of persons belonging to a national minority within a state, and the 
international protection of those rights, are capable of putting a lasting end to ethnic confrontations, and thus 
of helping to guarantee justice, democracy, stability and peace. " (Preamble of the Proposal for an Additional 
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning 
Persons Belonging to National Minorities, as appended to Recommendation 1201 (1993), Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe; available from THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY 
DOCUMENTS, at http: //ass(, iiil)lv,. coe. iiit/Documents/ AdoptedText/ta93/erecl2Ol htm). ) 
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solutions, policies, and formulas, " that can help you to tackle every single one of them. 
Seize it, accept it, believe it, invest all your trust in its wisdom, and you will find the path to 
the land of peace, order, justice, and prosperity, for the ultimate knowledge which this 
canon of standards imparts is not just some ordinary compendium of speculative theories, 
but the magic know-how of freedom, equity, and optimal governance. 
No feature characterizes the surface philosophy of the new ILTMC discourse more 
exhaustively than its unwavering belief in the mysterious capacity of a body of abstract 
standards to provide a fully adequate response to the most complex political challenges 
confronted by the modern society without any resort to the hegemonic violence of a 
Leviathan. No feature reveals the latent ideological momentum of the ILTMC project more 
tellingly than its continuous insistence on representing the newly established ILTMC canon 
of standards not as an artificial construct created in the course of an intense political 
struggle, but as a politically neutral embodiment of the objective truth of good governance. 
One of the main functions of all conventional wisdoms has always been to 
obfuscate the actual reality of the underlying social processes. What kind of social 
processes have been obfuscated by the conventional wisdom of the new ILTMC discourse? 
What kind of mystificatory role has it played in the development of the new ILTMC 
project? What sort of unpleasant political facts has it helped to conceal and what categories 
of political actors would normally find these facts so deeply unpleasant as to require them 
to be concealed in this way? To catch an initial glimpse into these and other related 
questions, let us turn now briefly to the history of one international organization's efforts 
undertaken on this front following the end of the Cold War. 
18 "I tend to favour a pragmatic approach ... and then to opt 
for formulas which would provide the best 
chance of relative stability. " (Wolfgang Zellner and Max van der Stoel, "Interview with the OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities, " in ZELLNER AND LANGE, supra n. 11,13,26. ) 
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Section Two 
What Lies Beneath: the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(CSCE) and the Rise of the New ILTMC Project 
a. The History of the CSCE Evolution and the Great Transformation of the Post-Cold War Europe 
The first comprehensive statement of the CSCE policy on the subject of the treatment of 
minority communities came less than a year after the unification of the two German 
republics. 19 Adopted in the summer of 1990, the Copenhagen Document of the Second 
CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension dedicated a whole section to outlining the 
new pan-European consensus relating to the decision of the minorities question. 2° Less 
than a half year later it was followed by the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 21 and in 
another half a year, by the Geneva Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National 
Minorities. ' Between them, these three documents can be considered today to have 
codified all the main aspects of the CSCE's substantive stance on the matter of minorities 
treatment during this initial post-Cold War stage, the Copenhagen Document still being 
widely regarded as the most comprehensive authoritative statement on the subject in the 
modern era, ' even if from the ideological perspective it is probably the Geneva Report that 
deserves significantly more attention, since it turned out to be the first international 
19 On the negotiating history of the CSCE ILTMC-related documents, see further Alexis Heraclides, The 
CSCE and Minorities: the Negotiations behind the Commitments, 3 Helsinki Monitor 5 (1992). 
20 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Second Conference on 
the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 29 July 1990. All cited CSCE and OSCE documents are available from 
THE OSCE DOCUMENTS LIBRARY, at litte: i /wz, -\iwwxw. osce. org/documents!. 
21 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 2°d CSCE Summit of Heads of States or Government, 21 November 1990; 
supra n. 20. 
22 Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities, 19 July 1991, id. 
23 Cf Zellner and van der Stoel, supra n. 18,14; JACKSON PREECE, supra n. 4,48-9,136; PATRICK 
THORNBERRY AND MARIA AMOR MARTIN ESTEBANEZ, MINORITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE 17 (Strasbourg. 
Council of Europe Publishing, 2004). 
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document whose title unequivocally confirmed not only the possibility but also the 
existence of such a phenomenon as an international expertise in the question relating to the 
treatment of minority communities. 24 
Be that as it may, in the end, however, it turned out to be neither the Copenhagen 
nor the Geneva meetings that produced the most important landmarks in the development 
of the CSCE/OSCE approach to the international problematic of minorities treatment. 
Indeed, the first most noteworthy achievement on this front did not actually take place 
until a full year after the Geneva meeting, when in the second decision of the 1992 Helsinki 
Summit of the Heads of State or Government, the CSCE participating states agreed to 
establish the first full-time European institution to deal with the question of minority 
protection on the international level, the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities 
(HCNM). 25 The second most important event followed two years later. In December 1994, 
at the 4" CSCE Summit in Budapest, the participating states resolved to transform the 
increasingly proceduralized Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe into a 
permanently institutionalized Organisation. The CSCE gave way to the OSCE. 26 
What were the main socio-theoretical trends that lay behind these events? To get a 
general sense of the political dynamics characteristic of this phase of the CSCE/OSCE 
response to the problematic of minority protection, let us consider briefly the main 
document adopted at the Budapest Summit. 
Like all other CSCE/OSCE documents of that rank, the Budapest Declaration 
opens with a customary adulation of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. 27 The students of the 
institutional theory will, of course, immediately recognize the basic logic behind this ritual. 
Every adulatory invocation of the institution's founding documents tends to cultivate a 
general sense of ideological continuity between the newly proposed policy measures and 
24 Following the Geneva meeting, the importance of the ILTMC project to the CSCE process increased so 
rapidly that already by 1994 commentators began to observe that "minority ... 
issues belong to the core of 
the CSCE activities. " See, e. g., Arie Bloed, The CSCE and the Minority Issue, 5 Helsinki Monitor 82 (1994). Cf. 
Heraclides, supra n. 19,5: "It is generally acknowledged that the CSCE has been at the forefront among 
intergovernmental forums in developing the rights of minorities. " On the highly politicized atmosphere that 
dominated over the Geneva meeting's negotiations, see also id., 13-5. 
25 Decision II, The Document of the Helsinki Summit of the CSCE, Helsinki, 10 July 1992, supra n. 20. 
26 Budapest Summit Declaration, 4th CSCE Summit of the Heads of States or Government, 1994, supra n. 20. 
27 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Helsinki, 1 August 1975, supra n. 20. 
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the organization's constitutional moment. The immediate practical effect of such an 
achievement normally is to lend the former an additional degree of historical and 
institutional legitimacy while reinforcing the latter's general authority as an ever-timely 
source of guidance and order. By downplaying the radicality of the introduced reforms in 
such a manner, the ritual of adulatory invocation also tends to induce a greater degree of 
consent on the part of the various power elites whose anxiety about the redistribution of 
power and welfare within the institutional structure in question could otherwise block or 
hinder the swift passage of the reform. 
To understand the full character of the Budapest Declaration, consequently, one 
needs to begin by bracketing out all customary references to the Helsinki Final Act and 
grasping the Declaration as a political event located within its own immediate context. That 
context, for the current purposes, can be said to consist essentially of a dynamic dialectical 
interplay involving two general processes: the disintegration of the former socialist bloc and 
the accompanying domestic regimes, a process started sometime in the late 1980s and 
effectively completed with the disintegration of the Yugoslav federations in 1990-1993, and 
the institutional transformation of the old CSCE structure into the new OSCE one. By 
virtue of the former, the power elites of the CSCE's former western bloc acquired an 
historic opportunity to renegotiate the original power balance underlying the Helsinki 
process. By virtue of the latter, they also acquired a unique chance to entrench the new 
power balance in a long-lasting institutional structure. 
Needless to say, however, one of the first steps that had to be taken to open the 
way for these transformations was to construct a new institutional philosophy. In order to 
receive a new political direction, the Helsinki process first had to receive a new ideological 
content. The solution found to that challenge by the Declaration's authors came to be most 
succinctly restated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Declaration: 
4.... Since we last met, there have been further encouraging developments. Most 
vestiges of the Cold War have disappeared. Free elections have been held and the 
roots of democracy have spread and struck deeper. Yet the path to stable 
democracy, efficient market economy and social justice is a hard one. 
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5. The spread of freedoms has been accompanied by new conflicts and the revival 
of old ones. ... 
The plagues of aggressive nationalism, racism, chauvinism, 
xenophobia, anti-semitism and ethnic tension are still widespread. Along with 
social and economic instability, they are among the main sources of crisis, loss of 
life and human misery. 
Three themes immediately spring to attention in the quoted passage. The first one is the 
theme of the liberal-democratic quest. The newly established OSCE community, suggest 
the authors of the Budapest Declaration, is essentially a community brought together by 
the tenets of liberal democracy. Every participant of the Helsinki process is portrayed to be 
committed without any reservations to the "spread of freedoms, " the creation of an 
"efficient market economy, " and the cultivation of "the roots of democracy. " It is in the 
pursuit of these and only these goals and values, arrives the logical implication, that the 
raison d'etre of the whole CSCE enterprise has to be sought. 2' 
That said, immediately add the authors of the Declaration, the journey to the 
liberal-democratic stability, of course, has not been an easy one to make. Grave challenges 
have faced the CSCE travellers on that road. New threats and perils, some unexpected, 
others misunderstood, have emerged since the fall of the Berlin Wall - the second theme of 
the Budapest Declaration - that now promise to undo every encouraging development 
achieved by the CSCE community. To deal with these threats in the most efficient way, the 
old CSCE structures can no longer be considered adequate. A new environment calls for a 
new set of institutional solutions. 29 Enter the concept of the OSCE and the underlying 
theory of institutionab ng the regional transition towards liberal democracy. 
28 By comparison, as the repeated references to "lasting peace, " detente, and "overcoming distrust" make 
clear, the enterprise originally envisaged by the Helsinki Final Act era was inspired mainly by the 
considerations of realpolitik and military security. Whatever attention was paid to the protection of human 
rights at the time was mostly limited to the questions related to the freedom of religion and freedom of 
emigration, both items being developed by the Western bloc as an arm-twister against the socialist countries. 
See Roth, supra n. 10,5. For further reflection on the evolution of the original CSCE agenda, see Wilhelm 
Höynck, The Role of the CSCE in the New European Security Environment, 5 Helsinki Monitor 16,17-8 (1994) 
(emphasizing the arms control dimension). 
29 Consider the message suggested by the language the CSCE Secretary General, Wilhelm Höynck, used in his 
October 1993 address to the Netherlands Society for International Affairs (id. ): "the gap between vision and 
reality is growing, " "serious doubts as to the effectiveness of [existing] political solutions in coping with our 
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Against the background of the traditionally decentralized pattern of the 
international political process, the ideological imports of this centripetal turn seem to be 
rather difficult to overlook. First, unlike the traditional structures of multilateral diplomacy, 
international organizations tend to create a consistently unisonic pattern of decision- 
making. Before the Budapest Summit, there had been only one democracy-promoting 
international organization in the region, the Council of Europe. Now, with the advent of 
the OSCE, there were two. The pan-European liberal-democratic reform received a very 
considerable boost with the Budapest Declaration. Second, unlike the Council of Europe, 
the newly-created OSCE was a structure conceived under the rubric of an international 
security mandate. Security mandates, as a rule, tend to provide executive powers of a far 
more considerable and flexible scope than the non-security ones. If the idea of centralizing 
the liberal-democratic reform project by institutionalizing it then essentially meant that no 
member state of the CSCE community would have the chance to stray too far from the 
common path; the idea of doing so within the framework of a security organization 
effectively meant there would be provided a far more efficient executive structure for 
overseeing that than before. 
But what exactly were the new threats and perils that endangered the liberal- 
democratic reforms in Europe following the end of the Cold War? The first among the 
threats listed in the Budapest Declaration, and by implication, therefore, also probably the 
most dangerous one, is the "plague of aggressive nationalism. " A main source of "crisis, 
loss of life and human misery, " the European nationalism of the Budapest Summit era 
seems to be a very far cry from the vital dynamic force its Versailles-era predecessor had 
been. The portrayal of nationalism in decidedly negative tones3° and its subsumption in the 
new problems, " "the spread of instabilities, " "now we have to provide for another quantum leap in 
cooperation, " "structural change is underway, " "making a meaningful contribution to new stability, " etc. 
30 Cf. Max van der Stoel, "The Role and Importance of Integrating Diversity", in ZELLNER AND LANGE, 
supra n. 11,151,159: "Above all, we must realize that the forces of extreme nationalism constitute the 
greatest enemy of a peaceful Europe.... [T]hey are directly responsible for the bloody conflicts which have 
erupted in the last ten years. ... 
We have seen how fast the ethnic card, once played, can create an 
atmosphere of suspicion, hatred and fear. .. 
Extreme nationalism profits from the division of societies 
through the demonisation of `the other' and it attributes guilt by association such that even the most innocent 
are forced to withdraw to the security of their purported `nation' notwithstanding the absence of strong ties. 
... 
We must treat the threat as extremely serious and we most not tolerate its manifestations. " Cf. Mullerson, 
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same item series as racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism forms the third main theme 
against whose background the Budapest era of the OSCE minorities discourse has to be 
approached. 
The institutionalization of the liberal-democratic quest in response to the ever- 
growing threats and perils of nationalism, racism, and ethnic tension - this is the gist of the 
Budapest Summit's surface political philosophy. But what could have made these threats 
and perils so important and so dangerous? 
The authors of the Declaration appear to have no doubts about what must be the 
right answer to that question. 
The emergence of the new pan-European crises and threats, announces the 
Budapest Declaration, reflects first of all the failure to apply the established CSCE 
principles and commitments. 31 Had the latter been implemented correctly and faithfully by 
all CSCE members, follows the logical implication, none of the current woes besetting the 
CSCE community would have materialized. Put differently, the established normative code 
which exists within the framework of the CSCE process at the moment of the Budapest 
Summit, and which includes, of course, the minorities regimes established by the 
Copenhagen Document, the Charter of Paris, and the Report of the Geneva Meeting, can 
still be understood to comprise a fully adequate set of policy responses to the minorities 
question within the CSCE area. However, as the string of various events that have taken 
place since the adoption of that code clearly indicates, in a sufficiently high number of 
cases the institutional mechanism through which this code has been implemented has 
proven itself to be grossly inadequate. As a response to this failure, the first practical 
measure that has to be taken by the CSCE community has to be to replace that mechanism 
with a new one, which in the present context effectively means substituting the old CSCE 
structure with the new OSCE one. 
Certainly, given the bloody record of the Yugoslav wars of secession, it would be 
perhaps completely unwarranted today to suggest that the inclusion of "aggressive 
nationalism" as the first item in the list of the new threats confronting the project of 
European stability in the post-Cold War era by the authors of the Budapest Declaration 
supra n. 10,803: "the role of nationalist ideology and nationalist movements is becoming ever more 
destructive and negative. " 
31 Budapest Summit Declaration, supra n. 26, ý5. 
15 
had been an entirely gratuitous move. The scale of the human and political catastrophe that 
accompanied that pronunciation, it seems, was far too considerable to justify such a 
conclusion. Nevertheless, it would probably be equally, if not even more, unwarranted to 
suppose as a result that in the circumstances in which it was made that move was not also 
intended to carry some other, more immediately strategic significance. Indeed, it is only 
when we begin to consider the immediate ideological implications it has had on the 
development of the basic argument alongside which it had been made, the argument by 
which the necessity of replacing the old CSCE structure with the new OSCE one was 
established, that the full practical functionality of the "aggressive nationalism" peg starts to 
reveal itself. Consider briefly the following observation. 
The territorial mandate of the new OSCE organization created by the Budapest 
Summit, from the formal point of view, remains exactly the same as that of the CSCE 
process before it. No new territories were added to the new institutional structure in 
Budapest, and no old territories were excluded from it. However, as the common 
knowledge of the time indicates, the geography of the nationalist conflicts in the CSCE 
area in the early 1990s was primarily confined to the territories covered by the countries of 
the former socialist bloc. Nowhere else within the CSCE area had any kind of nationalist 
conflicts been registered or detected. Placing these two facts side by side with one another 
and against the background of the newly declared theory that the post-Cold War conflicts 
in the CSCE area had been essentially caused by the respective CSCE members' failure to 
implement the existing CSCE standards, what is going to be the most immediate 
conclusion inviting itself to be made? 
The underlying logic of the new theory inaugurated by the Budapest Declaration 
suggests, first of all, that there must exist some sort of direct correlation between the 
degree of the incidence of violent conflicts in the CSCE area and the failure of the old 
uninstitutionalized CSCE process to ensure an adequate observance of the existing CSCE 
standards, Extending this premise logically, it follows that wherever one finds a situation 
where there had been no open violent conflicts in the CSCE area in the years following the 
end of the Cold War, the old CSCE process can be presumed to have performed its task 
well and, by presumption, to still remain adequate for its mission. If a new OSCE structure 
has to be created, consequently, it has to be created essentially as a response to the failures of 
the political dynamics occurring in those states where the violent conflicts did take place. 
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According to the conventional wisdom of the CSCE process, none of the states 
constituting the old Western bloc had witnessed the spread of aggressive nationalism in the 
years following the fall of the Berlin Wall. 32 Northern Ireland and Turkish Kurdistan were 
both afflicted by terrorism, not national liberation movements. So were also Corsica and 
the Basque country. None of the "old Western" states, consequently followed the implicit 
message, had a real, objective, and urgent necessity to have the old CSCE process replaced 
with a new OSCE structure. For them, the status quo existing on the eve of the Budapest 
Summit had worked fine. The countries of the former socialist bloc, in contrast, seemed to 
have all fallen prey to the worst forms of the nationalist virus as soon as the Moscow- 
backed regimes started to wane. Kosovo, Karabakh, Transdniestria, Bosnia, Cluj - it was 
the objective political needs of the former East that had created the greatest demand for 
the new institutional structure. It was for them - which is effectively to say, as a response 
to their failures - consequently, that the new OSCE was being created. 
In the final analysis, the use of the "aggressive nationalism" peg by the authors of 
the Budapest Declaration in conjunction with the institutional reform proposal was not 
perhaps completely gratuitous and without substance. But the way in which the objectivity 
of nationalism was diagnosed in practice - no aggressive nationalism found in Belfast or 
Barcelona, but a lot of it in Belgrade and Bucharest - and the way in which it was merged 
in one fell swoop with racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism (as opposed to, say, 
economic instability or massive unemployment) certainly did leave a very particular imprint 
on the logic of the new OSCE process. As a result of that conjunction, the implicit 
understanding that became inscribed into the background of the Budapest Declaration was 
that it had been essentially for the countries of the former socialist bloc, and, consequently, 
primarily in order to work on them, that the new OSCE structure had to be created. A close 
analysis of the actual record of the OSCE practice in the last twelve years proves this 
conclusion beyond any doubt. In the time passed since the days of the Budapest Summit 
the OSCE organs have virtually never turned their attention or taken any kind of intrusive 
action into the domestic affairs of any one of the OSCE's North Atlantic members. On 
paper, all CSCE member states may have been equal in that process of the massive 
32 Cf. Mullerson, supra n. 10,800: "Nationalism is, of course, a phenomenon which one can find in most 
countries where different ethnicities live together, but in former communist countries, which practically all are 
multi-ethnic states, nationalism has a particularly fertile soil. " 
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redistribution of sovereign powers which was effected by the Budapest Declaration. In 
practice, however, it was mostly the effective sovereignty of the former socialist bloc that 
was taken away to nourish the functionality of the new OSCE structure. 
But on its surface, of course, the Declaration did not betray any signs of such bias. 
The new OSCE was unveiled as a structure designed to address the problems facing all its 
member states as a whole, the chief declared purpose of the Budapest reform being to 
"further enhance the CSCE's role as an instrument for the integration of [all its member] 
States in resolving security problems. "" 
What was the logic by which that goal was proposed to be achieved? The new 
OSCE structure, explained the authors of the Budapest Declaration, was intended to 
become "a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis 
management" in the region. 34 Obviously, that was not a completely new ground for the 
CSCE to explore: over the course of the preceding several years it "has [already] created 
[several] new tools to deal with new challenges, " including the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the CSCE HCNM. 35 But it certainly 
represented a considerable advancement on everything that had come before. 
Still, to resolve to create a permanent institutional structure to serve as a practical 
instrument for conflict prevention and crisis management, however timely it might sound, 
was one thing, and to unveil a concrete plan for the achievement of those goals was a 
completely different thing. What exactly did the Declaration's authors have in mind when 
they spoke of all those conflicts, crises, and challenges that confronted the new OSCE 
community? What kind of programmatic vision did they imagine would have to guide the 
newly-created organization in its fight against the threats of aggressive nationalism, racism, 
and xenophobia? What exactly was it supposed to do to help its member states to advance 
ever further down "the path to stable democracy, efficient market economy and social 
justice"? Once more, a very peculiar, even if not entirely unwarranted, theory seems to have 
inspired the Declaration's authors. 
To build "a secure and stable [O]SCE community, whole and free, " explained the 
second operative paragraph of the Declaration, the answer, yet again, had to be sought in 
33 Budapest Summit Declaration, supra n. 26, ý7. 
34 Id., §8. 
35 Id., §9. 
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"the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent CSCE documents" reflecting 
those very "values which will guide our policies, individually and collectively. "" In the 
unlikely case anyone would suddenly start to wonder just what exactly that formula might 
have actually meant, an explanation was immediately offered: "[t]he protection of human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, is an essential 
foundation of democratic civil society. "37 How could one know what rights those rights in 
fact included? The answer, once more, could hardly be any clearer: the rights in question 
were the same rights that had been first inaugurated in the Helsinki Final Act and that were 
later reaffirmed and elaborated in "all other CSCE documents relating to the protection of 
the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, " which, of course, included the 
various "tools" produced by the OSCE HCNM - "[t]he participating States ... commend 
the work of the HCNM in this fieldi38 - as well as the Council of Europe - "[t]he 
participating States ... take note of the adoption, within the 
Council of Europe, of a 
Framework Convention on [sic] the Protection of National Minorities, which builds upon 
CSCE standards in this context. 2)39 
Fast-forward nine years. It is December 2003 now, and the OSCE starts to unveil 
its new strategy vision for the twenty-first century. Four years have passed since the end of 
the NATO campaign in Kosovo, two years since the Albanian uprising in Macedonia. Less 
than a year remains before the European Union is set to acquire a common land border 
with Russia. The ambitious political vision conceived a decade earlier at the Budapest 
Summit has gradually matured into a fully-fledged political dogma. Where a decade earlier 
one could only find the contours of a grand but vague aspiration, one sees now a fully 
crystallized, sophisticated ideological regime. 
The gravest "[t]hreats to security and stability in the OSCE region, " announces the 
new OSCE Strategy Document, "are today more likely to arise as negative, destabilizing 
36 Id., §2. 
37 Id., Budapest Summit Decisions, "VIII: The Human Dimension, " §2. 
38 Id., 21. Cf Para 3. of Statement 1 of the Ministerial Council of the OSCE, OSCE's 10th Meeting of the Ministerial 
Council, 7 December 2002, MC DOC/1/02: "We encourage concerned countries in the region to adopt and 
implement legislation on national minorities consistent with their international commitments and with the 
recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. " 
39 Budapest Summit Decisions, "VIII: The Human Dimension, " ýý 22,25. 
19 
consequences of developments that cut across the politico-military, economic and 
environmental and human dimensions, than from any major armed conflict. i40 
Weak governance, and a failure by States to secure adequate and functioning 
democratic institutions that can promote stability, may in themselves constitute a 
breeding ground for a range of threats. Equally, systematic violations of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to 
national minorities, can give rise to a wide range of potential threats41 
as can also "environmental degradation, "42 "demographic factors and widespread 
degradation of health, ' )43 and "the actions of terrorists and other criminal groups"among 
others. 
How should these multifarious threats be best addressed in the complex context of 
the post-Kosovo world? The answer, as ever, is clear and unambiguous: exclusively 
through collective international action. 
"No single State ... can, on its own, meet the challenges" engendered by the new 
security environment. 45 The first thing to do for all OSCE member states, consequently, 
concludes the Strategy Document, is to accept as unquestionable the proposition that any 
programmatic response to such challenges, if it is to be successful, has to be produced 
exclusively on the international level. 46 Whoever may be inclined to resent the implications 
of this theory is then immediately reminded of the incontrovertible fact that in the end it is 
always the "[n]on-compliance with international law and with OSCE norms and principles 
[that] lie [s] behind the immediate causes of violent conflict. i47 To address the challenges 
raised by the new security environment, consequently, the first practical measure that the 
40 ý3, OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century, OSCE 1111' Ministerial 
Meeting, 2 December 2003, MC DOC/1/03. 
41 Id., ý4. 
42 Id., §5. 
43 1 d. 
as Id., §7. 
as Id., 552. 
"' Id., ý2. 
a7 Id., ý9. 
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Organization's members have to take is to reaffirm their "respect for ... 
international 
law"' and to help the OSCE "build on [its] unique strengths and expertise. i49 
But what exactly do these "unique strengths and expertise" consist of? 
First of all, explains the Strategy Document in its opening operative paragraph, the 
source of the OSCE's unique institutional strength derives from its unique membership 
circle. The breadth of its territorial ambit allows the OSCE to include within its sphere of 
action not only the whole of the European continent, but also North America, Russia, and 
even "parts of Asia. s5° No other regional organization can boast of the same achievement. 
Never mind, of course, the fact that the greater tends to the scope of any mandate the less 
efficient tends to become its performance, or the fact that virtually all OSCE activities have 
so far been limited to the countries of the former social bloc: the greater the scope of the 
OSCE's territorial reach, imply the authors of the Strategy Document, the greater is the 
OSCE community's potential to meet the challenges of the new security environment. 
The second most important source of the OSCE's institutional strength is 
identified in the same passage. Quite unsurprisingly, it turns out to be the OSCE's 
"multidimensional concept of ... comprehensive ... and 
indivisible security. i51 Certainly, 
every alert political commentator after Carl Schmitt may recall at this point that the fuzzier 
the notion of the security threats tends to become, the more difficult it will be to challenge 
any intrusive action taken by the security-managing structures under the banner of security- 
enhancing measures, the more problematic, by implication, will become any attempt to 
establish a system of effective accountability for those undertaking such measures. But in 
the present case, of course, none of these considerations appear to be of any consequence. 
In the context of the OSCE practice, suggest the authors of the Strategy Document, the 
more adaptable the concept of the security threat becomes, the better it is for the OSCE 
community, the more prepared the Organization becomes for the various challenges posed 
to its members' well-being by the new security environment. 
as Id., ý2. 
49Id., ý17. 
50 Id., §1. 
51 Id. 
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The vacuity of such reasoning patterns hardly requires any further discussion. ' 
Everything else aside, neither its territorial mandate, nor its theory of security can supply an 
international organization with the required amount of political capital if it purports to act 
on the same scale as the OSCE. Every reasonable observer will be able to recognize that, 
and the Strategy Document's authors must have surely understood this. How is it then that 
they must have expected to justify their proposal to recognize the OSCE as the most 
capable international actor in the newly emerging security environment? 
To grasp the logic structuring their stance on this question, let us turn to 
paragraphs 16-27 of the Strategy Document. 
During the three decades of its existence, explain the authors of the Strategy 
Document, the CSCE/OSCE group has developed an unparalleled range of "special 
mechanisms for early warning and peaceful settlement of conflicts. i53 No other 
international institutional structure of comparable magnitude can boast the same wealth of 
practical experience, tools, capacity-building techniques, and security-enhancing know-how. 
Its network of early warning and crisis managements institutions together with its 
matchless system of "tools of rapid expert assistance and co-operation teamsi54 have put 
the OSCE over the last few years in a position where it can not only assist its members in 
the implementation of all their international commitments, but also do so in ways no other 
international organization can replicate, which should allow it to enter the new political era 
with a sense of poise and self-confidence. 55 
Of course, admit the authors of the Strategy Document, "[i]n a changing security 
environment, threats [will always be] evolving, and not all threats [are, therefore, ] 
52 It is nevertheless rather widespread. See, e. g., Hans van Mierlo, The Significance of the OSCE in the European 
Security Structure, 6 Helsinki Monitor 6 (1995). 
53 OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century, supra n. 40, §22. 
54 Id. 
55 Cf. Höynck, supra n. 28,19-21 (listing the [O]SCE procedures and its "high human dimensions standards" 
and "the newly acquired capability for concrete action" among the chief qualities enabling the Organization 
to perform its challenging tasks); Van Mierlo, supra n. 52,8-9 (observing that "although other organizations 
are active in the field of preventive diplomacy, the OSCE is unique because of its specialization" which 
consists, essentially, of the most comprehensive deployment of "non-military measures" for the purposes of 
early waiving and early action, and which makes "the OSCE ... the most appropriate organization 
for 
conflict prevention and crisis management in the region"). 
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foreseeable. "" And "the prime responsibility for providing security for their citizens, " of 
course, always "lies with the participating States" themselves, which thus always remain 
"accountable to their citizens and responsible to each other for implementation of their 
OSCE commitments. i57 But 
[a]s a regional arrangement [created] under Chapter VIII of the United Nations 
Charter [and] a key instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis 
management and post-conflict rehabilitation in its region, "' 
the OSCE has proven beyond any doubt its ability to respond promptly to every emerging 
threat in the most efficient manner. 59 An "extensive set of instruments" acquired by the 
Organization in the process, "rang[ing] from all forms of political consultations to special 
representatives, experts and fact-finding missions, "" has enabled it not only to respond 
successfully to every immediate challenge to international peace and security in the region, 
but also to "promote and assist in building [stable and secure] democratic institutions and 
the rule of lawi61 across the OSCE area, thus addressing the main long-term causes and 
processes behind the new security threats. 
Of course, proceeds the background message, both the breadth of its territorial 
mandate and the multidimensionality of its theory of security have been very important in 
ensuring the OSCE's continuous success. However, in the end, it has been exactly this 
unprecedented wealth of political know-how - the know-how of preventive diplomacy 
which allows "conflict prevention and crisis management by non-military measures" 
through "activities that occur either before the outbreak or escalation of violence or after 
the acts of violence have run their course"62 - and nothing else that has to be credited with 
the main achievements of the Organization. 
56 OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stabiliy in the Twenty-First Century, sup ra n. 40, ý16. 
57 Id., §18. 
58 Id., X24. 
59 Id., §25. 
60 Id. 
61 Id., X27. 
62 Van Mierlo, supra n. 52,8. 
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But what exactly does this know-how consist of? Like the Budapest Declaration a 
decade earlier, on its surface the new OSCE Strategy Document continues to emphasize 
the same concepts of the rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, and 
due process. 63 Like a decade earlier, the background theory underlying the OSCE's 
institutional philosophy continues to identify the principles of liberal democracy as the 
main component of the security-enhancement recipe. Like a decade earlier, the 
Organization's main selling pitch continues to revolve around the basic thesis that 
democracy, liberalism, and social stability always walk hand in hand, the implied message 
behind it being that because the OSCE has always had a special interest in all three of these 
questions, it has now a great deal more valuable advice to offer to its members. 
But consider now for a moment a statement produced exactly a year after the new 
Security Document by one of the OSCE's former chairmen. 
Speaking at the OSCE's 12th Ministerial Council in December 2004, the Portuguese 
Foreign Minister, Antonio Monteira, explained that one of the main reasons why the 
OSCE had become such "an exceptional tool for dealing with [the] new and complex 
security environment" of the post-Cold War era was not that it simply provided a 
qualitatively new forum for the creation of a permanent political dialogue in the region. 
The OSCE's most important achievement and strength, rather, derived from its 
unprecedented wealth of experience and its unparalleled capacity to assist those "States 
[which] suffer from a lack of democratic tradition and [whose] national institutions still 
seem to be distant from the democratic aspirations of their own people ... to further 
strengthen and implement a set of common [European] principles and values based on 
democracy, the rule of law, and the respect for human rights, " including those that "ensure 
that the rich cultural, religious and ethnic diversity of this vast area becomes a source of 
strength, not of strife. "" 
What is the significance of these brief passing remarks? Certainly, at the first sight 
there seem to be no real major differences between Monteira's statement and the new 
Strategy Document. Both documents seem to focus on the same key concepts and 
emphasize the same basic themes: democracy, the rule of law, ethnic diversity, and the 
63 OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stabihity in the Twenty-First Century, supra n. 40, ýj 4,36. 
64 Speech of the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Antonio Monteiro, OSCE 12th Ministerial Council, 
6 December 2004, MC DEL/27/04. 
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protection of human rights as the core common values of the OSCE community. But 
notice the two short references in the quoted passage about the construction of cultural 
diversity and the satisfaction of the democratic aspirations. Placing these comments side by 
side with our earlier observations about the implicit logic underwriting the institutional 
transformation of the old CSCE into the new OSCE, what kind of a background message 
can be read beneath the immediate surface of Monteira's statement? 
Clearly, what Monteira's language seeks to import in the quoted passage is not just 
some abstract belief that peace, freedom, and democracy in Europe are somehow 
inseparable from one another. What emanates from his words, rather, is a much stronger 
conviction, a conviction which, when vocalized in its fullest form, seems to suggest that for 
the first time in the post-World War II era an international organization has emerged which 
in its own self-understanding not only sees itself able to restructure its members' domestic 
political regimes but also understands itself to be in a significantly better position to do that 
than the members themselves, a conviction one of the major sources of which derives 
from the fact of this organization's accumulated body of expertise in the area of ethnic 
governance. ' 
A mere fourteen years separate Monteira's statement from the Charter of Paris. A 
mere fourteen years that also mark the completion of an enormous transformation in the 
development of the modem European political sensibility. 
In the same place where at the end of 1990 one would still find nothing more than 
just a high degree of enthusiasm for a new form of multilateral diplomacy - "a periodic 
platform for dialogue between East and West, " in the words of one a Dutch Foreign 
Ministertb -a decade and a half later one already discovers a fully-fledged regime of self- 
assured regional paternalism. From an innocently looking structure of general political 
dialogue ostensibly set out as nothing more than a good-faith attempt to ameliorate the 
pan-European security environment threatened by the rise of aggressive nationalism and 
65 Cf. Max van der Stoel, "In the OSCE Area there Can Be no Zones of Lesser Humanity", in ZELLNER AND 
LANGE, supra n. 11,107,108: "the OSCE has to assume as its responsibility the burden of supporting 
individual participating States which cannot by themselves solve the problems which are confronting them. 
This effort of co-operative implementation is not only a political duty of OSCE States but also a moral one. " 
Cf. text accompanying infra n. 89. 
66 Van Mierlo, supra n. 52,6. 
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ethnic tensions in the former socialist bloc in fewer than twenty years the CSCE process 
has grown into nothing less than a fully functional model of a pan-European imperialism, 
accompanied, as all imperialist models tend to be, by an unceasing rhetoric of peace, 
freedom, civilization, and progress. 67 
How has this new Great Transformation of our age happened? What has enabled 
its passing to occur so swiftly and successfully? What kind of political mythology has been 
concocted to cover up its ongoing actuality? How did it work? What role has international 
law played in this process? None of these questions would normally invite themselves to an 
easy, linear resolution. None, correspondingly, have yet been explored with any degree of 
systematicity in the contemporary international law scholarship. Yet few events in the post- 
Cold War history have had such far-reaching implications for the constitution of the global 
political order or symbolized as vividly the end of the traditional nation-state politics in 
modern-day Europe as those which have accompanied that Great Transformation. So, how 
should this discrepancy be best rectified now? 
How should those momentous changes which have taken place between the 
Charter of Paris and the statement of Ambassador Monteira be given their full due in the 
contemporary international legal theory? How ought those tremendous gaps which they 
have left in the discipline's intellectual order to be finally completed now? What kind of 
challenges does their analytical capture pose to the post-Cold War international legal 
discourse and how should international law scholars go about recognizing and addressing 
this problematic? 
«7 See EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM 8 (London: Vintage, 1994): "As I shall be using the 
term, `imperialism' means the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre 
ruling a distant territory, `colonialism', which is almost always a consequence of imperialism, is the implanting 
of settlements on distant territory. As Michael Doyle puts it: `Empire is a relationship, formal or informal, in 
which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society. It can be achieved by 
force, by political collaboration, by economic, social, or cultural dependence. Imperialism is simply the 
process or policy of establishing or maintaining an empire. ' In our time, direct colonialism has largely ended; 
imperialism, as we shall see, lingers where it has always been, in a kind of general cultural sphere as well as in 
specific political, ideological, economic, and social practices. " Further on the basic features of imperialism, see 
also DAVID HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); MICHAEL HARDT 
AND ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000). 
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No single set of international reforms that have accompanied the ideological 
journey from the Charter of Paris to the statement of Ambassador Monteira, it seems, can 
provide a better insight into these questions than that which has taken place under the 
rubric of the new ILTMC project. In no other field of international lawmaking has such a 
high concentration of ideological resources taken place as here. In no other dimension of 
the international political process can such a comprehensive illustration of the new 
governance techniques developed by the architects of the post-Cold War order be found as 
in the area of the new ILTMC. To see how and why that is so, let us turn now briefly to the 
telltale mythology created by the OSCE HCNM in his practice in the last thirteen years and 
the basic story it suggests about the continuous rise of the new ILTMC project. 
b. From Necessity to Suf czency: the Rise and Rise of the New ILTMC Project 
It would be impossible to pinpoint the exact moment when the paradigmatic shift from the 
political sensibility of the Paris Charter to that of the statement of Ambassador Monteira 
had actually taken place. Indeed, in all probability, such a moment never in fact happened 
in the conventional meaning of the term. The two sensibilities most likely had co-existed 
side by side for quite some time before one started to outweigh the other. 
Nevertheless, what can be asserted with a more or less substantial degree of 
certainty is that even in the context of the brief span of the post-Cold War history the firm 
conviction underlying the statement of Ambassador Monteira comprises a relatively recent 
phenomenon. 
Certainly, already in 1991, the Geneva Meeting Report had found it possible to 
conclude that peace, justice, stability and democracy in the European region were 
effectively unachievable if the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of Europe's 
national minorities was not protected, ' and that to ensure the latter, all present and future 
work undertaken within the OSCE area would have to be based not on the member states' 
individual domestic strategies but solely on those "commitments [that were] contained in 
68 Supra n. 22, Part I. 
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the relevant adopted CSCE Documents, in particular those in the Charter of Paris for a 
New Europe and the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the 
Human Dimension of the CSCE, i69 since "[i]ssues concerning national minorities ... are 
matters of legitimate international concern and consequently do not constitute exclusively 
an internal affair of the respective State. ); 7' By logical implication, this effectively suggested 
that, as far as the newly emerging global political consensus was concerned, only a policy 
programme based on the internationally-endorsed theory of governance could in fact 
guarantee a successful resolution of the minorities question, and that, consequently, no 
CSCE member had either the right or, indeed, the competence to experiment with the 
minorities question on its own outside the ambit of the common programme. 
Nevertheless, as late as October 1995, the first occupier of the OSCE HCNM post, 
the Dutch diplomat Max van der Stoel, at an official OSCE meeting in Warsaw, still saw it 
appropriate to recognize that while "[l]asting piece and stability on this continent are 
possible only if the Copenhagen Document, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
belonging to National Minorities and the Framework Convention of the Council of Europe 
are fully implemented, " a mere compliance with these international norms and standards 
"is by no means a panacea": although their full implementation "is essential for the 
protection of the identity of minorities, " it "will often not be sufficient to ensure an 
adequate solution to ... specific problems. 
"" 
A little more than a year and a half later, the situation had undergone a radical 
change. 
Speaking at the Michael Akehurst memorial lecture at the University of Keele, in 
the summer of 1997, the HCNM suddenly appeared to suggest that observing the 
internationally supplied code of minority standards no longer had to be seen as only a 
necessary factor when it came to building piece, order, justice, and democracy in the OSCE 
area, but also, increasingly, a relatively sufficient one. 
What might have enabled such a dramatic ground shift? Shortly before the Warsaw 
report, the HCNM, according to his own admission, had decided to request the newly 
established non-governmental organization called the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic 
69 Id. 
70 Id., Part II. 
71 Van der Stoel, supra n. 65,108-9. 
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Relations "to convene a conference with some outstanding experts to study [the] problems 
[related to the newly emerging minorities question]. "" The basic idea behind the request, at 
the first sight, seemed quite unremarkable. If the existing international standards were so 
basic that they could only provide a starting framework for the development of a 
comprehensive minorities policy but not a sufficient basis for efficiently addressing the full 
spectrum of the minorities problematic, then maybe "it would be useful to invite some 
internationally recognized experts to make recommendations on an appropriate and 
coherent application" of these standards, " on the premise that, perhaps, in one way or 
another, this might lead to a more adequate development of the ILTMC canon. 
What came out eventually as the result of that initiative was a rather remarkable 
document entitled the Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of 
National Minorities. What made it so remarkable and what immediately distinguished it 
from all other previous statements on the subject was not so much its content as its general 
tenor: for the first time since the creation of the new OSCE structure, a new ILTMC 
document was issued and it came out not in the shape of political statement but as a 
statement of objective expertise. 
Certainly, the official position on the matter, according to the document itself, 
continued to remain that "[t]he Hague Recommendations are not intended to be 
comprehensive. They are meant to serve as a general framework which can assist States in 
the process of minority education policy development. "74 Yet, as his later pronouncements 
on the question have unequivocally confirmed, in the eyes of the HCNM himself the 
document has certainly come to represent something far bigger than just a "general 
framework" designed to serve as a merely helpful implement existing for the convenience 
of the OSCE member states: 
I [am] pleased to find the Hague Recommendations so well received by relevant 
parties as a practical and balancedguide for resolution of many spec 7iic issues. 
72 Id., 111. 
73 Max van der Stoel, "The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National 
Minorities", id., 141,142. 
74 E. %p/anatory Note to the Hague Recommendations, available from littl-): //ww\ýw. o-ce. org/iteiii/2931. htiii. 
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To the extent that the Recommendations may usefully guide governments in 
elaborating more appropriate and acceptable laws and policies with regard to 
minority education, they uwill serve to resolve or at least diminish an important 
source of inter-ethnic tension. I am, therefore, pleased to see several states already 
having referred to the Hague Recommendations in the context of current national 
discussions. For example, in early April [of 1997] the [Latvian] Minister of 
Education states that the Hague Recommendations would form the basis for 
Latvian law and policy in this field. This was well received by representatives of 
national minorities and, if realized, zvüll remove a major source of tension between the 
majority population and national minorities ... 
The Hague Recommendations 
have now been translated into several languages. Through this kind of modest 
initiative, I believe much can be done to respond to the root causes of inter-ethnic 
tensions. 75 
A professional diplomat, van der Stoel is, of course, skilled in the art of vague statements 
like no one else, but the bottom-line message in the quoted passage is still ratherself- 
evident. 
Certainly, begins the HCNM, the formal appearance of the Hague 
Recommendations is nothing more than what its title implies: a potentially helpful set of 
general suggestions. But a formal appearance is always only that and nothing else. It is not 
the real indication of the document's substantive essence. Indeed, the only correct way to 
approach the Hague Recommendations, implies the Commissioner, is to view them not as 
a framework of helpful suggestions, but as the expertly identified quintessence of a 
practicably assured strategy for the mitigation of numerous types of inter-ethnic tensions, an 
objectively developed strategy which the governments of all OSCE member states 
experiencing problems with the handling of the minorities question should bear in mind as 
something that not only would be appropriate and advisable to incorporate domestically 
but which also, if adopted, would be essentially sufficient to provide the foundation for the 
development of all domestic minority education regimes. The logical implication deriving 
from such a suggestion is hard to miss: whatever may have come before the Hague 
Recommendations had only been a set of politically determined guidelines designed to 
75 Van der Stoel, supra n. 73,142-3 (italics added). 
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indicate which steps may be necessary to take in order to reach the condition of good 
governance; what is coming now is a fully functional expert know-how of what steps are 
positively sufficient to accomplish this task. The Rubicon has been crossed. Where 
previously one had found only a spirit of pledges and advice, one now begins to detect a 
spirit of directives and instructions. 76 
Two years later, and whatever ambiguities may have marred the language of Keele 
are now decisively erased. In a formal interview conducted a mere few weeks after the 
NATO campaign in Kosovo, the HCNM declared: 
Working on minority issues, I could of course not follow my own subjective views 
on specific issues in the educational or the linguistic fields. I had to base myself on 
international standards. The 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document on the human 
dimension and the Framework Convention of the Council of Europe are especially 
important in this respect. But these documents do not provide specific recipes for 
each problem one encounters; often they indicate more the direction for finding 
solutions. Reflecting on this, my staff and I felt that it ought to be possible to 
elaborate these standards a bit further. We asked a group of outstanding 
educational and linguistic experts to perform this task. 77 
The two documents that came out as the result of that request, the already mentioned 1996 
Hague Recommendations and their twin 1998 Oslo Recommendations Regarding the 
Linguistic Rights of National Minorities, did not, of course, have any legally binding force. ' 
76 Van der Stoel, of course, is not the only person to have aired this sentiment. Although he is certainly one of 
its most visible exponents, he is definitely not alone today in professing the view that over the course of the 
last decade the new ILTMC project, not least thanks to the work of the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic 
Relations, has developed a veritable know-how of good governance in the area of ethnic governance. For the 
expression of a similar attitude, see, among others, John Packer and Guillaume Siemienski, The Language of 
Equity: the Origin and Development of the Oslo Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities, 6 
Int'l J. Min. & Group Rts. 329,349-50 (1999); Sally Holt and John Packer, OSCE Development and Linguistic 
Minorities, 3. Int. J. Multicult. Soc. 99 (2001); YEORGIOS I. DIACOFOTAKIS, EXPANDING CONCEPTUAL 
BOUNDARIES: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON NATIONAL MINORITIES AND THE PROTECTION OF MINORITY 
RIGHTS IN THE OSCE 124-6 (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers, 2002). 
77 Zellner and van der Stoel, supra n. 18,23. 
78 Id. 
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Nevertheless, they did still have a very "considerable value. " What was its source? "First of 
all, " explained van der Stoel, "they help in determining the line I have to take in specific 
situations. "'9 Secondly, 
It is especially the fact that we have succeeded in having a group of people work 
on this who are well-known throughout Europe for their outstanding competence 
in these fields that has given the recommendations their weight. "' 
In a similar vein, speaking several years later at the Hague Academy of International Law, 
van der Stoel observed: 
[the previous standards existing in this field] might not always provide the High 
Commissioner a sufficiently clear directive on what position he has to choose 
when a Government and a minority have a quarrel about educational rights. In 
order to escape this dilemma, I decided in 1996 to invite a group of eminent 
international experts on education to further elaborate the concept of educational 
rights of minorities. They formulated the Hague recommendations regarding the 
educational rights of national minorities. They have not been formally adopted by 
States participating in the OSCE, but the high reputation of the authors give them 
considerable weight. 
In 1998 a similar study was undertaken by a group of experts on linguistic 
rights, resulting in the Oslo recommendations regarding the linguistic rights of 
national minorities. They also play a big role in the international discussion on the 
subject, and, like the Hague recommendations, were of great help to me in my 
work. 81 
Put differently, the two sets of recommendations are not just a restatement of the various 
international normative obligations incumbent on the OSCE member states by virtue of 
their membership in that organization, but, rather, a combination of, on the one hand, an 
79 Id., 23-4. 
ao Id., 24. 
81 Max van der Stoel, The Role of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in the Field of Conflict 
Prevention, 296 Recueil des Cours 9,21 (2002). 
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objective expert opinion delivered by an outstanding cohort of internationally recognized 
specialists, and, on the other hand, a practical statement of the HCNM's own institutional- 
professional know-how. 
Once more, the bottom-line message seems quite difficult to miss. The two 
documents in question, explains the HCNM in effect, are not just a product of a subjective 
attempt to rationalize some ambitious political project. They are, rather, a formal 
embodiment of the objective experience of an expert institution constituted as an 
independent and impartial instrument of conflict prevention' backed up by the best 
insights of the foremost international authorities on the subject. Both by their form and by 
their content, the Hague and the Oslo Recommendations are thus intended not just as a 
helpful summary of the existing ILTMC regime, but as a fully operationalizable set of 
instructions that have to be applied in practice not only by the HCNM himself, but by the 
governments of the participating states too: "[the Recommendations] help [me] in 
determining the line I have to take. But also a government can find inspiration in these 
documents. And that is not just hope. "83 Put differently, should a participating government 
decide to accomplish the same goals for the securement of which the HCNM has been 
constituted, the basic expectation incumbent on it within the OSCE structure will be that it 
would do so by turning directly to these documents and nowhere else. 
Surely, though, when the Commissioner suggests that the participating 
governments should only seek inspiration in the Expert Recommendations, while admitting 
that the Recommendations have not been formally adopted by the OSCE member states, 
this can only mean that the latter are completely free to take advantage of the experts' 
wisdom if they so wish but are not in fact in any way compelled to do so if they do not? 
Alas, the situation, it seems, is not nearly as simple as it may at first appear. 
82 For the formal statement of the HCNM mandate, see supra n. 25. 
83 Zellner and van der Stoel, supra n. 18,24. C£ Packer and Siemienski, supra n. 76,349-50: "When 
considering the Oslo Recommendations ... 
it should be kept in mind that they ... should 
be viewed as an 
attempt to provide further specificity with regard to the application of existing international standards. ... 
The 
ultimate objective was to render useful guidance for domestic authorities [not] the final word on the topic of 
the linguistic rights of national minorities. [However, ] the experts who elaborated The Oslo 
Recommendations felt that if the recommendations would be implemented in their present form, the OSCE 
region would be both more stable and secure and the probability of inter-ethnic conflict would decline 
significantly. " 
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Consider, for a start, the following three facts about the HCNM's general role in 
the context of the OSCE political process. 
1. As the Budapest Declaration and the 2003 OSCE strategy document make clear, 
when it comes to pursuing the goals of "peace, justice, stability and democracy, " every 
OSCE member state is obliged to observe, passionately, wholeheartedly, and relentlessly, 
every single standard laid down in the Organization's documents. Unless the OSCE itself 
decides otherwise, every commitment postulated within its framework is quite literally 
intended to be "irreversible. "" 
2. By the terms of the established structure, the HCNM is empowered to exercise 
the OSCE's full competence in the area of the ILTMC policy. 85 Everything the HCNM 
pronounces on the subject matter of minority treatment is by default considered a 
pronouncement of the whole of the OSCE itself. As van der Stoel himself put it, everyone 
involved "realize[s] that the views expressed in the recommendations are not exclusively 
those of the Commissioner, but also reflect the views of a considerable number of states. )286 
3. Even the briefest survey of the OSCE practice suffices to confirm that every 
formal recommendation the HCNM has issued on the subject of minority governance in 
the past thirteen years has been automatically and virtually without reservations endorsed 
by the Organization's governing bodies. "" The record of the numerous acts of international 
pressure mobilized by the HCNM against the recalcitrant states88 quite unequivocally 
suggests that whenever the HCNM decides to get involved in a particular minorities 
situation, the option of disagreeing with his considered opinion effectively disappears. 89 
84 See supra n. 21. 
85 See supra n. 25. 
86 Van der Stoel, supra n. 81,17. 
87 See KEMP, supra n. 5,72-4,88-9,92; Zellner and van der Stoel, supra n. 18,17-9. Cf. Max van der Stoel, 
"National Minority Issues in the OSCE Area, " in ZELLNER AND LANGE, supra n. 11,161,163. 
88 See KEMP, supra n. 5,73,99. 
89 Id., 73: "As the protection of persons belonging to national minorities is a consideration for EU accession, 
the High Commissioner was able to use his links with the European Commission and EU Presidency to great 
effect. This leverage was crucial in affecting changes in Slovakia (particularly in regard to the law on minority 
languages), and in Latvia and Estonia (regarding language laws) in 1999. Indeed, Van der Stoel's criticisms of 
the Meciar Government's treatment of minorities played a role in keeping Slovakia out of the first group of 
accession countries in 1997. " See also id., 96-100 (describing the HCNM's capacity to influence the policy 
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Anyone who tries to challenge that is doomed to fail before even getting a chance to make 
her case. " 
To be sure, the instructions which the Expert Recommendations provide to their 
addressees most of the time remain quite general from the point of view of their immediate 
substance. At least in that sense, the documents in question, one could say, could be 
described more as a set of guidelines than an actual ILTMC code. In the final analysis, 
however, this does not in any way alter the essential character and ideological import of the 
Recommendations. To paraphrase Terry Eagleton, just because a geography teacher does 
not tell her class the exact height of Mount Everest down to the last millimetre does not in 
itself make her statement that it is the highest mountain in the world look meaningless. 91 
One does not need to detail every leaf, or even every branch, of a tree to confirm that what 
one has drawn is a cedar and not a bear oak. 
Still, even if there had been any room for doubt after Oslo, the matter was quite 
conclusively put to rest with the arrival of the 1999 Lund Recommendations on the 
Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life: 
The twenty eminent persons that drafted the Lund recommendations tried to 
produce what could be called a `toolbox' of instruments which could be used to 
give the national minorities the confidence that their interests will be given the 
necessary attention, but in a way which will respect the territorial integrity of the 
state. In this way a balance of interests can be achieved. The majority can feel 
assured that the multi-ethnic state in which they form the largest group is not 
going to dissolve, and the minority or the minorities are provided with what they 
positions of the European Comission, the Council of Europe, the United Nations Development Programme, 
and the World Bank). 
90 There are a number of different tactics the HCNM uses to marginalize those who disagree with his 
opinions. See, e. g. Max van der Stoel, "In Trying to Perform My Tasks, I Am Making Enemies, " in ZELLNER 
AND LANGE, supra n. 11,123,123: "it is my duty to be an instrument of conflict prevention ... and to 
promote ethnic harmony. I am not going to hide from you that, in trying to perform these tasks, I am making 
enemies. But I also have to add that these enemies are almost invariably extreme nationalists. I think this is 
inevitable. I would even feel that I would not perform my task properly if they would not object to my 
activities and views. These nationalists are not interested in promoting inter-ethnic harmony - they prefer to 
stir up inter-ethnic hatred. " 
91 See TERRY EAGLETON, AFTER THEORY 204 (London: Penguin, 2004). 
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need most: special provisions which will ensure that their interests will not be 
neglected. 92 
The new ILTMC canon is not just a statement of the policy-measures necessary to avoid the 
outbreaks of genocides and violent inter-ethnic conflicts. It does not just tell you what 
exactly you must do to ensure an optimal development of the educational and linguistic 
dimensions of ethnic governance in the post-Cold War era. It knows what exactly is needed 
to build a stable inter-ethnically balanced social regime in every area of public life in every 
European state. 93 It knows what exactly an ideal multicultural society looks like and what 
having a good government is. And it also knows what each member of every polity has to do in 
order to ensure that. 
"The official vision of political life at the uppermost level" in the European 
Communities, wrote Noel Malcolm shortly after the Treaty of Maastricht laid down the 
foundations of the newly established European Union, "is essentially that of ... a 
technocrat's ideal, a world in which large-scale solutions are devised to large-scale problems 
by far-sighted expert administrators. i94 The official vision that has come to underlie the 
new ILTMC project since the second half of the 1990s seems hardly different. 
c. The Ideological Character of the New ILTMC Project 
The paradigm of the social order and the assumptions underlying it inscribed into the 
surface of the new ILTMC discourse may certainly look quite eccentric - how much of an 
overstatement would it be to conclude that the passage quoted on the previous page does 
not effectively imply the existence of a formula of social happiness? - but the longer one 
contemplates the background model on which it relies, the more familiar its general thrust 
seems to appear. 
92 Zellner and van der Stoel, supra n. 18,25. 
93 Cf. Introduction to the Lund Recommendations (infra n. 124): "The standards have been interpreted specifically to 
ensure the coherence of their application. " 
94 Noel Malcolm, The Case against Europe', 74/2 Foreign Affairs 52,64 (1995). 
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The belief in the political power of an intangible order of interconnected maxims 
accompanied by a principled investment of trust in the general capacity of a transcendent 
system of norms and standards to supply a sufficient solution to the problems of social 
intercourse has a very long pedigree in the modem political discourse. In ideational terms, 
it harks back to the days of the Rousseauvian theory of the social contract and that classical 
liberal sensibility so exhaustively captured by John Adams's yearning for a" government of 
laws, not men. " It is the same sensibility that has inspired the Lockean philosophy of 
constitutionalism and gave coherence to the Westphalian school in international legal 
thought. Derived from the Judeo-Christian tradition of Logocentrism mediated through 
the prism of Platonic idealism and the Cartesian philosophy of reason-worship, " the basic 
logic on which that belief is based has found perhaps its most consistent formulation in the 
works of the 18`'-century German philosopher, Immanuel Kant. 
For Kant, one of the central goals of human existence was to develop the condition 
of personal autonomy, ' Analysing Kant's own views and the subsequent moral- 
philosophical tradition derived from him, it appears that, in the Kantian understanding, 
personal autonomy meant first and foremost "a combination of freedom and responsibility 
[, ] a submission to laws which one has made for oneself. "9" Put differently, in the Kantian 
tradition, the rational agent, whose chief defining feature, according to Kant, is a perennial 
aspiration for autonomy, is believed to achieve self-realization only at that point when she 
95 For various discussions of the defining role of reason-worship in the age of Enlightenment, see generally, 
ROY PORTER, FLESH IN THE AGE OF REASON: HOW THE ENLIGHTENMENT TRANSFORMED THE WAY WE 
SEE OUR BODIES AND SOULS (London: Penguin, 2004); MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: 
SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977 (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1980); MAX 
HORKHEIMER, CRITICAL THEORY: SELECTED ESSAYS (transl. by Matthew J. O'Connell and others; New 
York: Herder and Herder, 1972). For a doze of healthy skepticism in conceptualizing the state of reason- 
worship today, see also Umberto Eco, "On the Crisis of the Crisis of Reason", UMBERTO ECO, FAITH IN 
FAKES: TRAVELS IN HYPERREALITY 125 (transl. by William Weaver, London: Vintage, 1998). 
96 Further on Kant's theory of autonomy, see IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF 
MORALS (trans. H. J. Paton; New York: Harper and Row, 1964). The notion of autonomy in Kant's works is 
quite different from the more traditional notion derived from the historical practice of Greek city-states. 
Further on the Kantian reappropriation of the Greek concept, see Andrews Reath, "Autonomy, Ethical", in 
EDWARD CRAIG (ED. ), ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, v. 1 586 (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1998). 
97 ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 14 (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). 
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comes to abide exclusively by those commands alone which originate in her reason. The 
crucial factor that distinguishes Kantians at this point from the later anarchist tradition 
(which, in fact, shares far more in common with Adam Smith than most of its adherents 
would find comfortable to admit) is the subsequent assertion that, to the extent to which 
they are actually made in the exercise of "free will" and are thus cleansed of all un- 
reasonable contaminations, these commands, even though they are in fact self-derived, will 
also be an accurate reflection of the Categorical Imperative, a "universal law of nature" 
comprising a set of objective, categorical moral principles. Based on a logic lifted directly 
from Aquinas' and to that extent essentially incomprehensible in the modern secular 
environment, " Kant's argument, thus, effectively runs more or less along the following 
lines: (i) when a subject comes to be autonomous, she starts to produce her own 
commands; (ii) the commands produced through an autonomous exercise of will are 
necessarily in consonance with the Categorical Imperative; (iii) thus even though the 
subject acts in a self-guided fashion, her actions are in fact reflective of the universal 
Reason; 10° (iv) the shortest route to social order, then, is to spread personal autonomy as 
much as possible: once you achieve that, there will be no need for anything as brutal and 
crude as the Hobbesean Leviathan to keep the society in check, the universal Reason will 
98 For a brief overview of the relevant theses in Aquinas' thought and their ideological contextualization, see 
ERICH FROMM, THE FEAR OF FREEDOM 59-63 (London: Routledge, 2001); Umberto Eco, "In Praise of St. 
Thomas", in ECO, supra n. 95,257. My understanding of Aquinas's thought is formed by my reading of 
Averroes. See also, consequently, ALFRED L. IVRY (ED. ), AVERROES: MIDDLE COMMENTARY ON 
ARISTOTLE'S DEANIMA (transl. by Alfred L. Ivry; Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2002). 
99 Its opaqueness is the first thing modem commentators observe about Kant's conception of personal 
autonomy. See, e. g., Thomas E. Hill, "The Kantian Conception of Autonomy", in JOHN CHRISTMAN (ED. ), 
THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 91 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); 
ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, THE AUTONOMY OF REASON: A COMMENTARY ON KANTS GROUNDWORK OF THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 178 (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1986). 
100 This may seem somewhat contradictory, and, indeed, some modern commentators have made exactly that 
point. See, e. g., FROMM, supra n. 98,60 (talking of Aquinas): "To bridge the contrast between the doctrine of 
freedom and that of predestination, he is obliged to use the most complicated constructions; but, although 
these constructions do not seem to solve the contradictions satisfactorily, he does not retreat from the 
doctrine of freedom of the will and of human effort, as being of avail for man's salvation, even though the 
will itself may need the support of God's grace. " 
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bring us to of peace, stability, and prosperity, taking care of everything else, and whoever 
doubts that Reason must necessarily be so benevolent is probably slightly dim-'O' 
The resemblances between the Kantian Logocentric theory of governance through 
reason and the Westphalian theory of international relations are truly striking. Consider, for 
a start, the classic passage from the Lotus case: 
This way of stating the question is also dictated by the very nature and existing 
conditions of international law. International law governs relations between 
independent States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from 
their own free will as expressed in conventions or usages generally accepted as 
expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations 
between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the 
achievement of common alms. Restrictions upon the independence of States 
cannot therefore be presumed. 102 
The secret of preserving peace and stability in the international arena, says the Court, is 
captured in the fundamental principle that the organization of international relations ought 
to be ensured solely through the autonomous choices made by independent states. In other 
words, there is no need to establish a centralized institution to ensure the orderliness of 
international relations; the system of abstract rules devised by the community of 
independent states through the exercise of their individual sovereignties can provide for 
every regulatory need. Moreover, so long as the independence of each state remains as full 
as possible, there is also no need to institute any other system of rules in the international 
arena. To ensure their peaceful co-existence and fruitful cooperation, it is enough that the 
states are bound only by those rules which emanate from their own free choices. No 
101 "Kantian autonomy... requires acknowledging the principles not only as `self-imposed', ... 
but also as 
unconditional requirements of reason" (Hill, supra n. 99,93). "[E]very minimally rational agent, in 
[autonomous] deliberating and acting, is actually committed to [the Categorical Imperative], as an overriding 
rational constraint. " (Ibid., 99). 
102 S. S. Lotus case (France v. Turkey), PCIJ, Series A, No. 9,1927,18. 
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additional or higher law is needed. The positive legal order, as long as it is created in 
accordance with this procedure, will be fully sufficient. 103 
The parallels between the Lotus dictum and the Kantian theory are quite striking. In 
both cases, the stability of the social order is expected to be secured not by some 
centralized hegemonic regime, but by a disembodied set of self-devised norms created by a 
community of actors whose main characteristic, essentially, is that they aspire to be 
mutually autonomous in the sense that they try not to be subjected to each other's personal 
wills. To the extent to which each of them manages to remain autonomous in this sense, 
the rules they end up positing through the accumulation of their free choices in both cases 
are imagined to develop into nothing less than a direct reflection of some transcendent 
universal wisdom under whose guidance every conceivable problem of social ordering, can 
be addressed and resolved, which is the main reason, ultimately, why there is no need for 
them to institute any kind of centralized government structure. If it works through rules, 
why involve institutions? 
Certainly, a sensibility of that kind must have made a lot of sense in the Logocentric 
world of Kant and Aquinas. No matter what happened to the commonwealth of the 
righteous, whatever nasty impasse it had entered, whatever calamity it had faced, in the 
religious mind of a Christian logocentrist, it could always rely on the certainty of "God's 
endless grace. " Men should trust their free will, ran the basic argument, and not worry 
about exercising it, because, at the end of the day, God is not just almighty but also kind. 
His kindness and generosity ensure that the acts of the righteous wi11 never stray too far 
from the path of wisdom. This makes certain that a righteously exercised free will shall 
always lead to the sight of Peace and Justice. Because that is how God's grace works, and 
that is what Man's bargain with God is ultimately all about: peace and justice through the 
observance of divine wisdom. 
103 Despite numerous calls for reform (see, e. g., Individual Opinion of Judge Alvarez, The Corfu Channel Case 
(Albania v. United Kingdom) (Merits), ICJ Reports 1949,4,39), this pattern of thought remains the dominant 
international law dogma to the present day. See, generally, ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-21 
(2nd edn.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). See also ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY, DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (7e edn.; Pans: Dalloz, 2004); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th edn.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (St. Paul, Minn.: American Law Institute, 1987). 
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Alas, most of us no longer live in that kind of world. '04 For better or for worse, 
international lawyers cannot proceed anymore on the implicit assumption that no matter 
how bad things may turn, God's grace can always be expected to fly in at the last moment 
to save the children of Adam from an imminent disaster. In an age in which all politics has 
become an exclusively this-worldly affair, there can be no place left for a divine guarantee. 
A question then immediately arises at this point: taking all this into account, how 
reasonable can it be for the students of the international legal process to continue to 
discuss their subject from the perspective of Kantian Logocentrism? How reasonable can it 
be for anyone attempting to accomplish a political task of the same scale and magnitude as 
that attempted by the new ILTMC project to insist that this can be done on the basis of 
what in effect is an ontological theory of medieval Christianity? 
Assuming for a moment that the architects of the new ILTMC project could not 
possibly be less intelligent than an average undergraduate student, how can one explain the 
fact that they seem to have done everything within their power to propagate the belief that 
one of the central tasks confronting the international community after the end of the Cold 
War has been to intervene in the ordering of ethnic governance and that the best way to 
accomplish that was not by creating a global ethnogovernance authority, akin to, say, the 
International Football Board or the International Labour Organization, but by constructing 
an abstract normative canon for the regulation of the questions relating to the treatment of 
minority communities? That the complex ideological regime eventually created under that 
rubric fully fit that description, did not exceed its terms, and did not, therefore, involve 
anything more than the creation of a disembodied set of abstract norms - certainly nothing 
in the way of a robust institutional structure acting as a de facto Leviathan? That because 
that structure was not created, it has not been necessary to examine it on the subject of its 
decision-making procedures, the adequacy of its success record, democratic legitimacy, and 
so on? That the terms of the general discourse this belief promoted made it increasingly 
difficult to discuss the executive aspect of the new ILTMC regime thus leaving the general 
public effectively unprepared to track and monitor the evolution of the ILTMC project? 
104 "But our days pass, and still we do not know you fully. Why then do you remain silent? Speak, God. " 
(ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 295 (New York: The Free Press, 1984). ) 
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Having removed God from the picture, how can anyone who continues to act as if 
a body of abstract rules could actually exist which, having been produced solely through 
the exercise of free will by this-worldly authorities, could, nevertheless, contain some secret 
magic formula for the building of peace, order, and optimal governance, be considered to 
act in good faith? 
Knowing that international lawmakers do not tend to be generally unintelligent, 
what kind of explanation can be offered for the fact that the official dogma of the new 
ILTMC project proceeds on the presumption that a body of objective expert knowledge 
can be obtained which should be able to relieve the national governments from ever having 
to count on the luck, intuition, political acumen, negotiating skills, and bargaining talents of 
their domestic elites when dealing with the challenges of ethnic governance? That a science 
of ethnic regulation can crystallize that will carry in its folds the mighty power of the 
transcendent reason? That the ordering of domestic ethnoscapes can be turned into the 
mechanistic application of a general algorithm? That the recipe for peace, justice, and order 
can be fully packed into a set of normative standards? 
d. The Challenge of Explaining the Emergence of the New ILTMC Project 
Commenting on the ideological predilections of the mid-19th century political philosophers, 
Karl Marx famously observed that almost all of their reform programmes essentially 
derived from the popular assumption that: 
[h]itherto men have constantly made up for themselves false conceptions about 
themselves, about what they are and what they ought to be. They have arranged 
their relationships according to their ideas of God, of normal man, etc. The 
phantoms of their brains have got out of their hands. They, the creators, have 
bowed down before their creations. Let us [, therefore, ] liberate them from the 
chimeras, the ideas, dogmas, imaginary beings under the yoke of which they are 
pining away.... Let us teach men ... to exchange these 
imaginations for thoughts 
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which correspond to the [real truth] and [the] existing [regimes of injustice] will 
collapse. 105 
The problem with that view, observed Marx, was that, unfortunately, it was quite 
fundamentally misguided. Giving the general public the "right ideas" is not normally 
enough to resolve the problem of social oppression. Stating the "truth" will not, as a rule, 
suffice to set anyone free. How and why is that so? Marx answers with a metaphor: 
Once upon a time a valiant fellow had the idea that men were drowned in water 
only because they were possessed with the idea ofgravity. If they were to knock this 
notion out of their heads, say by stating it to be a superstition, a religious concept, 
they would be sublimely proof against any danger from water. His whole life long 
he fought against the illusion of gravity, of whose harmful results all statistic 
brought him new and manifold evidence. "' 
What is the main message Marx tries to convey in this passage? The answer to this 
question, I think, is this: the effectiveness of the ideological process by which the dominant 
regime sustains itself cannot be annulled by simply debunking the regime's official dogma. 
It is not just because everyone has been convinced that the new ILTMC discourse tells the 
truth about the way the social reality works that the ILTMC project has managed to come 
as far as it has. The viability of hegemonic regimes is not exclusively determined by the 
practical believability of their dogmas. The march of an ideological project cannot be halted 
by the simple raising-of-consciousness act because the hidden logic of the ideological 
process cannot be reduced to the linear schematism of truth, lies, and setting the record 
straight. Certainly, an ideological regime can always be weakened by an act of 
demystification, but demystification alone will not normally be enough to bring an 
ideological project down, since, to put it briefly, the life of an ideology is not led only in the 
domain of lies, deception, and false consciousness. And what this means for the present 
context, consequently, is this: the practical functionality of the new ILTMC project will not, 
105 KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY (PART ONE) 37 (ed. by C. J. Arthur, 
London: Lawrence & Wishart, 19'99). 
106 Id. 
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in all likelihood, be fully comprehended if we construct our inquiry solely in terms of lies, 
misapprehensions, and conspiracy theories. 
Or, in other words, it will not make sense to try to answer any of the questions 
asked in the concluding paragraphs of the previous subsection by operating only with the 
theories of deception, ignorance, and misrepresentation. A far more complex frame of 
reference will need to be constructed to describe the productive logic of the new ILTMC 
project. A far more nuanced paradigm and theory of socio-historical causality will have to 
be put in place to illuminate the conditions enabling the emergence of the new ILTMC 
regime. To prepare the stage for that, however, let us first take the stock of our emerging 
problematic once again. 
e. Summari ing the Problematic 
How can the ideals of ethnic self-determination be reconciled with the practical exigencies 
of multicultural politics? Should national minorities be granted the right to political 
autonomy? What is the optimal level of ethnicization for democratic politics? When is the 
duty of protection and care every state owes to its citizens satisfied in the case of minority- 
language education? How much affirmative action must the state afford to its minority 
communities? All of these questions, the new ILTMC discourse suggests, it can now 
provide a fully sufficient answer for; all of them it can now supply with an objective expert 
opinion, elaborating, explaining, and clarifying every single major aspect of it; all of them, 
that is, but one: where exactly has that expertise come from? 
Clearly, the knowledge of what constitutes "good governance" can never arise by 
itself, spontaneously, like the Einsteinian Big Bang, without any preceding material cause. 
Policies and normative standards inscribed into the legal discourse do not emerge like the 
Leibnizian sufficient reason of their own accord. Kant was probably not a very good 
lawyer, or at least a very impractical one, if he failed to acknowledge that. Whoever has 
transplanted his philosophy into the domain of the practical legal process, however, 
deserves to have their intentions cast under an even deeper form of suspicion. 
Few facts could be more self-evident today, more than two centuries after the first 
seeds of Enlightenment broke through the crust of medieval dogma, than that all social 
phenomena, including moral and political norms, are entirely human creations. Global 
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benchmarks and standards do not crystallize out of some transcendent universal Ether. 
They are always produced by concretely positioned historical agents pursuing concretely 
determined, historically formulated political goals. The Categorical Imperative has as much 
to do with the content of international law as the level of precipitations on the Easter 
Island in the second week of February. 
Admittedly, no single discipline is inherently superior to any other, but if there is 
anything the last two centuries of sociological thought from Durkheirn to Leslie Sklair may 
have taught international law, it is certainly that there is no such place as a "heaven of legal 
conceptsi1p' in which the transcendent universal Reason resides and the boundaries 
between legitimate and illegitimate violence, permissible and impermissible affirmative 
action, democratic and undemocratic governance, collective and individual legal interests, 
or equitable and inequitable distribution of social welfare are justified and established. All 
facts of socio-theoretical knowledge are categorically historically contingent. If only because 
of that, they are also always completely and inescapably political. There does not, 
consequently, exist a single chance out of a million of ever explaining the emergence of any 
particular body of social norms, institutions, or processes without examining first the 
immediate socio-historical context in which it has been produced and the political stakes 
involved in its structuration, which these norms, institutions, and processes affect and 
distribute. No normative canon promoted under any banner, be it the "law of nations" or 
the "world-best practices, " can be ever comprehended in its full practical existence without 
first being rigorously investigated on the subject of what Foucault used to call its 
"hazardous career. ""' 
As we have seen in the previous pages, the rise of the new ILTMC project has 
become possible not least thanks to the rise of the global cult of international expertise. Its 
main ideological tenet essentially comes down to the theory "that the general public is best 
left ignorant, and the most crucial policy questions affecting human existence are best left 
to `experts, ' specialists who talk about their specialty only, and ... `insiders, ' people (usually 
107 See Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoL L. Rev. 809 (1935). 
108 FOUCAULT, supra n. 95,67. 
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men) who are endowed with the special privilege of knowing how things really work and, 
more important, of being close to power. "°9 
What is the politics of the global cult of international expertise? What kind of a 
global society does it create? What kind of a power elite does it authorize and enthrone? 
When the general public conviction becomes that the project of "building democracy" 
must be a field of objective expertise in which only those who are in the know should be 
allowed to make choices, what kind of a meaning does this inscribe in the concept of 
democracy? What kind of a hegemonic logic is created the moment the general social 
consensus starts to regard as uncontroversial the view that there should exist a group of 
people who would know best not only about what must be the most optimal relationship 
between the executive and the judiciary branches but also about how a working class Serb 
living in Macedonia should feel and express his Serbness in public? And what kind of a 
society do we create by convincing ourselves that the people who admit they have that kind 
of knowledge - most of them white, male, university-educated, and unable to put together 
a single sentence in Serbo-Croat - are indeed "experts in that kind of things"? 
Seven of the nine "experts" who have drafted the Hague Recommendations were 
university academics. Four of them were lawyers, three were linguists. Of the remaining 
two, one was a Dutch government official, the other was a senior curriculum adviser for 
the Dutch National Institute for Curriculum Development. 
Six of the eleven "experts" who drafted the Oslo Recommendations were lawyers, 
five of them were in full-time academic employment. Only two on the remaining list of five 
were professional linguists (one employed by a university, another by a government body). 
One participant represented the European Board of Lesser Used Languages; one worked as 
an adviser to the Norwegian Forum for the Freedom of Expression; one was a researcher 
for the Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies. 
Two thirds of the eighteen-strong body of "experts" by whose authority the Lund 
Recommendations established their legitimacy were lawyers, of them ten were primarily 
employed as academics teaching various aspects of public international law. What kind of a 
collective expertise can a group in which more than half of the participants earn their living 
109 EDWARD W. SAID, REFLECTIONS ON EXILE AND OTHER ESSAYS 119 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2002). 
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by lecturing about jurisprudence possess? In what field or area? Linguistic policy and 
religious affairs? Genocide prevention and ethnic conflict management? The practicalities 
of establishing national-territorial autonomies? 
Section Three 
Synopsis: the Main Argument and the Basic Terms of Inquiry 
a. The Main Argument 
The basic objective of this work is fairly straightforward. The main substantive thesis I try 
to defend in these pages is that the general character of the legal-normative processes 
hidden behind the complex discursive facade erected by the new ILTMC project is in fact 
far darker and more ambivalent than what is commonly revealed about it by the official 
ILTMC discourse. To put it somewhat more schematically, the new ILTMC regime 
established after the end of the Cold War neither does and can do nor is and can be what 
the established conventional wisdom about it claims on its behalf. 
The new ILTMC regime holds itself out as the end product of a long drawn-out 
expertise-driven project whose central objective from the very beginning has been to 
develop a system of politically neutral, pragmatic responses to the newly emerging 
challenges of racism, xenophobia, and aggressive nationalism. The longer one looks at it, 
however, the clearer it becomes that however generously one interprets the facts this image 
has to be completely false. 
The discourses of the ILTMC community operate on the presumption that the 
normative regime which they discuss is fully consistent with the ideals of social justice and 
liberal democracy. In reality, however, the objective predispositions created by this regime 
have established a political dynamics whose practical impact could never be considered 
compatible with these ideals in their usual understanding, even if we accept the view that 
the new ILTMC regime was intended not as a sub-species but as a substantive amendment 
to the classical liberal theory. 
One of the main starting points of the new ILTMC discourse, according to its own 
admission, was the understanding that in practice every modem society tends to break into 
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a series of different cultural communities; that some of these communities tend to view 
themselves as entitled to some form of political autonomy; that not all such self-awarded 
entitlements can be consistently honoured in practice; that despite this fact, every human 
individual still has the right to a free and effective expression of her cultural identity as well 
as the right to live in a state of basic equality with all other such individuals and to 
contribute to the governance of that sovereign polity in which she lives with more or less 
the same degree of effectiveness as all other members of that polity. The new ILTMC 
regime is claimed to rest on this understanding, but the objective dynamics created by it 
stands so far from what one would normally expect a dynamics inspired by such knowledge 
to look like that only the most extravagant assessment of it would ever fail to conclude that 
the image the new ILTMC discourse projects about it is not deeply problematic and that a 
very significant proportion of claims around which it is organized are not fundamentally 
untrue. 
In a way, one could say, the main substantive argument I try to make in these pages 
mirrors the scaled-down version of the general law-is-politics claim first made by American 
legal realists and the first-generation CLS. 11o The original version of that argument"'- 
which was made, it must be recalled, in a context in which most of the mainstream legal 
scholarship refused to accept the idea that the juridical practice is ineradicably ideological - 
asserted in effect that what is commonly known in modern liberal societies as the legal 
discourse is essentially indistinguishable from what is commonly known as "pure politics, " 
meaning that adjudication, for example, was, by default, a completely political process since 
the argument structure of judicial reasoning was to all intents and purposes the same as that 
"used in `ordinary' political discussions. i" 
Formulated in such terms, the claim, rather predictably, attracted quite a lot of fire 
from the mainstream circles. A stream of angry refutations followed, purporting to prove 
that not all judges experienced their professional practice the way the legal realists and the 
CLS crowd described it and that many statistical surveys, in fact, "demonstrated some 
110 See in particular DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1997). 
111 See, e. g., James Boyle, The Po&ics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
685,710-3 (1985); UNGER, supra n. 104,83- 100; Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. Leg. Stud. 351 (1973). 
112 Mark. V. Tushnet, Critical Legal Theory (without Modifiers) in the United States, 13 J. Pol Phil. 99,107 (2005). 
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degree of purely legalist, non-political influence on case outcomes. i113 The irony of these 
refutations, however well-intentioned some of them may have been, of course, was that in 
the end they only proved that the law-is-politics claim had been formulated relatively 
imprecisely, not that it was completely wrong. 
As Mark Tushnet put it years later: 
Not every [judicial] decision had to be motivated by politics in the usual sense for 
the "law is politics" claim [for that claim] to be interesting, and strongly critical. It 
would be enough that some decisions were so motivated, and that the ideology of 
legalism required that none were (or at least required that there be a careful account 
of why the occasional meanly political decision did not undermine the ideology of 
legalism). 114 
The parallel between the last statement and the main substantive argument of this thesis is 
rather direct. The basic ideological foundation on which the new ILTMC project rests - 
that grand conventional wisdom by the means of which it has secured that enormous 
amount of legitimacy capital which it needs to stay afloat - is essentially the same as the 
basic ideological foundation of the liberal theory of adjudication. It derives ultimately from 
the same type of socio-theoretical claim, namely that the complex normative canon created 
and promoted under the rubric of the ILTMC over the course of the last seventeen years is 
not in fact a product of some open-ended subjective political speculations, but that it actually represents 
a politically neutral body of expertise, established and justified by the fact of its ascent from a set of 
technocratic practices based on rigorous empirical studies and objectively different from politics. 
Consider once again the basic language patterns used by the new ILTMC 
ideologues, starting once more with the HCNM: 
In my work as High Commissioner on National Minorities, I have often observed 
constantly recurring issues regarding the specific needs and desires of particular 
113 Id., 106. 
114 Id. 
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minorities in various situations. There is a great variety of such situations, and no 
two are exactly alle. Nonetheless, they display some essential similarities. 115 
They could almost be characterized as constant aspects of the relationship 
between minorities and the states they live in. Let me indicate them by three 
words: communication, participation and integration. First, communication. ... 
In 
many cases an effective solution might be the establishment of a minorities' 
council or roundtable through which the authorities and representatives of the 
minorities can engage in a structural dialogue.... Sometimes what is needed is an 
independent state body to which persons belonging to minorities can turn when 
they feel that the authorities are not paying due attention to their problems and 
concerns. The figure of an ombudsman comes to mind, an independent 
personality who can take up cases and make the authorities pay attention to the 
and to the concerns expressed. ... 
Second, participation. ... 
Of immediate 
relevance in this respect is the right of persons belonging to national minorities to 
effective participation in public affairs. That includes participation in the affairs 
relating to the protection and promotion of the identity of such minorities, in the 
first place in parliament and government. ... 
Third, 
... the 
issue of integration ... 
Questions concerning language laws, citizenship requirements et cetera all have to 
do with this issue. 116 
Ethnic minorities consider especially linguistic and educational rights as essential 
for maintaining their identity. They are usually not satisfied with the teaching of 
their language as a subject in their schools, they want separate minority language 
schools. Moreover, large minorities often insist on the setting up of separate 
minority State universities. For majorities, the main concern is to ensure the 
loyalty of the minority toward the State they are living in. 117 
In general terms, one may consider nationalism to be a principal cause of national 
minority problems. ... People's reactions are usually 
based on perceptions, 
115 Van der Stoel, supra n. 30,154. 
116 Max van der Stoel, "Human Dimension Commitments Are Matters of Direct and Legitimate Concern to 
All Participating States, " in ZELLNER AND LANGE, supra n. 1 1,49,53-4. 
117 Van der Stoel, supra n. 81,18. 
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particularly in relation to things which are dear to them. These can be manipulated 
by xenophobic and chauvinistic slogans. ... 
To confront the root causes of 
excessive nationalism, one has to break down "nationalist" issues to their core 
elements. More often than not, these concern political participation, education, 
language, culture, or resource allocation. "' 
Relatively minor problems can, if not tackled, develop into major sources of 
tension. That is why I have decided to become increasingly involved in the 
development of contacts and concrete projects to look into and possibly tackle 
the root cases of ethnic tension. The first example I would like to mention lies 
within the field of education. It is clear that education is an extremely important 
element for the preservation and the deepening of the identity of persons 
belonging to national minorities. 119 
An unmistakable message emerges from these passages: (1) however different they may 
seem at first, all questions of ethnic governance in the last instance derive from the same, 
invariable problematic which, if we look at it sufficiently closely, will reveal itself to be 
essentially technical in nature; (2) setting about the subject of ethnic governance in the 
spirit of objective analysis, it follows, therefore, that all questions related to the problematic 
of minority-majority relations can be ultimately resolved on the basis of an objective, 
empirically oriented, technical approach. Extending this thesis by logical implication 
suggests, consequently, that: (i) all immediately observable ethnic problems are expressions 
and manifestations of the same single hidden cause (root-case); (ii) addressing the actual 
logic of that hidden cause provides an opportunity both to obtain a truly effective answer 
to every apparent question and to avoid having to re-invent the wheel every time there is a 
need to travel, so to speak; (iii) following this principle also leads to a radical minimization 
of all decision-making costs and allows to avoid having to engage in any kind of politics. 
Furthermore, since politics is that which always floats on the surface and the real causes of 
ethnic tensions lie at a far deeper, sub-surface level, it also follows that the best way to 
resolve every ethnic governance problem is by sidestepping all its immediate political 
118 Max van der Stoel, "Early Waning and Early Action: Preventing Inter-Ethnic Conflict, " in ZELLNER AND 
LANGE, supra n. 11,165,168 
119 Van der Stoel, supra n. 73,142. 
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aspects and concentrating instead on the underlying root causes, so as not to get distracted 
by the surface ripples and not to miss the sight of the underwater reefs. How does one 
know what the underlying root causes are, however? Why, that is precisely what the experts 
are for. 
Minorities do not want to have their kids wear their ethnic dress, teaches the new 
ILTMC expertise; they only want to "maintain their identity. " Majorities do not want to 
prevent minorities from setting up their investment funds; they only want to "ensure their 
loyalty towards the State they are living in. " Education is not a major ideological state 
apparatus whose regulation affects the construction of the body politic and, possibly, 
determines its very survival as a sovereign entity; 120 it is only an area in which majorities and 
minorities have identity concerns. The problem of the inter-ethnic equality and effective 
participation revolves around consultative bodies and the right to use one's mother tongue 
in dealings with the public authorities, not around differentiated taxation. Whoever misses 
these crucial points is set to commit a colossal mistake by overlooking the shape of the real 
root causes behind the rise of aggressive nationalism. Only a specially trained mind, 
however, can avoid this and deal with the underlying problematic adequately. 
Put differently, what the HCNM basically says here quite closely follows the 
traditional pattern of the classical dialectical (in the Hegelian sense) argument. It starts from 
the intuitive premise that every question of ethnic governance is not in fact what it seems 
on its face, but that it actually reflects some kind of hidden root-cause logic. From there, it 
moves to the preliminary conclusion that every question of ethnic governance can be 
therefore resolved not by addressing its immediate political problematic, but by focusing on 
its ultimate root-cause subject-matter, and then in a classical Hegelian move of negation 
supersedes that with another conclusion according to which every question of ethnic 
governance not only can but must be resolved through its root-cause problematic. 
What is the general meaning of this narrative sequence? 
Every minorities question can be resolved by addressing the root-cause problematic. Considering 
the broader context, this means essentially that in the HCNM's opinion there ought to be 
enough room in the ILTMC project for the evolution of an essentially administrative 
120 See further ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). 
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sensibility of ILTMC decision-making alongside the traditional sensibility of politics and 
diplomacy. 
Every minorities question must be resolved by addressing the root-cause problematic. The 
meaning of this statement, obviously, is markedly different. Unlike the previous statement, 
this one tries to suggest that the administrative sensibility not only can but also should 
replace the political sensibility, i. e. that there has to be as little politics and as much 
expertise in the ILTMC field as possible. 
Square this last idea now with the two commonplace beliefs - both clearly 
endorsed by the HCNM, as his comments about "communication" and "participation" 
show - that the concept of politics essentially represents a negotiation of conflicting 
interests and that the dispensation of expertise requires a retention of impartiality, and the 
immediate upshot of the whole argument sequence becomes that, despite all his formal 
statements to the contrary, the HCNM's basic proposal is essentially that, as much as possible, 
the questions of ethnic governance should be resolved not by the national governments of the participating 
states -a government, being an interested party, clearly cannot be expected to be impartial 
and thus to keep consistently on the administrative /expertise path - but by the representatives 
of the international community, who, having no apparent immediate interest in the resolution of any 
minority-majority question in one way or another, 12' can be generally trusted to act objectively and in the 
spirit of impartial expertise. The former can certainly be delegated some residual powers of 
interstitial improvisation here and there. But their main function remains essentially 
executive against the monolith of the "international legislature. " That is, their basic job is 
not to experiment and ad-lib on their own, but to accept the general policy packages 
supplied by the international community, adopt them into their domestic political orders, 
and faithfully implement (and finance) all their substantive requirements. 
At every point and in every passage, the language of the HCNM's discourse 
consistently betrays the symptomatic of a self-worshipping technocracy. Conflicts are not 
discussed in terms of avoidance. They are a set of phenomena that should be prevented 
(like some kind of an epidemic). Crises are not described in terms of negotiations. They are 
121 This is clearly an illusion. As the history of modern international involvement in minority-majority 
conflicts from Kurdistan to Transylvania shows, most of the time the representatives of the international 
community tend to have a clear interest in the retention of the existing status quo, which, as one can guess, 
normally tends to favour the dominant majorities over the non-dominant minorities. 
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a set of problems that should be managed (like a bank account). Ethnic governance 
regimes are not depicted as exceptional political constructs each of which is unique and has 
to be constructed according to its own singular circumstances. All ethnic groups in the 
world pursue the same basic goals (even if they do not know this themselves). All that 
requires to be done, therefore, to construct a functional ethnic governance regime in every 
case is to work out which goals these are and to apply the relevant set of formulas. 
Is there a tension in the area of "communication"? No problem! As soon as we 
have that diagnosis, the HCNM algorithm says: "Must set up an inter-ethnic roundtable or 
appoint an ombudsman. " The answer is there, all that needs to be done now is to 
implement it. 
Certainly, some dilettantes may observe at this point that to create a new 
government institution is probably the epitome of what most people would normally 
consider an act of politics, but that is certainly a completely wrong observation. Politics is 
something that, by definition, always involves bargaining, negotiations, and the conflict of 
wills. In the implementation of international standards, however, there can be no bargaining or 
negotiations. International standards are binding on every agent subjected to them, period. 
That is what makes them standards and not mere comity. If a standard says: "do X and 
then Y, " it means "do that and nothing else"; it certainly does not mean "let's talk about it, 
maybe you'd like to do X or Y or both? " 
Of course, as every international law student would normally insist, because 
international standards are ultimately created by the states, it is the states that must have the 
right of final decision whenever it comes to deciding what the given international standard 
in question means (which implies that, after all, there is in fact some room for bargaining 
and negotiation in this). But that is, naturally, what makes them students and not specialists, 
because specialists know that those theories are essentially nothing but a myth. Even if 
such an era did exist when it was the independent states that created international 
standards, it is long over now. The content of international standards today is decided by 
experts. ' That is what makes them so reliable, authoritative, and effective. And, naturally, 
whoever disagrees with what the experts have to say on a given point, considering how 
impartial and objective the experts, by definition, are, must clearly be a rogue, insolently 
122 See the text accompanying supra nn. 77,81. 
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bent on flaunting the international community and threatening the tasks of fruitful 
international cooperation. At which point, it may perhaps be appropriate to recall that 
[i]f there is simply no willingness to respect the international standards, ... then it 
becomes of course very difficult to speak about co-operative solutions. In such a 
case other methods of a more coercive nature may have to be used. Serbia is an 
'2 example that comes to mind in this respect. 3 
Sure enough, if we decide to look a little more closely at what the experts actually have to 
say, it may often turn out that the content of their advice tends in fact to be quite bland, 
not to say completely inane. Il24 But that, of course, is fundamentally beside the point: it is the 
123 Zellner and van der Stoel, supra n, 18,21. 
124 Ideally, the purpose of every norm-articulation is to distinguish between two or more alternative courses 
of actions, so as to affect the preference patterns of the norm's addressees by persuading them to choose a 
particular course of action which they otherwise would not necessarily do. Against this background, consider 
now, for example, §11 of The Oslo Recommendations Regardin, g the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities (available 
from http: //www osce org/doclunents/hcmu/ 1998/`02/2699 en pdý: "Access to media originating from 
abroad shall not be unduly restricted. " Consider also 55 of The Lund Recommendations on Effective Participation of 
National Minorities in Public Life (available from 
litte: //www. osce. org/docuinentsllicnm/1999/09/2698 en. pdt): 'When creating institutions and procedures 
in accordance with these Recommendations, both substance and process are important. Governmental 
authorities and minorities should pursue an inclusive, transparent, and accountable process of consultation in 
order to maintain a climate of confidence. The State should encourage the public media to foster intercultural 
understanding and address the concerns of minorities. " 
An old rule of interpretation suggests that the best way to test the insipidity of every discursive 
statement is to substitute it with its mirror-opposite. The more oxymoronic the new statement looks, the 
more insipid the original statement must be. Applying that rule to our two examples, what we seem to get is: 
(i) "Access to media originating from abroad shall be unduly restricted" and (ii) "When creating institutions 
and procedures in accordance with these Recommendations, only process, but not substance, will be 
important. Governmental authorities and minorities should never pursue an inclusive, transparent, and 
accountable process of consultation. They should not seek to maintain a climate of confidence. The State 
should discourage the public media from fostering intercultural understanding and addressing the concerns of 
minorities, " or in other words two statements which no reasonable democratic lawmaker could ever regard as 
promising norm-making material, no reasonable politician could ever adopt as a potential public policy 
heading, and no speech-writer could ever entertain as good campaign slogans. Considering all this, a question 
slowly starts to arise: just how meaningful was the norm-articulation executed by the authors of the Oslo and 
Lund recommendations when they came up with the two original statements cited above? 
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, general 
idea that counts, not its immediate content. And the general idea is always revealed not by 
the swarm of disparate bits that float on the surface, but by the background narrative 
structure that stands behind the discourse. The background narrative structure that stands 
behind the several passages quoted above, as every student of modern narratology would 
be able to recognize, is the narrative of the heroic quest. 
The narrative of the heroic quest is not, in fact, a simple narrative pattern. From the 
point of view of modern narratology, it is what is known generally as a masterplot. By this 
term, the modem narratologists normally describe those formulaic "stories that we tell over 
and over in myriad forms and that connect vitally with our deepest values, wishes, and 
fears. i12' To give a few examples, one of the most popular masterplots in the contemporary 
Western culture is the Cinderella masterplot: a poor, hard-working, decent girl earns the 
affection of a rich and handsome prince through an equal opportunities programme 
operated by a kind fairy. Another all-time Western favourite is the Icarus/mad-genius 
masterplot: in a feat of phenomenal inspiration a daring inventor rises far above anything 
any human before him had achieved; for a short time, this brings him to the top of the 
world and makes him equal with gods; in the end, however, it proves the cause of his 
downfall, misery, and destruction. Every cultural formation abounds with basic formulaic 
stories like these. Some of them tend to be more universal, others more local. The 
masterplot of the heroic quest is, arguably, one of the most universal masterplots of all 
times. It appears to be common to all known cultural traditions, from the ancient Sumerian 
to the modern Hollywoodian. 126 The general structure of the heroic quest narratives, as 
identified by the French-Lithuanian semiotician Algirdas Greimas127 on the basis of the 
125 H. PORTER ABBOTT, THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO NARRATIVE 42 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
126 See further CHRISTOPHER BOOKER, THE SEVEN BASIC PLOTS: WHY WE TELL STORIES (London: 
Continuum Publishers, 2005). 
127 See further A. J. GREIMAS, SEMANTIQUE STRUCTURALE 180 et seq. (Pans: Larousse, 1966). For further 
introduction to the Greimasian semiotics, see also ALGIRDAS JULIEN GREIMAS, ON MEANING: SELECTED 
WRITINGS IN SEMIOTIC THEORY (transl. by Paul J. Perron and Frank H. Collins; London: Pinter, 1987); 
RONALD SCHLEIFER, A. J. GREIMAS AND THE NATURE OF MEANING: LINGUISTICS, SEMIOTICS AND 
DISCOURSE THEORY 33-5 (London: Groom Helm, 1987); FREDRIC JAMESON, THE PRISON-HOUSE OF 
LANGUAGE: A CRITICAL ACCOUNT OF STRUCTURALISM AND RUSSIAN FORMALISM 124-5 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1972); TERENCE HAWKES, STRUCTURALISM & SEMIOTICS 91-3 (London: 
Methuen, 1977). 
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path breaking studies of the Russian philologist Vladimir Propp, 12' is essentially comprised 
by the interplay of six functional entities: 129 the Sender, the Subject (Hero), the Object, the 
Receiver, the Helper, and the Villain. '-" The formulaic sequence of the interplay always 
boils down to the same arrangement: the Hero struggles to deliver the Object sent by the 
Sender to the Receiver for the enjoyment and benefit of the latter, drawing in the process 
support and assistance from the Helper and finding resistance and opposition from the 
Villain. 
A classic example of the heroic quest narrative is the medieval epic cycle of the 
Holy Grail legends. The noble Knights of the Round Table set out to uncover the Holy 
Grail sent by God for the glory and profit of the humankind. In the process of 
accomplishing that goal they are obstructed by various wicked characters (Fata Morgana) 
and the temptations of sin and helped by the Christian virtues and various friends (Merlin). 
Another classic illustration can be found in the vulgar Marxist folklore, in which the march 
of History is equated with the act of the Sender, communism plays the role of the coveted 
Object, humanity as a whole the fulfills the function of the Receiver, with the proletariat, 
the communist party, and the forces of global capitalism acting as the Hero, the Helper, 
and the Villain respectively. 
Now, if we look at it from this perspective, the same basic pattern starts to reveal 
itself behind the surface ripples of the HCNM's discourse. The six functional entities are 
identified with History, International Community/International Experts, Good 
Govemance/Multiculturalism, New Europe/OSCE Participating Polities, the New ILTMC 
Regime, and Domestic Political Elites/the Forces of Aggressive Nationalism: history sent 
the OSCE member states the gift of good governance; international experts employed in 
128 VLADIMIR PROPP, THE MORPHOLOGY OF THE FOLK TALE (2nd edn.; transl by Lawrence Scott; Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1968). 
129 Greimas calls them actants. The morphology of the actantial plane does not always correspond to the 
morphology of constructed on the surface of the narrative. Depending on the circumstances, each actant may 
be represented in the body of the actual story by one character or several characters at once. In some cases, 
moreover, observes Greimas, an actant may have no immediate character representation but be actively 
implied by the rest of the story. In other cases, several actants may "share" the same character space (ie. one 
and the same character may perform simultaneously several narrative functions). 
130 hi Gremas's own formulation, the latter two were called 'Tadjuvant" and "l'opposant" respectively, For 
the purposes of greater clarity, I preferred to retain Propp's terminology. 
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the service of the international community with the help of the new ILTMC regime seek to 
bring that gift to its recipient; the forces of aggressive nationalism and excessively 
independent domestic elites thwart and obstruct every one of their attempts. 
The most important feature of all masterplots from the perspective of ideology 
studies is that they command an enormous amount of emotional capital. 131 They make new 
factual environments look familiar, lower the costs of information processing, and turn 
every encounter with an unknown phenomenon into a generally controllable affair. In the 
words of Frank Kermode, a masterplot is the foundation of "the mythological structure of 
a society from which we derive comfort, and which it may be uncomfortable to dispute. i1 
Every time we run into a masterplot-based discourse, we lower the level of our critical 
guard. The more the given set of narrative to which we are exposed turns out to follow the 
established masterplot sequence, the more we tend to accept the facts relayed in it as true 
and uncontroversial. It can be truly amazing sometimes how far a skillful deployment of an 
appropriate masterplot can induce the target audience to lose its critical faculties and 
suspend its sense of disbelief, but it is a fact long observed and explored by modem 
sociology and literary theory. 133 
What is the ideological upshot of the HCNM's deployment of the heroic quest 
masterplot in his discourse? The same as with every other heroic quest narrative employed 
in such circumstances: to convince the target audience that the Hero needs more help to 
ensure the delivery of the Object and to defeat the Villains. Or, in other words, the 
implementers of the new ILTMC regime must have bigger teeth, longer sticks, and more 
public support to assist in the establishment of good governance throughout the OSCE 
area. 
The same narrative pattern which stands behind the several passages quoted from 
the HCNM a few pages ago can also be detected in many other places throughout the new 
ILTMC discourse. Consider, for instance, the opening pages from Will Kymlicka's hugely 
influential Multicultural Citt enship: 
131 ABBOTT, supra n. 125,42. 
132 FRANK KERMODE, THE GENESIS OF SECRECY: ON THE INTERPRETATION OF NARRATIVE 113 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
133 See, e. g., ROLAND BARTDES, MYTHOLOGIES (transl. by Annette Lavers; London: Vintage Books, 2000); 
PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE (trans!. by Richard Nice; Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990). 
58 
Most countries today are culturally diverse. ... 
This diversity gives rise to a series 
of important and potentially divisive questions. Minorities and majorities 
increasingly clash over such issues as language rights, regional autonomy, political 
representation, education curriculum, land claims, immigration and naturalization 
policy, even national symbols, such as the choice of national anthem or public 
holiday. Finding morally defensible and politically viable answers to these issues is 
the greatest challenge facing democracies today. ... 
Since the end of the Cold 
War, ethnocultural conflicts have become the most common source of political 
violence in the world, and they show no sign of abating. ... 
There are no simple 
answers or magic formulas to resolve all these questions. [E]very dispute has its 
own unique history and circumstances that need to be taken into account in 
devising a fair and workable solution. My aim is to step back and present a more 
general view of the landscape - to identify some key concepts and principles that 
need to be taken into account, and so clarify the basic building blocks for a liberal 
approach to minority rights. 134 
Thus, on the one hand, it may certainly seem as if "there are no simple answers and magic 
formulas" and "every dispute has its own unique history and circumstances, " but on the 
other hand, it is absolutely clear what exactly underlies all ethnocultural conflicts (language 
rights, political representation, education curriculum, etc. ) and on what particular terms 
"fair and workable solutions" have to be dedsed, i. e. not begotten in the hearths of a 
strenuous political debate inspired by violence, luck, opportunism, intuition, and pure 
chance, but mechanically constructed in a cool state of mind, assembled in the same way in 
which a competent builder assembles a dog-house or a garden wall from "the basic 
building blocks. " 
Not all ILTMC ideologues, of course, agree with Kymlicka on what exactly the 
terms of the "fair and workable solution" must be, but virtually everyone agrees that it is 
possible to identify them. Thus, for Thomas Simon, for instance, the main factor that has 
to be taken into account in devising the new ILTMC policy is the concept of the group 
harm. Writing about the theoretical difficulties involved in the conceptualization of the 
notion of the minority community, Simon observes that even though 
134 KYMLICKA, supra n. 4,1-2. 
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[p]olitically, it should not surprise us that the concept of minorities has become a 
problem[, since] States have a stake in keeping the issue muddied[, ] intellectually, 
we should express dismay at how the political has duped our intellectual ability to 
see the contours of minority groups, which become evident once we look at 
his tory. 135 
In fact, however, the task of 
defining minorities poses no real problem. The historical record of oppression 
unleashed by dominant groups locates minorities. ... 
Group harm has stark 
manifestations. ... Internecine disputes erupt over who represents the Romani 
people, and the United Nations struggles to determine the positive identifying 
traits of the Romani. In the meantime, the harms, past and present inflicted upon 
the Romani stand out for all to see. [j]urists using a group harm analysis do not 
need to fear what statisticians call false positives and false negatives-136 
How exactly a jurist using the group harm principle may avoid these two inescapable 
scourges of social theory, Simon, unfortunately, forgets to explain. But, of course, that only 
confirms that the ILTMC is essentially a subject matter for an expert to work on, not an 
average enthusiast. 
Other ILTMC ideologues approach the matter essentially from the same 
philosophical position. Take, for instance, Fernand de Varennes. In a working paper 
prepared for the 4th session of the UN Working Group on Minorities, he explains, in a tone 
reminiscent of the adepts of exact sciences, that 
[t]he first and perhaps most basic way to provide more effective participation and 
representation of persons belonging to minorities in public life is to ensure that 
certain fundamental human rights are respected: [the rights] affecting the 
citizenship of individuals, ... non-discrimination ..., the prohibition of 
statelessness ... or of the right to vote and to 
be elected. [A]ny first step in terms 
135 Simon, supra n. 11,511. 
136 Id., 511-2. 
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of effective minority participation must be based on a state's scrupulous respect 
for these international standards.... Additionally, a truly effective presence and 
role for persons belonging to minorities may require some other mechanism in 
order to compensate for the "democratic deficit" ... 
There are in fact a vast array 
of mechanisms in many countries which have been shown to be appropriate and 
well adapted practices to widely different situations. These can include among 
others mechanisms such as federalism or some form of territorial autonomy, 
proportional electoral systems, special veto powers, guaranteed minority seats or 
advisory boards. 137 
Notice the absence of any traces of awareness that the question of effective participation is 
essentially a deeply political question that does not, in general, admit of any technical 
solutions because like all other political questions it is ultimately all about substance (a 
participatory regime becomes effective only thanks to its outcomes, not because of the 
shape of its architectural forms). 
Notice also that, as far as expert advices go, a statement like that could hardly 
qualify as particularly useful in any area in which the notion of professional expertise enjoys 
any kind of currency. "A vast array of measures that may or may not require to be 
supplemented by other measures" is hardly the kind of answer one would normally find 
satisfactory from one's dentist, ophthalmologist, or anyone else claiming to have a unique, 
professional understanding derived from an uncommonly profound immersion in the 
nature of the studied problem. Still, the expert sensibility continues to persist and 
proliferate from year to year throughout the whole ILTMC realm and the ideological 
impact it produces continues to intensify. 
Consider, for instance, a paper on autonomy regimes by Professor Tim Pottier, 
produced in the same context three years later. Discussing the logic of creating minority 
self-governance regimes, in a tone more befitting a concluding report of some 
pharmaceutical study than a policy-proposing document, Pottier explains: 
, 
presentation of Minorities, Documents of the 137 Fern an d de Varennes, Towards Effective Political Participation and Re 
4th Session of the UN Working Group on the Rights of Minorities, 29 May 1998, 
E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/AC. 5/ 1998/WP. 4. 
61 
Man is not naturally loyal - he is a creature of advantage and betrayal. ... 
When he 
feels he is being over-ruled, history has demonstrated his very power to overthrow 
that for which he has lost all respect and the strength of that tide has proved 
decisive even over the most resolute of regimes.... 
Autonomy is surely not a preferred model. 't'hese half-state entities would 
not arise were it not for the failure of nation states to satisfy, consequently 
provoking a desire for (if only some of) its peoples to start again.... In this post- 
[Berlin]Wall world, a decade on from the collapse of the Soviet bloc and its salt- 
water satellites, what will this new century ... prefer? ... 
While, without question, circumstances will arise where, practically, some 
form of territorial autonomy should be the preferred outcome, even, on 
occasions, where there has been no background to it; equally, `elsewhere', the 
wider needs of all groups in the state (minority and majority), as well as the 
interest of the given region will, frequently, be better served by the creation of 
[cultural and functional autonomies]. 
[As] the Estonian Law on Cultural Autonomy [shows, the content of 
cultural autonomy is] not only uncontroversial, but simple in form. ... 
The main 
aim ... of cultural autonomy is to preserve [minority] groups from deliberate or 
tacit assimilation.... 
What separates functional from cultural autonomy? Actually, not very 
much; indeed, one could address existing cultural forms of autonomy with very 
functional language. The history of functional autonomy is drawn very much from 
the Islamic, but also, `equally', Christian-populated lands of the Near East[, in 
[particular, ] the millet system of the Ottoman Empire. 138 
Could any reasonable observer with a general level of critical ability ever come to believe 
that a political system established at the end of the Middle Ages on the basis of the sharia 
theory of dhimmah protection might actually share so many intrinsic features in common 
with a normative regime established in a post-Cold War Baltic state in order to score some 
additional points with the liberal crusaders of the New-Europe project that the two 
phenomena not only do not have to be categorically distinguished from one another on 
138 Tim Pottier, Autonomy in the 2 1" Century: Through Theoretical Binoculars, Documents of the 7"' Session of the 
UN Working Group on the Rights of Minorities, 18 May 2001, E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/AC. 5/2001/CRP. 1. 
62 
account of their radical political, economic, and ideological incommensurability, but 
actually deserve to be subsumed under the same analytical category without any further 
discussion? Yet this is exactly what the quoted passage - and dozens like it - seeks to 
propose. 
What kind of a mass-scale reification and industrial-level enchantment backed up 
by a systematic suspension of reason and intellectual myopia are required to allow this kind 
of a discourse to be produced so casually? 139 - one might begin to ask. Or, maybe: just how 
many people do actually take the new ILTMC discourse seriously? Or: do not all the parties 
involved in this business in fact agree, at least implicitly, that the objective problematic of 
ethnic governance cannot be actually reduced to technocratic expertise? Or: but what 
would happen if the new ILTMC's grand fiction about expertise and technocratic 
regulation had somehow completely dissolved or had never been formed in the first place? 
However one goes about these questions, in the end, the basic fact seems to remain that: 
(i) both the theory and practice of the new ILTMC project are based on the fiction 
of its political neutrality; 
(ii) as it stands, this fiction has been formulated in such terms that make it 
ideologically unaffordable to continue carrying out the new ILTMC project 
while openly admitting that the ILTMC regime may have an in-built structural 
bias that serves any other cause than those endorsed by the theory of liberal 
multiculturalism; 
(iii) a close examination of the objective reality of the new ILTMC's social 
functionality clearly and unequivocally confirms the existence of exactly that 
kind of bias in the normative structures of the new ILTMC regime; 
(iv) a bias of that kind does not have to be complete and overwhelming, or a 
proven product of a bloodcurdling conspiracy, to justify the conclusion that the 
139 To understand how truly enormous the scale of the ideological mystification underlying the new ILTMC 
project has become, one only needs to recall now that this discourse was produced more than a whole 
century after Einstein, Husserl, Darwin, Lobachevsky, and Dewey, each in their own way, have taught the 
scientific and the philosophical communities that, as William of Ockham had long declared, universal 
absolutes, such as "stoneness, " "woodenness, " or the "essence of the idea of functional autonomy, " do not 
exist. 
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new ILTMC project is not what it actually says it is and that it promotes an 
essentially spurious image of itself 
It is to the exploration of this fact, consequently, that the present thesis is dedicated. 
b. In Defence of Legal Realism 
The gist of this thesis's main argument is encapsulated in claim (iii) detailed above. In a 
way, one could say, that claim constitutes the main ideological link connecting this thesis to 
the broader tradition of the legal realist scholarship. 14' As every student of modem 
jurisprudence would be able to recognize, however, the general socio-theoretical 
assumptions underlying the legal realist theory are not entirely free of controversy. It would 
not be completely uncommon in some juristic circles to consider the basic logic of the legal 
realist discourse somewhat scandalous. The main purpose of this short sub-section, 
consequently, can be formulated as an attempt to propose a general answer to the typical 
challenges posed to the legal realist project. 
The Postmodern Challenge. From the perspective of the modem-day postmodem 
tradition, "' every general claim presented in the language of legal realism will usually appear 
essentially misguided, unfounded, and extremely conceited. How could anyone claim to 
know what the objective reality of the international legal process actually is, if, as Derrida 
explained, "there is nothing outside the text, ""' that is, everything we think we know is 
ultimately only a product of a language game, and if all language-games which aim to 
construct a meta-narrative are completely and irredeemably corrupt? 143 
140 For the working definition of legal realism, see the "Introductory Note" section of the present thesis, at p. 
2. Otherwise, see Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism - Re. bonding to Dean Pound, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222, 
1233-55 (1931) (in particular consider n. 35 on p. 1234). 
141 Like every other philosophical tradition, postmodemism has gone through several stages of ideological 
development. The stage at which it finds itself today is characterized by the ideological domination of the so- 
called "French high theory, " otherwise known as (French) poststructuralism. 
142 See JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 158 (transi. by Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak; Baltimore, MD: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 
143 See JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (transL by 
Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi; Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984). 
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On the level of the abstract ontological theory, an argument constructed on such 
terms, as a rule, will come across as essentially irrefutable. It seems difficult to imagine how 
one could manage not to arrive at the same normative conclusions, if one accepted as given 
the same starting premises. That said, it should not, for all that, be particularly difficult to 
work out the general model of a tactical response one could produce to defend the legal 
realist tradition against such kind of criticism. 
Every postmodernist claim derived from the Derridean-Lyotardian tradition can be 
essentially attacked on at least two different levels. To put it rather schematically, it seems 
that every time a legal realist project attracts the ire of the postmodern tradition, it will be 
possible for the legal realist camp to respond to the criticism along more or less the 
following lines. 
Step One: there can be no common discursive ground between the legal realist 
camp and the postmodern camp on the level of the rational scholarly discourse because, as 
far as the former is concerned, from the logical point of view, the Lyotardian argument 
about meta-narratives is either completely meaningless in the same way in which Zeno's 
paradox about the tortoise and Achilles"' is meaningless, or it is completely self-defeating, 
in the general logical sense that if all meta-narratives are false, then, insofar as Lyotard's 
claim about meta-narratives is also a kind of a meta-narrative, that argument is false too. 
Step Two: the ideological significance of the Lyotardian argument, quite obviously, 
tends to lean in favour of supporting the currently existing hegemonic order, since the only 
outcome which this argument guarantees to achieve in practice is the legitimization of the 
ideology of political quietism and the dampening of the spirit of critical resistance. Insofar 
as the legal realist project, by its very definition, is a project of critical resistance organized 
in the desire to depose the existing ideological dogma, it follows that the legal realist camp 
can never be expected under any circumstances to share the same political sensibility as the 
postmodern camp, which means that there can be no common discursive ground between 
the two camps even on the non-rational level. 
Step Three: because there can be no common discursive ground between the two 
camps on either level, the two traditions cannot be expected to connect in any kind of 
common discursive exchange. There can be, consequently, no real reason for either of 
144 For further elaboration, see Lewis Carroll, What the Tortoise Said to Achilles, 104 Mind 416 (1995). 
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them to have to present any sort of reasoned response to what the other may consider a 
valid statement of its critique. The postmoderns may say all they want about legal realism 
(and vice versa). Their arguments simply will not have any theoretical significance in a legal 
realist universe. 
By and large, however, it is not usually the postmodern camp that subjects the legal 
realist project to the most gruelling and severe type of criticism. The most consistent 
assault on legal realism comes normally from a completely different end of the disciplinary 
ideological spectrum: the so-called "mainstream, ' 145 or, which is essentially the same thing, 
the followers of the "good traditions" of the international law profession. It is mainly 
against them, then, that the legal realist project requires an apologia. 
The Mainstream Challenge. Judging by the patterns of the recent practice, the general 
sequence of the verbal attacks mounted against legal realism by the defenders of the good 
traditions most commonly boils down to: (i) a basic epistemological challenge ("what 
makes you think you got the reality all figured out? "), followed by (ii) a combination of 
various ideological accusations involving charges of ignorance, sabotage, ill-will, and 
impudence ("just who do you think you are to criticize all the good men of tradition who 
have come before you and to obstruct them in their noble business? "). Presuming a state of 
goodwill on the part of its authors, it seems the legal realist camp could easily counter such 
criticism by pointing out (as Lon Fuller suggested one should14' in such situations) that one 
does not actually need to know the exact shape of the international legal reality to be able to recognize that 
this or that account of it is so manifestly false or biased that this fact deserves to be brought to the attention 
of the general public immediately; or, to go back once more to Eagleton's example, "' one does 
not need to know just how tall the Mount Everest is to be able to know that whoever 
claims it to be lower than Ben Nevis must certainly be wrong, so much so that even if we 
cannot say at once by exactly how many metres Mount Everest is taller than Ben Nevis, 
there is still more than enough merit in saying that they are wrong. For, surely, is it not that 
every act that diminishes the volume of falsehood must have enough merit in itself even 
ias For a general theorization of this concept in modem international law, see further David Kennedy, When 
Renewal Repeats Itsef Thinking against the Box, 32 N. Y. U. J. Intl L. & Pol. 335,373-97 (2000). 
146 See further LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 5-15 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963) 
(discussing the difference between the morality of aspiration and the morality of duty). 
147 Cf. supra n. 91. 
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when it does not bring us the truth whole and pure? This rule of scholarly discourse 
appears to be so uncontroversial, it seems, every sensible scholar acting in good faith can 
be expected to accept it without any commotion or hassle ... 
But the mainstream challenge 
of the legal realist project, alas, is not at all about good faith dialogues. The more one 
studies the patterns of its recent practice, l48 the clearer it seems to become that in the eyes 
of the "good men of tradition" being a legal realist in international law today is not just a 
sign of an intellectual indiscretion: it is an ideological offence. 
Certainly, most reasonable people would usually find it quite unproblematic to 
accept that even though the "possibility of a trouble is not [yet] a prediction of a trouble, " 
one "would [still] do well to keep an alarm signal flying. "149 By the same token, most 
modern social theorists would normally find it unproblematic to recognize that because 
"[t]he given reality has its own logic and its own truth" within whose terms it always looks 
irreproachable, "the effort to comprehend them as such and to transcend them [by 
definition] presupposes [the need for] a different logic, a contradicting truth"; that in order 
to be constituted, this logic would require a rigorous investigation of the overall momentum 
inscribed in the current historical conjuncture, basing on the principle of the non-identity 
of essence and appearance; that, because it challenges the truth of the established 
appearances, this logic would not qualify as "scientific" within the established dogma's 
circle of criteria, since the latter, in order to retain its fiction based on the appearances it 
148 Mainstream international law scholars tend to get very angry very quickly whenever they come across a 
legal realist discourse. It is not uncommon for them to slip immediately into a sharp accusatory tone, charging 
legal realists with unprofessionalism, opportunism, lack of intelligence, short-sightedness, weak-mindedness, 
egotism, sabotage, intellectual plagiarism, and, as the last straw in the draw, nihilism and ressentiment. For 
various recent illustrations, see, among others, Oliver Gerstenberg, IY/hatInternational Law Should (Not) Become: 
A Comment on Koskenniemi, 16 EJIL 125 (2005); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Some Reflections on Contemporary International 
Lain and the Appeal to Universal Values: A Response to Martti Koskenniemi, 16 EJIL 131 (2045); Jason A. Beckett, 
Behind Relative Normativity: Rules and Process as Prerequisites of Law, 12 EJIL 643 (2001); Andreas Paulus, 
International Law after Postmodernism: Towards Renewal or Decline of International Law?, 14 Lei J. Int'l L. 727 (2001); 
Christian Tomuschat, "International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century, " 
281 Recueil des Cours 9,25-9 (1999); Ian Brownlie, "International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United 
Nations, " 255 Recueil des Cours 9,27-9 (1995); ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND How WE USE IT 9-10 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Iain Scobbie, Towards the Elimination of 
International Law: Some Radical Scepticism about Sceptical Radicalism, 61 B. Y. I. L. 339 (1990). 
149 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 151 (rev. edn.; London: Penguin, 1999). 
67 
endorses, would always have already taken care to delegitimize as un-rigorous all those 
reasoning patterns which can lead to a contrary opinion; that this logic, nevertheless, would 
not for all that be any more disconnected from the reality of the existing historical 
conjuncture, if only because "it understands the world as a historical universe, in which the 
established facts are the work of the historical practice of man" and "[t]he ontological 
tension between essence and appearance [is always a] historical tension, " and historical 
tensions can always be identified conclusively and sufficiently reliably but only if one 
studies the structural terms of the present historical conjuncture as a whole. 15o 
Yet, just because one would normally expect something like that in the context of a 
general socio-theoretical discussion, "' it does not yet necessarily follow that one ought to 
expect the same when facing the militant defenders of the "good men of tradition. " And it 
is not that they tend somehow to be less intelligent or have a weaker understanding of 
social theory than the rest of the social science community - quite on the contrary, in fact, 
some of them tend to be astonishingly well-versed in such matters - it is more rather that 
by the very fact of having entered the enterprise of defending the project of the "good 
traditions" against the background just outlined, the "militant defenders" in effect always- 
already end up having automatically refused to play the game of critique-countercritique on 
the basis of those rules which characterise the practice of the usual socio-theoretical debate. 
The stakes of the game for them, the logic of their investment in the discourse, in other 
words, acquire a markedly different character. 
150 See HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 144-6 (London: Routledge, 2002). See also id., xli-xlii 
and 225-6. C£ LuKAcs, supra n. 9,52. 
151 What is normal is not universal. Social science empiricists are likely to be more sceptical of this 
proposition - which, in effect, reflects nothing more than a simple dialectical thesis that the social reality is 
not what it appears to be at the first sight and that it is possible, nevertheless, to know the "true reality" of the 
social reality - than those with a more philosophical understanding of social theory. For a general criticism of 
the empiricist tradition in social sciences (and its various disciplinary cousins) as an ontologically 
misconceived enterprise, see further MARCUSE, supra n. 150,127-203. More generally, see also PHILIP 
ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); ERIC HOBSBAWM, ON 
HISTORY (London: Abacus, 1997); BOURDIEU, supra n. 133; ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, SOCIAL 
THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); HORKHEIMER, supra n. 95; LOUIS 
ALTHUSSER AND ETIENNE BALIBAR, READING CAPITAL (transL by Ben Brewster; London: New Left Books, 
1970); ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY, V. XII (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961). 
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But if saying what one really thinks about the question of legal realism should 
indeed be so pointless in this case, how should then the legal realist camp begin to respond 
to the typical criticisms made of it by the "good men of tradition"? What ought I begin to 
say if someone decided to attack this Ph. D. thesis by criticizing its jurisprudential tenor and 
lambasting its main arguments on the same grounds which are traditionally cited by the 
"militant defenders" and their sympathizers? To understand the basic factors conditioning 
the response line which I propose to adopt in these pages, let us turn first to the general 
structure of the ideological challenge traditionally laid by the "militant defenders" against 
the legal realist discourse. 
The classical line of attack mounted by the militant defenders of the "good men of 
tradition" against legal realism (or for that matter any project of legal critique derived from 
the socio-legal tradition) consists, generally, of three basic themes. Each theme ultimately 
boils down to one single, but very powerful, narrative sequence which, when it is 
articulated in the right tone of voice, tends to create a completely "objective" impression in 
the minds of the unprepared audience that even though the legal realists may have 
something sensible on their side (which is not, of course, at all a foregone conclusion), it is 
definitely those who oppose them who have the moral high ground. 
The basic argument that establishes the first theme runs more or less along these 
lines: what the realists are saying certainly looks meaningful but only to the extent to which 
we are ready to ignore the fact that they are subjecting the targeted rules or regimes of law 
to an absolutely paranoid test of reason. Nobody in their right mind would take the idea 
that international law should be internally coherent, democratic, flexible, representative of 
the Other's viewpoint, formally realizable, egalitarian, predictable, equitable, self-consistent, 
or effective that seriously. The realist critique works, in other words, only because it 
constantly overshoots and its advocates pretend not to be aware of this. The legal realists, it 
follows, therefore, are not really proper scholars, but just a group of saboteurs permanently 
lodged in the deepest reaches of "bad faith, " since they obviously know that the rigours of 
the testing drive they are proposing for the vehicle in question far exceed the levels of 
pressure it has been designed to survive (and yet they are still going ahead with it! ). 152 For 
152 The only other alternative is that they are not really that bright since they constantly fail to realize how 
inappropriate their expectations of international law are. 
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brevity purposes, we can call this theme the "(you're not a) Jehovah" theme, since it 
essentially takes off on the same note as the famous "if thou, Jehovah, shouldest mark 
iniquities, 0 Lord, who could stand? "u3 
The second theme around which the criticism of legal realism is usually organized 
seems to be slightly different. The basic argument at its core consists of three separate but 
analytically inter-linked parts: (i) nobody said international law is (already) perfect; (ii) but 
we are getting there - it just takes time; and, anyway, (iii) the realist critics are clearly 
exaggerating the extent of international law's imperfections, since, as it stands, international 
law actually works quite satisfactorily most of the time. Since this argument is a composite 
one, quite predictably, it does not always get articulated in its entirety. Sometimes sub- 
arguments (ii) or (iii) (or both) are left under-formulated (or are dropped completely). At 
other times they are run autonomously, in seeming independence from sub-argument (i). 
Variations of that kind, however, should not be allowed to prevent us from seeing the big 
picture. Relying either on sub-argument (ii) or sub-argument (iii) by necessity entails accepting 
sub-argument (i) as a given. Even if it is not articulated, therefore, it is always present in 
this line of thought. For this reason, we can call the second theme of the anti-realist attack 
the "it is okay (for international law) to be imperfect" theme. 
The third theme rehearsed by the "militant defenders" is probably the most familiar 
one. It seems, at any rate, to feature more frequently than the other two themes in the 
modern-day mainstream writing. The basic argument at the centre of this line of discourse 
normally takes one of the following two forms. In its milder version, the argument runs 
somewhere along the lines of "talking negative does not really help, what we need is people 
acting constructive, " the underlying theory being that to support critical scholarship is 
essentially an evil act because critique is always counterproductive. The harder version of 
the argument has a considerably different tone. The basic refrain here is "we heard your 
point, now what is your solution?, " the underlying suggestion being "if you are not going 
yourself to solve the problem you have just identified, you had better to keep quiet. " 
Borrowing from Pierre Schlag we may call the third theme of countercritique the 
153 THE BOOK OF PSALMS, Book V, Psalm CXXX ("Hope in the Lord's Forgiving Love"); available from 
htt4: //tvyvw bartleby cone/44/3/! 30. html. 
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"Thumper school of jurisprudence, "'5' since its main premise seems to be the theory that 
"if you can't say anything nice, don't say anything at all. " 55 
The Thumper school of jurisprudence, like virtually all other jurisprudential 
schools, has taken a rather decisive instrumentalist turn lately. Accordingly, in 
the legal academy, Thumper's transcendental value in niceness has been 
transformed into the more instrumentalist value in being "constructive. " Thus, it 
is widely held among legal thinkers that one should not merely criticize or 
destroy, but try to be constructive as well. 156 
The problems with the "Thumper school of jurisprudence, " of course, are many. The first 
of them, perhaps, is its unbridled enthusiasm for replacements: 
Consider a graphic example: If you take someone's neurosis away, are you being 
destructive (of that person's way of doing things) or are you being constructive (of a 
new organically healthy person)? If you were being destructive when you took 
away the person's neurosis, are you then obliged to do something more afterwards 
- something constructive? What would this additional constructive moment look 
like, and how would it help? Indeed, how often does a "cured" patient terminate 
therapy with the statement, "Yes, I understand I'm fine now. There's just one 
more question, doctor. What should I do? "157 
154 Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 167,175 (1990). 
155 "Thumper" was the name of the little hare from Walt Disney's animated film BAMBI (Walt Disney Studios, 
1942). The scene to which Schlag seems to refer is this: 
"Thumper. He doesn't walk very good, does he? 
Mrs. Rabbit. Thumper! 
Thumper. Yes, mama? 
Mrs. Rabbit. What did your father tell you this morning? 
Thumper [clears throat] If you can't say something nice ... 
don't say nothing at all" 
See THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, entry "Title: Bambi (1942), " section "memorable quotes"; available at 
http: / lwyW°vv` inndb. com/title/tt0034492/quotes). 
156 Schlag, supra n. 154,175-6 n. 23. 
157 Id., 176. 
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To any outside observer this suggestion alone should normally be enough to discredit the 
whole Thumperist discourse in international law. But not, of course, to those who practice 
it. 
So, going back to the three classical themes of the anti-realist attack, the first two of 
them seem to be generally not that difficult to counter. To the "it is okay (for international 
law) to be imperfect" argument, legal realism, depending on the circumstances, can always 
say either (i) no, it is not okay - the terms of the implicit social contract concluded between 
the legal profession and the rest of the society do not stipulate that the former can get away 
with submitting such an under-par product as is being presented on their behalf by the 
ILTMC drafters; call the consumer protection line, we have a faulty product here, or let's 
start a product liability proceedings; or (ii) yes, but not that imperfect - the new ILTMC 
regime does not work satisfactorily; it does not pass any of the established tests of legal 
technique; if we believe that its drafters are really trying to improve it (which is not, in fact, 
a foregone conclusion), it is still taking them an excessively long time to sort it out, which is 
not okay, etc. 
Once either of these statements is pronounced, the encounter is likely to enter into 
an argument pattern that, sooner or later, is going to relocate the focus of the discussion to 
the question of facts, where the "good men of tradition" will usually either argue the 
"(you're not a) Jehovah" theme - and thus suggest that the realists are applying an 
impermissibly harsh set of criteria to judge international law's imperfection - or construct a 
combination of the "(you're not a) Jehovah" argument and a Thumperist argument, by 
suggesting that not only are the realists being excessively stringent but that they should also 
keep generally quiet since they have no immediate solution on hand for the problem they 
describe. In the former case, the legal realist answer will be quite simple: (i) yes, we are not 
a Jehovah, but one does not need to be a Jehovah to be able to mark the iniquities; and (ii) 
there is nothing excessively stringent in the tests we have used to evaluate the performance 
of the ILTMC regime - the same tests have been used in the domestic constitutional law of 
most established democracies as well as in the modem international human rights law and 
so on. In the latter case, what needs to be added is a statement to the effect that one, of 
course, does not need to know what the perfect solution would be to be able to say what a 
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blatantly dysfunctional solution is. A variation of that statement was famously formulated 
by Fuller in The Morai y of f Law' 
The task of finding [the right moral balance to guide our ethical action] has been 
needlessly complicated by a confusion of thought that runs back at least as far as 
Plato. I have in mind an argument along these lines: In order to judge what is bad 
in human conduct, we must know what is perfectly good. [This argument is 
wrong. ] [T]he assumption that we cannot know the bad without knowing the 
perfectly good ... 
is contradicted by the most elementary human experience. The 
moral injunction "thou shalt not kill" implies no picture of the perfect life. It rests 
on the prosaic truth that if men kill one another off no conceivable morality of 
aspiration can be realized. In no field of human endeavor is it true that our 
judgments as to what is undesirable must be secretly directed by some half- 
perceived utopia. In the field of linguistics, for example, none of us pretends to 
know what a perfect language would be like. This does not prevent us from 
struggling against certain corruptions of usage which plainly tend to destroy useful 
distinctions. 
In the whole field of human purpose - including not only human actions 
but artefacts of every kind - we find a pervasive refutation for the notion that we 
cannot know what is unsuited to an end without knowing what is perfectly suited 
to achieve it. ... If a working companion asks me for a hammer, or the nearest 
thing to it available to me, I know at once, without knowing precisely what 
operation he is undertaking, that many tools will be useless to him. I do not pass 
him a screwdriver or a length of rope. I can, in short, know the bad on the basis of 
very imperfect notions of what would be good to perfection. So I believe it is with 
social rules and institutions. We can, for example, know what is plainly unjust 
without committing ourselves to declare with finality what perfect justice would be 
like. 159 
The new ILTMC regime, then, one could say, is like a screwdriver that holds itself out, with 
the help of its accompanying discourses, as a hammer; the "good men of tradition" and 
158 Whatever else he might have been, no one today would describe Lon Fuller as a bad lawyer, a weak 
theorist, or an intellectual radical. 
159 FULLER, supra n. 146,10-2. 
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their defenders are, in fact if not in name, the cynical continuators of the post-Platonic 
confusion that mixes the prosaic dynamics of everyday life with the ideal aspirations of 
perfect existence; and the legal realist critique of the new ILTMC dogma is like a projection 
of the Fullerian reminder into the domain of the ILTMC scholarship. One could say all 
that, but it would still not be enough to repel the anti-realist assault. 
But what should legal realists do if their opponents do not resort to the first two 
arguments but jump instead straight to the Thumper school of jurisprudence? The 
Fullerian move, of course, would still remain fully applicable. However, a crucial difference 
would need to be introduced and borne in mind at all times: compared to the other two 
themes, the "Thumper school" theme tends to be far more aggressive in its anti-realist 
enterprise. Its logical endpoint is not simply to suggest that the realist critics (or any of their 
sympathizers) may be slightly deluded, unhealthily pedantic, or permanently lodged in the 
deepest reaches of bad faith, but that, if they do not at once cease causing trouble, they 
should be publicly denounced as a clique of aspiring Herostratuses16° and despicable 
nihilists. Without addressing this latent suggestion, consequently, one cannot really counter 
the Thumperist assault in an effective way. And for that, one must, therefore, move beyond 
Fuller. 
This, however, should not, in the end, be that much of a challenge. The nihilist 
move, after all, is a very telling sign. A tactic honed to perfection by political theorists and 
law professors ever since the Catholic Church lost its historical monopoly on 
excommunication and hunting the morally suspicious characters became a deregulated 
industry in Europe, the accusation of nihilism constitutes at once the most sublime and the 
most desperate move in every modem argument about ethics. Whoever gets to throw the 
nihilist card on the table essentially gets to pre-empt their opponent's arguments - and thus 
avoid having to engage with them (which may say something about not having anything to 
respond with) - by branding them as the material embodiment of decadence, 
totalitarianism, perverse voluntarism, and moral corruption, the utterly despicable traits 
with which, as everyone knows, the "men of good will" may never argue but which they 
160 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ® describes Herostratus as the disgraceful "madman" who burned the 
Temple of Artemis at Ephesus, one of the seven wonders of the ancient world, 
in pursuit of vainglory and 
historic fame. See BRITANNICA ONLINE, littp: //wk\, w. v. britazinica. com/eb/ai.. ticle- 
9009680cfuei}v=HeiNostratus&ct=. 
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t fight, relentlessly, bluntly, ardently, without any trace of compassion or forgiveness. 161 
threat of the use of force, of course, is often as effective as the use of force itself. The 
nperists do not always have to throw the nihilist accusation on the table. Hence the 
Co mon tendency for the active employment of metonymies" and halftones163 whose 
LJ 
N 
-nal mildness only emphasizes the fervour of the passion concealed by the thin veneer 
> 
-UL use gentlemanly conduct. 
Against this background, how should the legal realist camp proceed to defend 
itself? Mainly, it seems by combining and switching between the following five arguments: 
(i) the "stepping stone" argument. The basic narrative sequence here runs along the 
following lines: "You say `trashing does not help and you need to be constructive. ' We say 
- no, you are wrong. Of course, trashing helps! It convinces everyone to reopen the debate 
and to start searching for the new solutions. Without this, there would be no progress of 
161 On the rhetorical patterns of the nihilist accusation, see further Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of 
Form, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 801,828-831 (1991). See also Symposium: "Of Lax and the River", and of Nihilism and 
Academic Freedom, 35 J. Leg. Educ. 1 (1985). Cf. Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. Leg. Educ. 222 
(1984); John Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L. J. 1,47-56 (1984). 
162 A popular metonymy for the nihilist accusation is the use of the name of Carl Schmitt: "We should not, 
therefore, be afraid of demanding the promotion of universal values that have already been integrated into the 
norms of positive law. They are not (or not only) part of our European heritage, but the common heritage of 
mankind, and automatic suspicion of such norms on principle should be left to those ... nostalgic 
for Carl 
Schmitt. " (Dupuy, supra n. 147,135. ) "What remains a puzzle for me, personally, is why Schmitt continues to 
exert such an attraction to `critical' legal scholars. " (Gerstenberg, supra n. 147,130. ) 
163 Consider, for instance, the undercurrents animating this passage: "There is a certain inward-looking 
tendency in both Martti Koskenniemi's and Hilary Charlesworth's contributions to this symposium. Whereas 
the former does not even try to give an `operational' answer to the problem of how to deal with the 
perpetrators of human rights violations, the latter seems to dispense with neutrality and objectivity for the 
sake of a highly subjective analysis. We doubt, however, that such analysis will be helpful in the dialogue with 
decision makers because it does not appear compatible with the setting of general standards for human 
behavior - norms urgently needed to hold the perpetrators of crimes against women accountable under the 
rule of law. ... 
Of course, the time when the claim of positive science to objective knowledge remained 
largely unchallenged is over, and there is no way back to yesterday's certainties behind the insights of critical 
theory, be it late- or postmodern. If we take the critique of positivism as a call for self-consciousness of one's 
own political, economic, religious, ethical, male or other bias, we do not object. But what we do reject is the 
step from criticism of positivism to arbitrariness or postmodern relativism. " (Bruno Simma and Andreas 
Paulus, The Responsibihýty of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: a Positivist View, 93 AJIL 302, 
306-7 (1999). ) 
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policy analysis. So what that we do not propose any extensive solutions ourselves? We do 
not need to do that in order for trashing to become a useful act. It is enough that we do 
something to help awaken other people's attention and thus enable those who can work out 
the new solutions (but who are not yet aware that these solutions are needed) to do that 
when the time comes. Trashing is constructive. Its contribution to the progress of the 
policy dialogue is not negligible. Criticisms clear the undergrowth. Without them, those 
who can build new solutions will not be able to begin. Cleansing the house of reason from 
the miasma of superstition is no mean feat. " 
(ii) the "flat denial" argument. The basic narrative here is: "You say we are not 
contributing any constructive proposals. You are wrong in the most ordinary sense of the 
word. We are contributing a lot of constructive proposals. You just do not see them (or, 
what is far more likely, do not want to admit it). The answers you claim we are not giving 
are all there, in black and white, just look in Section X. Or turn to page Y, for instance. 
Here, we give a very concrete set of proposals about what needs to be done to improve the 
situation. None of these proposals lie out of the bounds of what is realistic and cost- 
efficient. So, in what way is that not a constructive contribution? " 
(iii) the "who told you it's our job? " argument. The narrative sequence here would 
normally look like this: "The people you are defending have bungled everything up (even 
though they were constantly warned about that by those around them), so why is it that 
you are saying now that we are not allowed to criticize them unless we have cleaned up 
after them first? What kind of perverse logic is that? If your pig-headed neighbour tinkers 
with the communal drain pipe and breaks it, are you going to say you have to sit tight and 
keep quiet about it unless you can and are willing to repair it? Let's all be clear about this: it 
was not us, it was the people you are defending here who got us into that dark, miserable 
situation in which we find ourselves today. It is their responsibility, not ours, to get us out 
of here. And, yes, it would still be absolutely fair for us to continue to ostracize them even 
if we knew they could not `make things whole again. ' If someone in the street knocked out 
three of your front teeth, would you think it is fair to let him off the hook just because 
neither he nor you can put those teeth back in your jaw now? The damage is done, and we 
are here to speak about it. What kind of skeletons in your closet do you have to suggest 
there is anything wrong with that? " 
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(iv) the "institutional competence" argument. The basic sequence here is somewhat 
similar to the previous one but it has several distinguishing features: "First of all, it seems 
you really got us confused with someone else. We are the watchdogs who look out on behalf 
of ourselves and the general public, we are not the lawmakers who get paid - and 
presumably also trained - to run the world in the interests of the common good and to 
come up with elaborate constructive solutions to every sophisticated problem facing the 
international order and who for these ends have millions of taxpayers' money at their 
disposal, including the funds for hiring hundreds of Ivy League-trained policy analysts and 
multilingual research associates and dozens of Swiss-based think-tanks to do long-term 
specialist studies. In fact, it is rather disingenuous of you to demand that we do these people's 
job, when we all know that we have none of their resources at our disposal and that they, 
despite having all of them, still have managed not to perform their job properly. It is even 
more disingenuous when you make our submission to that demand a condition for our 
exercise of the right to speak. It is totally scandalous, finally, that in doing so you also call us 
`arrogant, ' when it is, in fact, they who had been so conceited in the first place that they 
willingly assumed - nobody forced them, remember - the mantle of the world lawmakers 
and then held themselves out as if they actually knew how the world should be governed, 
how oppression could be ended, and how social justice could be achieved. They established 
themselves as people who worked for the common good and they got invested for that 
with all the responsibility (as well as the accompanying privileges, perks, and kudos) that 
comes with that kind of job. It totally escapes us now why we should just let it go. They 
have kept charging the world more and more each year for the grace of their wisdom, and 
in the end they still have not succeeded. Now, what exactly would be wrong with us telling 
this fact to those who have been paying their bills all these years literally and figuratively? " 
(v) the democracy argument. The basic idea here is this: `By telling us to stay quiet 
unless we know how to resolve the problems the people you are defending have got us 
into, you destroy all those democratic values that make constructive dialogues (which you 
so passionately appear to advocate) a virtue in the first place. Not only do you seek to deny 
us - completely unjustifiably - our right to free speech, but you also seek to destroy in the 
process the very culture of democratic accountability that you claim to be protecting. We 
do not claim any fancy ethical positions for ourselves. All we are saying is that people deserve 
to know what is happening around them, at their expense, and in their name, and that 
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those who inflict untold sufferings on multitudes of innocent people deserve to be held 
responsible for their deeds. What we do - even if you think it is nothing but trashing - 
serves all of these ends excellently. What you do stifles the democratic process and 
promotes obscurantism. " 
The response matrix comprised by these five arguments is not, of course, perfect. 
Some arguments do not seem to combine so well with one another (argument two, for 
example, appears to be quite difficult to reconcile with argument three). Taken in its pure 
form, each of the five arguments, moreover, may appear to be somewhat extremist. 
Perhaps, metonymies and halftones should once again be preferred over direct statements. 
Or, perhaps, one should at long last dare to become firm and upfront and not allow the 
rituals of form to defuse the impact of substance. After all, how often have the Thumperist 
militiamen treated the legal realist scholarship with the courtesy of the "true gentlemen"? 
Perhaps the established dogma of the new ILTMC project has survived for so long not 
because its ideologues have kept everyone in the dark about its real dysfunctionality but 
because it has never been attacked with sufficient intensity. 
At any rate, the general message sent out by the legal realist camp, it seems, ought 
to proceed somewhere along these lines: 
"1. As far as its professional and disciplinary ethics is concerned, the legal realist 
camp has nothing to have to be ashamed of and nothing to have to justify. The accusations 
thrown at the legal realist scholarship by the militant defenders of the established dogma 
are all essentially spurious. The realist critics are not a `combination of worthless wreckers 
and hopelessly vague visionaries. i " Far more often than not, it is not they but those who 
pour vile and scorn on them who chum out the most unrealistic utopias and harmful 
delusions and confuse their audiences' thought-processes. 
2. To the extent to which some of the legal realist scholars do end up sometimes 
sounding a little highfalutin, the real reason behind that is not that they are just `too full of 
themselves, ' but rather that the techniques of oppression and mystification developed by 
the `good men of tradition' have become now so complex and sophisticated that they can 
no longer be resisted on the level of the traditional conceptual apparatus. 165 The more 
164 Mark G. Kehnan, Trashing, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 293,297 (1984). 
165 Id., 326. 
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sophisticated the hegemonic practices are, the more sophisticated the mechanisms of the 
counter-hegemonic project must become. The legal realist scholarship is not pretentious. It 
just does not share the idiotic belief that David must come to every battle wielding nothing 
but a sling. 
3. Moreover, what the legal realist scholarship does is not only completely 
legitimate in professional-ethical terms; it is also completely necessary and indispensable on 
the level of the general ideological practice prrwided we do indeed intend to protect and 
promote all those democratic values which the `good men of tradition' claim to be so 
fervently committed to on the surface of their discourse. For, clearly, it is not the realist 
critics, but the `good men of tradition' themselves who constitute the most serious threat to 
the protection of the democratic culture in international law. It is they who insist, in deed if 
not in name, on retaining a complete carte blanche for everything the dominant elites try to 
do, denying everyone the right to criticize them by advocating the view that one must never 
be able to disparage the good men of practice unless they can readily better them at their 
own job (which, considering the extent of the resource monopolization /deficit problem 
outlined above, is, obviously, completely unlikely to happen), and escaping every form of 
professional responsibility, while still trying to keep all the perks that come with the job. ' 
Without a strong tradition of a legal realist critique, the international law project driven by 
the interests of such self-declared ideological elites will certainly and irreversibly evolve into 
a complacency-inducing instrument employed in the service of the established hegemonic 
166 Mark Kelman captures the logic of the situation quite laconically. "While the greatest desire of the 
producers of `good rhetoric' may be that people think their rhetoric good so that such producers can stay 
atop some pyramid, producers of apology also have a reasonably, perhaps unusually, strong belief that general 
status differentials are justified at a general level[, ] that the legal system is well-grounded, that the particular 
legally-based disabilities and privileges they dimly perceive to frame one's social position are distributed 
according to an orderly scheme. " (Id., 323. ) 
In a passage immediately after that, Kelman goes on further to outline the possible class dimension of 
the critique-countercritique conflict: "[R]elatively well-off citizens generally are more prone to be self- 
righteous and immune from crises of conscience because they sense that people are generally treated fairly - 
that, for both better or worse, people ... get what they 
deserve. To a discernible degree, the idea that legal 
rules of the most general form are defensible and are being defended (somewhere) by experts bolsters this 
belief. " Any critique of the established legal order, consequently, tends to upset them profoundly, making 
them feel uncomfortable with themselves and motivating them, as a result, to join the "good men of 
tradition" against the "worthless wreckers" speaking the voice of critique. 
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order. Every time the legal realist tradition comes under attack, consequently, it must be an 
immediate duty of all those who believe in the general ideals of the modern international 
law project to come swiftly to its defence. " 
c. The Main Argument Continued 
But there is, of course, something else here too, something more than just an internecine 
academic battle waged around the endless chain of glaring inaccuracies in the new 
ILTMC's "official autobiography. " For the new ILTMC discourse is not, at the end of the 
day, just an academic discourse. It is also an ideological order whose internal dynamics 
decides and dispenses with a great number of tremendous political stakes. What kind of stakes 
these are and how big they tend to be can probably be best gleaned from another one of 
Ambassador van der Stoel's recent suggestions, viz., the suggestion that the patterns of 
compliance with the new ILTMC regime have now become a key component of the 
postmodern standard of civilization. " 
One does not need, of course, to have an especially profound knowledge of 
international law's history to be able to recall what particular ideological role the concept of 
the standard of civilization has traditionally played in international affairs. As Antony 
Anghie has so convincingly demonstrated in his numerous writings produced over the 
course of the last decade, once it had become possible in international law to draw a 
categorical distinction between the civilized and the uncivilized polities as a matter of legal 
theory, it became only a matter of time before the "international community" arrived at the 
"completely logical" proposition that not only was it entirely acceptable to deny the 
uncivilized polities the right to any kind of political independence on the international 
arena, but that it was also utterly legitimate for the governments of the civilized polities to 
disagree with the uncivilized natives' opinions about the contents of their best political, 
economic, social, and cultural interests. "' 
167 See Max van der Stoel, "Integrating Diversity in a Multiethnic Region: Promoting Peace and Security in 
South-Eastern Europe" (as quoted in DIACOFOTAKIS, supra n. 76,139): "An important lesson of the 2011' 
century is that the way we treat minorities is ... a measure of the overall civility of our societies. " 
168 For the development of this argument, see further Antony Anghie, Findin, the Peripheries: Sovereagnty and 
Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 Harv. Int'l L. J. 1,25-30 (1999). See more generally also 
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As I will show in the following pages, the new ILTMC project does not just 
propagate an essentially erroneous understanding of nationalism, ethnic politics, and 
minority communities. The political potentiality which its development has served in the 
context of the post-Cold War international relations, in one way or another, appears to 
have led to what, in the final analysis, appears to be nothing less than a new regime of pan- 
European imperialism. 
Undoubtedly, the emergence of the new ILTMC regime has brought a great deal of 
positive developments to the post-Cold War European politics. It has certainly decreased 
the level of transaction costs for the regional decision-makers at a time when the 
prohibitive impact of such costs may have been truly enormous. Very probably, it has also 
generated a certain endowment effect169 dynamics by occupying the field of political 
imagination with its structures, values, and standards, as a result of which the extreme right 
elements in some European countries probably did not gain as much political capital as 
they otherwise could. In any event, at the very least, it has also provided a common frame 
of reference for the representatives of different ethnic communities, in whose absence the 
tone of conflict and tension across the region would have very probably been considerably 
more electric. 
No responsible student of the subject could plausibly deny or downplay any of 
these facts. But neither ought one to ignore the darker sides of the phenomena which they 
tend to conceal. 
History does not allow itself to be acted out twice. It is impossible to say with any 
degree of certainty how exactly the events in the ECE region would have turned out in the 
last seventeen years had the new ILTMC project not taken place. Would there have been 
more ethnic conflicts? Would those that did take place have been more violent? Would the 
region's transition to democracy have been slower? The assessment of the next most 
probable scenarios is always a speculative act, not an exact science. 
ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
169 The endowment effect arises when the owner's willingness to retain a particular good exceeds her 
willingness to have it replaced by an equivalent sum of money. The practical impact of the endowment effect 
tends to chill the exchange activities and reinforce the established status quo. For further discussion, see 
Christopher Curran, "The Endowment Effect", BOUDEWIJN BOUCKAERT AND GERRIT DE GEEST (EDS. ), 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, V. 1 819 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000), 
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What has been more politically considerable: the positive or the negative impact of 
the new ILTMC project on the events in the ECE area? Recognizing the complex historical 
role it has played in the post-Cold War development of the ECE politics, should we decry 
the emergence of the new ILTMC project as a blameworthy enterprise of ideological 
subjugation or a laudable undertaking that ultimately served benevolent and prudent ends? 
Questions like these, in the final analysis, can only admit of a purely abstract answer, and 
even that, in all probability, is likely to be nothing more than a thinly veiled version of a 
general moral prejudice. "Colonialism is wrong, period. " "But the brutes will run 
themselves into death if left to their own devices. " "No one has the right to deny another 
people the right to live its own life according to its own rules. " "But a humanitarian 
imperialism is better than genocide. " "Imperialism can never be humanitarian. Whoever 
says humanity cheats. A slave well-fed is a slave still. " "But it is the mark of the mature 
mind that it wants a cause preserved humbly rather than destroyed brilliantly. " And so one 
and so forth. 
The complexity of the problem we are dealing with here is probably best revealed 
at the point where we remember that a great deal of the new ILTMC's self-justifying 
rhetoric derives not only from its claims about peace and stability - if that had been the 
ILTMC's only base of self-validation, its ideology probably would not have been able to 
make its vision of good governance look as convincing as they eventually made it look - 
but also from the notion that the regime in question can actually strengthen and enhance 
the experience of freedom for those under its rule. It is best revealed at this point, I think, 
because it is exactly here that Herbert Marcuse's observations about the nature of 
unfreedom immediately spring to mind, and few modern writers, one would have to admit, 
have explored that subject so insightfully as Marcuse. 
Of course, one says from the Marcusean positions, there must be something 
unseemly about the fact that the ECE polities have not been allowed to resolve their ethnic 
governance problems (or even decide if what they had on that front should have counted 
as problems) on their own, and that the promise of freedom for these polities in this matter 
has been extended to them from somewhere else: that imaginary space-process whose 
ideologues identify it by the name "international community", a half-mystified deity 
serviced by the solemn priesthood of self-proclaimed "international experts. " A political 
regime created by such a dubious system of social relations cannot but be essentially rotten. 
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What underlies it is a firm conviction that "we" have the access to the privileged truth 
which "they" do not. What kind of a privileged truth can there be when it comes to living 
one's life in freedom? 
And yet, one notices immediately, however easy it may be to condemn that kind of 
discourse, it is still impossible 
to refute [it] because [at least] it has the merit to acknowledge, without much 
hypocrisy, the conditions (material and intellectual) which serve to prevent genuine 
and intelligent self-determination. 
[It shows that the] society must first create the material prerequisites of 
freedom for all its members before it can be a free society; ... 
it must first enable 
its slaves to learn and see and think before they know what is going on and what 
they themselves can do to change it. And, to the degree to which the slaves have 
been preconditioned to exist as slaves and be content in that role, their liberation 
necessarily appears to come from without and from above. They must be "forced 
to be free, " to "see the objects as they are, and sometimes as they ought to 
appear, " they must be shown the "good road" they are in search of. 
But with all its truth, the argument [still] cannot answer the time-honored 
question: who educates the educators, and where is the proof that they are in 
possession of "'the good"? 170 
So where does this all bring us then? I think it brings us to a point where we must make a 
fundamental choice, a choice the implications of which for the rest of this inquiry will be 
truly enormous but which itself cannot be guaranteed in the end by any traditional means: a 
foolproof test of objective science, a divine revelation, or a reference to an infallible 
authority. And the choice that I decided to make here, the wager of this work, if you will, is 
that, however significant the positive impact of the new ILTMC project on the 
development of the ECE polities may have been over the course of the last seventeen 
years, it was still not enough to justify refraining from criticizing it. 
"when men of all social disciplines and all political faiths seek the comfortable 
and the accepted; when a man of controversy is looked upon as a disturbing influence; 
170 MARCUSE, supra n. 150,43-4. 
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when ... the bland lead the bland, 
""' those are the days when the greatest achievements of 
freedom come into the service of its greatest enemies. 
It is a usual thing in some circles to purposely equate critical deconstruction with 
arrogance and nihilism. "If you really care about law, why don't you go and do something 
with it? " is a common reaction one usually gets even when one steers clear of the rampant 
Thumperists. Most of the time such comments, of course, are quite beside the point. If you 
look at them from the point of view of formal logic, they are often, in fact, self- 
contradictory. They proceed from the twin premises that, to put it simply (i) doing 
international lawyer makes ample moral sense because, essentially, law being an instrument 
of governance, one can turn people's lives for the better by working from within 
international law; and (ii) doing international law scholarship makes ample moral sense too, 
because international law scholars teach and train the rest of the international law cadre and 
(at least to some extent) impart to them their professional values. But they do not then 
remain consistent enough in their reasoning to recognize that to offer a critical 
reconsideration of the existing legal arrangements with a view to restoring to light the 
historical alternatives which their political establishment had thwarted or suppressed, so as 
to broaden the arsenal of concepts and doctrines available for present or future policy 
employment, cannot but be one of the most direct and valuable constructive contributions an 
international law scholar can make to the formation of the international law profession. 
The politics of the countercritical attacks, of course, tends to become even more 
problematic when they are executed by other international law scholars. When legal 
scholars start to reprimand other legal scholars for not playing along with the ideological 
elites' favourite story of the day, what does this tell us about the values of legal scholarship 
and legal academia in general? If international law scholars refrain from submitting the 
ideological mystifications created by the global establishment to relentless critique, who will 
be there to pick up the. baton? How well will they be able to carry it? And what will the 
academics do themselves then? 
Certainly, the message of every critical text can often be disheartening. Things that 
had seemed morally progressive and deserving of an ethical investment may lose a lot of 
their shine and appeal because of a critical intervention. And obviously even having one's 
171 GALBRAITH, supra n. 149,4 
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profession's public record subjected to any kind of ostracism can rarely be an enjoyable 
experience. But then, perhaps, not all records deserve to be concealed and not all 
enjoyments are, probably, worth preserving. 
When all is said and done, whichever choice one makes in the confrontation 
between legal realism and the mainstream international law scholarship, it seems that in the 
end it would be completely unacceptable for international lawyers to resist any kind of 
public criticism of their work. For not only is it always and completely true, for 
international law as much as for every other field of ideological production, that every act 
of critique "by itself exercises an effect - one which appears to me to be liberating - every 
time the mechanisms whose laws of operation it establishes owe part of their effectiveness 
to miscognition, i172 but if Robert Cover had been at all, even partially, right, and the 
practices of law do indeed, at least sometimes, take place in a field of pain and death, "' 
then it must also be true that, international law being the law of the all-humanity, 174 the 
international legal practice must be a field of global pain and global death. With scales and 
stakes of that kind, who can demand that the voice of an alternative truth be silenced in the 
name of unity? 
d. The Context 
This thesis, then, is a work produced in the genre of legal critique. Its analytical tenor 
derives essentially from the intellectual traditions of American legal realism and the first- 
wave CLS. '"5 The substantive part of its argument sequence, as already indicated, begins with 
the declaration that the usual "stories" which the newly established ILTMC project tells of 
itself and its place in the wider social context have all been severely "edited" and that the 
172 Pierre Bourdieu, "A Lecture on the Lecture, " in PIERRE BOURDIEU, IN OTHER WORDS: ESSAYS TOWARDS 
A REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 177,178 (transl. by Matthew Adamson; Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990). 
173 See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L. J. 1601 (1986). 
174 Philip Allott, The Conceit of International Law, 10 EJIL 31 (1999). 
175 My understanding of these two jurisprudential traditions has been shaped primarily by KENNEDY, supra 
n. 82,73-96 and MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS 
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169-212 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). To a lesser extent, it has also 
been influenced by Llewellyn, supra n. 140, SCHLAG, supra n. 9, Tushnet, supra n. 112, as well as Andrew 
Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15 Phil & Pub. Aff. 205 (1986). 
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programmatic conclusions which these stories "arrive" at, moreover, look convincing and 
supportable only because of that. Whether deliberately or not, the ideological elites behind 
the new IL MC project have constantly and unfailingly "omitted" all those aspects of the 
international political reality which do not fit the general picture they are trying to present 
and have then carefully papered over this fact. The resulting product became a series of 
fundamentally unrealistic and essentially self-supporting myths, which the general public - 
and this includes to a considerable extent the "invisible college of international lawyersi176 
- has accepted without any serious testing or questioning, partly because they did not seem 
to deviate from any of the conventional wisdoms of the post-Cold War European 
discourse, the order of the doxic knowledge which Fredric Jameson would usually call the 
"political unconsciousi177 and Thurman Arnold would have perhaps described as the 
modern-day folklore of the new Europe. 17' Their acceptance, however, does not make any 
of these myths any more truthful. Each of them, in the end, is an elaborate fabrication. 
The reverse side of this argument is the classical critical contention of the kind 
traditionally practised by every ideology critique project. It starts with the proposition that 
if we manage to bring all the "omitted bits" back into the full picture, the official stories of 
the new ILTMC project will start to fall apart. Their accounts of their surrounding context 
will begin to reveal themselves as essentially spurious and the conclusions they try to impart 
on that basis will then no longer look as convincing or supportable as they do now. A 
completely new set of stories about the new ILTMC enterprise will then emerge, far darker 
and more troublesome than its ideologues today would find it acceptable to allow. What 
had previously seemed like a fairly unproblematic and generally progressive phenomenon 
will now come out as a profoundly questionable enterprise. The political dynamics of the 
new ILTMC project will start to reveal its ugly sides and their list in the end will prove 
quite substantial: thousands of innocents will be shown to have been forced to suffer; 
oppression will be shown to have spread and proliferated; the imperialist project will be 
revealed to have been advanced and reinforced, injustices to have gone unmentioned and 
176 I borrowed this term from Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of f International Lawyers, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
217 (1977). 
177 FREDRIC JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS: NARRATIVE AS A SOCIALLY SYMBOLIC ACT (London: 
Routledge, 2002). 
178 THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937). 
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unacknowledged, freedom to have turned into servitude, tensions intensified, the 
reputation of international law as a discipline tarnished, and the professional ethics of the 
"invisible college" given a rather sinister tinge. 
This thesis, then, is essentially a thesis about international law's ideological role. 
Before and above that, however, it is also a thesis about legal discourse, legal thought, and 
legal scholarship, which is to say, in essence, it is not just a longer version of the basic 
argument sequence reviewed in the two previous paragraphs. Before it starts to explore the 
substantive dimensions whose general outlines I have just sketched, it will try to uncover 
the doxic structure of its own productive context. A very considerable part of this thesis's 
argument space-process, in other words, has been dedicated to the examination of the 
underlying systems of knowledge habits, thought mechanisms, and ideological assumptions 
that make up its cognitive environment. 
Admittedly, doing something like that is not a particularly widespread practice in 
contemporary ILTMC scholarship. But there are more than one good reason for changing 
that. Few ideas in history have been so widely shared across the spectrum of social and 
political theory as the basic belief that in one way or another there must exist a relationship 
of direct dependence between the general assumptions adopted in the common theory of 
knowledge and the specific visions of governance, order, and institutional principles 
adopted in the everyday practice of politics-"' Without addressing the former, any attempt 
to examine the latter will always risk falling over into a bottomless pit of unsolvable riddles, 
a mirror-hall of empty phantoms in which the weary thought endlessly chases the play of 
its own shadows constantly confusing it with the signs of the real world outside itself. The 
starting step of every rigorous inquiry must always be to reconstruct the hidden structure of 
its own general epistemic condition, to understand the in-built logic of its analytical reflexes 
and learn the limits of what its executors can hope to uncover within its studied object. 
Unless and until it does that, it shall always "misunderstand [its] own ideas by failing to 
apprehend their [enabling] premises and implications. i18' The temple of reason in which it 
will work will always turn into "a prison-house of paradox whose rooms [do] not connect 
and whose passageways le[a]d nowhere. s18' The flight of its knowledge will remain 
179 UNGER, supra n. 104,3. 
180 Id., 6. 
181 Id., 3. 
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condemned to the tunnel of incessantly proliferating superstitions and self-indulgent 
incoherences of whose superstitious and incoherent nature it will remain constantly 
unaware, destined to acquiesce in a chain of insoluble paradoxes it will find both 
irresolvable and inescapable, while, in reality, they would only be the instant consequences 
of the invisible postulates it does not need to accept. Regarding "as disparate principles 
what are in fact different aspects of a single doctrine, " it will "be deluded into imagining it 
possible to dispose of one without rejecting all the others, or to accept one without 
conforming to the rest. i182 What will emerge at the end of that journey will only be 
describable by one word: myth. 
None of the phenomena which form the ultimate object of this thesis's substantive 
inquiry - "minority community, " "imperialism, " "reality of the legal process" - reflect a 
plain, straightforward set of social facts. Nor do, of course, the concepts of "international 
law, " "legal regulation, " or "the wider social context. " Too often the students of the 
modern international legal order pretend not to be aware of the enormous complexity of 
the epistemological challenges incident to its study. Too often the temptation to seek short 
and simple answers that fit with a pre-established wisdom wins over the duty to present a 
rigorous methodical analysis. 
True, in a way, one could say, this thesis turns rather heavy on what some may call 
"abstract theory. " It spends a lot of time on such matters which many other ILTMC 
scholars normally skip over or do away with in only a few paragraphs. But what is the real 
merit of trying to treat as simple that which in reality is complex and convoluted? 
It is never possible simply to oppose "concrete facts" to a conceptual order. To 
criticize one set of concepts, we need to draw on another set that has to be meticulously 
constructed by the use of a complex rival analytical framework. Otherwise, the broader 
ideological form underlying the target phenomena we seek to challenge will escape our 
critical reach. Moreover, through our implicit acceptance of its underlying terms, it will 
become even more strengthened in its grip over our imagination-space. Without taking the 
targeted domain in its full ideological totality, thus, we have no chance to win an ideological 
encounter. 183 
182 Id., 6. 
183 For further development of this thought, see, e. g., ERNESTO LACLAU, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN 
MARXIST THEORY 53 (London: NLB, 1977). 
88 
The only real advantage of glossing over the tremendous intricacy of the general 
problematic raised by the new ILTMC project, including in area of methodological 
significance, other than that, of course, it greatly eases the reception of the resulting 
discourses in certain scholarly circles, is that it helps to divert the both the scholarly and the 
general public's attention from the enormous leeway enjoyed by its enforcers and the 
colossal ruses created by its ideologues and sustain the popular belt f in the possibility of a self- 
executing universal technology of good governance and an objective, context-independent 
know-how of social justice building. Beyond this, the oversimplification of the subject- 
matter in question achieves nothing that could be remotely praiseworthy. Believing that 
every complicated problem can be effectively reduced to a series of simple, easy-to- 
understand questions each of which correlates with a simple, easy-to-understand objective 
answer, and that the search for these answers is exactly what the international institutions 
and those pretending to act on behalf of the international legal order today are engaged in, 
is, beyond doubt, a serious delusion. Complex problems do not admit of simple solutions. 
Social ordering is inconceivable without making contentious policy choices. Pretending this 
fact away has always been a favourite technique of those trying to use such policy choices 
to promote power changes they know otherwise would be considered unacceptable. What 
kind of unacceptabilities can the people behind the new ILTMC project be interested in 
covering up? 
The language which international lawyers normally use when they talk of 
international law's practical functionality, minority rights, legal regimes, politics, ethnic 
conflict, and good governance practices tends to create an impression of an order of facts 
and phenomena that is transparent, stable, and easily cognizable. That impression is 
profoundly wrong. The moment we step outside the idealist, formalist solipsistic world of 
conventional wisdom and push to its logical conclusion the central injunction of the liberal 
Enlightenment project - the injunction to seek consistently secular, this-worldly explanations 
for every social phenomenon we encounter, without turning away from the fulminating 
temporality of social existence or trying to find refuge in the false comfort of religious 
mystificatory tropes - this soothing mirage of serene simplicity will dissolve immediately 
and without a trace. The international legal order is a tremendously complex phenomenon. 
No social process in the global arena today could probably be as unstable, multilayered, 
convoluted, internally fragmented, and multivectored as the process of the international 
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legal regulation. And that is not just some unfortunate accident or a side-effect of some 
random twist of fate. In the age of an ever-intensifying transgovernmentalization of 
governance, globalization, and polymorphic juridification, there is hardly any other way for 
the international legal order to be or to be constituted. 184 The students of international law 
will do their object of study no little disservice if they persist in pretending away this fact. 185 
I mentioned earlier that there is a certain affinity between the investigative project 
of this thesis and the scholarly traditions of American legal realism and the first-wave CLS. 
I should make it clear now: this is not exactly a work written in the field of either of these 
traditions or any of their historical manifestations in the contemporary international law 
discipline. However displeasing or pretentious this may sound, the discipline of 
international law has not yet developed an adequate theoretical apparatus that could 
effectively meet the epistemological requirements of this inquiry. The reason for this, of 
course, is not that difficult to point out. 
Most of the ILTMC-related scholarship in the last twenty years has been decidedly 
formalist and doctrinalist (in its practice, even if not self-designation). No serious lawyer, of 
course, would ever deny that formalism and doctrinalism can have a considerable heuristic 
potential under certain conditions. But a formalist paradigm cannot explain the practical 
effects of the international legal order in its wider social context and doctrinalism cannot 
decode the ideological functionality of its accompanying discourses. To tackle that kind of 
a challenge, one needs to turn away from the rules-oriented approach to the methodology 
of the socio-legal studies. And that is exactly what the new ILTMC scholarship has by and 
large failed to do. 
The degree of progress which the ILTMC project has witnessed in the last twenty 
years has been barely short of breathtaking. From a short list of bland recommendations 
which made up its core in the early 1980s - Article 27 of the International Covenant on 
184 See further on this International Symposium on the International Legal Order, 16 Lei. J. Int'l L. 839 (2003); 
Philippe Sands, Turtles and Torturers: the Transformation of International Larv, 33 N. Y. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol 527 
(2001); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76/5 For. Aff. 183 (1997); David M. Trubek et al, 
Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational 
Arenas, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 407 (1994). 
185 Cf. Philip Alston, Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalization, 8 EJIL 435 (1997). 
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Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)1S6 is a typical illustration - it has moved in less than a 
decade to a full-blown, hierarchically organized normative code of elaborate structure 
spread through a series of ostensibly soft-law instruments adopted initially under the aegis 
of the CSCE and then the Council of Europe. 18' By the middle of the next decade, having 
discovered in the process a completely new field of application and raison d itr' for itself, it 
further witnessed the arrival of a whole separate UN Declaration, "' two legally binding 
treaties, one global, "' one regional, "' a full-time institutionalized mechanism (the OSCE 
HCNM), followed in the next several years by half a dozen sets of "expert 
recommendations" and solemn statements about nationalism, ethnic conflict, and 
multiculturalism that were mentioned earlier. 
None of these developments at the end of the day, however, has received any kind 
of sustained socio-legal engagement from the new ILTMC scholarship. Most of the 
scholarly work dedicated to the ILTMC project in the last two decades has been limited to 
surface descriptions, token historicizations, doctrinal apologetics, and low-intensity 
ideological rationalization. Even those few non-formalist studies that have been produced 
on the topic by the non-mainstream scholars have by and large failed to address the 
essential socio-legal problematic of the new ILTMC order. '`" Partly this happened because 
there were just too few of them; partly because often they did not even try that. 192 
186 Article 27, International Coi'nant on Civil and Political R. aghts, 1966,999 UNTS 171: 
"In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities 
shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language. " 
iss The primary points of reference are the Copenhagen Document, supra n. 20; and the Geneva Report, supra n. 22. 
188 Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, UN GA 
Resolution 47/ 135,18 December 1992, UN Doc. A/47/49. 
189 Contention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 1989,72 ILO Off. Bull. 59. 
190 Frameivork Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, LETS No. 157,1995; reprinted in 34 ILM 351. 
191 The list is short, even if the entries are brilliant: Nathaniel Berman, "The International Law of 
Nationalism: Group Identity and Legal History", in ROBERT J. BECK & THOMAS AMBROSIO (EDS. ), 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RISE OF NATIONS (London: Chatham House, 2002); ZELIM SKURBATY, As 
IF PEOPLES MATTERED 
...: A 
CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL OF `PEOPLES' AND `MINORITIES' FROM THE 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE AND BEYOND (The Hague: Kluwer, 2000); Bill Bowring, 
"Multicultural Citizenship: a More Viable Framework for Minority Rights? ", in DEIRDRE FOTTRELL AND 
BILL BOWRING (EDS. ), MINORITY AND GROUP RIGHTS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 1 (The Hague: Kluwer, 
1999); Eric Heinze, "The Construction and Contingency of the Minority Concept", id., 25; Nathaniel 
91 
To say that the social practicality of the new ILTMC project has remained therefore 
fundamentally underexplored in the contemporary international law scholarship would be, 
thus, a rather serious understatement. There have been no critical-deconstructive analyses 
of the new ILTMC project's internal logic, its impact on the evolution of the practical 
understanding of the international legal order in the ECE region, or its influence on the 
transformation of the international legal process. There have been no socio-legal inquiries 
seeking to elucidate the real effective structure of the new ILTMC regime and its place in 
the regulation of the political economy of the post-Cold War European societies, the 
ideological function of its discursive patterns, or its relationship with the broader processes 
of globalization, juridification, and transgovernmentalism. Aside from the brilliant (but 
ultimately confused) attempt by Skurbaty, 193 there have been no real scholarly efforts to 
penetrate the shiny facade of the official dogma proliferated by the ideological elites at the 
helm of the new ILTMC project and to explore the murky reality behind it. At the end of 
the day, the "invisible college" of the international law scholarship seems to have by and 
large completely ignored the social factuality of the new ILTMC project. 
Moving to the broader field of the general critical discourse, the story hardly seems 
to improve. While numerous studies have been produced in recent years that have 
successfully addressed from the perspective of the traditional critical theory the 
Berman, `But the Alternative is Despair': European Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 
Harv. L. Rev. 1792 (1993); Nathaniel Berman, Nationalism Legal and Linguistic: the Teachings of European 
Jurisprudence, 24 N. Y. U. J. Intl L. & Pol 1515 (1992); Nathaniel Berman, A Perilous Ambivalence: Nationalist 
Desire, Legal Autonomy, and the Limits of the Interwar Framework, 33 Harv. Intl L. J. 353 (1992); Nathaniel 
Berman, Modernism, Nationalism, and the Rhetoric of Reconstruction, 4 Yale J. L. & Hum. 351 (1992). 
192 None of Berman's works target the new ILTMC project. The object of his usual attention, rather, is the 
history of what he calls the "international law of nationalism" in the interwar period. 
193 Supra n. 191. Another potential exception could be the scholarship produced by the modem feminist 
international law scholars. Most of their ILTMC-related insights, however, have come by as a side-effect of 
their investigations of other international legal regimes, in particular the regimes of international human rights 
protection. There have been no feminist studies focused immediately on the ILTMC itself. For the two most 
directly relevant examples of the feminist international law scholarship, see KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND 
SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) and Karen 
Engle, International Human Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet, 13 Mich. J. Int'l L. 517 (1992). 
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problematics of the international human rights project, '" globalization, '95 imperialism, ' 
European integration, 197 and the transformation of the capitalist mode of production, ' 
there has been no comparable degree of interest in the problematic of the new ILTMC 
project. The subject of the new "minorities question" ideology, its legal realization, and its 
historical significance in the context of the post-Cold War international political 
development has by and large remained outside the field of attention of the general critical 
discourse. 
But no one today writes in a true theoretical solitude, 199 not even an international 
legal realist. 
Dialectical theory, legal realism, critical deconstruction, and historical materialism 
may not be, certainly, the most fashionable trends among the modern ILTMC scholars, but 
the analytical project pursued in these pages is not for all that a solitary and lonely project. 
Granted, no single work so far has shared the exact methodological premises of this 
inquiry. But a number of them have resonated with it rather strongly. Of these, a particular 
mention has to be made of David Kennedy's The Dark Sides of I>irtue, 200 China Mieville's 
Between Equal B ghts, 201 B. S. Chimni's Global State in the Making, 202 Kerry Rittich's 
194 See, e. g., DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIANISM (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
195 See, e. g., AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE (London: William Heinemann, 2003); William I. Robinson, 
Globali ation: Nine Theses on Our Epoch, 38: 2 Race and Class 13 (1996). 
196 See, e. g., HARVEY, supra n. 67; Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant, On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason, 16 
Theory, Cult. & Soc. 41 (1999). 
197 See, e. g., Susan Watkins, Continental Tremors, 33 NLR 5 (2005). 
198 See, e. g., LESLIE SKLAIR, THE TRANSNATIONAL CAPITALIST CLASS (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001); HARDT 
AND NEGRI, supra n. 67. 
199 On the notion of theoretical solitude, see further LOUIS ALTHUSSER, MACHIAVELLI AND US 117-30 
(transl. by Gregory Elliot and Ben Brewster; London: Verso, 1999). 
200 Supra n. 194. See also David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15 Harv. 
Hum. Rts. J. 101 (2002). 
201 CHINA MIEVILLE, BETWEEN EQUAL RIGHTS: A MARXIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Leiden: 
Brill, 2004). See also China Mieville, The Commocla'y-Form Theory of International Law: an Introduction, 17 Lei. J. 
Int'l L. 271 (2004). 
202 B. S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: an Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 EJIL 1 (2004). See also 
B. S. Chimni, "Cooption and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative Law", IILJ Working Paper 
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Kecharacterz! ýng Restructuring, " and James Gathii's Good Governance as a Counter Insurgency 
Agenda. 204 On the level of the epistemological tactics important parallels can also be found 
in Peter Fitzpatrick and Patricia Tuitt's Critical Beings, 2'S Nathaniel Berman's Modernism and 
the . 
Rhetoric of Reconstruction, 206 and David Kennedy's International Legal Strzrctures. 207 
Like every other product of the literary process, 208 this thesis is ultimately a work 
that has developed its theory as it went about performing its practice. The theory in which 
this inquiry has found its organization, in other words, was not a master blueprint executed 
by a mechanical process. It did not grow out from some pre-existing insight like a plant 
from a seed sown in a patch of fertile soil. On the contrary, it was the product of a drawn- 
out laborious practice, constituted painstakingly, step by step. 
"A literary work, " wrote Pierre Macherey once, "is never entirely premeditated; or 
rather, it is, but at several levels at once without deriving monolithically from a unique and 
simple conception. "209 It is "the product of a certain labour, " an overdetermined work of 
an artisan, "not of a conjurer or a showman. " To grasp the general essence of the literary 
process, we must recognize two things. First, "method" and "theory" are not just some 
free-floating phenomena but the essential materials of the scholarly work. Second, "[t]he 
writer, as the producer of a text, does not manufacture the materials with which he works. 
Neither does he stumble across them as spontaneously available wandering fragments, 
2005116 (Global Administrative Lain Series), Institute for International Law and Justice, New York University 
Law School, 2005. 
203 KERRY RITTICH, RECHARACTERIZING RESTRUCTURING: LAW, DISTRIBUTION AND GENDER IN MARKET 
REFORM (The Hague: Kluwer, 2002). See also Kerry Bittich, Transformed Pursuits: the Quest for Equality in 
Global. Zed Markets, 13 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 231 (2000). 
204 James Thuo Gathii, Good Governance as a Counter Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and Transformaiive Social 
Projects in International Law, 5 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 107 (1999). See also James Thuo Gathii, Neoliberalism, 
Colonialism and International Governance: Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 
1996 (2000). 
205 PETER FITZPATRICK AND PATRICIA TUITT (EDS. ), CRITICAL BEINGS: LAW, NATION AND THE GLOBAL 
SUBJECT (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004). 
206 Supra n. 191. 
207 DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
1987). 
208 I borrow the idea of the literary production from PIERRE MACHEREY, A THEORY OF LITERARY 
PRODUCTION (transt by Geoffrey WaTh London: Routledge, 2006). 
209 Id., 46. 
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useful in the building of any sort of edifice. i21° Rather, he constructs them, gradually, 
painstakingly, while also coming inevitably to be constructed (in his text-producing role) 
"back. " 
The methodological component that in the conventional imagery cements every 
thesis and gives it its specific sense of internal composure is not, in fact, a starting element 
of the inquiry, but a thoroughly overdetermined effect of its practice. Its construction is 
not deprived of its own logic, but that logic is too complex to be reduced to an abstract 
formulation. To see it in its full complexity, to comprehend the manner in which its 
constituent tensions are turned into that ad-hoc balance which in the end finds its 
embodiment in the final product, one must restore the awareness of its individual history, 
its past, its trajectory, the long and winding path the course of its development took on its 
way to where it is now. 
However, the conventions of the established practice dictate that as far as possible 
one should always refrain from attempting anything along those lines. The sequence of the 
written narrative, according to the established expectations, must be decoupled from that 
of the thought in which it was produced. What in reality, thus, can only become clear after 
the work is finished - and even then only with the benefit of several journeys up and down 
the same path - in written practice is usually articulated at the beginning of the work. With 
this as my basic disclaimer, let me turn now to my next chapter, the chapter on the 
question of method. Retracing the steps that have taken me through this field, let me show 
now how exactly - by what logic and on what terms - this thesis has arrived at that model 
of the legal realist critique which it adopted and what exactly it understands by the idea of 
"legal realism. " 
210 Id., 47, 
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II 
Method 
"The most valuable insights are the last to be discovered; 
but the most valuable insights are methods. " 
Friedrich Nietzsche, TbeAnti-Christ, §13 
My objective in this chapter is twofold. First, I am going to explain the basic 
methodological challenges facing this thesis. Then I am going to describe the general 
epistemological framework from within which I have written it. 
For a number of reasons, which I discuss in the opening section, I have decided to 
steer clear of the traditional epistemological framework characteristic of most modem-day 
international law scholarship. Drawing on the work of the French Marxist philosopher 
Louis Althusser and his students Pierre Macherey and Nicos Poulantzas, I offer instead to 
consider the problematic of the ILTMC from the perspective of an alternative 
epistemological framework, one constructed on the basis of a dialectical understanding of 
the historically constituted socio-political conjuncture (historical materialism). Seen against 
this background, the first main question addressed in this chapter can be essentially 
summarized in the following terms: 
The first problem, which materialism always re-establishes in its priority, is the 
problem of the objectivity of the reflection. It poses the question: `Is there an 
existent material reality reflected in the mind which determines thought? ' ... 
The 
second problem, which can only be posed correctly on the basis of the first, 
concerns the ... 
knowledge of the exactitude of the reflection. It poses the 
question, `If thought reflects an existent reality how accurate is its reflection? ' or 
better, `Under what conditions (i. e. historical conditions whereby the dialectic 
between `absolute truth' and `relative truth' intervenes) can it provide an accurate 
reflection? ' ... 
In the context, it is clear that this second problem poses the 
question, `What form does the reflection take? ' But it only has a materialist 
implication once the first question has been posed and the objectivity of the 
reflection affirmed. ' 
1 Etienne Balibar and Pierre Macherey, "On Literature as an Ideological Form, " in TERRY EAGLETON AND 
DREW MILNE (EDS. ), MARXIST LITERARY THEORY: A READER 275,278-9 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) (transt 
by I. McLeod et al. ). 
97 
Every method constructs its own object. In the end, though, the authority of every method 
always derives from the nature of its object. 2 From this basic interdependency derives the 
general law of all discursive production, a social practice whose basic concept is 
constituted by a structure which combines ('Verbindun<g) the type of object (raw 
material) on which it labours, the theoretical means of production (its theory, its 
method and its technique, experimental or otherwise) and the historical relations 
(both theoretical, ideological and social) in which it produces. 3 
The epistemological mechanism of the historico-materialist method having been 
constructed, I will turn then to the production of this thesis's object of discourse, 
explaining in the process the basic difference between a genuinely historico-materialist 
study of the new ILTMC's problematic and the study undertaken in these pages. 
2 See PIERRE MACHEREY, A THEORY OF LITERARY PRODUCTION 9 (transl. by Geoffrey Wall; London: 
Routledge, 2006). 
3 LOUIS ALTHUSSER AND ETIENNE BALIBAR, READING CAPITAL 41 (trans]. by Ben Brewster, London: New 
Left Books, 1970) [hereafter READING CAPITAL]. For a similar understanding but formulated in different 
terms, see J. M. Ballon, Interdiscz kinarity as Colonisation, 53 Wash. & Lee L Rev. 949,955-7 (1996) 
(outlining a 
vision of a discursive process occurring under the rubric of 
"discipline" and its relationship with thought, 
reason, and reasoning). 
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Section One 
The Discursive Conventions of International Law Scholarship 
a. The Ethical Dynamics of the Traditional Scholarsh p 
Whatever one may think of them otherwise, most Ph. D. theses are written to be read. The 
starting question of every such undertaking, consequently, must be: "Who is the target 
audience of this work? " 
It is not very common among modem international lawyers' to spend much time 
thinking about the target audiences of their discourses. Naturally, virtually all international 
lawyers will be quick to recognize (or at least declare they do) the basic difference between 
an article written for an international law yearbook and a dissenting opinion rendered in the 
context of an international adjudication. That, however, is usually nothing but an 
appearance. 
In practice, most international lawyers hardly exhibit any real awareness of the basic 
differences between the readers of yearbook articles and the readers of international 
judgments. A good portion of the modern-day "invisible college" seems to live under the 
impression - even though most of them would probably deny this with great vehemence if 
4 It is possible that this statement can be seen as an excessive generalization. As Austin Sarat has repeatedly 
argued (see, e. g., The Profession versus the Public Interest: Rýflections on Two Re(cations, 54 Stan. L Rev. 1491 (2002), 
the legal profession is not nearly as unitary and internally coherent as most sociological discussions of it tend 
to suggest. That said, it still remains true that, however we go about it, unless we are ready to give up on 
everything but the most vulgar forms of phenomenologism, generalizations will remain an inevitable feature 
of every theoretical inquiry we undertake and every scholarly text we write. 
True, one can always assert at this point that few actual international lawyers consciously subscribe to the 
views I discuss here. As I understand it, this argument completely misses the point. What I offer here is a 
general impression of the scholarly genre as a whole, not a statistics sheet for every individual scholar's life 
project. Some symptoms plaguing our collective practices cannot be adequately explained unless we are 
prepared to engage in large-scale generalizations. The current case, I believe, is one of those cases. 
5 David Kennedy has written at length about this. So has Paul Kahn. See, further, David Kennedy, Theses 
about International Law Discourse, 23 GYIL 353 (1980); PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: 
RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 109 et seq (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999). More 
generally, see also David Kennedy, The Disci'lznes of 
International Law and Policy, 12 Lei. J Int'l L. 9 (1999). 
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anyone decided to state it openly - that they secretly sit on the International Court of 
Justice or, better still, that it is once again 1648 or 1945 and they have just been asked to fill 
in for the whole San Francisco conference or whoever it was who thought up the Treaties 
of Munster and Osnabruck. ' Reading on a regular basis Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute' 
and Ronald Dworkin, 8 obviously, does not help. 
Regardless of how far one can legitimately go in categorizing such attitudes as a 
mild form of daydreaming, it seems that a fairly good case can be made today for the 
proposition that historically the most respectable genres of scholarly writing in 
international law seem to have been those that have denied every notion that the scholarly 
endeavour might have any value in its own right, constantly reducing it to the pallid role of 
the shy dishwasher who simply cannot believe her fantastic luck in having stumbled upon 
these glamorous demigods of "legal practice" whom she can now humbly serve. The basic 
idea behind the ideal model of the scholarly practice in international law, in other words, is 
that 
scholars [are supposed to] suggest ways to modify current practice, proposing 
that what worked in one area be tried in another, or generalize from past 
successes and failures in order that they might be repeated or avoided. 
6 For a comprehensive overview of these two treaties, more commonly known under a single heading as "The 
Peace of Westphalia, " and a good illustration of the established dogma about their ideological contribution to 
the development of modem international law, see further Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 42 AJIL 20 
(1948). 
7 See Article 38, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945,59 Stat. 1031: 
"1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. " 
For a summary of the traditional understanding of Article 38(1)(d), see further IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4,24-5 (5th edn.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) (the works of 
international law scholars are a material source of international law, not a formal source). 
8 See, e. g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
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Scholarship of this type aims to persuade the reader that there exists a better 
mousetrap, and most scholarly work in the international law field presents itself 
in this way. ... The key here is that there is another group of people, called 
"practitioners, " for whom scholars are doing this work and who will judge its 
persuasiveness and ultimate value. However argumentative and critical this work 
may be, it will ultimately be judged not by other scholars on the basis of its 
arguments, but by practitioners on the basis of its usefulness.... If an idea is not 
taken up and repeated by practitioner-beings, it must not be useful. 9 
On closer inspection, the reality behind the appearances, as usual, turns out to be quite 
different. The image of the Dworkinean Hercules, as Pierre Schlag has correctly observed, 'o 
at the end of the day, is not, in fact, an idealized image of a judge - just as the Fullerian 
Rex" is not, in fact, an idealized image of a legislator - but rather that of a middle-aged, 
middle-class, First-World legal academic with an overly ambitious ego. The constant self- 
effacement practiced by the practice-oriented international law scholarly discourse is in 
reality, thus, nothing but an inverted form of self-aggrandizement. Scholars write for 
judges12 not because they hope that the judges will take the time to listen to their helpful 
advice, but because they expect the judges to heed and venerate their wisdom. 
Certainly, not all international law scholars usually write in this vein. The argument 
here, however, is not about that. When I talk about the discursive conventions of 
international law scholarship I do not have in mind some universal invariants or a brooding 
omnipresence in the sky of which the invisible college of international law scholarship is a 
mere plaything. I do not pretend - nor am I interested - to know what holds true for all 
international law scholars under all conditions all of the time. My interest is only limited to 
their conventional wisdom, i. e. what the invisible college of international law scholars has 
historically identified as the privileged forms of its practice and how these forms of practice 
9 David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats Itself. " Thinking against the Box, 32 NYU J Intl L. & Pol. 335,398-9 
(2000) [hereafter Da. Kennedy, Thinking against the Box]. 
10 Pierre Schlag, `Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi". " The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction, 11 
Cardozo L Rev. 1631,1662-6 (1990). See also Pierre Schlag, Normativüy and the Politics of Form, 139 U. Pa. L 
Rev. 801,845 (1991). 
11 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33 et seq. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963). 
12 See Pierre Schlag, IF%ritzng for Judges, 63 U. Colo. L Rev. 419 (1992). 
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construct their target audiences. In this connection, I find it is rather uncontroversial to 
observe that at the very least: (i) most international law scholarship today is essentially 
normative; 13 (ii) the hallmark of normative legal scholarship is that is proceeds on the 
assumption that social institutions, such as, for instance, treaty regimes, can and ought to 
be subjected to some sort of moral (in the broader sense of the word) evaluations; (iii) for 
such evaluations to be possible, at least three conditions have to be assumed: (a) that a set 
of principles external to the institutions in question exists and can be employed in the role 
of a yardstick against which the institutions can be measured, (b) that people can be 
reasoned to on the basis of these principles, and (c) that people have enough free will to be 
able to accept or to refuse to accept these principles; (iv) the abstract person who agrees 
with all the above and, in particular, satisfies condition (c) is the ideal "Thinking Man" to 
whom all this scholarly discourse is addressed. 14 
It does not take a particularly strenuous effort to figure out how problematic this 
attitude can become. To start with, the "Thinking Man" simply does not exist; chances are, 
moreover, it never did. 15 Even if this were not the case, it would still be true that whoever 
comes close to fitting the "Thinking Man"'s ideal profile is not, probably, the kind of 
person the modem international law discourse - or, at any rate, the ILTMC discourse - 
should pride itself on picking as its main interlocutor or target audience. Judging by the 
general traits expected of him, the "Thinking Man" is clearly a well-educated, upper-middle 
class person who resides in the First World, belongs to the global cultural-economic elite, 
and is sufficiently politically empowered to interest himself with the moral improvement of 
the global political institutions. 
Put differently, the ideal target audience of the traditional international law 
scholarship does not consist of the global underclass, the economically marginalized, the 
ethnically cleansed, the uneducated, the low-paid, or the IDPs. The moral vantage point 
from which the majority of the "invisible college" writes its normative evaluations of those 
13 Further on the concept of normative scholarship, see Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 Stan. L 
Rev. 167 (1990). 
14 For further analysis of the narratological institution of the "Thinking Man, " see THURMAN W. ARNOLD, 
THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 5-7 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937). 
15 "Fact-minded persons who do not believe in the `thinking man' and who do not expect to gain political 
objectives by making rational appeals to him are not considered respectable. They are called `politicians' and 
not `political scientists. "' (Id., 60. ) 
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social institutions which it picks for consideration is not that of the dispossessed, the 
excluded, and the browbeaten. The sociology of the traditional international law scholarly 
discourse does not extend beyond the maddeningly narrow - especially when considered in 
the global context - circle within which the mythology of 
liberal politics can resonate freely 
with the practical experiences of its interlocutors undrowned by the grim realities of annual 
epidemics, civil strife, ethnic cleansing, functional illiteracy, urban poverty, permanent 
economic crisis, gender violence, systemic discrimination, and exclusion. 
Approaching it against this background, consequently, here is the first 
methodological challenge confronting us in these pages: how can this Ph. D. thesis begin to 
comment on the established normative regimes constituting the body of the modem 
international law relating to the treatment of minority communities if the discursive 
conventions adopted in the traditional international law scholarship make it structurally 
incapable of engaging with the practical experiences of some of the worst afflicted among 
these minority communities? Is it not the case that every discourse that addresses itself only 
to the ideologically dominant groups but has as its immediate object of reference the 
general situation and the terms of life of the politically disempowered communities, is, in 
fact, an instrument of hegemonic dominance, by means of which the former manage and 
administer the lives of the latter, or, to put it slightly less elegantly, keep the excluded where 
they are? Accepting the prevailing consensus that, whatever else it may be, a minority 
community is first and foremost politically non-dominant, how, against this background, 
can we start producing an international law scholarship for and in favour of - and not just 
about or on behalf of - such communities? Is this something that is practically achievable? 
Or 
does this task belong in the realm of the effectively impossible? How can we produce an 
international law scholarship that will empathize with the minorities' practical experience 
and still not veer away from the established professional conventions so far as to alienate 
the rest of the "scholarly guild" and sink, against their rejection, like a stone in a quiet 
pond? 
It is not, of course, a pure contingency that the scholarly discourse of international 
law has developed such a strong tilt in favour of the powerful and the dominant. But is 
there any way one could try to change this? Put differently, is international law scholarship 
by its very nature the wrong forum for doing something other than entertaining the fantasy of 
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the Dworkinean Hercules and talking to the "Thinking Man" or can we write an 
international law scholarship that from the perspective of the oppressed minorities? 
The further one delves into these questions, the more unlikely it seems one is going 
to find a quick resolution to any of them. Part of the reason for that, undoubtedly, lies in 
the essential complexity of the ethical impulse for empathization. 
The basic logic of the modem aspiration for empathy, as Keith Jenkins has recently 
pointed out, derives ultimately from the classical liberal tradition in its Millian 
formulation, " at the centre of which, famously, stood 
the notion that the individual could do what he/she desired so long as the 
exercise of that desire did not curtail the liberty of others. To calculate if this 
would occur as a consequence of any action, the person (agent) had to imagine 
what these consequences would be; to put him/herself into other people's 
positions; to see their point of view. In doing so this calculation would have to be 
both rational and universalisable, capable of rational reciprocation for all 
involved. For if the person(s) affected were ever in a position to do the same 
thing back to the agent then mutual harm could occur. ... 
This approach - being 
rational, seeing other people's views and balancing the options and thus the 
possibly hurtful consequences of extreme actions (extremism) - is thus what lies 
behind all those requests to put oneself into another person's position ...; to try 
to see things from their perspective. 17 
What Jenkins seems to be saying here, in other words, is this: the practical logic of 
empathization in its classical liberal format essentially requires that, in order to be able to 
empathize, we need both to de-contextualize the phenomenon of experience and to assume 
the existence of something in the register of a universal experiential grammar, that is, a 
transcendental systematic grid in reference to which different agents can synchronize their 
appreciations of different experiences. For an intellectual project like this to become 
possible, however, at least three ontological conditions appear to be necessary. 
16 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
17 See KEITH JENKINS, RE-THINKING HISTORY 54 (London: Routledge, 2003). 
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Firstly, it must be assumed that all experiences are essentially intelligible. In other 
words, we must accept as basically self-evident the view that every experience is organized 
around a certain internal logic by grasping which one can make enough sense of it to 
understand its practical significance. Secondly, it must be assumed that every experience is 
susceptible to cognition not only through immediate practice but also through analytical 
exertion so long as by that exertion we grasp the essence of its internal logic. In other 
words, one must believe that in order to understand what it is like to be a lower middle 
class Tatar woman living in Kyiv one does not necessarily have to fill her proverbial shoes: 
so long as one frames the terms of one's analysis correctly, one can understand everything 
one needs to understand. Thirdly - and most importantly - it must be also assumed that all 
experiences have a common, context-independent foundation. In other words, we must 
take it for granted that all experiences consist of the same constituent blocks and follow the 
same set of developmental regularities by understanding which the non-experiencing 
subjects can work out the basic essence of every experience without having to enter them 
on the receiving end. 
A different way of putting this is to say that the practical logic of empathy is 
essentially the logic of rationalist hegemony. To figure out, how a particular action would 
be perceived from other people's vantage point, we project ourselves into the functional 
subject positions occupied by them by first singling out the intelligible essence of the 
targeted experiences and then analytically readapting the corresponding context to our 
subject capacities through the transposition of the relevant blocks of our personalities into 
the relevant parts of the given experiences' logical grids. When we engage in empathetic 
practices, in other words, what we really do is not gauge what other people's experiences 
are but only imagine what our experiences in their situation could become, which is 
effectively the same thing as to say that the methodology of empathy is based on a 
combination of reduction, universalization, and the self-aggrandizement of reason. Since it 
is only the functionality of another person's experience, i. e. the experience's objective 
relationship with the rest of its context, that can be cognized without having to live 
through that experience itself, it follows that to be able to empathize we must always 
inevitably reduce the lived experiences of other people to their functional role in that 
remainder of their context which is susceptible to analytical reconstruction. At the same 
time, since there is no such thing as a presuppositionless thought, when we empathize we 
105 
always inevitably end up universali ing our own values by substituting an abstract golem 
constructed through our exercise of reason for the multidimensional singularity of the living 
experiencer's figure within its lived practice. The usual name reserved to such operations in 
modern political theory is "hegemony. >)18 
But if empathy is essentially (only) a species of hegemony, where does this fact 
leave us with regard to our initial apprehension about the methodology of the traditional 
international law scholarship? 
One way of responding to this dilemma, of course, would be to reject this 
apprehension and to re-legitimize the traditional conventions of the scholarly practice: 
hegemonism is inevitable; it happens in all discursive contexts, between all cultures, and in 
all inter-personal encounters. Foucault said as much. 19 So also did Edward Said. ZO 
International law scholars cannot be expected to achieve what is ontologically 
unachievable. The only thing each of them can then be asked to do is to admit that: "[l]Ike 
other theorists, I have no wish to write in a way that is falsely universalizing, exclusionary, 
arrogant, and domineering. Yet the fact remains that it is impossible to write theory 
without generalizing and universalizing. "21 For "the very moment of speaking (or writing) is 
[in itself always] a moment of arrogation, " and to that "there is no alternative. "' 
However logical (and practically convenient) it may seem at first, this argument, I 
think, is ultimately flawed. Simply because hegemonism is ontologically inevitable - and the 
discourse of the international law scholarship cannot, for that reason, ever escape being 
18 ERNESTO LAC-LAU AND CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY AND SOCIALIST STRATEGY xiii (2nd edn.; London: 
Verso, 2001): "This relation, by which a certain particularity assumes the representation of a universality 
entirely incommensurable with it, is what we call a hegemonic relation. " 
19 Although Foucault did not explicitly use the term "hegemony" in the sense described above, a common 
idea that goes through all his works is the idea that every discursive enterprise is ultimately an enterprise of 
ruling and domination. See further MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF 
INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON (transl. by Richard Howard; London: Routledge, 2001); MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (transl. by Alan Sheridan; New York: 
Vintage Books, 1995); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 92-102 (transL 
by Robert Hurley, New York: Vintage Books, 1990); MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED 
INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977 (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1980). 
20 See in particular EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 50-72 (London: Penguin, 2003). 
21 TORIL MOI, WHAT IS A WOMAN? 123 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
22 Id., 249-50. 
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hegemonic, however hard it tries - it does not yet necessarily follow that the particular 
hegemonic system maintained by the discursive conventions of the traditional international 
law scholarship is in fact legitimate. Hegemonies, like realisms, after all, come in different 
stripes and colours. 23 To be able to figure out which are "better" than others, we need first 
to understand what it is about hegemonism that makes it so immediately objectionable to 
our eyes as international lawyers. 
A significant part of the moral case justifying the impulsive aversion to the practice 
of hegemonism commonly perpetuated in the modem cultural environment, it seems, 
ultimately derives from the classical liberal assumption that, in its essence, hegemony 
represents an unrestrained projection of subjective political will, and will, being a basic 
emanation of desire, is always, by its character, arbitrary and irrational. Desires, declares the 
liberal metaphysics, are by their very nature always irrational. 24 Their contents can never be 
defended by any exertion of Reason, nor can they be brought onto any kind of logical 
basis. Desires can only be described and classified, but never fully comprehended or 
controlled. However one goes about them, in the liberal worldview, desires are an 
unwaveringly suspicious bunch of characters that should never be given a free hand in 
anything. 
Given that all people are born equal, continues the classical liberal argument, no 
one person's desires can be recognized as inherently superior to anyone else's. Any attempt 
to impose one's desires on others, consequently, is not only utterly indefensible on the 
ground that it cannot be sanctioned by Reason, but also on the ground that it runs 
absolutely contrary to the principle that all people are essentially equal. Only if a positively 
created political consensus concluded by people in the exercise of their mutual equalities - 
the Rousseauvian social contract - establishes some form of an inter-personal hierarchy, it 
seems, can this position ever be changed. In the self-imagery of the modern international 
law project no such consensus, however, has ever been concluded, not at least in the 
context of the inter-cultural encounters between minority and majority communities. If we 
are to remain worthy of the ethical ambitions our professional sensibility has inculcated in 
23 Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Lain and International Relations, 285 Recueil des Cours 9,30 (2000). 
24 My understanding of the metaphysics of liberalism is borrowed from ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, 
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (New York: The Free Press, 1984) and Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 23 
Leg. Stud. 351 (1973). 
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us, 25 consequently, it follows, we must on every possible occasion oppose every 
manifestation of inter-cultural hegemony. But let us take another step forward and ask: to 
what extent is this duty practically performable? 
The logic of the liberal ideology, as Unger and others before him pointed out, is 
essentially a logic of vicious circles and irresolvable contradictions. 26 The reason for this, as 
Nietzsche explains, derives from a rather peculiar ideological anachronism: having 
dethroned the medieval metaphysical system of Religion grounded in the concept of God, 
liberalism decided to retain the two basic prizes - knowledge and comfort - which Religion 
had traditionally promised to its disciples. The problem with that retention, however, was 
that it created a set of fundamentally unfulfillable expectations, for once God had been 
removed from the picture, the two basic questions on which Religion offered to its 
disciples the possibility of a comfortable knowledge - "why does anything exist at all, rather 
than nothing?, " and, "why do people have to die? " - became effectively unanswerable. 
Instead of interrogating the driving momentum of the productive impulses which pushed it 
towards these questions, liberalism chose to press on stubbornly in its quest to answer 
them, thus preparing its own self-arrestment. 
Suppose that everything man `knows' does not satisfy his desires but instead 
contradicts them and arouses horror, what a divine excuse it is to be permitted to 
lay the guilt for this at the door of `knowing' rather than `wishing'? ... 
`There is 
no knowing; consequently - there is a God'. 
27 
The problem, says Nietzsche, is that once the liberal project of Reason begins to realize its 
inability to resolve the two questions it had inherited from Religion, it ultimately has no 
way to stop itself from self-destruction. "' Not knowing how to restore its internal 
composure, liberalism throws itself back to the same point from which it had tried to 
25 I borrow this phrase from Pierre Bourdieu. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, HOMO ACADEMICUS xxv (transi by 
Peter Colier; Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988). 
26 See UNGER, supra n. 24,6-7. 
27 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY 123 (tranls. by Carol Diethe; Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
28 Terry Eagleton discusses the same problematic from a slightly different perspective in TERRY EAGLETON, 
AFTER THEORY 194-8 (London: Penguin, 2004). 
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depart in the first place when it set out to eradicate "Religion. " Arrested by the radical 
incommensurability between its aspirations and its capacities, the liberal project of Reason 
pushes itself into an endless sequence of irresolvable contradictions. Brought to its logical 
limits, it leads itself into a situation in which the only way for it to overcome its paralyzing 
antinomies is to bring back the same metaphysical sensibility which it had originally set out 
to fight on the grounds that it was essentially a mystification, a sensibility which it now 
purifies and reinforces, making it "more elusive, more spiritual, more insidious" by 
"constantly and unsparingly detach[ing] and br[eaking] off a wall or outwork that attached 
itself to it and coarsened its appearance. i29 
Nietzsche's diagnosis of the basic predicament of the liberal project of Reason was 
issued more than a century ago. Yet it could hardly be any more relevant today. One only 
has to think of Heidegger with his Dasein, 30 Camus with his deification of "the absurd, i31 or 
Unger, with his nervous "Speak, God, "' to see how prescient Nietzsche's observations 
have turned out to be. 
Whatever guise it takes, the liberal project of Reason always runs out of steam at 
one point or another. When this happens, the ethical logic (i. e. the logic that teaches us 
what we must do) generated on its basis immediately grinds to an abrupt halt. 33 The void 
that becomes exposed after this can then either be acknowledged in an open return to 
29 NIETZSCHE, supra n. 27,122. 
30 See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (transi. by John Macquarie and Edward Robinson; Routledge, 
2002). 
31 See ALBERT CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS (transi. by Justin O'Brien; London: Penguin, 2000). 
32 See UNGER, supra n. 24,295. 
33 Camus captures the mood quite forcefully: "all the knowledge on earth will give me nothing to assure me 
that this world is mine. You describe it to me and you teach me to classify it. You enumerate its laws and in 
my thirst for knowledge I admit that they are true. You take apart its mechanism and my hope increases. At 
the final stage you teach me that this wondrous and multi-coloured universe can be reduced to the atom and 
that the atom itself can be reduced to the electron. All this is good and I want for you to continue. But you 
tell me of an invisible planetary system in which electrons gravitate around a nucleus. You explain this world 
to me with an image. I realize then that you have been reduced to poetry: I shall never know. ... 
What need 
had I of so many efforts? The soft lines of these hills and the hand of evening on this troubled heart teach me 
much more. ... 
A stranger to myself and to the world, armed solely with a thought that negates itself as soon 
as its asserts, what is this condition in which I can have peace only by refusing to know and to live, in which 
the appetite for conquest bumps into walls that defy its assaults? " (CAMUS, supra n. 31,25. ) 
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some pre-Enlightenment sensibility or be shamefacedly covered up by the various ersatzes 
of the postmodern God and the corresponding tropes. 34 
Faced with the "unnameable" "monstrosity" "proclaiming itself ... under the 
species of the non- species, "" Jacques Derrida had discovered, beneath the maze of all signs 
and structures, the traces of an "arche-writing" and a "d4erance. i36 Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
bending his seasoned spade, uncovered instead the "language games" and the "forms of 
life. "" Jacques Lacan invented "the Real, "38 Gilles Deleuze made out the contours of the 
"pure immanence .,, 
3' Antonio Negri thought up "kairo. ' and "the multitude. "' Jurgen 
Habermas conjured "discourse ethics" and "ideal speech situations. "" Toril Moi invested 
her faith in the good intentions of speech and the "non-defiant silence" of "restful self- 
respect. "42 Each of them might as well have joined John Lennon and simply called it 
"God. "43 Little would have changed in terms of the additional insight. 
34 For an illuminating overview of how this is achieved, for example, in modern American jurisprudence, see 
further PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 92-125 (Durham, NC: The Duke University Press, 
1998). 
35 See Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, " in JACQUES 
DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 278,293 (transl. by Alan Bass; Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1978). 
36 On arche-writing, see JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAIvIMATOLOGY (transi. by Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak; 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). On diferance, see JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS 
OF PHILOSOPHY 1-28 (transl. by Alan Bass; Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982). 
37 See further LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY (trans]. by Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe; 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979). 
38 For a general introduction to Lacan's theory, see JACQUES LACAN, ECRITS (trans]. by Alan Sheridan; 
London: Routledge, 2001); MALCOLM BOWIE, LACAN (London: Fontana Press, 1991); SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE 
SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY (London: Verso, 1989). 
39 See further GILLES DELEUZE, PURE IMMANENCE: ESSAYS ON A LIFE (trans]. by Anne Boyman; New York: 
Zone Books, 2001). 
40 See further ANTONIO NEGRI, TIME FOR REVOLUTION (transl, by Matteo Mandarin; London: Continuum 
Publishers, 2003). 
41 See further JÜRGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE ETHICS 
(trans]. by Ciaran P. Cronin; Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993). 
42 See MOI, supra n. 21,230-50. 
43 Cf. John Lennon, "God", in JOHN LENNON/PLASTIC ONO BAND 10 (Parlophone Audio CD; 2000): "God 
is a concept by which we measure our pain. " 
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The relevance of all these observations for the present purposes should be quite 
self-evident. So long as in our discursive practices we continue to retain both the liberal 
promise of a non-religious metaphysics and the religious promise of reaching an existential 
comfort amidst the practical activity of knowledge, the question of hegemony is going to 
remain ontologically irresolvable. Another way of putting this is to say that the ethical 
question of discursive hegemony in international law scholarship is effectively only a proxy 
for the ontological question of God in the liberal project of non-religious metaphysics. 
Some of the best minds of the 20" century have tried to resolve this problem. All of them 
have failed without exception. Even the illustrious leaders of the "new approaches to 
international law" movement, ' all their unquestionable brilliance notwithstanding, have not 
been able to escape this fate. 45 Faced with the fundamental irresolvability of the Reason- 
induced conflict between the ethics of empathy and the ethics of anti-hegemonic 
resistance, every discursive resolution they produced over the last twenty years has, in one 
way or another, has arrived on the back of an essentially religious trope. 
Thus, for Nathaniel Berman in 1999 it was the trope of expiatory self-flagellation 
that provided a convincing illusion of a way out from the impasse into which the stalemate 
of international law's universal present and its Eurocentric imperialist past had evolved. ' 
Meanwhile, for Martti Koskenniemi a decade earlier it was the Hegelian update of Spinozist 
pantheism that created the confidence that there might be a viable path beyond the Scylla 
and Charibdes of apology and utopia. 47 For David Kennedy two years before that the 
44 Further on the history of the "new approaches to international law" movement, see Da. Kennedy, Thinking 
against the Box, 457-500; Martti Koskenniemi, Letter to the Editors of the Symposium, 93 AJIL 351 (1999); Thomas 
Skouteris, Fin de NAIL New Approaches to International Law and Its Impact on Contemporary International Legal 
Scholarship, 10 Lei J Intl L. 415 (1997). For the external perspectives on the movement, see also Deborah Z. 
Cass, Navigating the Newstream: Recent Critical Scholarship in International Law, 65 Nord. J Intl L. 341 (1996); 
Anthony Carty, Critical International Lase: Recent Trends in the Theory of International Law, 2 EJIL 66 (1991); Nigel 
Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32 Harv. Intl Lj 81 (1991). 
45 Which they themselves would probably not contest. See Da. Kennedy, Thinking against the Box, 499-500; 
Koskenniemi, supra n. 44,359-61. 
46 See Nathaniel Berman, In the Wake of Empire, 14 Am. U. Intl L Rev. 1521,1552-4 (1999) (propagating the 
acceptance of international law's "fundamental irredeemability" and ending with an appeal for "international 
law [to] muster the courage to look frankly, painfully, at the horrors of its own past'). 
47 See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ARGUMENT 491-8 (Helsinki Lakimiesliiton Kustannus, 1989) (arguing that "it is necessary to outline for the 
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promise of international law's disciplinary liberation from the chain of deadlocks between 
theory and practice had come from essentially the same logic as that which lies at the heart 
of the literal Kabbalah. ' A decade and a half later, in 2004, it became the tam of the 
Calvinist tropes of unceasing effort49 (Koskenniemi)5° and grace (Kennedy)51 to do the job 
of the dens ex machina by carrying the burden of transcending the irresolvable opposition 
between "law-humanitarianism-community" and "politics-governance-oppression. " 
Where does all this leave us in the end? What does the record of these failures tell 
us about the nature of the ethical challenge facing us on the methodological front? There 
are, it seems, at least two general lessons that we can draw from our discussion so far: 
1. Pursuing a scholari commitment in international law requires a basic tolerance for 
contradiction and the unachievabilzty of emotional tranquility. The job of the international law 
lawyer an existance in routine which constantly aims at transforming the contexts which shape it and an 
intellectual directedness towards context-transformation without losing touch of its embeddedness in 
routine, " the proposed solution being the ethics of "contextual equity" defined as the "commitment to 
reaching the most just solution in the particular disputes he is faced with" and the "routine which allows the 
lawyer to escape from the limitation of the role and help to create a better society while enabling him to live a 
conscious and meaningful life as a lawyer in the midst of the actuality of social and political conflict"). Cf. 
Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1 E31L 4,31 (1990). 
48 See David Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7 Wisc. Intl L. J. 1,6-12 (1988) 
(expressing the hope that by "reimagining the field" in terms of rhetorical patterns, treating "theory" and 
"history" as the continuation of "doctrine, " and approaching "doctrine" as a set of textual practices, one can 
"dislodge the discipline of international law from its stagnation in post-war realism" and "releas[e it] from a 
constellation of [illusory] images"). See also more generally KENNEDY, infra n. 83. 
49 For further discussion of this trope, see ERICH FROMM, THE FEAR OF FREEDOM 78-80 (London: 
Routledge, 2002). 
50 See Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal, 16 EJIL 113,118-123 
(2005) (arguing that "the choice is not between law and politics, but between one politics of law and another" 
and that through hard effort and good-faith reliance on our everyday practical wisdom - "the real difficulty 
lies in being able to make that distinction - and I can invoke nothing better than the personal 
histories of all 
of us to make the point that we constantly do make that distinction" - backed up by art and religion we can 
somehow make that choice in a meaningful fashion). 
51 See DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM 
xxv-xxvi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) (announcing "the hope that well-meaning people, 
people who hope to make the world a more human and just place, " will be able "to embrace the 
human side 
of humanitarian practice, including its dark sides, uncertainties, and ambivalences, " 
finding, in other words, 
what "[p]erhaps the word grace" encapsulates best: "I propose we rethink our 
humanitarian traditions as the 
search for grace in governance. ") 
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scholarship is not to deify some dubious ersatz of a transcendental godhead. Whatever 
institutional legitimacy the modern scholarly enterprise may have, it has it, at least in part, 
because of its commitment to the liberal project of Reason and demystification. Whether 
one likes it or not, however, one cannot simply remain faithful to this commitment without 
at the same time accepting the ontological unachievability of existential comfort in one's 
professional practice, i. e. without treating as inevitable the absence of any metaphysical 
guarantees for one's project of knowledge. If we should resist the re-mystification of our 
discourses, to be able to go on with our investigations, we must learn to accept that none 
of them are ultimately guaranteed and that each of them can disintegrate at every moment. 
2. The barriers raised by the question of hegemony cannot be surpassed by reformulating the 
methodological problematic. The question of hegemony cannot be resolved without resolving at 
the same time the basic predicament of the liberal project of Reason. Without giving up on 
the liberal promise of a non-religious metaphysics, however, the latter task remains 
effectively impossible. One can gloss over the problem and conceal the void, but never get 
over it. 
With this as our starting platform, we can move now to the more technical part of 
our inquiry, the question of the epistemological mechanism. The main query that will 
concern us at this stage of our inquiry is essentially twofold: (i) what are the main epistemic 
limitations facing the project of juridical scholarship?; (ii) what are the conditions under 
which international law scholarship can provide its object of knowledge with an objective 
grounding without resorting to any of mystificatory tropes? 
b. The Practice of Interpretation and the Epistemological Challenge of Intertextuality 
To understand the basic problematic of juridical knowledge in the context of modem-day 
international legal studies, it is instructive to begin by considering the general challenge 
presented to the traditional international law scholarship by the rise of the doctrine of 
intertextuality. 
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The concept of intertextuality, according to the traditional view, 52 was first 
introduced in the modem literary discourse some forty years ago by the French-Bulgarian 
psychoanalyst and literary theorist Julia Kristeva. 53 In its narrower sense, the concept of 
"intertextuality" is generally understood to stand for the simple proposition that no piece 
of writing can be ever isolated from the rest of the semiotic domain. 54 Each text carries in 
itself the traces of some other texts and the various extra-textual discursive events against 
whose background it is located. 55 Seen from this perspective, for example, it follows that 
one cannot really approach Francesco Capotorti's definition of minorityhood56 without also 
52 See, however, GRAHAM ALLEN, INTERTEXTUALITY 8-30 (London: Routledge, 2000) (tracing the theory of 
intertextuality back to the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and the Russian literary theorist Mikhail 
B akhtine). 
53 See JULIA KRISTEVA, DESIRE IN LANGUAGE: A SEMIOTIC APPROACH TO LITERATURE AND ART (transl. by 
Thomas Gora et al.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1980). 
54 The classical definition of "semiotics" (or "semiology" - in the last half a century the two terms have 
become virtually interchangeable), given by Saussure, reads: "It is... possible to conceive of a science which 
studies the role of signs as part of social life. It would form part of social psychology, and hence of general 
psychology. We shall call it semiology (from the Greek semeion, `sign'). It would investigate the nature of signs 
and the laws governing them. " FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 15 (transL by 
Roy Harris; London: Duckworth, 1983). A modern introductory text on the subject describes semiotics as a 
study of "signs not in isolation but as part of semiotic `sign systems' (such as a medium or genre)[, i. e. a] study 
[of] how meanings are made: as such, being concerned not only with communication but also with the 
construction and maintenance of reality. " DANIEL CHANDLER, SEMIOTICS FOR BEGINNERS (1994), available 
at <htti2: //www. aber. ac. uk/media/` 
ss Here is how Jonathan Culler defines intertextuality: "Recent theorists have argued that works [of literature] 
are made out of other works: made possible by prior works which they take up, repeat, challenge, transform. 
This notion sometimes goes by the fancy name of `intertextuality'. A work exists between and among other 
texts, through its relations to them. " JONATHAN CULLER, LITERARY THEORY: A VERY SHORT 
INTRODUCTION 33 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
56 Famously, there is no official definition of what counts as "a minority" in contemporary international law. 
Ever since the new ILTMC discourse began to emerge in the late 1980s, international lawmakers have 
consistently avoided producing a coherent definition of minorityhood. (See, however, CEI Instrument for the 
Protection of Minority Rsghts, 1994; available from http: //w)Nw. ceinet- 
download. org/download/minority rights. pdf; Recommendation 1201 (1993), Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe; available from THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS, at 
http"//assembly. coe. int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta93/ erec1201. htm). In the absence of a universally 
adopted formal definition, the most authoritative statement on the question is commonly considered to 
be 
that given in 1977 by the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
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invoking the League of Nations Minorities Treaties' or the PCIJ dicta on the same 
subject. 58 In its broader sense, the concept of "intertextuality" is understood to reflect a 
more general epistemological theory whose central tenet involves the rejection of every 
notion of disciplinary or epistemic closure. 59 The project of knowledge cannot be subjected 
to any internal-structural limitations. Kant was wrong. The number of valid forms in which 
cognition can proceed is infinite. " 
Conceived against this background, the basic stance of the international law 
profession regarding the question of intertextuality can be generally summarized as follows: 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Francesco Capotorti, according to which the term "minority" 
refers to "a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, 
whose members - being nationals of the State - possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing 
from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards 
preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language. " See Francesco Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Lin, guistic Minorities, 1977, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/384/Rev. 1, para. 568. 
57 On the League of Nations Minorities Treaties system, see further Geoff Gilbert, Religio nationalist Minorities 
and the Development of Minority Rights Lax, 25 Rev. Int'1 Stud 389,402-6 (1999); JENNIFER JACKSON PREECE, 
NATIONAL MINORITIES AND THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATES SYSTEM 67-94 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998); PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 38-54 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991); Julius Stone, Procedure under the Minorities Treaties, 26 AJIL 502 (1932). For a 
contemporary view of the Minorities Treaties system, see also Helmer Rosting, Protection of Minorities by the 
League of Nations, 17 AJIL 641 (1923); Ifor L. Evans, The Protection of Minorities, 4 BYIL 95 (1923-4); Joseph S. 
Roucek, Procedure in Minorities Complaints, 23 AJIL 538 (1929). 
58 Prior to Capotorti's report (supra n. 56), the passage that was commonly treated as the most conclusive 
pronouncement on the nature of minority communities was this one: "the `community' is a group of persons 
living in a given country or locality, having a race, religion, language and traditions of their own and united by 
this identity of race, religion, language and traditions in a sentiment of solidarity, with a view to preserving 
their traditions, maintaining their form of worship, ensuring the instruction and upbringing of their children 
in accordance with the spirit and traditions of their race and rendering mutual assistance to each other. " 
(Greco-Bulgarian "Communities" 1930, PCIJ, Series B, No. 17,21). See also Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia 
(Minority Schools), 1928, PCIJ, Series A, No. 15,32-3. 
59 The idea of the epistemic closure refers to the general theory that "we [can] know [everything] that follows 
from what we [already] know. " Cf. Steven Luper, "The Epistemic Closure Principle", in EDWARD N. ZALTA 
(ED. ), THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (spring 2002 edn. ); available from 
htLp: //121ato. stanford. edu/,. ircliiires/- spr2002/entries/closure-epistemic/. 
60 For a classical expression of this view, see further ROLAND BARTHES, IMAGE Music TEXT 142-8,155-64 
(transl. by Stephen Heath; London: Fontana Press, 1977). 
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(1) International law practice. While "in private" most international law practitioners 
seem to feel generally ambivalent about intertextuality, bl "in public" they usually either 
pretend it out of existence completely, preferring the far more comfortable notion of the 
"legal context, "62 or approach it with a sense of profound suspicion. The unique case of 
Martti Koskenniemi is all the more revealing because almost everyone knows it to be 
unique. 63 The common view held by the college of the international law practice, in other 
words, is far more orthodox than what would be usually advocated under the rubric of the 
intertextuality theory. Whenever an international law practitioner encounters a piece of 
written text, the usual epistemological assumption seems to be that she can easily uncover 
the meaning of the studied text by extracting it directly from the body of the text itself, 
throwing, perhaps, an occasional glance at the travaux preparatoires or the "teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists", but without really having to consult the broader political, 
historical, and cultural contexts of its production. Part of what makes it possible for her to 
pull off that trick on a regular basis is the "incontrovertible fact" that meanings exist 
independently of interpretations and that - as a result - every international law text always 
possesses an objective, intelligible essence eminently amenable to analytical capture. The 
skills that enable international lawyers to perform that capture are what ultimately 
constitutes the essence of international law's disciplinary canon, i. e. that epistemological 
method whose mastery sets the international law profession apart from everyone else. ` 
61 For a telling illustration, see, e. g., R. Y. Jennings, "Closing Address", in CATHERINE BRÖLMANN ET AL. 
(EDS., PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 341 (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1993). 
62 For a definition of "legal context, " see, e. g., the dissenting opinion of judges Basdevant, Winiarski, McNair, 
and Read in Conditions ofAdmission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 
1948,57,84: "it is a rule of interpretation which was well recognized and constantly applied by the Permanent 
Court of International justice that a treaty provision should be read in its entirety[i. e. ] it must be placed in its 
legal context as supplied by the other provisions of the [treaty in question] and the principles of international 
law. " 
63 Koskenniemi published the first edition of From Apology to Utopia, an intertextualist manifesto par excellence, 
while he was still a practicing international lawyer with the Finnish ministry of foreign affairs. See 
KOSKENNIEMI, supra n. 47. 
64 "To determine the meaning of a treaty provision - to determine, as in this case, the character (exhaustive or 
otherwise) of the conditions for admission stated therein - is a problem of interpretation and consequently a 
legal question. " (Conditions of Admission, supra n. 62,61. ) Cf. Free Zones of Upper Savoy, 1932, PCIJ, Series A/B, 
No. 148,138 (`... the Court whose function it is to declare the law... "). 
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Of course, goes on the conventional wisdom, some international legal texts can be 
sometimes confusing. Normally this tends to happen because their drafters use imprecise 
language or choose inconsistent formulations. Take, for instance, the classical texts on the 
right to self-determination. Does the penultimate paragraph of the section on "The 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" of the 1970 Declaration on the 
Principles of International Law"' endorse a limited right of secession in apartheid-style 
circumstances66 or does it not? If it does, what kind of procedure does it require to be 
followed? The same as in Resolution 1541? " Also, how does the subject identified in the 
paragraph just before that as "the people" differ from the subject identified in Article 1 of 
the ICCPR as "a people"? 68 Sometimes, the confusion can also result from the multiplicity 
of the text's authoritative versions. A treaty drafted in two languages can say different 
things in different versions. That both of them can qualify as "authentic" obviously does 
not help. 
65 "Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which 
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self- 
determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole 
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed, or colour. " (Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance urith the Charter of the United 
Nations, UN GA Resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, UN Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV); as reprinted in 
65 AJIL 243,249 (1971). ) 
66 For a discussion of this possibility, see further ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A 
LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 108-124 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); THORNBERRY, supra n. 57,19- 
20. 
67 Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obkgation exists to transmit the information called 
for underArticle 73e of the Charter, UN GA Resolution 1541 (V), 15 December 1960, UN Doc. A/4651. 
68 See Article 1, ICCPR 
"1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice 
to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual 
benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of 
Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, 
and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. " 
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None of these problems, however, are endemic. All of them are, rather, the 
products of rare accidental glitches, virtually all of which are easily rectifiable. Thus, when 
the problem of the conflicting authentic texts came up before the European Court of 
Human Rights in the Bel<gian Lin<guistics Case, the immediate solution worked out by the 
court turned out to be as effective as it was simple: whenever two authentic meanings 
clash, the narrower meaning should be selected over the more general one. 69 
However daunting the interpretative obstacle may be, declares the conventional 
wisdom of the traditional international law practice, there is nothing, in theory, that the 
international law practitioner should not be able to deal with without leaving her 
disciplinary home turf. True, sometimes the literal meaning of a provision may be 
somewhat deficient or lacking, but, ultimately, that does not really matter that much. If the 
literal meaning does not work, it can always be discarded: 
In every legal system, whether common law or civil law, where the meaning of 
the words in a statute is clearly defined, the obligation of the judge is to give the 
words their clearly defined meaning and apply them strictly. This is the literal rule 
of interpretation.... Where the use of a word or expression leads to absurdity or 
repugnance, both common law and civil law courts will disregard the literal or 
grammatical meaning. 11 
In one way or another, every interpreted object, according to the conventional wisdom of 
the international law practice, is seen to possess a singular, correct, natural meaning. -Il 
Every such meaning, moreover, is imagined to be completely objective and to reside 
69 Case relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium, 23 July 1968, Series A, 
No. 6; 1 EI-RR 252. It bears mentioning, however, that what was ultimately involved in that case was a fairly 
minor terminological problem involving two rather closely related European languages. It is difficult to 
imagine the same principle would apply with the same ease if one dealt, say, with a terminological ambiguity 
in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which, apparently, has six authentic versions written in six 
different languages representing three different language families. 
70 Prosecutor v. Delahic et al., ICTY, Case No. IT-96-21, Trial Chamber, judgment, 16 November 1998,63, 
161-2. 
71 The "natural" meaning is sometimes also called "ordinary. " See, e. g., Polish Postal Service in Danzig, 1925, 
PCIJ, Series B, No. 11,37. 
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(almost always) inside the immediate body of the text. 72 As a result, it follows, there is no 
need for the college of the international law practice to spend any time on intertextuality, 
since there is really not that much use for it in its work. 
(2) International la scholarship. By contrast with their practicing colleagues, a fairly 
significant proportion of international law scholars over the course of the last few decades 
have chosen to take a considerably more sympathetic view of the theory of intertextuality. 
Proceeding under the rubric of interdisciplinary studies, the intertextualist tradition in 
international law scholarship seems to have not only taken a rather firm professional 
rooting, but also gone through at least two different stages (generations), with the second 
stage following on the heels of, but not replacing, the first one. 
Generally speaking, for the international law intertextualists of the first stage 
accepting the theory of intertextuality has essentially meant supporting one or another form 
of discursive interdisciplinarism. 73 Anne-Marie Slaughter's appeal for the linkage of 
international law and the international relations theory conveys the sentiment perfectly: 
72 "It is appropriate to recall the rule of interpretation stated by this Court in its Advisory Opinion of 3 March 
1950 on the subject of the Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United 
Nations, to the effect that the text should be recognized as authoritative, unless its terms are ambiguous or 
lead to an unreasonable result. " (Separate opinion of judge Ammoun, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal 
Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), ICJ Reports 1969,3,102. ) 
Cf.: "Having been asked to determine the character, exhaustive or otherwise, of the conditions stated 
in Article 4, the Court must in the first place consider the text of that Article. The English and French texts 
of paragraph 1 of Article 4 have the same meaning, and it is impossible to find any conflict between them. 
The text of this paragraph, by the enumeration which it contains and the choice of its terms, clearly 
demonstrates the intention of its authors ... 
" (Conditions of Admission, supra n. 62,62. ) Compare J. L. BRIERLY, 
THE LAW OF NATIONS 238 (4th edn.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949): "law often does not hesitate to 
attribute an intention to parties who have never thought of the situation with which in the even the law has to 
deal. ") For a succinct summary of the general epistemological code adopted in the traditional international 
law practice, see also more generally Article 33(3), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969,1155 UNTS 
331. For a traditional doctrinal understanding of that code, ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 134 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
73 For a representative sample of first-stage intertextualist works in international law, see further Kenneth W. 
Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 
AJIL 361 (1999); ABRAM CHAYES AND ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University 
Press, 1995); Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules: Customary International Law from an 
Interdisciplinary Perspective, 17 Mich. J Int'l L. 109,128-9 (1995). 
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Institutionalists and international lawyers subscribe to a common ontology of the 
international system: the actors, the structure within which those actors act, and 
the process of their interaction. Both groups, separately and together, are 
describing a common agenda focused on the study of improved institutional 
design for maximally effective international organizations, compliance with 
international obligations, and international ethics. Although a broad avenue with 
many promising vistas, the Institutionalist road to interdisciplinary collaboration 
is only one possible route, with an inevitably limited set of destinations. [This 
article] proposes another path, equally promising, but considerably more 
challenging. This new interdisciplinary bridge involves the application of 
"Liberal" international relations theory to law within and among nations.... The 
Liberal agenda will require international lawyers to revise their most fundamental 
conceptions of the international system. The rewards are worth it, however, this 
approach permits the construction of a comprehensive legal framework that links 
factors and trends of interest to the widest possible spectrum of international 
lawyers, from traditional specialists on questions such as national self- 
determination, to human rights activists, environmental lawyers, trade experts and 
international litigators and deal makers. Moreover, the Liberal agenda complements 
the Institutionalist agenda as the study primarily of law among liberal states. 
Many of the world's most pressing problems are left to the Institutionalists. In 
sum, the dual agenda is a unified agenda, offering powerful tools and a 
cornucopia of research opportunities for all students of international law and 
politcs. 74 
[I]nternational lawyers can ill afford to ignore the growing wealth of political 
science data on the world they seek to regulate. The measurements may be 
imprecise, the theories crude, but the whole offers at least the hope of a positive 
science of world affairs. ... In the end, 
law informed by politics is the best 
guarantee of politics informed by law. 75 
74 Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations Theory: a Dual4genda, 87 AJIL 205,206-7 
(1993). 
75 Id., 239. 
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As Jack Balkin probably would have pointed out, 76 the central element here, of course, is 
not so much the author's heartfelt conviction that the epistemological techniques of the 
traditional international law scholarship have somehow become profoundly inadequate - 
after all, this kind of conviction has characterized every generation of ambitious international 
law scholars, from Grotius to Alvarez to Lauterpacht7 - but rather the immediate form 
which it takes. As in most other fields of legal studies, the main characteristic feature of 
international law's first-generation intertextualism seems to be the fact that it has come to 
recognize itself as such. What motivates it and gives it a distinct sense of identity, thus, is 
not just a desire for a disciplinary renewal, but the conviction that there exists a concrete 
epistemological technique called "interdisciplinarity" and that its practical elaboration 
requires, in effect, a union of two traditions (one of which is called "law") and not just, say, 
a progressive development of the traditional legal technique. 
As one can imagine, the professional-ideological implications of such a posture, all 
its technical aspects aside, are not particularly inconsequential. On the one hand, running 
away from the suffocating formalism of the traditional legal scholarship, every group of the 
first-generation interdisciplinarians has ended up, in one way or another, creating a 
formalist technique of their own, equipped with a full set of non-rebuttable axioms, 
untestable preconceptions, and self-fertilizing deductive chains. On the other hand, 
because they have made such a special point emphasising the fact of their transcendence of 
the narrow confines of the traditional legal technique, none of them, in the end, could 
really recognize that if the web of the self-fertilizing dogma is the ultimate prison-house of 
reason, then the only thing which the first-generation intertextualism has really managed to 
achieve was exchange one prison-cell for another, slightly bigger, more spacious, perhaps, 
and more colourful, but a prison-cell none the less. In that sense, one could say, the 
ultimate apogee of international law's first-generation intertextualism came in the second 
half of the 1990s, with the development of the so-called "international law and economics" 
movement, " whose unfailing insistence on the immediate "analogy between the market of 
76 See Balkin, supra n. 3,950. 
77 Cf. David Kennedy, A New World Order: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 4 Transn'l L& Contemp. Probs 329, 
357-61 (1994). 
78 For a representative sample of "international law and economics" works, see Eyal Benvenisti, The US and 
the Use of Force: Double-Edged Hegemony and the Management of Global Emergencies, 15 EJIL 677 (2004); Eric A. 
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international relations and the traditional markets for goodsi79 appears to be the most 
logical conclusion of the trend set in motion two generations earlier by the New Haven 
scholars. 8° 
The methodological allegiances of the second generation of international law 
intertextualists were markedly different. Far less respectful of the sacred cows of their 
predecessors than the first generation, the second generation of international law 
intertextualists took as their starting point the traditional poststructuralist$' injunction to 
resist every form of disciplinary hypostatization, including those that merged two or more 
disciplines together. 82 In their understanding, the main implication of accepting the theory 
of intertextuality was not that the scholarly community had to throw the weight of its 
authority on the side of a modest interdisciplinary linkage (and, consequently, a new, even 
if misnamed, formalism), but that it had to force a decisive reopening of every 
Posner, A Theory of the Laws of TY/ar, 70 U. Chi. L Rev. 297,300 (2003); Alexander Thompson, App ng Rational 
Choice Theory to International Luv: the Promise and Pi falls, 31 J Legal Stud. S285 (2002); James D. Morrow, The 
Laws of War, Common Conjectures, and Legal Systems in International Politics, 31 J Leg. Stud. S41, S45 (2002); Jack L. 
Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. Chi L Rev. 1113 (1999); William 
J. Aceves, The Economic Analysis of International Law: Transaction Cost Economics and the Concept of States Practice, 17 
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L. 227 (1996); Richard Morrison, Efficient Breach of International Agreements, 23 Denv. J. Intl 
L& Pol'y 183 (1994). 
79 Jeffrey L. Runoff and Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 Yale J Intl L 1,4 (1999). 
80 It is difficult to think of the New Haven school's "policy-oriented approach, " with its Porphyrian tree of 
self-hypostatised functions, tasks, values, and analysis phases, as anything other than a formalist dogma in 
denial. For a representative sample of the New Haven school scholarship, see Harold D. Lasswell and Myres 
S. McDougal, Jurisprudence in Policy-Oriented Perspective, 19 U. Fla. L Rev. 486,501-13 (1966-67); Myres S. 
McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and W. Michael Reisman, Theories about International Law: Prologue to a 
Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 Va. J Int'1 L 188 (1968); Myres S. McDougal, Human Rights and World Public Order: 
Principles of Content and Procedure for Clarifying General Community Policies, 14 Va. J Intl L 387,394-405 (1974); 
LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (211d edn.; New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2000). 
81 On poststructuralism, see generally CATHERINE BELSEY, POSTSTRUCTURALISM: A 
VERY SHORT 
INTRODUCTION (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); PETER BARRY, BEGINNING THEORY: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LITERARY AND CULTURAL THEORY 61-79 (2nd edn.; Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2002); COLIN DAVIS, AFTER POSTSTRUCTURALISM: READING, STORIES AND THEORY (London: 
Routledge, 2004). 
82 See on this further FREDRIC JAMESON, THE PRISON-HOUSE OF LANGUAGE: A 
CRITICAL ACCOUNT OF 
STRUCTURALISM AND RUSSIAN FORMALISM 182 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972). 
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methodological consensus forged by the previous generations. The basic objective of the 
second generation intertextualism, on this view of things, was not to popularize the 
practice of occasional foraying into the neighbouring fields in search of loose 
methodological chattel but to bring about a complete eradication of every discursive 
boundary between international law and other disciplines. ' The final goal was not to 
remove the centre of international law's discursive gravity to some adjacent field, but to put 
an end to the idea of having such a centre in the first place. The task, put differently, was 
not to learn to think outside the box, but rather against it. " 
Now, to understand the general significance of the intertextualist tradition in the 
context of the modern-day international law scholarship and to grasp its immediate 
implications for the present project, it seems two basic facts need to be borne in mind. 
First, the general epistemological stance adopted in this thesis leans far closer to that of the 
second-generation intertextualism than to that of the traditional international law practice. 
Second, to endorse the basic premises of the intertextualist method does not necessarily 
mean to accept the view that "a text can mean anything you want it to mean. " In that 
sense, one could say, the basic problem of the intertextualist project, once it is brought to 
its logical conclusion, is effectively the same as the basic problem of the Nietzschean ethics. 
The traditional logic of the international law practice, let us recall, is essentially a 
quasi-religious logic: the metaphysical foundations on which the international rule of law 
83 The prime examples here are Da. Kennedy, Thinking against the Box and KOSKENNIEMI, supra n. 47. For a 
representative sample of second-generation intertextualist works in international law, see also more generally 
Nathaniel Berman, "`The Appeals of the Orient': Colonized Desire and the War of the Riff', in KAREN 
KNOP (ED. ), GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS 195 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Makau Mutua, 
Savages, Victims, and Sarnors: the Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 Harv. Intl LJ 201 (2001); Antony Anghie, Finding 
the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Lau', 40 Harv. Intl LJ1 (1999); Anne 
Orford, Embodying Internationalism: the Making of International Lawyers, 19 Aust. Yb. Int'1 L1 (1998); Karen 
Knop, Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law, 3 Transn'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 293 
(1993); Karen Engle, International Human Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet, 13 Mich. J Intl L 517 
(1992); DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
1987). 
84 Needless to say, many literary theorists would have viewed this attempt with utter scepticism. See, e. g., 
STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH (AND IT'S A GOOD THING Too) 231 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994); JAMESON, supra n. 82,182-6. For further discussion, see Balkin, supra n. 3, 
958-9. 
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project is premised, as we observed earlier, have been borrowed directly from the Judeo- 
Christian tradition of Logocentrism. 85 By contrast, the productive impulse of 
intertextualism, as Roland Barthes once pointed out, derives from the ethics of a relentless 
secularism: "by refusing to assign ... an ultimate meaning ... to the text, [we engage in] 
what may be called an anti-theological activity, ... since to refuse to fix meanings is, in the 
end, to refuse God. i$6 Seen from this perspective, the second-generation intertextualist 
project in international law scholarship can be effectively understood as a direct 
continuation of the Nietzschean project of "attack on all values": what Nietzsche had 
argued about morals in general, the second-generation intertextualists argue about 
epistemology and disciplinary conventions. 
To understand the logic of the second-generation intertextualist project, 
consequently, it is instructive to consider the basic pattern of Nietzsche's reception in the 
modern discourse. Moral norms, declared Nietzsche originally, never come "from the 
beyond"; they are all, rather, products of the human history; as a result, the only ethically 
responsible stance that can be taken on this front is that all our virtues must become our 
inventions. " Now, for a number of various reasons, against this background, it has become 
a rather common position among Nietzsche's commentators to declare that, because he 
denied the existence of a transcendentally valid system of morals, Nietzsche was effectively 
an ethical nihilist - or, to be more precise, a libertine - who preached that people could do 
everything they pleased, including destroying each other's property and killing children. 
From a "purely" philosophical perspective, of course, all such readings are completely 
spurious. As Albert Camus has repeatedly pointed out, the only direct logical conclusion that 
can be validly deduced from Nietzsche's pronouncement that self-evident moral norms do 
not exist is that, in the end, no ethical conduct is in itself either categorically prohibited or 
categorically authorized. To have no eternal truths on which one can rely for moral 
guidance does not automatically translate into "people may do whatever they want. " 
85 See Chapter I of this thesis. C£ ANTHONY CARTY, THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1986) (tracing the metaphysical origins of the modem international law project). 
86 BARTHES, supra n. 60,147. 
$7 See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS AND THE ANTI-CHRIST 133 (transi. by R. J. 
Hollingdale; London: Penguin, 2003). See also more generally NIETZSCHE, supra n. 27. 
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Authorization, like prohibition, requires a pre-existing system of values. " The destruction 
of property and the killing of children are not legitimated in Nietzsche's philosophy. 
Rather, the responsibility for their permission - if and when it is given - is placed squarely 
at the door of that society in which these acts take place: our virtues, according to 
Nietzsche, are in the end our inventions. 
The analogy with the intertextualist tradition at this point becomes quite obvious. 
Even if we accept the most radical version of the intertextualist creed - the thesis that there 
does not exist any privileged epistemological method - it still does not follow that 
international law texts can be interpreted to have whichever meanings we like. The number 
of valid interpretative moves, although potentially large, is not infinite. A statement like 
"persons belonging to national minorities have the right to maintain and develop their 
culture in all its aspects" may be one of the most indeterminate statements in the modern 
international law discourse (what are the precise limits of "culture"? what exactly is 
understood by "all aspects"? does the right to develop one's culture entail a right to receive 
financial support from the state? ), but it cannot be interpreted to mean just anything. It 
cannot be interpreted to mean, for example, that persons belonging to national minorities 
must be assimilated into the majority culture or that national minorities have the right to 
external self-determination - unless, of course, we have agreed in advance that it should 
mean that, in which case, however, we would have precisely that which Camus had 
mentioned: a case of a pre-established authorization. 
Reflecting on his literary experiences, Umberto Eco once wrote: 
[s]ome contemporary theories of interpretation [suggest] that ... a text 
is nothing 
more than a picnic where the author brings the words and the readers the sense. 
Even if that were true, the words brought by the author are [still] a rather 
embarrassing bunch of material evidence that the reader cannot pass over in 
silence. 89 
88 See ALBERT CAMUS, THE REBEL 62 (transl by Anthony Bower; London: Penguin, 2000). See also CAMUS, 
supra n. 31,65. 
89 Umberto Eco, Reading My Readers, 107 MLN 819,821 (1992). 
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The intertextualist injunction to seek meaning beyond the immediate boundaries of the 
given text does not necessarily mean that "the text is there, do with it what you will": "the 
notion of unlimited semiosis does not lead to the conclusion that there are no criteria for 
interpretation. X90 
The practice of the international legal interpretation may not be as linear as the 
conventional wisdom of the practitioner college suggests - there is certainly far more 
inexactitude and ambivalence in it than is acknowledged in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties - but that does not mean that it is, therefore, a completely open and 
unstructured affair. International law, after all, is an applied discipline. It operates, to recall 
the famous metaphor from Robert Cover, "in the field of pain and death. i91 If only 
because of that, it seems, the practice of interpretation adopted in international law 
scholarship must be inevitably a practice with concrete foundations, not a field of merry 
chaos. 
But what must be those foundations? If the discourse of international law 
scholarship must have a set of objective criteria that determine the limits of what can be 
considered a valid act of scholarly interpretation, how are these criteria provided? What do 
they consist of? Put differently, how should we proceed with the epistemological aspect of 
this inquiry once we step outside the narrow box of traditional scholarship? 
The most effective way to start answering all these questions -a way, the outlines 
of which I have already sketched in the previous chapter -I believe lies in the work of the 
French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser and his students, Pierre Macherey and Nicos 
Poulantzas. It is to that now, that this chapter will turn. 
90 Id. 
91 See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the lord, 95 Yale LJ 1601 (1986). 
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Section Two 
The Epistemological Mechanism of Historical Materialism 
a. Dispensing with Hegel Materialism Is Not Monism 
To understand the epistemological relevance of the Althusserian tradition for the purposes 
of the present thesis's inquiry, it is necessary to begin by briefly recounting the basics of the 
Althusserian theory of ontology and its peculiar variation of historical materialism. In order 
to perform that task most efficiently, however, it seems we must first take stock of the 
immediate historico-intellectual context in which the works of Althusser and his followers 
first emerged in the post-World War TI France. 
Whatever else his other influences and inspirations may have been, as a philosopher 
Althusser was always first and foremost a Marxist. Marxism was his intellectual base camp, 
his political home, and the basic horizon of all his thought and practical engagement. 
Althusser's first major publications started to appear in wide circulation in the first half of 
the 1960s. What had become the orthodox philosophical position in Western Marxism at 
that time was essentially a crude combination of two closely inter-related monist 
sensibilities: 92 Hegelian teleologism and vulgar economism. According to the former, the 
course of all historical development was imagined to unfold in accordance with some 
ambitious transcendental plan established and guaranteed for implementation outside the 
historical plane and allegedly described in The Communist Manifesto. The language of the 
"inexorable march of events" and the "inevitable triumph of socialism" were the usual 
symptoms of that approach. 93 According to the latter, the logic of all social intercourse was 
understood to be defined by a unidirectional relationship between the so-called base (Basis) 
constituted by the totality of economic relations, i. e. relations effectuated in the context of 
the productive process, and the so-called superstructure (Überbau), i. e. all other "cultural" 
92 Cf. LOUIS ALTHUSSER, ESSAYS IN SELF-CRITICISM 186 (transL by Graham Lock; London: New Left Books, 
1976) [hereafter ESSAYS IN SELF-CRITICISM]. 
93 Further on the Hegelian teleologism, see LOUIS ALTHUSSER, THE HUMANIST CONTROVERSY AND OTHER 
WRITINGS 188-9 (transL by G. M. Goshgarian; London: Verso, 2003) [hereafter HUMANIST CONTROVERSY]. 
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forms of social life, including law, ideology, and politics. The language of the economic 
determinism ("the base defines the superstructure") was the usual symptom of this 
sensibility. 94 
However effective they might have been as ideological teachings a generation or 
two earlier, following the end of World War II, neither teleologism nor economism seemed 
to be sufficiently well-suited to meet the exigencies of the current political environment. 
Lest the Marxist practice was to be allowed to bury itself in a political impasse, 95 it was felt 
that the Marxist theory had to be "restored" to its pristine integrity. 96 For Sartre, Camus, 
and Garaudy this, consequently, meant attempting to give Marxism "a humanist face. " For 
Althusser, by contrast, it meant cleansing it of all Hegelian traces. 
The basic problem with the Hegelianized Marxism, declared Althusser, was 
essentially twofold. On the one hand, the Hegelianization of the Marxist theory of history, 
with its tropes of the "inexorable march of events" and "historical inevitability, " cultivated 
a sense of false security among the Marxist corps. If the "bankruptcy of the Second 
International" was anything to go by, this was, certainly, not something to be taken 
lightly. " On the other hand, the Hegelianization of the Marxist frame of reference 
dangerously distorted the Marxist theory of historical materialism, " without which, as 
Lenin pointed out, and Althusser reminded his audiences, Marxists could never hope to 
develop a viable political strategy. 99 A Marxist trained to think of history in terms of a pre- 
established script in which both the port of departure and the port of arrival are known 
before one even embarks on the journey, would, thus, not only tend to underestimate the 
importance of the ideological and political struggles, but would also misrecognize the 
94 Further on economism, see LOUIS ALTHUSSER, FOR MARx 213 (transL by Ben Brewster; London: Verso, 
2005) [hereafter FOR MARX]. For an illuminating example of economism, see, e. g., JOHN MCMURTY, THE 
STRUCTURE OF MARX'S WORLD-VIEW 157 et seq. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). 
9S The stakes of the dilemma facing the Western Marxism at the end of the Stalinist era and Althusser's 
intervention in that context are discussed in admirable detail in G. M. Goshgarian's Introduction, in HUMANIST 
CONTROVERSY, xi-lxii. 
96 FOR MARX, 30. 
97 HUMANIST CONTROVERSY, 188-9. 
98 FOR MARX, 103-4,202-6. 
99 LOUIS ALTHUSSER, LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 31 (transi by Ben Brewster; New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 2001) [hereafter LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY]. 
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irreducible multidimensionality of social contradictions and thus get completely disoriented 
in her assessment of the current situation. The longer the Western Marxism remained 
enthralled by Hegel, followed the conclusion, the more toothless its political practices 
would become. A Hegelianized understanding of the social reality, pointed out Althusser, 
could never provide a practicable basis for devising a political strategy: there has never been 
and cannot be "a Hegelian politics. ""' 
Furthermore, the only logical condition, explained Althusser, under which a linear 
vision of history uninterrupted by any breaks, fissures, or discontinuities could become 
imaginatively possible would be when our discourse, in one way or another, accepted, on 
the level of its ontological assumptions, that behind the facade of all disparate events that 
we perceive in our day-to-day existence there lies a single fundamental act, a hidden super- 
Event, of which everything else is only an elaborate appearance, a shadow, a pure 
phenomenon. By its very structure, the making of such an assumption, however, would 
also require us to make a second assumption. To be able to imagine history as a single 
fundamental act, one has to imagine first some kind of a supreme Subject, through whose 
grace and will that fundamental act is sustained and held together. In short, one has to 
assume the existence of God (Logos). lol 
It is true, concedes Aithusser, that at the root of Hegel's doctrine lies an open 
denial of "every thesis of Origin, Transcendence or an Unknowable World": "[t]he first 
words of [Chapter 1 of Hegel's Great Logic] tell us: Being is Nothingness. The posited 
beginning is negated: there is no beginning, therefore no origin. i102 But that is only the first 
appearance. Despite making such a promising start, in its essence, the Hegelian theory is 
100 FOR MARX, 204. 
101 For further exploration of that idea, see the work of Jacques Derrida (supra nn. 35,36). Derrida was one 
of Althusser's students, although not a Marxist (see infra n. 177). 
102 ESSAYS IN SELF-CRITICISM, 135. The particular passage to which Althusser refers at this point reads in full 
as follows (see G. W. F. HEGEL, SCIENCE OF LOGIC (transi by A. V. Miller, London: Allen & Unwin, 1969): 
132. Being, pure being, without any further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to 
itself. It is also not unequal relatively to an other; it has no diversity within itself nor any with a reference 
outwards. It would not be held fast in its purity if it contained any determination or content which could be 
distinguished in it or by which it could be distinguished from an other. It is pure indeterminateness and 
emptiness. There is nothing to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of intuiting; or, it is only this pure 
intuiting itself. Just as little is anything to be thought in it, or it is equally only this empty thinking. Being, the 
indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing. " 
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thoroughly Logocentric. The only two factors that separate the more traditional Judeo- 
Christian Logocentrism from that of Hegel are (i) the ontologization of egos in Hegel, the 
transcendental domain of the supreme Subject is placed not outside the lived plane of 
human history (heaven) but within it; and (ii) its narratological manifestation: in Hegel, the 
Subject is constructed not in the form of a sovereign Origin but in the form of the ultimate 
End (Telos): 
Hegel, who criticized all theses of subjectivity, nevertheless found a place for the 
Subject, not only in the form of the "becoming-Subject of Substance"103..., but in 
the interiority of the Telos'°4..., which by virtue of the negation of the negation, 
realizes the designs and destiny of [I. ogos]. 105 
The most fundamental trope of Hegel's philosophy - the very trope that allows the 
Hegelianized Marxists to present history as a process governed by a pre-established finality 
- is, thus, a profoundly religious trope. At its core rests the concept of a supernatural 
godlike entity which by its majestic will and action organizes the field of history into a 
single line and guarantees its arrival at a determinate, immutable destination. (It is not for 
nothing, observed Althusser, that Hegel described humanity as a product of the self- 
alienation of some supernatural Weltgeist (world spirit). ) Marxism, being a thoroughly 
materialist teaching, should have no time for any form of religious idealism. If the Marxist 
103 This is, of course, a direct reference to Spinoza. In Spinoza's pantheistic philosophy, the totality of all 
material existence was conceptualized as a single Substance inhabited by God. In Althusser's understanding, 
Hegel began by accepting Spinoza's starting point but then departed from it by discarding the Spinozist 
theory of the ontological consubstantiality of God and matter and positing instead the theory of the matter as 
the product of God's self-alienation, thus replacing the pantheist paradigm with the Logocentric trope of the 
inner kernel of existence. 
104 Here is how Althusser explains this point in a later essay: "[even though] the Hegelian dialectic rejects 
every Origin, which is what is said at the beginning of the Logic, where Being is immediately identified with 
Nothingness, it [still] projects this into the End of a Telos which in return creates, within its own process, its 
own Origin and its own Subject. There is no assignable Origin in Hegel, but that is because the whole 
process, which is fulfilled in the final totality, is indefinitely in all the moments which anticipate its end, its 
own Origin. " ESSAYS IN SELF-CRITICISM, 180-1. 
105 Id., 136. 
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theory is to be preserved and developed in its pristine integrity, concluded Althusser, all 
Hegelian traces have to be expunged. 
What this meant in practical terms was, first of all, a round repudiation, on the 
theoretico-philosophical level, of the whole legacy of the Second International. "' The 
theorists of the Second International (Karl Kautsky, Georgy Plekhanov, etc. ) with their 
mechanistic understanding of the supersession of the modes of production and blind faith 
in the inevitability of socialism were for Althusser as pitiable and deplorable as George 
Eliot had been a century before that for Nietzsche. " Having never found enough courage 
to openly acknowledge their faith in the Weltgeist, they were still unscrupulous enough to 
retain most of its ontological tropes. Everything they wrote by way of social theory was to 
be resolutely discarded, announced Althusser. Plekhanov's ideological contribution to the 
popularization of Marxism might have been tremendous and without parallel, but in 
philosophical terms his theories were lame and hopelessly flawed. "' 
Had Althusser stopped his reform project at this point, none of his contemporaries 
would have probably regarded him half the rebel they eventually did. Everyone who 
pretended to be anyone in the post-World War II Marxism, it seems, would think it a kind 
of a rite of passage to try to pour a bucket of scorn on the clumsy dogmas of the Second 
International. 109 For a 1960s French Marxist, there was nothing radical in denouncing 
Kautsky or criticizing Plekhanov. What was radical was criticizing Marx himself. 
Having set out on his anti-Hegelian mission, it was only a matter of time before 
Althusser had come to the inevitable conclusion that if the mission were to be completed 
successfully, he could not afford to stop at the vulgarisms of the Second International. The 
ultimate target had to be Marx himself, for even he, in his 1844 Manuscrzzts, with their 
incessant references to the man's species-being and the irrational faith in the pre- 
determined nature of history, had been contaminated by the Hegelian virus. If the Marxist 
106 For further discussion of the common paradigm shared by the theorists of the Second International, see, 
e. g., LACLAU AND MO UFFE, supra n. 18,14-48. 
107 See NIETZSCHE, supra n. 87,80: "G. Eliot. - They have got rid of the Christian God, and now feel obliged 
to cling all the more firmly to Christian morality. " 
108 For Althusser's diagnosis of Plekhanov's materialist monism as a variation of Hegelianism, see FOR MARX, 
202, n. 42; HUMANIST CONTROVERSY, 188. 
109 In this, of course, they had quite an impressive tradition to follow. See, e. g., V. I. LENIN, THE STATE AND 
REVOLUTION 97-113 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977). 
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theory were to deliver on its materialist promises, concluded Althusser, all of Marx's early 
writings showing the traces of Hegelian teleologism had to be discarded, however mildly. 
Only his later writings - starting more or less with the first volume of The Capital - could 
be retained as part of the canon. llo For that to be done, however, Marxists had to agree to 
pay a truly heavy price: for better or for worse, in his later works Marx said virtually 
nothing about philosophy or general social theory. 11' If the anti-Hegelian mission was to be 
completed, concluded Althusser, it was left to those who took it upon themselves to 
initiate it, to "reconstruct" the true materialist apparatus of the Marxist philosophy, a task 
he duly set out to perform beginning with his seminal For Mar. 12 and Reading Capital»3 
b. Materialism as a Theory of the Complex Whole 
The general solution Althusser offered to rescue Marxist materialism from the 
encroachments of the Hegelianized mysticism involved two basic steps. First, he proposed 
to eradicate all traces of ontological monism by insisting on the immediate irreducibility of 
every component of the social architecture. Second, to explain the logic of the socio- 
historical causality in a non-Logocentric way, he proposed to "bring back" the Spinozist 
concepts of the immanent cause and aleatory materialism. 
To this day the most famous element in Althusser's proposed re-reading of Marx 
remains, probably, his fundamental reconstruction of the concept of superstructure. Unlike 
in the orthodox Marxism of the Stalinist era, in the Althusserian understanding the 
phenomenon of the superstructure was no longer presented as a mere phenomenon of the 
base, i. e. a passive screen on which the economic instance projected its sovereign 
determinations. Instead, it was reconceptualized as an essentially autonomous ontological 
entity, an instance in its own right, irreducible in its existence to anything other than itself. 
Moreover, picking up on an idea outlined earlier by Gramsci, Althusser also declared at this 
110 Althusser made the case for this decision in virtually all his writings published in the mid-1960s. See, e. g., 
FOR MARX, 49-86,153-8; HUMANIST CONTROVERSY, 231-270. 
111 Engels hardly fared any better. See FOR MARx, 117-28. 
112 Cf. id., 30-1: "The end of dogmatism puts us face to face with this reality: that Marxist philosophy, 
founded by Marx in the very act of founding his theory of history, has still largely to be constituted, since, as 
Lenin said, only the corner-stones have been laid down. " See also KELLE, infra n. 120,20-1. 
113 READING CAPITAL, 30-2,74-8. 
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point that, even though there may, in the end, be only one economic "base, " there is, in 
fact, not one, but many different superstructures. Each of them is an instance in its own 
right. Each enjoys a degree of relative autonomy from the rest of the social space, including 
the base itself Each also exerts a certain degree of constitutive influence (feedback effect) 
on its "neighbours. " 
The ontological consequences of accepting this thesis, predictably, were barely 
short of revolutionary. "' In lieu of the monist mantra of the reigning orthodoxy, Althusser 
basically proposed a theory in which 
the `secondary' contradictions [produced within the playing fields of various 
superstructures] are not the pure phenomena of the `principal' contradiction 
[taking place at the level of the economic relations], ... so much so that the 
principal contradiction might practically exist without the secondary contradictions, 
or without some of them, or might exist before or after them. On the contrary, ... 
the secondary contradictions are essential even to the existence of the principal 
contradiction, ... they really constitute its condition of existence, just as the 
principal contradiction constitutes their condition of existence-115 
In other words, put together, argued Althusser, the totality of the mutually conditioning 
relatively autonomous superstructural instances and the economic base comprise a single 
"complex whole, " or, as he also called it, the existing "structure in dominance. " Each 
instance influences every other within the limits established by the complex whole and is in 
return influenced back, again, within the limits established by the complex whole. "6 As a 
114 And the frenzied character of the reaction it elicited (and still does) from the more traditional Marxist 
circles confirms just as much. See, among others, FRANCIS WE-TEEN, MARX'S DAS KAPITAL: A BIOGRAPHY 
108-10 (London: Atlantic Books, 2006); ALEX CALLLINICOS, Is THERE A FUTURE FOR MARXISM? 53-80 
(London: Macmillan, 1982); E. P. ThOMPSON, THE POVERTY OF THEORY AND OTHER ESSAYS 1-210 
(London: Merlin, 1978); Andre Glucksmann, A Ventriloquist Structuralism, 72 NLR 68 (1972); Leszek 
Kolakowski, Althusser's Marx, 8 Socialist Register 111 (1971). 
115 FOR MARX, 205. 
116 C£ ERNESTO LACLAU, NEW REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION OF OUR TIME 24 (London: Verso, 
1990): "What we find, then, is not an interaction or determination between fully constituted areas of the 
social, but a field of relational semi-identities in which `political', `economic' and `ideological' elements will 
enter into unstable relations of imbrication without ever managing to constitute themselves as [completely] 
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result, the effective web of the determinative impulses circulating within the relational 
matrix comprised by such numberless interdependencies cannot but give rise to such a 
tremendously complicated logic of overlaps, clashes, and condensations that none of the 
traditional concepts used in the general theory of causation could be considered adequate 
to convey its essential character. A new descriptive formula had to be found, concluded 
Althasser. In the end, it was the Freudian "overdetermination" that provided the right 
metaphor. "' 
The main thesis at the core of the Althusserian theory of structural 
overdetermination is as simple as it is ingenious. The logic of the socio-historical causality, 
begins the argument, is in principle neither univocal (as economism and other monistic 
theories would have it), nor, strictly speaking, "equivocal" (as voluntarism and other "pure 
contingency" theories would have it). 118 Rather, it is determinedly polyvocal, i. e. it is comprised 
of several, mutually irreducible lines of causal impulses whose common aggregate 
determines the actual dynamics of socio-historical causation. Which particular shape that 
aggregate will take at any particular moment is always decided by the shape of the existing 
structure in dominance, i. e. that specific combination of social instances and their mutually 
separate objects. ... 
This does not mean, of course, that an area of the social cannot become autonomous and 
establish, to a greater or lesser degree, a separate identity. But this separation and autonomization, like 
everything else, has specific conditions of existence which establish their limits at the same time. " 
117 FOR MARX, 206-9. The concept of overdetermination is closely linked to the concept of non-linear 
dynamics as developed, for instance, in fractal geometry and modern chaos (complexity) theory. Further on 
the complexity theory, see, e. g., M. MITCHELL WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING SCIENCES AT THE 
EDGE OF ORDER AND CHAOS (London: Penguin, 1992). Cf. Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and 
Economics, 109 Harv. L Rev. 641,642 (1996). 
118 Id., 209. Many of Althusser's critics have failed to appreciate Althusser's insistence on the second part of 
this thesis. See, e. g., Ireland, infra n. 120,125 (concluding that in Althusser's theory the course of historical 
development is a "hopelessly arbitrary and contingent affair"). It was Balibar, I think, who captured most 
succinctly (see Etienne Balibar, "The Infinite Contradiction", in JACQUES LEZRA (ED. ), DEPOSITIONS: 
ALTHUSSER, BALIBAR, MACHEREY AND THE LABOR OF READING 142,162 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1996)) what Ireland and others like him have missed in Althusser: "One cannot propose that history is 
causally overdetermined without positing that there are truth effects in history. All materialism ... 
is 
incompatible with any relativism. It does not, though, seek the antithesis of relativism in some eternal truth or 
in what is no more than a lay version of such a truth, a law of evolution, Le., some guarantee or a priori that 
anticipates a consensus. ... 
That history is not the process of effectuation of truth [as the Hegelian tradition 
holds] does not mean that it is the process of its constant destitution. " See also Lewis, infra n. 128, ý 36. 
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constitutive interconnections which obtains at the present moment. Depending on the 
development of the structure, it may turn out that at one given point, the centre of 
causational gravity may lie in one particular social instance (e. g. the order of law); at another 
point, it may lie in another instance (e. g. culture); at a third point, in a third, and so forth. 
The only thing that is guaranteed to remain the same at all times is the complex character 
of the causational mechanism. Its immediate outlook, however, is subject to constant 
change. 
What is the logic that determines the course of that change? Is the evolution of the 
complex whole an essentially random process or does it follow some particular determinate 
pattern? How is the exact character of causational dynamics decided under the theory of 
structural overdetermination? The answer proposed by the Althusserian school to these 
questions became with time as (in)famous as its theory of the relative autonomy of the 
superstructures. 
The make-up of the existing structure in dominance, declared Althusser, drawing 
on an oft-celebrated passage in Engels's 22 September 1890 letter to Joseph Bloch, "' is 
essentially decided by the developments occurring in the field of economic production. Put 
differently, if the essential dynamics of the socio-historical causality at every given moment 
of time is determined by the current logic of structural overdetermination, the terms of the 
latter themselves are always determined by the current state of the relations of production. 
Thus, although the economy never decides the course of the socio-historical development 
directly, it still defines it "in the last instance": 120 
in order to conceive [the notion of the structure in dominance] it is necessary to 
refer to the principle of the determination `in the last instance' of the non- 
economic [instances] by the economic [instance, for] only this `determination in 
119 See FOR MARX, 112. The relevant part of the passage is also reprinted in EAGLETON AND MILNE, supra 
n. 1,39. 
120 Many orthodox Marxists took this point as a betrayal of Marx. See supra n. 114. For some of the more 
recent examples, see also ELLEN MEIKSINS WOOD, DEMOCRACY AGAINST CAPITALISM: RENEWING 
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 7-8 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Paddy Ireland, History, 
Critical Legal Studies and the Mysterious Disappearance of Capitalism, 65 MLR 120,124-5 (2002). Compare, however, 
V. ZH. KELLE (ED. ), PRINTSIP ISTORIZMA V POZNANII SOTSIAL'NYH YAVLENIY 8,79-80 (Moscow: Nauka, 
1972); JAMESON, infra n. 179,30. 
135 
the last instance' makes it possible to escape the arbitrary relativism of observable 
displacements by giving these displacements the necessity of a function. 121 
Thus, although as such the logic of socio-historical causality "cannot be reduced to the 
primacy of a centrei" because each of the superstructural instances carries "an existence 
largely specific and autonomous, ""' in the end, it is still 
the economy [that] is [ultimately] determinant in that it determines which of the 
instances of the social structure occupies the determinant place. 124 
Or, as Poulantzas put it several years later: 
the fact that the structure of the whole is determined in the last instance by the 
economic [domain] does not mean that the economic [domain] always holds the 
dominant role in the structure. The unity constituted by the structure in dominance 
implies that every mode of production has a dominant level or instance; but the 
economic [instance] is in fact determinant only in so far as it attributes the 
dominant role to one instance or another, in so far as it regulates the shift of 
dominance which results from the decentration of instances. 125 
By supplementing the theory of structural overdetermination with the thesis of the 
determination in the last instance, the Aithusserian tradition offered historical materialism a 
fine middle road between the vulgar economism of the orthodox Marxist dogma and the 
radical voluntarism of the liberal humanist tradition. Insisting that the structural dynamics 
of the complex whole was ultimately grounded in the character of the dominant mode of 
production, it established a critical distance between itself and that kaleidoscopic motley of 
theories that unites today the Anglo-Saxon discipline of "cultural studies" with the various 
121 READING CAPITAL, 99. 
122 Id., 98. 
123 FOR MARX, 113. 
124 READING CAPITAL, 224 (Balibar). 
125 NICOS POULANTZAS, POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL CLASSES 14-5 (transL by Timothy O'Hagan and 
David McLellan; London: NLB and Sheed Ward, 1973). 
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postmodern traditions in their common diminution of the value of the political economic 
inquiry. 12' At the same time, by highlighting the fact that the logic of the economic 
determination bore only a last-instantial character, it also distanced itself from all other 
theretofore known materialist traditions. 
c. Summarizing the Althusserian Theory of Social Ontology 
The architecture of the social space, according to the Althusserian tradition, consists of a 
complex combination of semi-autonomous, mutually irreducible domains or instances. No 
instance within this combination enjoys the privileged position of the "central-subject 
instance, " i. e. the foundation category - the latent supreme Subject - of which all other 
instances are only a phenomenal expression. 12' The relationship that unites the totality of 
social instances into one structured whole, however, is not a relationship of analogical 
correlation in which different instances connect with one another through a series of 
homological parallels. Nor is it a relationship of a pre-established exteriority in which the 
various interacting instances relate to one another as objects constituted outside the 
context of their interaction. Rather, the place and the immediate character of each 
particular instance at every given moment in time are defined by the structure of the 
general complex of mutually constitutive interactions linking it with other instances, that 
complex itself being, in the last instance, a function of the existing relations of 
production. 128 
126 Slavoj Zizek, The Parallax View, 25 NLR 121,128 (2004). 
127 POULANTZAS, supra n. 125,14. 
128 In their seminal work on hegemony, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have attempted to appropriate 
Althusser's theory of overdeterrnination while excluding every trace of the determination in the last instance 
thesis. Their basic argument seems to be that while the former is certainly sound, the latter is not and, indeed, 
the two are logically incompatible. See LACLAU AND MOUFFE, supra n. 18,97-105. As William Lewis 
has 
shown, however, that contention is clearly wrong. See further William S. Lewis, "The 
Under-theorization of 
Overdetermination in Hegemony and Socialist StrategY', Borderlands E-journal, Vol. 4, No. 2,2005; text available 
from httl2: //NN, wxN,. borderlandsejotiLriil. adelaide. edu. qu/vol4no2 2005/lewis overdetermination. htm. 
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d. The Role of Law 
Against the background of the general social theory outlined in the previous sub-section, 
what role does the Althusserian tradition ascribe to the juridical instance? What structural 
function does it imagine Law as a field of social activity to perform in the context of the 
complex whole? To answer this question in line with the onto-theoretical principles 
established earlier, let us begin by examining the basic dynamics of the last-instantial 
conditioning created by the currently dominant logic of economic relations. According to 
the general Marxist view, that logic today is commonly understood to be a species of the 
Capitalist Mode of Production (CMP). 129 
The central characteristic feature of the CMP, in the common Marxist 
understanding, resides in the fact that "[c]apitalism is the only mode of production in which 
the maximization of surplus-creation is rewarded per se. In every historical system, there has 
been some production for use, and some production for exchange, but only in capitalism are all 
producers rewarded primarily in terms of the exchange value they produce and penalized to 
the extent they neglect it. ""' As every student of Pashukanis will be able to recall, the two 
crucial components that enable the functioning of every exchange-dominated economic 
system are an increased standardization of the exchange transactions and the 
corresponding sophistication of the accompanying politico-legal superstructures. "' 
Without a highly sophisticated system of politico-legal support mechanisms, it is impossible 
to sustain a progressive development of the economic domain geared simultaneously 
towards the maximization of surplus-creation and the sustenance of an elaborate web of 
129 See, e. g., ELLEN MEISKINS WOOD, THE ORIGIN OF CAPITALISM: THE LONGER VIEW (London: Verso, 
2002); Robert Went, Globalization: towards a Transnational State? A Skeptical Note, 64 Sci. & Soc'y 484 (2001); 
Ronald Dore, Will Global Capitalism be Anglo-Saxon Capitalism?, 6 NLR 101 (2000); William I. Robinson and 
Jerry Harris, Towards a Global Ruling Class? Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class, 64 Sci. & Soc'y 11 
(2000); Sebastian Budgen, A New `Spirit of Capitalism', 1 NLR 149 (2000); GIOVANNI ARRIGHI AND BEVERLY 
J. SILVER, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE IN THE MODERN WORLD SYSTEM (Minneapolis: The University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999); Jason W. Moore, Capitalism over the Longue Duree, 23 Crit. Soc. 103 (1997). See also 
sources cited in supra n. 120. 
130 ETIENNE BALIBAR AND IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, RACE, NATION, CLASS: AMBIGUOUS IDENTITIES 117 
(London: Verso, 1991). 
131 E. B. PASHUKANIS, SELECTED WRITINGS ON MARXISM AND LAW 77-100 (ed. by Piers Beinre and Robert 
Sharlet; transl. by Peter B. Maggs; London: Academic Press, 1980). 
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standardized exchange transactions. The more elaborate becomes the structure of social 
exchange, the more intense becomes the necessity for the guardianship of its regime, the 
more elaborate become the politico-legal regimes propping it up. 
Starting from these premises, the Althusserian tradition has proceeded to conclude 
that on the most fundamental level the last-instantial dynamics of every CMP-dominated 
social formation is determined by the combination of the following three factors. 
First, under the CMP, the economic and the political instances are constituted in a 
relationship of very considerable mutual autonomy. Naturally, this does not mean that 
under other modes of production the economic and the political instances are not mutually 
autonomous, only that under the CMP their reciprocal autonomy is far more extensive 
than it was before. 132 
Second, even though the economic domain under the CMP continues to retain the 
dominant role in the context of the overall structure, its dependence on the political order 
increases tremendously. More than ever before, a "pure" economic relationship under 
capitalism becomes unimaginable without an accompanying political framework. The 
"lonely hour of the last instance" is less likely to strike under the CMP than under any 
previous mode of production. "' All economic processes in CMP-dominated social 
formations are, thus, utterly dependent on the support of the accompanying political order. 
"To be sure, the relations of production still play the dominant role [but] the relations of 
production are [always-]already relations of struggle and power, " and the relations of power 
can only be carried out through the institutional structure of the political order. " 
Third, partly because of this increased dependence on the political order, partly 
because of its general systemic impetus that constantly pushes it to search for an ever- 
greater productive efficiency, the last-instantial dynamics produced by the CMP-dominated 
economic instances constantly induces the structural evolution of the accompanying 
political order in the direction of an ever-increasing sophistication. What emerges as a 
result then is a political field comprised not of one but of many different political 
132 POULANTZAS, supra n. 125,29. 
133 FOR MARX, 113. 
134 See NICOS POULANTZAS, STATE, POWER, SOCIALISM 44-5 (transl. by Patrick Camiller; London: Verso, 
2000). 
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apparatuses, each conditioned, adjusted, and optimized for the performance of a particular 
set of specialized functions but essentially ineffective for the performance of others. 
Where all other previous modes of production have thus tended to rely on a 
generally straightforward and unsophisticated regime of political ordering, the CMP, under 
the pressure of its internal logic, has a tendency to produce a whole multitude of 
supporting political mechanisms. On a long enough time scale, under the influence of the 
logic of cost-minimization, this inevitably leads to the propensity to substitute every overfly 
repressive political mechanism with a less noticeably repressive alternative, the underlying 
presumption being that in the long run it will always be more cost-efficient to convince the 
economic subjects to comply voluntarily than to force them into compliance by explicitly 
violent means. 135 
What this means for the structural-institutional dynamics of the capitalist society is 
that the more developed the CMP relations become in the given social unit, the more 
conclusively the corresponding order of political mechanism tends to divide into two 
formally disparate categories: 136 (i) the mechanisms that operate mainly through the 
imposition of overt repression, i. e. the Repressive State Apparatus (RSA), "that is to say the 
State apparatus in the classical Marxist sense of the term (government, army, police, 
tribunals and administration"; 137 and (ii) the mechanisms that operate mainly through 
inducing consent, i. e. the Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs), that is, those social 
institutions whose main function consists of elaborating, inculcating, and reproducing the 
various competing ideologies sustained through corresponding material practices, and 
whose ultimate aim is to forge a particular set of "lived relations" "which orients the 
subject to its practical tasks in society. i1 The RSA provides the basic backbone of the 
political order; the ISAs ensure its effective functioning at the lowest possible cost. 
Crucially, it must be observed at this point that the term "State" in that context is 
used in a veg different sense from that in which it is normally used in the mainstream 
135 See TERRY EAGLETON, IDEOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 113-6 (London: Verso, 1991). 
136 LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY, 94-7, According to the Althusserian tradition, with the exception of Gramsci, 
Marxist theorists had never explicitly theorized this split, even though "in their political practice, [they] treated 
the State as a more complex reality than [what they formulated] in the `Marxist theory of the State'. 
" See id., 
95. See also Poulantzas, infra n. 141,80; POULANTZAS, supra n. 134,28. 
137 Nicos Poulantzas, The Problem of the Capitalist State, 58 NLR 67,77 (1969). Cf LENIN, supra n. 109,9-18. 
138 EAGLETON, supra n. 135,22. 
140 
international law discourse. For the Marxist tradition, the idea of the "State" does not 
normally refer to Westphalian-style territorial-political entities organized under efficient 
governments capable of participating in international relations on behalf of those 
territories' inhabitants, '" but, rather, to that "instance that maintains the cohesion of a social 
formation and which reptvduces the conditions of ptvduction of [the given] social . ystem. 
"l4° 
In other words, the term "State" in the Althusserian discourse is used to convey the 
idea not of some concrete institutional entity, but of the general organrational principle by 
which the political process of the given social formation is produced and held together. 141 
To the extent to which the modern international arena can then be said to comprise a 
coherent social formation, it follows that the domain of the international political process 
can also be said to be endowed with a discrete "State" system of its own. Needless to say, 
the State in question does not have to take any particular institutional shape: it can be 
organized in the form a global hegemon, a bloc of mutually balanced powers, a web of 
supranational organizations, or indeed none of the aforementioned. As recent Marxist 
scholarship shows, these are certainly not the only possible senses in which international 
law can speak today of the "global State. "lag 
139 See Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933,165 L. N. T. S. 19: "The State as a person 
of international law should possess the following qualification: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined 
territory (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states. " 
140 Poulantzas, supra n. 137,77 (italics added). 
141 POULANTZAS, supra n. 125,44. Cf. Nicos Poulantzas, The Capitalist State: a Reply to Milzband and Laclau, 95 
NLR 63,74 (1976): "the State should be seen (as should capital, according to Marx) as a relation, or more 
precisely as the condensate of a relation of power between struggling classes. In this way we escape the false 
dilemma entailed by the present discussion on the State, between the State comprehended as a 
Thing/instrument and the State comprehended as a Subject. As a Thing: this refers to the instrumentalist 
conception of the State, as a passive tool in the hands of a class or fraction, in which case the State is seen as 
having no autonomy whatever. As Subject: the autonomy of the State, conceived here in terms of its specific 
power, ends up by being considered as absolute, by being reduced to its `own will', in the form of the 
rationalizing instance of civil society (cf. Keynes), and is incarnated in the power of the group that concretely 
represents this rationality/power (bureaucracy, elites). " 
142 Consider, for instance, B. S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 
EJIL 1,5-6 (2004): "The thesis that a nascent global state has emerged ... 
does not imply ... the replacement 
at a structural level of the sovereign state system, but rather its transformation in a manner that facilitates the 
construction of a global state. " 
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The relevance of all these observations for the purposes of the present argument 
should be self-evident. 
If the international arena can be said to possess its own State - in the sense of the 
"organizational principle of the social formation" - then it follows that it can also be said 
to possess its own RSA and its own ISAs. 143 Any analysis, from the Althusserian 
perspective, of the broader systemic context in which the new ILTMC phenomenon 
appears to have emerged, consequently, has to be conducted against the background of the 
questions: what role does the new ILTMC play in the context of the global political 
apparatus? How do other elements of the "global State" relate to it? Is the new ILTMC 
part of the global RSA or the global ISAs? 
And that is where the argument starts becoming slightly complicated. 
First of all, according to the Althusserian understanding of the CMS', the juridical 
instance in a CMP-dominated social formation falls neither entirely within the RSA nor 
entirely within the ISA domains. 144 Rather, it belongs simultaneously in both fields. That is, 
it is both an institutional modality by which the State constructs the ontological field of the 
social formation by inscribing it over the "practical terrain ... of 
[monopolized] violence" 
and a discursive form that serves to "organiz[e] the consent of the dominated [groups]" to 
facilitate the governance process. In the former capacity, the juridical instance "organizes 
the conditions for physical repression" by "establish[ing] an initial field of injunctions, 
prohibitions and censorship" as well as prescriptions, commands, and authorizations 
enabling "private" repression. In the latter capacity, it "gives expression to the imaginary 
ruling-class representation of social reality and power" by, on the one hand, "obscur[ing] 
the [true] politico-economic realities ... 
by means of a peculiar mechanism of concealment- 
inversion" and, on the other hand, by presenting the members of the social unit with an 
ideological grid "which assigns [them] the place they must occupy [in] the politico-social 
"145 system. 
143 From now on the term "state" (with a small "s") will be used in the sense of supra n. 138, and the term 
"State" (with a capital "S") will be used in the sense defined by Poulantzas in supra n. 140. 
144 LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY, 96-7. 
145 See POULANTZAS, supra n. 134,77-83. Cf. PASHUKANIS, supra n. 131,54-62,96-8. 
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In the context of the everyday practice, each of the two functions of the juridical 
instance appears to be as important as the other. However, in the final analysis, it is always 
the RSA-component that plays a more important role, for 
[p]hysical violence and consent do not exist side by side ..., related in such a way 
that more consent corresponds to less violence. Violence-terror always occupies a 
determining place - and not merely because it remains in reserve, coming into the 
open only in critical situations. State-monopolized physical violence permanently underlies 
the techniques of power and mechanisms of consent: it is inscribed in the web of discztlzna g and 
ideological deuices; and even when not di ctly exercised, it shapes the materiality of the social body 
upon which domination is brought to bear. '46 
Obviously, the central and the essential meaning of "repression" is the organized exercise 
of violence "in the most material sense of the term: ziolence to the body. i147 Even when it is 
not explicitly concretized in the daily exercise of power, violence is still constantly present 
in the background of every power relation. " It determines every act of the State in the 
same way in which the pursuit of surplus determines every act of the capitalist enterprise. It 
is the gist of its enabling principle. 
In common understanding the practice of repression is usually associated with 
physical constraint, assault, and mutilation. The actual truth, of course, is significantly more 
complicated. An overwhelming majority of repressive practices are constituted by acts that 
tend to fall considerably short of open physical coercion. A critical glance at the everyday 
manifestations of State power activities in CMP-dominated formations indicates that far 
more often than not repression is actually exercised not through armed constraint but 
1416 POULANTZAS, supra n. 134,81 (italics in the original). Cf. Poulantzas, supra n. 137,77-8: "The condition of 
possibility of the existence and functioning of [the ISAs] is the State repressive apparatus itself. If it is true 
that their role is principally ideological and that the State repressive apparatus does not in general intervene 
directly in their functioning, it remains no less true that this repressive apparatus is always present behind them, 
that it defends them and sanctions them, and finally, that their action is determined by the action of the State 
repressive apparatus itself. " 
147 Id., 29. 
148 Id., 80-2. 
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through regimentation, normalization, and other forms of order. 149 Or, in other words, the 
logic of repression under the CMP is not synonymous with "the purely negative logic of 
rejection, obstruction, compulsory silence, and the ban on public demonstration": 
"repression is never identical with pure negativ4y. "lso 
More than a conglomeration of prohibitions and censorship, law has since Greek 
and Roman times also issued positive injunctions: it does not just forbid or leave 
be [-] it lays down things to be done, dictates positive obligations, and prescribes 
certain forms of discourse that may be addressed to the existing power. Law does 
not merely impose silence or allow people to speak, it often compels them to speak 
[in a particular way. L]aw organizes the repressive field not only as a repression of 
acts forbidden by law, but also as a repression of a failure to do what the law 
prescribes. "' 
The more law acts in the latter capacity, the more it acquires the quality of the normakj ng 
order, i. e. the order that trains its subjects to be in a particular way by making them commit 
certain types of positive acts on a regular basis, the more it reveals its society-constitutive 
potential. 152 
e. From Ontolo gy to Epistemology: the Idea of the Conjuncture and the Parallax Theory 
The epistemological mechanism of historical materialism is predicated directly on its 
ontological theory. The most important feature of the historical materialist ontology, 
meanwhile, is its relentless insistence on ontological immanentism and situationality. 
Compare this now with the epistemological dynamics of Hegelianism. It is possible 
to understand the whole mystificatory nature of Hegel's philosophy, observes Althusser, 
without ever examining any of his allusions to the transcendent finality of history. All that 
needs to be done is we should inspect the way in which Hegel treats concrete social 
149 Id., 29. 
150 Id., 82 (italics in the original). 
151 Id., 82-3. 
152 It in this sense that the idea of law as the self-constitution of the social unit must be understood. Compare 
Philip Allott, The Concept of International Law, 10 EJIL 31 (1999) 
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phenomena in his discourse. Wherever you look in Hegel, writes Althusser, "the concrete 
of a political situation" is always regarded "as [only] `the contingency' in which `necessity is 
realized'. ""' The whole multitude of elements comprising the richness of the social space is 
treated as nothing but a collection of random instrumentalities, a transparent vessel graced 
by the presence of the transcendent Logos. 
By contrast, in the works of the Marxist tradition, all socio-political phenomena are 
always studied exclusively in the context of their given immediacy and from the point of 
view of their observer. Marxism, being a thoroughly materialist teaching, has no place in its 
ontology for any transcendental fictions. For materialism, there exists nothing beyond the 
limits of the material given - no God, no Weltgeist, no supreme Telos - consequently, it does 
not make sense to study anything in terms of such entities or from their alleged point of 
view. All Marxist knowledge projects are, thus, entirely concretized and situationalized. 
Does that mean, however, that the epistemological mechanism of the Marxist 
tradition must necessarily be empiricist in character? Not at all, exclaims Althusser. 
Empiricism may have been the earliest historical form of the materialist epistemology, but 
it is certainly not the limit of its practical horizon. The empiricist knowledge project is 
pervaded with the sensibility of the "myth of the inner presence. "154 Since the days of 
Aristotle, all variations of empiricism155 have been fundamentally essentialist in their 
outlook, that is, they assumed, in one way or another, the existence within each studied 
phenomenon of a hidden invariable essence - the kernel of gold within the dross of earth - 
making the cognitive retrieval of that essence the ultimate target of their epistemic 
aspirations. '56 From the materialist point of view, this makes empiricism analytically 
indistinguishable from the Hegelian version of transcendentalism and thus effectively a 
species of Logocentrism and a variation of religious idealism. A truly materialist 
epistemology must, therefore, at all times seek to escape the plane of the empiricist reason 
153 FOR MARX, 178. 
154 For a further development of this thesis, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS 238-70 (trans]. 
unknown; London: Routledge, 2005). 
15s The sense in which Althusser uses the term "empiricism" does not allow him to agree with Hume and 
Deleuze's self designations as empiricists. Then again, most people would probably agree with Althusser on 
this point. For Deleuze's peculiar understanding of empiricism, see John Rajchman, "Introduction", in 
DELEUZE, supra n. 39,7-20. 
156 See READING CAPITAL, 35-40. 
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(which is not to say it must steer clear of all empirical investigations; as Althusser shows 
quite convincingly, there is a world of difference between empirical and empiricist studies). 
Without slipping into the mystificatory scepticism of Camus or Ockham, 157 it must seek 
and find a robust nominalist attitude that would allow it to engage with the material 
physical and social reality not simply with a view to producing more - and more accurate - 
knowledge but with a view to enabling it to sponsor effective practical action. What does 
this mean in practical terms for the materialist approach? To answer this question, 
Althusser turns to Lenin. 
As Althusser explains it, when Lenin set out to write his famous commentaries 
about the vicissitudes of the Russian revolution and global imperialism in 1917, he had not 
actually tried to address the question of imperialism as such. Rather, what he tried to do was 
comprehend the historically existing imperialist phenomena in their immediate current 
context, i. e. "the concrete of the Russian situation, of the Russian conjuncture '[of "158 
Lenin's overarching concern, in other words, was not to grasp the abstract essence of the 
imperialist institution as it might exist in the heaven of socio-political concepts, "' but to 
comprehend the imperialist dynamics "in the modality of a current existence: in a concrete 
present. i16° 
At no point in his writings from this period, continues Althusser, did Lenin's 
thought betray any signs of an idealist sensibility. At no point did it try to pursue a pointless 
goal and understand the invariant traits of the imperialist idea. Lenin's sole target of 
investigation was the immediate given conjuncture and its material features. Did that 
require him to turn empiricist? Not in the least. 
157 Further on Ockham's philosophy, see Paul Vincent Spade, "William of Ockham", in EDWARD N. ZALTA 
(ED. ), THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (fall 2002 edn. ), available from 
htII2: //121ato. stanford. edu/archiN, es/-- fall2002/entries/ockham/. 
158 FOR MARX, 178. 
159 Cf. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Col. L. Rev. 809,809 (1935): "Some 
fifty years ago a great German jurist had a curious dream. He dreamed that he died and was taken to a special 
heaven reserved for the theoreticians of the law. In this heaven one met, face to face, the many concepts of 
jurisprudence in their absolute purity, freed from all entangling alliances with human life. Here were the 
disembodied spirits of good faith and bad faith, property, possession, lachen, and rights in rem. " 
160 FOR MARX, 178. 
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What is clear from Lenin's commentaries about the Russian revolution and global 
imperialism from 1917, observes Althusser, is that in working out his theoretical 
understanding of these phenomena Lenin did not at any stage reduce his analytical 
methodology to the one-dimensional poverty of vulgar empiricism. His accounts of 
imperialism and revolution suggest a penetrating understanding of the deep logic of the 
surrounding historical conjuncture, a theoretical insight that would remain simply 
unachievable from the immediate surface of the empiricist inquiry. What was it, however, 
that enabled Lenin to perform this feat? Mainly and in the first place, says Althusser, his 
attention to the logic of social production and his implicit understanding of the irreducible 
complexity of the social whole. By isolating different logics of the social process from one 
another, Lenin was able to identify the taxonomy and the configurations of the existing 
social instances. With that as his theoretical arsenal, he was then able to "analyse[j what 
constitutes the characteristics of [the currently existing] structure: the essential articulations, 
the interconnexions, the strategic nodes ...; the 
disposition and relations typical of the 
[given] contradictions. ""' 
The lessons which the Althusserian school went on to draw from these 
observations turned out, in the end, to be as simple as they were fundamental. First, 
repeating after Marx, 162 it declared that the structure of the complex whole should never be 
studied formally and in abstracto, but only through its immediate manifestation in the 
concrete "living" conjuncture. Second, where Marx stopped at the point of a simple 
announcement, it went further to articulate the ontological meaning - the philosophical 
premises - behind that injunction: the structure of the complex whole must 
be studied 
through its manifestation in the current conjuncture not because this way we can obtain 
more practically relevant knowledge, but because the structure simply does not exist in any 
other form. 
The structure is not an essence [located] outside the [field of the social] 
phenomena which comes and alters their aspect, forms and relations and which is 
161 Id. 
162 See his "Theses on Feuerbach" and "Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy, " in KARL MARX 
AND FREDERICK ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY (PART ONE) 121-51 (ed. 
by C. J. Arthur, London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1999). 
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effective on them as an absent cause, absent because it is outside them. The 
absence of the cause in the structure's `metonymic causality' on its effects is not 
the fault of the exteriority of the structure with respect to the [social] phenomena; 
on the contrary, it is the very form of the interiority of the structure, as a structure, 
in its effects. This implies therefore that the effects are not outside the structure, 
are not a pre-existing object, element of space in which the structure arrives to 
imprint its mark: on the contrary, it implies that the structure is immanent in its 
effects, ... that the whole existence of the structure consists of its effects, in short, 
that the structure, which is merely a specific combination of its peculiar elements, 
is nothing outside its effects. 163 
The social reality constituted in the course of historical development comprises the only 
plane of existence for the social structure. If by "historical conjuncture" we understand the 
social reality as it is located within the course of its historical development, then it is exactly 
that which, according to Althusser, circumscribes the full ontological horizon of the 
structure in dominance. To resort to the organicist metaphor, the historical conjuncture is 
the living body of the structure, its "real, concrete, current" field. 164 Outside it, there can be 
no structure, just like outside the living organism, there can be no life (Althusser's debt165 to 
Spinoza166 becomes most obvious here); without it, there can be no idea of structuration. 
The field of the historical conjuncture is identical with the space of the complex whole, or, 
to put it in a slightly different way, the structure of the social plane manifests itself 
exclusively within its present givenness since it is that which embodies it. There is no other 
163 READING CAPITAL, 188-9. 
164 FOR MARX, 207. 
165 See ESSAYS IN SELF-CRITICISM, 126-41. 
166 My understanding of Spinoza is essentially based on E. V. ILYENKOV, DIALECTICAL LOGIC: ESSAYS ON 
ITS HISTORY AND THEORY (transl. H. Campbell Creighton; Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977). On the 
Spinozist legacy in modem Marxism, see also WARREN MONTAG, BODY, MASSES, POWER: SPINOZA AND HIS 
CONTEMPORARIES (London: Verso, 1999); ETIENNE BALIBAR, SPINOZA AND POLITICS (transl. by Peter 
Snowdon; London: Verso, 1998); WARREN MONTAG AND TED STOLZE (EDS. ), THE NEW SPINOZA 
(Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press; 1997); ANTONIO NEGRI, THE SAVAGE ANOMALY: THE 
POWER OF SPINOZA'S METAPHYSICS AND POLITICS (trans' by Michael Hardt; Minneapolis: The University of 
Minnesota Press, 1991). 
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form or space in which the locus of the structure in dominance can be inserted or grasped. 
To think otherwise is to fall back into the pits of religious idealism. " 
Even when the appearance of the present conjuncture suggests the presence of a 
structural gap, continues Althusser, even when, that is, this or that particular social instance 
appears to be completely inconsequential in the determination of the current socio- 
historical momentum, as was, for example, the case in October 1917, when the course of 
the Russian revolution seemed to have been determined entirely through the developments 
in the field of political actions (the Bolshevik coup, the storm of the Winter Palace) and the 
developments in the field of culture, for example, did not even seem to register, that gap is 
still a direct sign of the structure as a whole, an unambiguous symptom of its current shape. 
No silence is ever completely silent; every lacuna always says something about the 
content of the field around it. It was the logic of the structural overdetermination 
accumulated within the historical conjuncture of October 1917 that produced such an 
exceptional condensation of all determinative processes in the political instance that the 
developments occurring in other planes were so confidently overridden as to suggest they 
were effectively negligible in historico-causational terms. 
The invisible is the indispensable factor whose function is to highlight and 
complement the visible. A gap in its practical imprint is not a sign of the current structure's 
internal incompleteness; on the contrary, it is a direct indication of what exactly its internal 
completeness at the given moment looks like. When the constituted conjuncture appears to 
lack "activity" in a particular region of the complex whole, this is nothing but a symptom 
of the present form the structure of the complex whole has taken. 
An essential component of the historico-materialist epistemological theory, 
consequently, consists of the symptomaticist know-how, i. e. the know-how which enables 
reliable symptomatic interpretations of the social material supplied by the historical 
conjuncture. As Althusser saw it, it is precisely that know-how which Lenin practiced on 
the political reality of 1917168 and Marx on the classical political economy half a century 
earlier. 16' The "only" thing that was left for Althusser himself to do was, consequently, to 
167 Cf. KELLE 
, supra n. 
120,164 (from the materialist point of view, structuralist analysis makes sense only as 
part of a historically grounded investigation). 
168 FOR MARX, 175-80. 
169 READING CAPITAL, 18-28. 
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formulate that know-how in explicit terms in order to enable a functional historico- 
materialist methodology17' and to point out on this basis the inherentl limits of f ex g materialist 
knowledge pmject. 
Althusser's first conclusion in this context was quite simple: if the space of the 
embodied structure is a field permeated with both what from within that field appear as 
visibilities and what appear as invisibilities, and the latter are as much a symptom of the 
structure's historical development as the former, then it obviously follows, considering that 
every discourse is itself a structured field (because it is a field of production), that no 
discourse can provide a complete vision of its own structure (and consequently of the full 
complex whole), since every discourse will always contain at least some lacunae (regions of 
invisibilities) within its field which it will not be able to visualize, but which would 
nevertheless be constitutive of its structure. Even Marx's own symptomatic reading (lecture 
ryrrrrtomale) of classical economics had to be subjected to a further symptomatic reading by 
Althusser to reveal its full structure. "' 
The second conclusion flowed out directly from the first: from the epistemological 
point of view, the theory of the social reality as a structured complex whole designates 
nothing other than that the social space-process contains all its structural conditions within 
its surface, including its lacunae and condensations, 172 which is to say that (i) in social 
sciences, all valid analytical vantage points are immanent to the object of study; and (ii) 
there is no single vantage point from which we can cover the "whole field. " 
And that is where we come to the theory of the parallax view. 
The gist of the parallax theory, according to the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj 
Zizek, can be best understood in the following context. Take an irresolvable binary 
opposition, strip it to its basic ontological terms, work out the contradictory logic 
connecting these two terms until you finally hit the dead mass of the Wittgensteinian 
bedrock, and what will come out in the end is the realization that "it is not that one [term 
of the opposition] is the `truth' of the other, " or that the truth somehow hides on some 
higher ontological level, above that immediate plain on which the opposition takes place: 
"the truth is rather the very shift of perspective between [the two elements of the 
170 Id., 13-69. See also MACHEREY, supra n. 2,172-4. 
171 Colin Davis explores the implications of this thesis in DAVIS, supra n. 81,111-2. 
172 FOR MARX, 209. 
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opposition]. "17 Consider now that in the Althusserian theory, given the principle of 
overdetermination, the dialectical process always involves more than just two opposites. 
Adjust the parallax theory to that condition and what you get in the end is the basic outline 
of the Athusserian theory of interpretation, i. e. the epistemological mechanism of the 
structural-conjunctural analysis. 
To understand the factuality of any given social phenomenon in accordance with 
structural-conjunctural theory, it must always be studied from several different angles at 
once. Put differently, it is absolutely futile to try to understand a social event from one 
perspective only, say, only in terms of its cause (i. e. by imagining it as an effect of 
something that needs to be comprehended) or only in terms of its effect (i. e. by imagining 
the event as a cause of something that needs to be comprehended). The cause cannot 
provide the sole valid criterion by which one can judge the effect (contra liberal humanism), 
just like the effect cannot provide the sole valid criterion by which one can judge the cause 
(contra Hegel). The reason why that is so derives ultimately from the general ontological 
character of the social reality: the social instances are not related to one another according 
to the logic of transitive causality. The effects, as Spinoza would say, in this context, are 
only a mode of the existence of the causes. 17' The only theoretical dimension in which a 
given social phenomenon can be adequately comprehended, consequently, is that in which 
the concrete relationship of the mutual support and mutual entailment which links it with its 
causes and its effects can become apparent. Practically speaking, in the final analysis, this 
basically means that every studied phenomenon has to be approached exclusively within 
that particular historical conjuncture in which it is constituted, each element of it being 
understood at once as its potential symptomatic and constitutive factor. 17' To the extent to 
which this requires us to approach the studied question from several different perspectives 
at once, each of which remains at all times epistemically irreducible to any of the others, it 
follows inevitably that, with each perspective giving rise to a separate act of discursive 
production and each object of discourse being ontologically distinct from the real object 
173 SLAVOJ ZIZEK, IRAQ: THE BORROWED KETTLE 6 (London: Verso, 2005). 
174 See supra n. 103. C£ also ESSAYS IN SELF-CRITICISM, 140-1; ILYENKOV, supra n. 166. 
175 C£ James H. Kavanagh and Thomas E. Lewis, Interview with Etienne Balibar and Pierre Macherey, 12 Diacritics 
46,49 (1982). 
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cognized through that discourse, 1"76 a concrete knowledge of the studied object produced 
in accordance with the parallax theory will in effect be a composite product constructed 
through the combination of the disparate discursive objects produced in accordance with 
each interpretative perspective adopted in the inquiry, a product that, like the structure in 
dominance itself, will lead a systemic existence, being manifested in no particular single point 
of space but rather in the many mutually autonomous instances of which it consists and 
which it organizes. 
Another way of conveying the same idea is to say that in order to be understood 
"in a materialist way, " every interpreted object must be taken in its immediate givenness 
contextualized by its surrounding conjuncture and approached as a singular, complexly 
overdetermined effect produced through its continuous encounters with its dialectical 
opposites. 17 Through each of these encounters another side of it will be glimpsed, a full 
176 Cf. READING CAPITAL, 43: "Knowledge working on its `object', then, does not work on the real object 
[existing in the real world outside the cognizing subject's consciousness] but on the peculiar raw material, 
which constitutes, in the strict sense of the term, its `object' (of knowledge), and which, even in the most 
rudimentary forms of knowledge, is distinct from the real object. For that raw material is ever-already ... a raw 
material, i. e., matter already elaborated and transformed. " A few pages later, Althusser goes on to explain that 
"the problem of the relation between these two objects (the object of knowledge and the real object) [is] a 
relation which constitutes the very existence of knowledge" (id., 52). That problem, it seems, is the very 
question to which the parallax theory aims to give an answer. Cf text accompanying supra n. 1. 
177 Cf. Warren Montag, Materiality, Singularity, Subject: Response to Callan, Smith, Hardt, and Parker, 17 Rethinking 
Marxism 185,189 (2005): "We can understand this on the basis of Spinoza's theory of singularities. Works 
are always themselves conjunctions of disparate elements that combine in such a way as to produce an effect 
(Ethics II, definition 7) - in this case, the effect of meaning, the effect of being read. As they persist in time, 
they encounter other singularities and may enter into new conjunctions (and thus become parts of new 
singularities) to produce new effects, new meanings, new readings. " A similar ontological theory has been 
advocated under the rubric of differance by Jacques Deräda (see supra n. 36), a concise summary of which for 
the purposes of the contemporary international law theory can be found in Sarah Kyambi, "National Identity 
and Refugee Law", in PETER FITZPATRICK AND PATRICIA Tun-r (EDS. ), CRITICAL BEINGS: LAW, NATION 
AND THE GLOBAL SUBJECT 19,22-4 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004). C£ also PIERRE MACHEREY, IN A 
MATERIALIST WAY (transL by Ted Stolze; London: Verso, 1998). Notice, however, that Derrida does not 
share Althusser's understanding according to which the main problem which the materialist epistemology 
must resolve is the problem of the relationship between the object of knowledge and the real object (cf. 
Balibar and Macherey, supra n. 1; supra n. 170). For Derrida, the cognition of the real object will always remain 
impossible/ deferred (see supra n. 36). 
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understanding being available only through a constant reconstruction exercise bringing all 
these side images into a single complex whole. 
Or as another Marxist philosopher once put it: 
Precisely because reality is a structured, evolving, and self-forming whole, the 
cognition of a fact or of a set of facts is the cognition of their place in the totality 
of this reality. In distinction from the summative-systematic cognition of 
rationalism and empiricism which starts from secure premises and proceeds 
systematically to array additional facts, dialectical thinking assumes that human 
cognition proceeds in a spiral movement in which any beginning is abstract and 
relative. If reality is a dialectical, structured whole, then concrete cognition of 
reality does not amount to systematically arraying facts with facts and findings with 
findings; rather, it is a process of concreti. Zation which proceeds from the whole to its 
parts and from the parts to the whole, from phenomena to the essence and from 
the essence to phenomena, from totality to contradictions and from contradictions 
to totality. It arrives at concreteness precisely in this spiral process of totalization 
in which all concepts move with respect to one another, and mutually illuminate one 
another. [S]uch cognition is not a summative systematisation of concepts erected 
upon an immutable basis, constructed once and for all, but is rather a spiral 
process of interpenetration and mutual illumination of concepts, a process of 
dialectical 
... totalization that transcends ... one-sidedness and 
isolation [and 
asserts] that the parts not only internally interact and interconnect both among 
themselves and with the whole, but also that the whole cannot be petrified in an 
abstraction superior to the facts, because precisely in the interaction of its parts 
does the whole form itself as a whole. 178 
f The Epistemological Mechanism of Historical Materialism 
And thus at last we come to the main question of this chapter: in the light of the outlined 
theory, which particular interpretative techniques (in the sense of angles or levels of 
inquiry) suggest themselves for adoption into the epistemological mechanism of the 
178 KAREL KOSIK, DIALECTICS OF THE CONCRETE: A STUDY ON PROBLEMS OF MAN AND WORLD 23 
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1976). 
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present thesis? To answer this question, let us first briefly recap the four main lessons we 
have learned so far from Althusser: 
(1) The social reality exists in the form of a complex structured whole. Its 
constituent parts are mutually autonomous and are not reducible to anything other than 
themselves. Each social instance has its own internal dynamics. 
(2) Every social instance influences every other social instance. Put together, the 
web of combined influences gives rise to a complex system of overdetermined causation. 
The exact character of every given overdetermination is determined, in the last instance, by 
the realities obtaining in the domain of the relations of production. That said, this domain 
itself is also subject to the constitutive influences emanating from other domains, not least 
the domain of law. 
(3) The social structure that constitutes the complex whole exists only in the form 
of that immediate historical conjuncture whose social "material" it organizes. The 
architectural make-up of the historical conjuncture consists both of internally visible and 
internally invisible elements. Within the context of the structured whole, the latter carry an 
enormous symptomatic significance. The ability to diagnose that constitutes the foundation 
of every materialist epistemology. Symptomatic reading can be practised both at the level of 
the historical conjuncture as a whole and within every individual regional structure (internal 
structure of the particular social instance). 
(4) No single interpretative technique can yield a full knowledge of the interpreted 
object. A true historico-materialist knowledge can only be developed on the basis of the 
parallax methodology, the main thesis at the heart of which states that an accurate 
understanding of every particular object can only be achieved through a constant shift of 
perspectives conditioned by the overdetermined logic of the current historical conjuncture. 
Every interpretative method is apt to produce its own object of discourse. 
Proceeding against this background now, it seems we can draw the following 
general conclusions for the construction of this thesis's epistemological mechanism: 
(i) Combining the thesis of the relative autonomy of social instances with the 
theory of the structural causality, the parallax theory, and the thesis of the determination in 
the last instance suggests that, from the perspective of historical materialism, every 
interpreted social phenomenon has to be studied both in terms of its own internal dynamics 
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and the "regional history" of that social instance within whose field it takes place and in 
terms of the broader social context formed by the surrounding historical conjuncture. 
(ii) In the case of a jurisprudential inquiry, taking into account the dual functionality 
of the juridical instance as a constituent element of both the repressive-political and the 
ideological-political orders, this consideration effectively translates into the methodological 
injunction to adopt an essentially tri-partite investigative approach, the three corresponding 
stages of inquiry being: (a) the study of the given legal regime as an integral part of the 
order of the RSA; (b) the study of the accompanying body of legal discourse as an integral 
part of the order of the ISAs; and (c) the study of the underlying social project - the 
enterprise that brings together the legal regime with its accompanying discourse - as an 
ideologematic component of the broader historical conjuncture. 
(iii) Even in the context of this complex approach, it must still be acknowledged 
that however much we approximate the goal of cognizing it, the given legal regime and its 
accompanying discourses can never be grasped exhaustively in all their plenitude. The basic 
reason for this ultimately has less to do with the practical limitations of our investigatory 
resources (although that, too, obviously, plays an important part) than with the 
epistemological inexhaustibility of the material phenomena comprising the studied object. 
On the one hand, every real object acquires its identity only in the course of its concrete 
dialogical interaction with other objects. To the extent, consequently, to which our 
"political unconscious' 179 (doxa) also constitutes one of these objects, it inevitably follows 
that, being the participating co-constituents of these dialogues, we can never in fact remove 
ourselves to an effective external point (the view from nowhere) from which we could 
perceive the dialogical field in its entirety, since that would require us to "undo" our status 
as cognizing agents. 'ß° At the same time, considering that every object represents in the end 
an overdetermined effect of its continuous encounters with its dialectical opposites, it also 
follows that the process of knowledge production concerning any given phenomenon can 
never be terminated: whatever meaning we produce of the analyzed object, it can always be 
179 See FREDRIC JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS: NARRATIVE AS A SOCIALLY SYMBOLIC ACT 
(London: Routledge, 2002). 
180 Nietzsche formulated this idea far more succinctly (even if also more ambiguously): an exhaustive 
judgment is impossible because everyone of us always remains a party to that dispute over which we are 
supposed to pronounce a judgment. See NIETZSCHE, supra n. 87,40. 
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supplemented by still another meaning produced in line with the on-going development of 
the historical conjuncture and thus ad infinitum. 
g. The Epistemological Mechanism of f This Thesis 
Earlier I have said that this thesis is essentially a work written in the genre of legal realism. 
So far in this chapter I have spoken at length about historical materialism, structural 
conjunctural theory, dialectical knowledge, parallax theory, and what not. But I have not 
spoken about legal realism. As far as I could, I have tried to explain the objective 
advantages of historical materialism as a general ontological-theoretical instrument and the 
epistemological inevitability of arriving at the structural conjuncturalist position once one 
adopts the historico-materialist approach in the domain of social sciences. But I have not 
discussed what exactly this means for legal scholarship and if the application of structural 
conjuncturalism is what one should ultimately understand by legal realism. 
So, to start with the last question first, the brief answer is: yes. Legal realism is the 
"local" variation of structural conjuncturalism adapted to the needs of juridical scholarship. 
It is a sub-species of historical materialism, and, within the context of this thesis at least, 
this is the only correct way to understand this term. 
When I say, consequently, that this thesis is a work written in the genre of legal 
realism, what I ultimately mean by that is that it is the end product of a particular type of a 
historico-materialist investigation of a particular type of socio-historical problematic, in this 
case the rise and development in the post-Cold War era of the new ILTMC project. I do 
not mean to say it is the final product of a complete historico-materialist investigation of that 
problematic. To accomplish that kind of investigation in the case of the new ILTMC 
project, one would have to write a work several times longer than this one. 
Were I to undertake a work of that scale, I would probably have to make now a 
general declaration explaining that even though there may exist only one object of knoxled<e 
behind its inquiry, there would have to be constructed at least three different objects of discourse, 
each a product of its own analytical perspective. The first of these three perspectives, as 
explained in the previous sub-section, would focus its exploratory attention on the 
factuality of the ffectively existing legal regime produced and sustained by the new ILTMC 
project. The second perspective would focus on the factuality of the discursive space process 
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accompanying that regime and its relationship with the general order of the global ISAs. 
The third perspective, in contrast, would turn to the general ideologematic function performed by 
the new ILTMCproject in the context of the corresponding historical conjuncture as a whole. 
Needless to say, I have not produced that kind of work in these pages. My ambition 
in this thesis is not nearly as big as that. Pursuing all these three lines of inquiry within the 
space of one investigative project would have required a truly gargantuan effort, an 
expenditure I decided to leave for the time being for some other occasion. 
Just how enormous the analytical task facing the author of such kind of a work 
would be, one can glean, for example, from considering the fact that in order only to begin 
to uncover the third topic, one would need to go through hundreds if not thousands of 
disparate pieces of evidence drawn from dozens of different fields and sources. 
As we saw earlier, the basic concern of every ideologematic inquiry is not to 
identify the immediate causal contribution made by any particular social project to any 
particular event, but to elucidate the general function the corresponding ideological form 
underlying that project played in the context of the broader socio-political process. 18' The 
reason for such a peculiar choice of focus, as Fredric Jameson pointed out, is that the 
analysis of the background ideological form, unlike the study of the immediate social 
projects which it produces and sustains, can ultimately provide us with an insight into the 
objective dialectical condition of the currently existing structure in dominance (complex 
whole). "' Or, in other words, by approaching the given social project as a parole-like 
manifestation of an underlying langue-like structure we can develop an understanding of the 
actual character of the current historical conjuncture as a whole, and not just some separate 
aspect of it. 
To accomplish that task, however, one must always place the studied suprstructural 
domain in the context of its interaction with all other such domains existing within the 
current conjuncture, or, in other words, one must insert the given ideological form against 
the background of all those economic, repressive-political, and discursive practices and 
their dialectical interconnections which accompany its historical existence in time. In the 
case of the new ILTMC project, that would mean, inter alia, contextualising the 
181 Cf. JAMESON, supra n. 179,73,103-4 
182 Id., 47,103-4. 
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development of the new ILTMC regime and its accompanying discursive space-process 
against the background of 
0 the rapid spread of the CMP across the surface of the globe in the wake of the 
disintegration of the Soviet bloc; 
" the rise of the pan-European organizations and their associate and subordinate 
institutional structures and the corresponding projects of pan-Europeanisation, 
manifested not least in the development of the theory of a "common acquis"; 
" the reinvigoration after the end of the Cold War of the United Nations process, the 
branching out of the UN human rights architecture and the corresponding political 
projects, including the creation of the post of the UN High Commissioner on 
Human Rights and the corresponding human-rightsization, in the second half of 
the 1990s, of all aspects of the UN activity; 
" the growth in size and the increasing sophistication of the Bretton-Woods 
architecture and the expansion of its programs into the former Soviet bloc; 
" the politico-institutional reinvention of the NATO and the patterns of its 
enforcement operations in the ECE region, not least its "policing campaigns" in 
the Balkans, its elaboration of the Partnership for Peace scheme, and its punitive 
actions against Yugoslavia in 1999; 
" the continuous expansion of the European Union from the 1980s EEC into a post- 
Amsterdam fortress Europe without any parallel institutionalization of the all- 
Union structures other than in the area of monetary control; ` 
" the rise in prominence and prestige of the international law profession (including its 
scholarly constituent) accompanied by the intensification of the alliance struck 
under the rubric of "transition studies" between "legal expertise" and "progressive 
international policy-making"; 184 
" the rearrangement of the international security practice on the basis of the OSCE- 
defined "comprehensive security" theory; 
183 See on this further, PERRY ANDERSON AND PETER GOWAN (EDS. ), THE QUESTION OF EUROPE (London: 
1997). 
184 See on this further, David Kennedy, The Politics of the Invisible College: International Governance and the Politics of 
Expertise, 2001 EHLRR 463; David Kennedy, Contestation of the Outcomes and Procedures of the Existing Legal 
Regime, 16 Lei J Int'l L. 915 (2003). 
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" the decoupling of the formal-political and the effective-economic dimensions of 
the national sovereignty processes and the migration of the locus of economic 
decision-making into the politically unaccountable, under-institutionalized 
transnational domain; "" 
0 the popularization and rise in prominence of the practices of allegedly neutral 
judgments passed on the lower-tier polities by regional and global powers through 
the instrumentality of corruption studies, security analysis briefs, and human rights 
and development reports; 
" the rapid institutionalization of the practice of international expert missions and its 
break-neck expansion into areas as diverse and complex as banking, public health, 
and secondary education reform; 
" the rapid expansion and the stupefying rise in prominence of the watchdog 
component of the transnational civil society architecture generously financed (and 
often staffed) by the citizens of regional and global powers and the increase in 
attention attributed by these powers and the international public organizations to 
its judgments about governments and societies lacking any history of indigenous 
liberal capitalism; "' 
" the gradual but decisive displacement on the level of the legal form, in the writings 
of legal scholars and international institutional discourse alike, of all communitarian 
self-determination tropes in favour of the individualist human rights vocabulary; 
" the historical transformation of the modern warfare patterns away from the large- 
scale conventional war in the direction of low-intensity guerrilla conflicts"' 
accompanied by the intensification of the technological progress in the area of 
telecommunications enabling the introduction of same-minute reporting practices 
by international news agencies, not least those relying on electronic media; 
185 See on this further, e. g., Stanley Hoffrnann, Clash of Globalziations, 81/4 Foreign Affairs 104,108-111 
(2002). 
186 See on this further, e. g., Chiinni, supra n. 142,11-2. 
187 See on this further, e. g., MARTIN VAN CREVELD, 
THF- TRANSFORMATION OF WAR (New York: The Free 
Press, 1991). 
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" the rise in popularity of various aspects of international studies in Western 
universities and the corresponding increase in demand for beginner- and 
intermediate-level literature; 
" the general retreat of organized religion and the disintegration of the 
communitarian value system in the North-Atlantic societies over the course of the 
last several decades, followed by a rapid spread of the active consumerist culture 
and the "end of ideology" discourse; 
" the universal defeat of every significant outlet of the traditional Left project in the 
North Atlantic societies, from Western Marxism to the first-wave feminism, and 
the drift of the traditionally centre-left parties to traditionally right and centre-right 
agendas, represented not least by the rise of the New Labour in Britain and the 
Clintonian triangulation of the Democratic Party in the United States; 
" the rapid spread of the neoliberal dogma across the former Soviet bloc in the early 
1990s aided by the large-scale social demoralization following the collapse of the 
established political regimes; 
" the progressive separation of the effective ideological order of lived practices 
inhabited by the working masses from the formally articulated official ideological 
orders propagated by the governing elites, with the former's tendency to oppose 
the pro-multiculturalist, pro-individualist, and anti-nationalist doctrines of the latter 
in favour of the passive-aggressive practices of particularist communitarianism, 
culturalism, and racism;... 
188 Cf. BALIBAR AND WALLERSTEIN, supra n. 130,230: "[It is] useful to distinguish the perspectives of the 
small group of `cadres' and the vast majority of the population. I do not think they relate in the same ways to 
the ideological constructs of their system. [U]niversalism is a belief-system primarily intended to reinforce the 
ties of the cadres to the [capitalist] system. This is not simply a question of technical efficacy. It is also a way 
to limit the effects of the very racism and sexism the cadres find so useful to the system, since sexism and 
racism, if carried too far, are potentially dangerous to the system. ... 
To be sure, there always exist other 
cadres, the second team as it were, who are ready to challenge those in power in the name of diverse 
particularisms. But, in general, univesalism as an ideology serves the long-term interests of the cadres better 
than its inverse. I do not argue that the attitudes of the various working strata are simply the obverse of those 
of the cadres. But they do seem to tend in the opposite direction. By assuming a particularist stance - 
whether of class, of nation or of race - the working strata are expressing an instinct of self-protection against 
the ravages of a universalism that must be hypocritical within a system founded both on the permanence of 
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" the swift replacement on the level of popular and scholarly discourse in the West of 
the class-centred problematic with the problematic of multiculturalism and the 
corresponding failure to register the overwhelmingly imbalanced class dimension of 
the "weakening" of state sovereignty in the European region in the 1990s. 189 
The list of the relative factors that would have to be taken into consideration in an 
ideologematic inquiry can be extended still longer. But the basic message it conveys is 
sufficiently clear already. The scale of the analytical challenges presented by the 
requirements of the ideologematic inquiry is truly and genuinely daunting. To complete an 
inquiry of such a large magnitude, one would have to spend hundreds and hundreds of 
research weeks, covering the span of a dozen neighbouring disciplines and recruiting far 
greater intellectual and investigative resources than are currently at the disposal of this 
thesis's author. And all that only in order to complete the ideologematic strand of the 
analysis. There would still be left the other two fronts. 
To elucidate the internal logic of the discursive space-process surrounding the new 
ILTMC legal regime, one would have to conduct a close, painstaking analysis not only of 
the general ideational substance grafted on its conceptual scaffolding, but also of the 
regular form patterns of the corresponding discursive constructs. In other words, one 
would have not only to uncover the ideological significance of the various rhetorical 
resolutions the new ILTMC discourse offers to the philosophical conflicts between, for 
instance, the individual rights theories and the collective rights theories, but also to identify 
inequality and on the process of material and social polarization. ... 
It is perhaps only because ordinary 
people have less room for manoeuvre that they remain more loyal to the others in their group, but the fact 
remains that this is the case. That is, the nation, the race and even the class serve as refuges for the oppressed 
in this capitalist world-economy which explains why they remain such popular ideas. " 
189 As Susan Watkins argues, it would be rather short-sighted to assume that the intensification of the 
European economic integration in the last fifteen years has sounded the death knell for the institute of the 
national economic sovereignty in Europe. National economic sovereignty has not died with Maastricht. It 
underwent a fundamental structural transformation. With the overall responsibility for ensuring the 
macroeconomic stability still resting in the hands of the national governments and most of the historically 
established mechanisms for cyclical and other macroeconomic adjustments blocked, what the European 
economic integration has effectively meant from the class-centred perspective, explains Watkins, is that the 
only effective instrument of controlling the macroeconomic processes, such as inflation and the balance of 
payments, left at the disposal of the national governments was "wring[ing] concessions from labour. " See 
further Susan Watkins, Continental Tremors, 33 NLR 5,13 (2005). 
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and critically deconstruct the typical masterplots on the basis of which it assembles its 
narratives. 
Moreover, since the ideological functioning of the legal discourse can never be 
practically isolated from the ideological effects of the broader belief-system underlying the 
general structure of the political Überbau, the completion of this stage of inquiry would also 
have to take in at some stage what Thurman Arnold described once as "the more general 
superstitions concerning the function of government. i19o A casual empirical survey of the 
general discursive space-process produced in the internationally-minded Western circles 
throughout the 1990s191 tends to suggest that the starting list of such superstitions in the 
case of the new ILTMC project would at the very least include: 192 
" the belief that while the Western nationalism of the 19' century was a liberating 
and enriching phenomenon, the post-Cold War nationalism of the ECE region 
is a regressive, exclusivist, destructive, blood-thirsty, and totalitarian force; 193 
190 ARNOLD, supra n. 14,60-1. 
191 For the symptomatic traces of these beliefs in the scholarly discourse, see, among others, LARRY 
DIAMOND AND MARC F. PLATTNER (EDS. ), DEMOCRACY AFTER COMMUNISM (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2002); Gyula Csurgai, "Geopolitical Aspects of the Minority Question in Central 
and South Eastern Europe, " in KINGA GAL (ED. ), MINORITY GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE 55 (Budapest: Open 
Society Institute, 2002); Will Kymlicka, Nation-building and Minority Rights: Comparing West and East, 26 J. Ethn. 
& Migr. Stud. 183 (2000); FRITZ PLASSER AND ANDREAS PRIBERSKY (EDS. ), POLITICAL CULTURE IN EAST 
CENTRAL EUROPE (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996); Andras Sajo, Protecting Nation States and National Minorities: a 
Modest Case for Nationalism in Eastern Europe, 1993 U. Chi L. Sch. Roundtable 53. For the traces of the same 
belief-system in the "official discourse, " see, e. g., President George Bush's Address to the NATO Summit in Istanbul 
Turkey, reprinted in The Guardian, 30 June 2004; Statement on South-Eastern Europe as a Region of Co operation, 
OSCE, 11th Ministerial Meeting, 2 December 2003; ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN 
HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY (Brussels: European Communities, 2003). See also the various speeches and 
interviews with the OSCE HCNM cited in Chapter I above. 
192 For further discussion of the general folkloric belief-system underlying the new ILTMC project, see, 
among others, Slavoj Zack, `You May)', London Review of Books, 18 March 1999; Serge Schmemann, What's 
Wrong uith This Picture of Nationalism?, New York Times, 21 February 1999; ATILLA AGH, THE POLITICS OF 
CENTRAL EUROPE 7-21,202-25 (London: Sage, 1998); Cristina Posa, Engineering Hatred., the Roots of 
Contemporary Serbian Nationalism, 11 Balkanistica 69 (1998); Sabrina Petra Ramet, War in the Balkans, 71/4 
Foreign Affairs 79,80-2 (1991-1992). 
193 C£, e. g., Robin Cook, Bosnia: What Labour Would Do, The Guardian, 10 December 1994: "All these 
measures, though, will be meaningful only if the West's democratic, secular states grasp the destructive 
character of the fundamentalist nationalism now wrecking post-communist countries. Nationalism can be a 
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" the belief that the post-Cold War ECE nationalism is not a new historical 
development but actually a continuation of a very old political trend that had 
long been suppressed by communism, but that has now been reawakened; '94 
" the belief that at the deepest bottom of her heart no reasonable person should 
ever trust the native political elites of the ECE states, since most of their 
unconscious reflexes are ultimately ruinous for the freedom, justice, stability, 
and prosperity of their societies, and the reason for this is that some of these 
elites are not yet fully competent when it comes to such matters, while others 
are either essentially indifferent or, worse still, outright opposed to the values of 
freedom and democracy; 
" the belief that the main problem with the ECE polities following the end of the 
Cold War is not that their economic decision-making power has been taken 
away from them by the West, but that their native political elites, unlike their 
North-Atlantic counterparts, do not have any real understanding of the nature 
of democracy and that most of them, moreover, are generally predisposed to 
succumb to the lure of aggressive nationalism, corruption, and xenophobia, 195 
liberating and enriching force, but in the ex-communist world it has supplied an exclusivist identity which 
strengthens itself through violence. Western nationalism of the 19th century aimed to build a common loyalty 
to the state that conveyed a mutual territory, and therefore offered similar democratic rights of citizenship to 
multiple ethnic groups. The nationalism now feeding the conflicts of eastern Europe is based not on territory, 
but on ethnic identity, and is trying to build a polity based on ethnic, not state, citizenship. " 
194 C£, e. g., Vernon Bogdanor, Exorcising the Ghosts of 1914, The Independent, 1 August 1994: "Many people 
have spoken of the changes in [the ECE region] since 1989 as having created a new political order. It would 
be more accurate to view what has happened as the restoration of an old order, which the peacemakers at the 
end of the First World War tried to create to fill the vacuum left by the decay of empire. " Cf also Peter 
Jenkins, Nationalism Deserves a Better Name, The Independent, 14 July 1991 (observing that "[w]ith the 
communist yoke lifted ... 
it is fashionable to dwell upon the unresolved and long-suppressed nationality 
questions of [the ECE region] in the expectation of history repeating itself [as] the collapse of the Soviet 
empire in Eastern Europe has enabled the resumption of some ancient quarrels'). 
195 Cf., e. g., John Edwin Mroz, Russia and Eastern Europe: Will the West Let Them Fail?, 72/1 Foreign Affairs 44, 
52 (1992). Cf also Racism: a Legacy of Fascist Rule (editorial), The Independent, 10 January 1993: "[W]ithin the 
European Community at least, no sizeable political party (Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front apart) preaches 
crude nationalism or racism. The reasons are clear. National governments [in Western Europe] have 
voluntarily pooled a good deal of their sovereignty and intertwined their economic destinies. Non-member 
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since (i) unlike in the North-Atlantic region, there has always been a lot of 
inter-ethnic hostility in the ECE region, and the ECE peoples have always been 
unhealthily obsessed with their past and can never get over their historic 
grievances; (ii) the tensions of communist totalitarianism not only generally 
weakened the socio-political immune systems of the ECE polities, but also 
cultivated tremendous distrust and hatred between different ethnic and 
religious groups; and (iii) having been ruled by Moscow for several decades, the 
ECE political elites lack the necessary capacity for ideological self-sufficiency of 
the kind acquired by the West Europeans through the creation of the European 
Union; 196 
" the belief that the Balkans are indeed the powder-keg of Europe and that world 
wars have a habit of starting in Sarajevo; 
" the belief that it is not only a prudent measure but also an honourable duty for 
the "West" 19' to extend its helping hand to the ECE polities and to share its 
Scandinavians have strong democratic institutions. There is no such tradition in Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans. " 
196 Cf. Bogdanor, supra n. 194. 
197 C£, e. g., Polly Toynbee, Left behind and Left Seething as a New Way Struggles to Be Born, The Guardian, 12 April 
1999. See also Andrew Marshall, Clinton Offers Vision of Wider Europe, The Guardian, 10 January 1994: 
"Western Europe should open up to eastern Europe and Russia, Bill Clinton said yesterday, warning of the 
threat of ultra-nationalism if integration failed: `We must not let the Iron Curtain be replaced with a veil of 
indifference. ' 
... 
The President underlined that the most important challenge facing Europe was in the east. 
The region faced a `race between rejuvenation and despair. The West must offer assistance, trade, military 
co-operation, support for democracy and a place at the table. He wanted `to help lead the movement to that 
integration, and to assure you that America will be a strong partner in it. ' But this support for Moscow's 
efforts was matched by a warning that reformers had enemies. `Pitted against them are the grim pretenders to 
tyranny's dark throne, the militant nationalists and demagogues who fan suspicions that are ancient, and 
parade the pain of renewal in order to obscure the promise of reform. ' [H]e said the West's stance would help 
decide whether Russians `elect leaders who incline back towards authoritarianism and empire'. " C£ Lord 
Cobbold, Maastricht, The Times, 6 June 1992: "The stability and success of the European Community, albeit 
under the umbrella of NATO, has been the inspiration for Europe's eastern population in its struggle against 
the economic and intellectual poverty of communism. As the people of Eastern Europe and of the Russian 
empire rediscover their identity and their independence, the free peoples of the European Community must 
not allow themselves to slip back into the catastrophic patterns of nationalism. The beacon of co-operation 
that has shone into the totalitarian darkness must not now be dimmed. " 
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values and wisdom with them in order to save them from the perils of 
aggressive nationalism, corruption, and xenophobia, since (i) unfortunately, the 
Eastern Europeans themselves are too inexperienced yet to know how to avoid 
all these dangers on their own (so much so that, if left to their own devices, 
most of them probably would immediately slip up and allow some populist 
demagogue to cloud their minds, taking them off the road leading to freedom, 
justice, and prosperity in an opportunistic pursuit of some short-term goals); ` 
and (ii) what is really at stake in guiding the ideological transition in the ECE 
today is nothing less than the future of freedom/human dignity/the Western 
civilization itself. 199 
In short, the task of producing a complete his torico-materialist account of the new ILTMC 
project would require the completion of an investigative study on such an enormous 
investigative scale that, it would seem, even in the most optimistic and confident 
assessment the present thesis cannot be expected to provide anything more than a general 
opportunity to sketch out its basic contours. 
All of which is basically to say that instead of trying to accomplish the 
unaccomplishable, having outlined the structural terms of its general epistemic condition, 
this work from here onwards is going to restrict its investigative focus to the exploration of 
only one of the three indicated objects of discourse: the effectively existing legal regime 
created by the new ILTMC project through its repressive-political functionality. 200 The two 
198 Cf., e. g., Mroz, supra n. 195. 
199 Cf, e. g., Vaclav Havel, A Call for Sacrifice: the Co-Responsibility of the Vest, 73/2 Foreign Affairs 2 (1994). 
200 The sense in which the term "regime" is used in this context is not the same in which it has been used in 
some international relations works in recent years. There, the concept of "regime" normally corresponds to a 
complex social phenomenon which includes in itself not only a particular set of rules, principles, and 
standards, but also institutions, procedures, values, informal conventions, and programs. By contrast, in this 
work the term "regime" is used exclusively to describe the factuality of the ILTMC on the plane of the 
juridical instance. For a similar usage of the term "regime, " see Byers, supra n. 73,128-9. See also Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, The Liberal Agenda for Peace: International Relations Theory and the Future of the United Nations, 4 
Transnat'l L& Contemp. Probs. 377,385-8 (1994). For a representative sample of regime theory works, see 
further ARILD UNDERDAL AND ORAN R. YOUNG (EDS. ), REGIME CONSEQUENCES: METHODOLOGICAL 
CHALLENGES AND RESEARCH STRATEGIES (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004); ROBERT O. KEOHANE (ED. ), POWER 
AND GOVERNANCE IN A PARTIALLY GLOBALIZED WORLD (London: Routledge, 2002); ANDREAS 
HASENCLEVER ET AL. (EDS. ), THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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central concerns of the last, third, chapter of this thesis, consequently, will be, firstly, to 
reconstruct the exact shape and content of the new ILTMC regime, and, secondly, to 
determine to what extent and in which way the effectively existing ILTMC regime may 
differ from its ideological self-image and what kind of consequences this may have for the 
sustainability of the latter. 
With this as our background, let us close now this section and move back to the 
plane of the new ILTMC and its legal realist critique. 
Press, 1997); Marc A. Levy et al., The Study of International Regimes, 1 Eur. J. Int'l Rel 267 (1995); Jack Donnelly, 
International Human Rights: a Regime Analysis, 40 Intl Org. 599 (1986); STEPHEN D. KRASNER (ED. ), 
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). 
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III 
Critique 
"Men think in terms of models.... When we verify a 
model by testing how far it does or does not correspond 
to the phenomena, this is, of course, not an end in itself 
but only a means to an end. Our ulterior purpose is not 
to learn whether the model is or is not valid; it is to get 
new insight into the structure and nature of Reality by 
applying a model that is valid and is therefore an 
effective tool" 
Arnold Toynbee, A Stony of History, Vol. 301 
As explained in the last sub-section of the previous chapter, the main analytical objective of 
this chapter is basically twofold. The first main task pursued in these pages will be to 
identify and describe the full content of the effectively existing legal regime created by the 
new ILTMC project. Once this stage of the investigation is successfully completed, the 
next general task will be to identify and evaluate the social distributive impact of that legal 
regime and to compare the obtained findings with the "official story" produced by the new 
ILTMC project. 
Despite all its unquestionable advances on the front of social theory, historical 
materialism has not yet worked out a coherent practicable approach for evaluating the 
contents of effectively existing international legal regimes. A number of important 
advances have been made in this direction, to be sure. As things stand, however, none of 
them have yet been developed into a comprehensive workable theory. The main challenge 
confronting the opening sections of this chapter, consequently, will be to try to rectify this 
crucial shortcoming. 
Predictably, the pursuit of this goal will bring us once more to the subject of juristic 
epistemology. Continuing the general line started in the previous two chapters, I will 
complete my investigation of the question of method by working out an immediately, 
applicable analytical model that can enable the production of truly objective understanding of 
international legal phenomena. In the process of doing so, I will return to the question of 
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the traditional epistemic conventions adopted in the mainstream international law 
scholarship and the basic reasons for steering clear of them. 
To a certain extent, the logic underlying the analytical model I propose here may 
suggest that I believe it necessary to rethink the theory of the formal sources of 
international law. That is not so. From the point of view of the RSA-functionalist tradition 
elaborated in the course of this chapter, the question of the theory of sources is ultimately 
completely irrelevant. This is not to say, naturally, that the historico-materialist tradition 
does not ever care about the rules of recognition adopted in the international legal order; 
only that in the context of its jurisprudential theory this topic is not in fact substantively 
important. ' 
Several assumptions will have to be made in order to enable an effective execution 
of this stage of our inquiry. First, because our main aim here is to understand the structure 
of objective incentives created by the new ILTMC regime through its RSA functionality, I 
propose to simplify our model understanding of the basic dynamics of social agency. What 
this means in practical terms is this. To be able to understand the objective limits of social 
possibility, I will suspend for the duration of this stage of our investigation all awareness of 
the full range of subjective diversity and the complexity of individual and collective 
psychology patterns. Every subject category studied in these pages will be constructed on 
the basis of an archetypal model. In other words, instead of, for instance, investigating how 
the new ILTMC regime affects the reality of social possibilities for every single minority 
community and every state in the ECE region, I will only investigate the patterns of the new 
ILTMC's distributive impact on the social possibilities of an archetypal minority 
community and an archetypal state. 
Immediately, a question starts to arise: against the background of everything that 
was said in the previous chapter, would this not be a completely absurd action? Have I not 
just spent more than a dozen pages berating Hegel and preaching the virtues of cognitive 
1 Cf. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 35 (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1991) (explaining that ever since international law became multilateral and left the narrow confines 
of bipartite treaties, the international law discipline has been haunted by the constant need of creating a 
mechanism for the conclusive determination of its current status and pointing out that the most common 
solution found to this problem has been to formulate a "doctrine of sources" laying down "the verifiable 
conditions for ascertaining and validating legal prescriptions"). 
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concretism, insisting on the need to recognize the ontological irreducibility of the studied 
phenomena? Is archetypization not a species of abstraction and does not the idea of 
abstraction fly in the face of everything that structural conjuncturalism is all about? 
The brief answer to the last sentence is: yes and no. All archetypes, of course, are a 
species of analytical abstractions. However, as Kelle quite correctly pointed out, just 
because the requirements of the historico-materialist method constantly postulate the need 
to reject all forms of abstract schematism, it does not necessarily follow that a historical 
materialist inquiry must reject the use of all kinds of abstractions. ' As Jameson observes, as 
long as one remains continually aware of their basic limitations, it would be highly 
counterproductive to insist that a social analyst should discard the instruments of the non- 
dialectical thought (such as, for instance, syllogistic logic) simply because they are non- 
dialectical. ' 
What are the limits of the admissible use of abstractions in structural 
conjuncturalism then? To understand the basic conditions for answering this problem, let 
us first clarify the content of the corresponding concepts. Writes Ilyenkov: 
The terms `the abstract' and `the concrete' are employed both in everyday speech 
and in the special literature rather ambiguously. Thus, one hears of `concrete facts' 
and `concrete music', of `abstract thinking' and `abstract painting', of `concrete 
truth' and `abstract labour'. This usage is in each case apparently justified by the 
existence of shades of meanings in these words, and it would be ridiculously 
pedantic to demand a complete unification of the usage [in all types of discourse. 
However, ] the categories of the abstract and the concrete [do] have quite a 
definite meaning in dialectical logic, which is intrinsically linked with the 
dialectico-materialist conception of the truth, the relation of thought to reality, the 
mode of theoretical reproduction of reality in thinking, and so on. As long as we 
deal with categories of dialectics connected with words, rather than with words 
themselves, any licence, lack of clarity or instability in their definition (let alone 
incorrectness) will necessarily lead to a distorted conception of the essence of the 
matter. For this reason it is necessary to free the categories of the abstract and the 
2 V. ZH. KELLE (ED. ), PRINTSIP ISTORIZMA V POZNANII SOTSIAL'NYH YAVLENIY 8 (Moscow: Nauka, 1972). 
3 See FREDRIC JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS: NARRATIVE AS A SOCIALLY SYMBOLIC ACT 10,32, 
34,41 (London: Routledge, 2002). 
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concrete from the connotations that have been associated with them throughout 
centuries in many works by tradition, from force of habit or simply because of an 
error, which has often interfered with correct interpretation of the propositions of 
dialectical logic. 4 
The starting premise of all non-Hegelian understanding of the relationship between the 
abstract and the concrete derives from the recognition that 
knowledge reflecting an individual fact, though it may be a frequently recurring 
one, but failing to grasp its internal structure and internally necessary links with 
other such facts, is extremely abstract knowledge even if it is direct and sensually 
perceived. ' 
The concept of concreteness, warns Ilyenkov, should not be confused with the concept of 
the concrete example: "[g]raphic examples illustrating a meagre abstraction can only 
camouflage its abstractness, creating merely an appearance or illusion of concrete 
consideration. "6 A properly dialectical understanding of the concept of concreteness (and 
therefore of the limits of permissibility in the use of abstractions) is determined by a 
different set of factors. 
The basic idea of abstraction 
means considering a quite particular recurring fact with respect to its own 
immanent content, it means considering it `in itself, as the familiar phrase has it, 
ignoring everything that this fact owes to the entire totality of the external 
influences of the broader spectre of reality in which it exists. That is the path 
Marx follows in Capital in studying the phenomena of simple commodity 
exchange. He obtains the real objective characteristics of value `abstractly 
4 See Chapter 1, "The Conception of the Abstract and the Concrete in Dialectics and in Formal Logic", in 
EVALD ILYENKOV, THE DIALECTICS OF THE ABSTRACT AND THE CONCRETE IN MARX'S CAPITAL (transl. by 
Sergei Kuzyakov; Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982); available from 
http: //, s«vw niarxists org/archive/ilyenkov/works/abstract/abstral. htm. 
5 Id., Chapter 2, "The Abstract as an Expression of the Concrete", available at 
http: //w-, vw. ilialxists. org/ archive/fýyenkov/works/abstract/abstra2. htrn. 
6 Id. 
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considered, that is, apart from circumstances not immediately flowing from the 
laws of the simple circulation of commodities. '' 
All abstractions, in other words, involve a certain measure of decontextualization. Not all 
decontextualizations, however, points out Ilyenkov, are equally legitimate. 
The point is ... that the very right to consider the given particular phenomenon 
abstractly presupposes comprehending its specific role and place in the whole, 
within the universal interconnection, within an ensemble of mutually conditioning 
particular phenomena. ... 
The fact that commodity is considered abstractly, 
independently from all other phenomena of capitalist production, expresses 
logically (theoretically) its concrete historically unique form of dependence on the 
system of production as a whole. The point is that the commodity-form of 
connection proves to be the universal, elementary form of interconnections 
between men only within the developed system of capitalist production and in no 
other system of production relations. ... 
Had any system of social production 
relations other than the capitalist one ... 
been theoretically studied as the subject- 
matter, nothing would have been more erroneous in Marxian logic, than to 
consider the commodity form abstractly, as it is considered in the economic 
theory of capitalism. [So, w]hile the theoretician has not merely a right but even an 
obligation to consider the commodity form in abstraction within the capitalist 
system, he has no logical right to consider just as abstractly any other form of 
economic connection in the same capitalist organism, e. g., profit or rent. " 
All of which leads to the conclusion that 
the right to abstract consideration of a phenomenon is determined by the 
concrete role of this phenomenon in the whole under study, in a concrete system 
of interacting phenomena. If the starting point of the development of a theory is 
taken correctly, its abstract consideration happens to coincide directly with a concrete 
consideration of the system as a whole-9 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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The starting point of the theoretical project undertaken in this chapter is to ascertain the 
structure of objective incentives created by the new ILTMC regime. Within the concrete 
system of interacting phenomena presupposed as that regime's grounding context, the 
phenomena of minority communities, majority communities, and the state play the role of 
the structural nodal points in reference to which all other phenomena covered by that 
regime's discourse are conceptualized. Furthermore, within its own terms of reference, the 
ILTMC legal regime is designed to provide a social structure of general application 
covering all existing examples of specified subject categories. Considering these two facts, it 
seems to make perfect practical sense for the purposes of this thesis to construct the 
subject categories corresponding to these phenomena in the form of archetypal models. 
The construction of social models, however, cannot be an act of "exact science. " 
How well a given archetypal model fulfils its heuristic functions in a given setting will to a 
large extent depend on how logical (objectively supportable) the model-production criteria 
used for its construction look against the background of the internal condition of its 
original context. A close analysis of the internal condition of the new ILTMC project 
suggests the appropriateness of the following three criteria: 
(i) every archetypal subject (minority community, majority community, state, etc. ) 
has to be constructed on the basis of both the new ILTMC's conceptualization of it and 
the general understanding of such subjects' objective traits at the current conjuncture 
obtained on the basis of the structural-conjunctural analysis; 
(ii) because we are interested in understanding the web of objective incentives created 
in the repressive-political order, all considerations of the ideological order created by the 
new ILTMC project will be suspended; as a result, in our discussion of the archetypal 
subjects we will not entertain the possibilities of their developing a state of false 
consciousness, misrecognition, self-denial, mass delusion, etc.; all subjects considered at 
this stage of our inquiry will be assumed to act, react, and choose as if they were completely 
unconstrained by such factors; 
(iii) to maximize the analytical penetration of the topic, all subjects will be also 
assumed to be boundedly rational; in other words they will be assumed to posses (a) an 
ability to recognize the different costs and benefits associated with different courses of 
actions; (b) an inclination to maximize benefits and minimize costs; and (c) an inclination 
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to preference deliberation and consistency over impulsive and random action. 1° The 
ultimate function of this assumption is to help us to flesh out the static component of the 
strategic field created by the RSA aspect of the new ILTMC regime. It is not to produce a 
formula of the dynamic action occurring within that field. " In other words, as institutional 
economists would normally say, the main objective we will try to achieve this way will be to 
obtain "a theory of advantage rather than a theory of behavior, "" i. e. we will seek to 
understand the shape of "opportunity sets" created for the interacting parties, not the 
pattern of how these sets are actually used. 13 
10 C£ RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 252 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2001) (defining rationality as "choosing the best available means to the choosers ends"). See also Thomas S. 
Ulen, "Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics", in BOUDEWIJN BOUCKAERT AND GERRIT DE 
GEEST (EDS. ), ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, V. 1 790,791-2 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000). 
Cf also Heico Kerkmeester, "Methodology: General", id., 383,384-5. 
11 This point is very important. It separates the knowledge project of this chapter from the Chicago-school 
style law and economics project Further on the limitations of the rational actor paradigm, see Mark Kelman, 
Law and Behavioral Science: Conceptual Overviews, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1347 (2003); Lee Ross and Donna 
Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology's Challenges to Legal Theory and Practice, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1081 (2003); John 
F. Tomer, Economic Man vs. Heterodox Men: the Concepts of Human Nature in Schools of Economic Thought, 30 J. of 
Soc. -Econ. 281 (2001); Christine Jolls et aL, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 
1471 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1997); Mark G. Kelman, 
Misunderstanding Social Life: a Critique of the Core Premises of "Law and Economics', 33 J. Leg. Educ. 274 (1983). Cf. 
Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Corniiulsoy 
Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Maryland L. Rev. 563,631-2 (1982). Cf. POSNER, supra n. 10,256-64. 
12 See, e. g., A. ALLAN SCHMID, PROPERTY, POWER, AND PUBLIC CHOICE (2nd edn.; New York: Praeger, 1987). 
13 As Ross and Shestowsky point out, "[a]n important truism of social psychology is that people respond not 
to some objective reality but to their own subjective interpretations or definitions of that reality. [V]ariability 
and unpredictability in such subjective construals can give rise to variability and unpredictability in behavior. " 
(See supra n. 11,1088. ) It is not the objective of this thesis to predict through a combination of mathematical 
models what particular response the new ILTMC regime will engender in every particular minority 
community in the ECE region. 
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Section One 
Understanding Law as an Element of the Repressive Political Order 
a. The Question of Names and the Basics of the FunctionalzstApproach 
A series of preliminary questions must be addressed before we proceed anywhere further. 
The first of them is: what is the relationship between "ILTMC" and the more traditionally 
used category "the international law of minority rights"? 14 Are these just two different 
terms that refer to the same object? Is it the same single phenomenon we have in mind 
when we use these two labels? The answer, of course, is: no; and there are at least two good 
reasons for it. 
First, there is nothing flagrantly unintelligible with the term "the international law 
of minority rights. " It is a sufficiently accurate designation of a body of law that exists in 
large part in the space of the international political process and is certainly concerned with 
the question of minority rights. The name, by and large, seems to justify itself and, 
practically speaking, makes perfect sense from the point of view of jurisprudential 
semantics. It is, furthermore, a sufficiently well-established usage in the modem 
international law discourse. Practitioners seem to like it. So do scholars and the 
representatives of the civil society. Amending it simply for the sake of the amendment 
would, thus, only lead to unnecessary confusion, which is not the intention of this thesis. 
More importantly, the legal regime identified here as the ILTMC is not, in fact, 
identical with the legal regime commonly designated as "the international law of minority 
rights. " Although the latter can be said to form a significant part of the former, on the 
conceptual level, the two entities are not the same. There are parts of the ILTMC regime 
which are not constituted by the international norms concerning the protection of minority 
rights. Similarly, there are parts of the international law of minority rights which have very 
little to do with the ILTMC. One of the best ways to understand how and in what sense 
14 Cf, e. g., PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991). 
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this is so is to recall the analytical distinction15 between "minorities as positive associations" 
(in Sartrean minorities for-themselves) and "minorities as negative associations" (in Sartrean 
minorities-in-themselves), or, to use a slightly more accurate description, "minorities seeking to 
retain and promote their communal identity" and "minorities formed as an object-effect of 
other communities' inter-ethnic practices. " The immediate shape of the boundary line 
between the two categories as social factualities, of course, is a completely separate matter, 
but the basic idea behind the theory seems to make a lot of sense when one analyzes the 
patterns of the international legal response to the minorities question. For instance, it 
seems it was clearly the former - minorities as positive associations - whose interests the 
League Minorities System was designed to protect in the interwar period, while today it is 
mostly the latter that Nigel Rodley, for instance, has in mind when arguing that all the usual 
concerns included under the heading of minority rights can in fact be easily addressed by 
the existing body of general human rights law, such as, for instance, that contained in the 
ICCPR, without actually having to invent a separate category of minority rights. " Most of 
the modern scholarship addressing the topic of the international legal regulation of the 
minorities question tends to ignore this distinction. The practical organization of the 
international regulatory project, however, suggests it should not. To put it slightly 
schematically, a minority collective that has come into existence only because its members 
have been constantly discriminated against by the rest of the society certainly may over 
some unspecified period of time develop some kind of form of residual group solidarity, 
but that feeling of solidarity will be highly unlikely to develop into any kind of "aggressive 
nationalism, " so it is very probably not those kinds of minority groups which the pan- 
European lawmakers had in mind throughout the 1990s when expressing their horror and 
dismay at the spread of postmodern tribalism, the rise of ethnic conflict, and the threats 
posed by disloyal minorities to the stability of the existing states. 
A minority formed solely as an object-effect of the discriminatory practices of the 
majority is highly unlikely ever to develop into a community in the normal sense of the word, 
15 John Packer makes a lot of this distinction in "On the Definition of Minorities, " in JOHN PACKER AND 
KRISTIAN MYNTTI (EDS. ), THE PROTECTION OF ETHNIC AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES IN EUROPE 23 
(Turku: Abo Akademi University, 1993). 
16 See further Nigel S. Rodley, Conceptual Problems in the Protection of Minorities: International Legal Detdlopments, 17 
HRQ 48 (1995). 
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i. e. in the sense adopted, for instance, in the Greco-Bulgarian "Communities" cases' (and 
duplicated later by Capotorti18 and numerous others' , val.: a group of people possessing a 
common set of cultural traits and intent on retaining and developing them where possible. 20 
If nothing else, that consideration alone should be enough to distinguish the ILTMC from 
the rest of the international-law-relating-to-the-regulation-of-the-minorities-question field. 
The immediate object of the ILTMC's attention, as the name suggests, must be the 
question of the treatment of minority communities as communities. As every international lawyer 
knows, however, in the eyes of the existing international legal system minority communities 
are not currently recognized as legal subjects, " i. e. as entities capable of possessing and 
enjoying legal rights and exercising legal duties in their own name 'A great deal of 
international legal regulation of their status, consequently, has to take place through 
juridical schemes not immediately manifested in constructs commonly known as "minority 
rights. " The substantive scope of the ILTMC as a body of law, therefore, in many respects 
has to go beyond the substantive scope of the international law of minority rights. 
If that is the case, however, if, in other words, the ILTMC is not the same thing as 
the international law of minority rights, then a question must inevitably arise: what is it 
then? Better still, how do we know, how can we be certain that it is, i. e. it exists as a body 
of law, to start with? 
Obviously, the phrase "international law relating to the treatment of minority 
communities" is not a common usage in the modern international law discourse. It is not 
17 See Chapter II, Section 1, p. 115, n. 58, above. 
18 Id., p. 114, n. 56. 
19 Including the OSCE HCNM. See, e. g., Max van der Stoel, "Considerable Sacrifices Are Inevitable in Order 
to Avoid New Disasters in Europe", in WOLFGANG ZELLNER AND FALK LANGE (EDS. ), PEACE AND 
STABILITY THROUGH HUMAN AND MINORITY RIGHTS: SPEECHES BY THE OSCE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON 
NATIONAL MINORITIES 77 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999). 
20 Rodley was certainly right insofar as criticizing the Capotortian line of reasoning. Capotorti's decision to 
subsume all minority issues covered by Article 27 of the ICCPR under the umbrella of the Greco-Bulgarian 
"Communities" doctrine is profoundly flawed. 
21 See further IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 61-7 (6th edn.; Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003); PETER MALANCZUK (ED. ), AKEHURSVS MODERN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 105-7(7'h edn.; London: Routledge, 1997). 
22 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (6t' edn.; London: Professional 
Books Ltd., 1976). 
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used as a chapter heading in any of the existing international law textbooks (unlike, for 
instance, "international law of air space" or "international environmental law"). ' There are 
no international organizations or tribunals named after it (unlike, for instance, 
"international labour lawi24 or "international law of the sea") 25 Universities and law 
schools do not offer advanced degrees in the ILTMC (unlike, for instance, "international 
law of human rights" or "international law and development')-' How can we know then 
that the object described in these pages actually exists? Moreover, how can we claim that 
the "invisible college" of the international law scholarship is aware of its existence and that 
there is, in fact, such a thing as the ILTMC scholarship if no one writes books and articles 
using the words "international law relating to the treatment of minority communities" (or 
its synonyms) in the title? 
Clearly, as the short survey of the established usage above shows, to be able to 
declare the existence of a legal regime entitled the "international law relating to the 
treatment of minority communities, " one needs to resort to some other criterion than a 
routine reference to the established discursive conventions. Two questions arise in that 
regard immediately. First, what should that criterion be? Second, is it legitimate to impute 
to a given discursive community the knowledge of a particular concept and, consequently, 
the theoretical practice of the corresponding knowledge project, when its positive 
discursive conventions do not seem to include that concept in their outwardly observable 
conceptual framework? 
23 See, e. g., MALANCZUK, supra n. 21,198-201,241-53; ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 327-53 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
24 For a brief synopsis of the mandate and history of the International Labour Organization, see further 
"About the ILO", available from http: //www. ilo. org/pu blic/english/about/index. htm. 
25 For a brief synopsis of the mandate and history of the International Maritime Organization and the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, see further "Introduction to the IMO" and "General 
Information - Overview: International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, " available respectively from 
http: //www. imo. org/home. asp and http//www. itlos. org/start2 en. htmL 
26 See, for example, the list of LL. M. specialist degrees offered at the University of Nottingham, available 
from http: //www. nottiiigliam. ac. uk/law/courses/pg courses introduction. php. Cf the list of LL. M. 
specializations offered at the New York University School of Law, available from 
http"//www. nyilawglobal. org/graduateadmissions/masteroflaws/index. htin. Cf also the list of specialized 
LL. M. degrees offered at the UCL Faculty of Laws, available from 
http"/ /www ucl. ac uk/laws/prospective/graduate/index. shtml? llm specdegree. 
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To start with the second question first, the brief answer is yes. The longer answer 
is: yes, because, firstly, although a lot of the modern-day international law discourse on the 
minorities question is couched in terms of "minority rights, " a lot of it is also couched in 
terms of "minority protection, " and what "minority protection" in that context really 
means, of course, is not "just" the protection of persons of minority origin, but more like 
"the regulation of the inter-communal relations between minorities and majorities, " since if 
we look at the actual contents of the corresponding regimes, such as, for instance, that 
reflected in the Lund Recommendations, it will be clear that a lot of existing international 
norms purport to address questions that cannot in the normal understanding of the term 
be legitimately qualified as "only" protection27 (unless one takes such a sophistic approach 
to interpretation that virtually anything can be read into "protection, " including ethnic 
cleansing and apartheid). From the semantic point of view, therefore, calling the 
corresponding body of law "the international law relating to the treatment of minority 
communities" seems to make far more sense. 
Secondly, accepting the premise that the ILTMC does in fact exist also seems to 
make a lot of sense from the point of view of inductive reasoning. Postulating the existence 
of an ILTMC as an entity ontologically separate from the international law of minority 
rights helps to explain many phenomena that otherwise would remain inexplicable, such as, 
for instance, why so many scholars writings about international law and the minorities 
question so often end up turning to the problematics of nationalism and group interests 
even when the immediate raw material to which their knowledge process is applied is 
entitled "the rights of persons belonging to ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities"; or 
why whenever in the last twenty years the pan-European bodies purported to discuss the 
questions of the legal regulation of minority protection, they almost always in the same 
breath also spoke about nationalism, irredentism, and ethnic conflict, phenomena that 
normally tend to happen at the level of communities and inter-communal affairs and not at 
the level of disparate individuals; or why it is that the COE convention on the minorities 
question and the various HCNM recommendations on the different aspects of 
multiculturalist governance are entitled the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
27 See, for instance, 514-18 of the Lund Recommendations. 
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National Minorities and the Hague, Oslo, and Lund Recommendations on the Rights and 
Participation of National Minorities and not "persons belonging to national minorities. )728 
Going back to the first question now, the answer in this case seems to be a lot 
simpler. As far as this inquiry is concerned, it was probably first formulated and elaborated 
in the late 19" century, in the writings of one of the most prominent American jurists, 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 29 The immediate passage I have in mind comes in what 
certainly must be his most celebrated piece of scholarly writing, The Path of the Law. It 
begins with the simple observation that: 
in societies like ours the command of the public force is intrusted [sic] to the 
judges in certain cases, and the whole power of the state will be put forth, if 
necessary, to carry out their judgments and decrees. People want to know under 
what circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming against what it so 
much stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out when 
this danger is to be feared. -I0 
From these premises, Holmes goes on to conclude that if one really 
28 A diehard empiricist may reject this argument because it is an ex hypothesi argument. The implication here - 
the background assumption on which that rejection is based - is that ex hypothesi reasoning is somehow 
analytically inferior and that good arguments cannot be built this way. Needless to say, this assumption is 
fundamentally wrong. Certainly, a lot of bad ideas and ideological rubbish have started out as bold hypotheses 
- the Fukuyamian end of history thesis is a good example - but so have also a lot of good ideas and genuine 
examples of the theoretical progress. From Newton's discovery of gravity to Plank's discovery of the 
quantum, from the Mendeleev periodic table to the Kondratiev long waves, the greatest advances in modem 
thought have started their life as just guesses. The functioning of every knowledge process turns on the 
creation of hypotheses. The ultimate criterion by which every hypothesis must be judged is whether or not it 
helps make more sense of the empirically observed reality than its rivals. The hypothesis offered about the 
existence of the ILTMC certainly meets that criterion. 
29 Further on O. W. Holmes, Jr., and his contribution to jurisprudence, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 109-42 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992). See also Neil Duxbury, The Reinvention of American Legal Realism, 12 Leg. Stud. 
137,161-4 (1992); Neil Duxbury, The Birth of Legal Realism and the Myth of Justice Holmes, 20 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 
81 (1991); G. Edward White, The Rise and Fall ofJustice Holmes, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 51 (1971). 
30 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 991,991 (1997). 
180 
want[s] to know the law and nothing else, [one] must look at it as a bad man, who 
cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to 
predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the 
law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience. 31 
But what does it actually mean, he asks then, to adopt the bad-man perspective in terms of 
one's jurisprudential outlook? 
Mainly, and in the first place, [the bad man is interested to know] that if he does 
certain things he will be subjected to disagreeable consequences by way of 
imprisonment or compulsory payment of money.... It does not matter [to him], 
so far as the given consequence ... 
is concerned, whether the act to which it is 
attached is described in terms of praise or in terms of blame, or whether the law 
purports to prohibit it or to allow it. 32 
In other words, what Holmes is saying here is this: to understand the law from the 
perspective of the bad man, i. e. to know the law as it actually is, to see the real shape and content 
of the given legal regime, we must analyze it from the point of view of its addressees by 
asking the question: what disagreeable material consequences are the judges likely to visit 
on the given category of subjects under a particular scenario? The underlying assumptions 
informing Holmes's vision, as we can see, are thus completely and thoroughly functionalzs? 3 
as well as situationa§st. ' If you want to know the law, Holmes is basically saying, you have 
to study its practical workings in a particular given situation: law is what the law does. 35 
31 Id., 993. 
32 Id., 994. 
33 The Holmesean concept of functionalism used in this chapter must not be confused with that constructed 
in Hans Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AJIL 260 (1940). 
34 Further on the use of situationalism in international law, see generally OUTI KORHONEN, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW SITUATED (I'he Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000). 
35 Cf. Sheldon M. Novick, "Introduction to the Dover Edition", in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., Tý-iE 
COMMON LAW iii, xvii-xviii (New York: Dover, 1991): "[What was Oliver Wendell Holmes] truly original 
insight[? All throughout the 19th century l]aw writers, including Holmes [himself] up through the very year of 
his Lowell lectures [1880], had tried and failed to make sense out of the multitudinous rules of conduct that 
courts seemed to recognize and enforce. A landowner had a duty [of care] to guests, but not to trespassers; 
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And what the law does, according to Holmes, is not just bring together an abstract set of 
morals but determine the application of social repression. 
The law, for Holmes, is not essentially a lofty complex of ethical ideas but an 
elaborate practical system through the instrumentality of which the social body in question 
administers different kinds of compulsion on its members. 36 Structurally speaking, the legal 
system, in Holmes's theory, thus, consists of three basic elements: (i) a particular set of 
ap paratuses, 37 which are authorized to apply (ii) a particular type of cnmpulsion38 under (iii) a 
particular set of abstractly formulated39 cin'umstames. The knowledge-in-advance of these 
circumstances, in Holmes's understanding, is what ultimately constitutes the central task of 
every jurisprudential inquiry. 
The relevance of this insight for the purposes of the present inquiry is genuinely 
invaluable. Firstly, it gives us the basic notion of the ILTMC. Taken in the context of its 
practical social functionality, the ILTMC represents the general object-effect of that body of coercive 
practices b_ y international apparatuses wich a minority community, if it were in the position of a 
Holmesean bad man, would want to know about. 
railroad companies had complex duties toward their passengers and the owners of their freight, still others to 
pedestrians crossing their tracks. Holmes had labored unsuccessfully, like his predecessors, to make sense of 
this tangled mass of duties and correlative rights. In 1880, however, he seemed to have suddenly seen a new 
organizing principle. The question in every case, Holmes realized, was whether liability would be imposed. 
His great stroke was to examine not the rules themselves, but the circumstances under which a breach of the 
rule would be punished. By looking at the circumstances in which liability was imposed, and ignoring 
rationalizations about duty and rules of conduct, Holmes for the first time was able to make general 
statements about law and its relation to society. " 
36 One can see at this point the immediate parallel between the Holmesean and the Althusserian traditions. 
For both, the most important thing about the law's identity is its socially repressive function. For Althusser, 
the law is essentially the primary organizer of the repressive field operated by the dominating class. For 
Holmes, the law is the main institution through which the body politic administers whatever compulsion it 
deems necessary on its members. 
37 As we can see from the quoted excerpts, for Holmes these are effectively limited to judges and courts. This 
feature, however, is not really central to the functionalist theory. As every international lawyer knows, it is not 
necessary to have a compulsory adjudicatory structure in order to have a functional system of law. 
38 In the examples Holmes gives in The Path of the Law, the taxonomy of applicable compulsion is limited to 
physical (imprisonment) and pecuniary (fine) compulsion. Once again, one can see how that feature is not, in 
fact, essential for the validity of the functionalist theory. 
39 Because, as the first quoted excerpt indicates, they are sufficiently knowable in advance to justify the 
emergence of a whole category of consultant businessmen. 
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Secondly, despite all its unquestionable advances on the front of general 
jurisprudence, the Althusserian social theory has never developed a workable, hands-on 
mechanism for investigating the internal structure of the juridical instance in its repressive- 
political quality. Holmes's path-breaking studies of the functional dimension of the legal 
order comprise, in this regard, an unparalleled practical advance. 
This said, none of Holmes's own observations are in themselves quite sufficient to 
set up the full problematic of the ILTMC's status as an element of the repressive-political 
order. Although he had outlined in great detail the general terms on which the functionalist 
inquiry must be conducted - the bad man looks out for the disagreeable material 
consequences and does not really care about their formal designation in the legal discourse 
- Holmes gave no immediate guidance as to where exactly such consequences should be 
expected to come from (to pot) or how one can reliably complete a map of such 
consequences in a decentralized legal order bereft of a compulsory judiciary organ. 40 To 
complete the missing links of the analytical chain, we must, therefore, turn now from 
Holmes's own works to those of his students and followers, the scholars who picked up 
the functionalist theory where he left it and who brought it to that point where it can be 
easily connected to our inquiry. The particular scholar I propose to concentrate our 
attention on here is the American legal realist from Columbia University, Robert Lee 
Hale. 41 
b. The Logic of the Functionalist Approach: Coercion, Law, and the RSA 
According to Hale, the general function of every legal order regardless of its immediate 
historical context essentially boils down to deciding the distribution of power and welfare 
across the given body politic. The general structure of all social interactions, in Hale's 
40 For a commentary on Holmes's own understanding of how the material circumstances triggering the 
application of compulsion can be known, see further Hessel E. Yntema, Mr. Justice Holmes' View of Leal 
Science, 40 Yale L. J. 696,700-1 (1931). 
41 Further on Hale and his contribution to jurisprudence, see Warren Samuels, The Economy as a System of Power 
and Its Legal Bases: the Legal Economics of Robert Lee Hale, 27 U. Mi L. Rev. 261 (1973); Neil Duxbury, Robert 
Hale and the Economy of Legal Force, 53 MLR 421 (1990); Duncan Kennedy, "The Stakes of Law, or Hale and 
Foucault! ", in DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC. 83-111 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1993). 
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understanding, consists of what he calls the "bargaining situation. " The constitutive terms 
of every bargaining situation are co-determined by a variety of institutional patterns, 
including moral conventions and ideological values, and are also affected by different types 
of historical givens (path dependence) and the facts of nature (e. g. climate and geography). 
But it is the legal regime - in the Halean sense of it - that ultimately decides its structure. 
What normally takes place in the context of every bargaining situation, according to 
Hale, is basically this: (1) every bargaining situation is essentially like a game42 - it has its 
constitutive rules, its internal dynamics, and its set of preferable skills; (2) depending on the 
objective predispositions created by the confluence of the background institutional patterns 
and the historical and natural givens, every game attracts a particular variety of collective 
and individual players; (3) every player enters the game in pursuit of his own particular goal 
and preferences; all players, however, seek, in the end, partly for its own sake, partly to 
enable the pursuit of other goals, to maximize their relative shares of power and welfare 
available for distribution within the context of the given bargaining situation; (4) no player 
is usually strong enough to secure all of his needs by himself; cooperation and negotiation 
with others are, thus, an inevitable condition of every game; (5) as a result, every social 
interaction at one point or another tends to resolve itself into an act of bargaining, in which 
the participants apply various forms of pressure (sticks) and supply various types of 
encouragement (carrots) to one another in order to achieve their respective ends; (6) the 
available stocks of power and welfare, however, remain at all times limited; every social 
interaction can be, consequently, modelled in terms of its internal potential for 
conflictuality, i. e. dynamics, conditions, and forms of conflict inscribed within it. a3 
42 C£ ERIC BERNE, GAMES PEOPLE PLAY: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 49-50 (New York: 
Grove Press, 1964): "The use of the word `game' should not be misleading. ... 
The possible seriousness of 
games and play, and the possibly serious results, are well known to anthropologists.... The grimmest of all, 
of course, is `War'. " 
43 This is very Hobbesean. See further THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (London: Penguin, 1985). The vulgar 
understanding of Hobbes misreads his thesis about bella omnia contre omnes as suggesting that in the state of 
nature men are embroiled in an unbridled violent conflict. As Foucault has shown, however, a much more 
accurate reading of that thesis would be that: (i) the state of universal war does not belong only to the state of 
nature but in fact continues throughout al stages of social existence: "beneath [all] peace, order, wealth, and 
authority, [a] primitive and permanent war" rages unendingly and even "peace itself is [nothing but] a coded 
war"; and (ii) the universal war does not in fact involve open unbridled violence but is always sublimated: 
considering its structural condition (everyone against everyone), the society will never be sufficiently 
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This latter thesis constitutes the central theme of all Hale's theoretical writing. 
Every social context, according to Hale, is saturated with relations of force and coercion. 
Even the most innocent at the first sight social situations are, in reality, constituted by a 
complex system of various types of coercion. Take, for instance, a contract for the purchase 
of goods. 44 Such transactions, observes Hale, are generally believed to be voluntary for the 
simple reason that the parties who enter them appear to do so as of their own volition. 
That belief is wrong. As every student of duress knows, just because people agree to enter 
into a transaction, it does not necessarily follow that their actions had not been forced. 45 
Consider the practical implications of human socialization. No member of the 
human society can satisfy all his vital needs by himself. People need food, shelter, 
education, physical protection, family support, socializing, etc. Nobody can supply all this 
for himself. Every individual, consequently, is at least somehow dependent on the rest of 
the society for the satisfaction of his living requirements, which is to say every individual 
must engage in at least some kinds of bargainings to obtain the goods required to satisfy his 
vital needs. Because everyone is dependent at least at some point on somebody else, it 
follows, concludes Hale, that everyone at least at some point can be coerced into agreeing to 
some course of action he would not under ideal circumstances find acceptable. Even the 
richest capitalists and landowners are not invulnerable to coercion. Each of them is 
susceptible to changing his course of action at least insofar as his relationships with the 
labour force and other capitalists and landowners are concerned. ' 
incentivized to allow the universal war to erupt in the open -"[t]here are no battles in Hobbes's primitive war, 
there is no blood and there are no corpses. There are presentations, manifestations, signs, emphatic 
expressions, wiles, and deceitful expressions; there are traps, intentions disguised as their opposite, and 
worries disguised as certainties [-] a sort of unending diplomacy. " MICHEL FOUCAULT, SOCIETY MUST BE 
DEFENDED 46-7,51,92 (transl. by David Macey; New York: Picador, 2003). 
44 See further Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Libeqy, 43 Col L. Rev. 603 (1943). 
Hale's theory of coercion finds many parallels in Foucault's capillary theory of power, as summarized 
in, e. g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 92-102 (transL by Robert 
Hurley, 1990). For further comparison of Hale and Foucault's theories, see generally Kennedy, supra n. 41. 
45 See further Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: a Comparison of `Political" and `Economic" Compulsion, 35 Col. L. 
Rev. 149,150 (1935). 
46 As Duncan Kennedy points out, it is here that Hale's radical difference from the vulgar economist Marxists 
starts to come out in full. See Kennedy, supra n. 41,85. 
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The old axiom of the conflict theory teaches: a conflict prevented is a conflict 
won. 47 Hale's re-reading of it emphasizes: a conflict prevented is a conflict still. 
Even if no workers at the given factory actually join the industry-wide strike in 
order to force their employers into paying them a higher wage, it still does not follow that 
there has been no coercion in their relationship with the employers. The workers and the 
employers, being experienced bargainers, are always aware that if the workers decide so, a 
strike can take place more or less at any time. The industrial process will be halted, the 
factory's output targets will not be met, the owners will lose profits. Whatever they do, the 
owners will sustain at least some damage to their economic interests. The threat of the 
strike, thus, is quite tangible and constantly hangs over every worker-employer relationship. 
Because the employers know that the workers can strike and because they know that the 
workers also know it, the employers, being en masse a rational group of agents, would 
normally seek to pre-empt the actualization of that threat by increasing the workers' wages 
in advance. If this occurs, the unilateral character and the advance timing of that decision at 
the first appearance may suggest it was a voluntary act. But that would be a completely 
incorrect interpretation, explains Hale. The outwardly expression of the employers' act 
should not at any point distract our attention from the simple fact that had the threat of the 
strike not hung over their heads at all times, the employers would have never raised the 
workers' wages beyond the bare minimum required to sustain an adequate reproduction of 
the labour force which would, almost certainly, not be the kind of money that the workers 
would find sufficient to forego their right to strike. ' To the extent to which the amount of 
the wages the workers are paid is conditioned by the employers' desire to avoid the strike, it 
follows that it is a direct product of a coerced relationship. 
Moving to the larger scale, Hale observes, the same pattern can also be discovered 
in every other social context: 
The owner of a shoe factory is in no danger of going il-shod - he may wear his 
own shoes. But he cannot live on shoes alone. Like everyone else, he must buy 
food or starve. Even the producer and owner of food must as a rule buy other 
forms of food than those in which he has specialized. Any person, in order to 
47 SuN-TZU, THE ART OF WAR 14,132-3 (ed. and trans]. by John Minford; New York: Penguin, 2003). 
48 Robert L. Hale, Coercion and ¢istribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci Q. 470,474 (1923). 
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live, must induce some of the owners of things which he needs, to permit him to 
use them. The owner has no legal obligation to grant the permission. But if 
offered enough money he will probably do so; for he, too, must obtain the 
permission of other owners to make use of their goods, and for this purpose he 
too needs money - more than he has at the outset He needs it more than he 
needs his surplus of shoes. 49 
Most people, rich as well as poor, would die of want were it not for the fact that 
many owners of the necessities of life can be induced to relinquish their 
constitutional rights to withhold them, and many workers to relinquish their 
constitutional rights to remain idle. They relinquish these rights in order to obtain 
money, without which they cannot induce other owners of goods to permit their 
use. 50 
But what is it exactly that makes the rich owner of a shoe factory coerced in his 
relationship with a local grocer? Surely, it is not the amount of physical force the latter can 
summon in his defence were the shoe factory owner's minions to raid his shop. No, the 
answer, says Hale, must be sought in the construction of the repressive-political order: 
The owner of the shoes or the food or any other product can insist on other 
people keeping their hands off his products. Should he so insist, the government 
will back him up with force. The owner of the money can likewise insist on other 
people keeping their hands off his money, and the government will likewise back 
him up with force. By threatening to maintain the legal barrier against the use of 
his shoes, their owner may be able to obtain a certain amount of money as the 
price of not carrying out his threat. And by threatening to maintain the legal 
barrier against the use of his money, the purchaser may be able to obtain a certain 
amount of shoes as the price of not withholding the money. A bargain is finally 
struck, each party consenting to its terms in order to aver the consequences with 
which the other threatens him. 51 
49 Hale, supra n. 44,604. 
50 Robert L. Hale, Our Equivocal Constitutional Guaranties, 39 Col. L. Rev. 563,576 (1939) 
51 Hale, supra n. 44,604. 
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he conditions of social compulsion are thus determined not so much by the relative 
physical strengths of the bargaining parties, but by their ability to mobilize the repressive 
state apparatus in protection of their interests. What prevents the shoe factory owner from 
sending his servants to rob the local grocer, in other words, is not the latter's ability to 
resist robbery but the knowledge that if he actually tried to do that, there would be a very 
high likelihood - measured by the terms of the grocer's protective entitlements under the 
government-endorsed legal order - that the government would interfere on the side of the 
grocer. No shoe factory owner is normally powerful enough to afford a fight with a 
modern state apparatus. Consequently, even the richest private consumers are going to 
accept the grocer's price demands and comply with his compulsion to offer him money in 
return for his commodities so that he does not mobilize the force of the RSA and direct it 
against them. 
Naturally, the extent of the grocer's power will be always limited, not least by the 
availability of other grocers (the more grocery shops there are in the vicinity, the less power 
each grocer has in his dealings with his clients) and the scarcity of the commodities he 
controls and how essential they are (one can compel a higher price when one sells medicine 
or bread than when one sells chewing gum). Still, when all is said and done, it is the 
grocer's position under the structural order enforced by the RSA and not something else 
that defines the fundamental terms of his power. Whether or not the given grocer will have 
many local rivals whose competitive pressure will compel him to lower his prices is going 
to be determined in the last analysis not by some fortuitous event but by how many grocery 
shops the government allows in the given vicinity (licensing), how well the police protects 
the grocery shops in that region, how much grocery owners are taxed, what kind of 
economic subsidies they receive, and so on. The ability of the grocer to control a scarce 
product is likewise going to be ultimately determined by the position taken on the issue by 
the government and enforced in practice through the RSA. If the government caps the 
prices or refuses to grant the grocer a monopoly over a particular commodity his capacity 
to compel his clients to accept a particular exchange rate will diminish. 
The bottom line, argues Hale, is simple: coercion is ubiquitous and in the final 
analysis coercion can always be traced to the government's use of the RSA. Even "the 
systems advocated by the professed upholders of laisse? faire are in reality permeated with 
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coercive restrictions of individual freedom. " "Some sort of coercive restriction of 
individuals 
... is absolutely unavoidable. 
2752 
What role in this context can then be ascribed to the phenomenon of the legal 
order? Having carried to its logical conclusion the Holmesean observations about the bad 
man's basic concerns, Hale produced two crucial insights about the social functionality of 
the legal order. 
The first was a direct continuation of Holmes's own remarks. How the legal 
discourse describes a particular juridical phenomenon does not in fact give us any 
conclusive guidance about its real nature. A phenomenon can be portrayed by the 
lawmakers in perfectly neutral terms, but its social function for a given subject can be 
deeply negative. For the person "on the receiving end of it, " it does not matter if the act by 
which he is deprived of the possibility to fulfil his vital needs is formally depicted in terms 
of blame or in terms of praise. If it hurts, it hurts. That is what matters. And that is, 
consequently, what we should focus on in our study of the law: the susceptibility of 
different subjects to harm and coercion under different juridical scenarios. 
The second insight pushed the envelope significantly further: the degree of a given 
subject's susceptibility to harm and coercion is not determined by the scope of those acts 
which are formally designated as "violence" and "duress, " but by the actual extent of 
circumstances in which his partners in those transactions through which he obtains the 
goods he requires to satisfy his needs (food, education, entertainment, etc. ) can withhold 
these goods from him under the aegis of the RSA. Or, in other words, the law is different 
things to different people. Depending on the kind of bargaining situation we engage in, the 
shape and content of the legal regime to which we are subject are likely not to be the same 
for us as for our neighbours. 
The basic logic by which Hale arrived at these conclusions can be glimpsed from 
the following series of passages: 
When the government ... threatens to 
[execute or imprison someone] unless he 
conforms to some prescribed course of conduct, it is exerting compulsion to 
make him obey. ... 
While his obedience may be voluntary in case he has no 
52 Hale, supra n. 48,470. 
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desire to deviate from the prescribed course of conduct, the requirement that he 
conform is itself compulsory. 53 
Prescription and proscription, of course, are the most obvious manifestations of the 
government's coercive practices. But they are certainly not the most widespread or the 
most typical ones. Take, for instance, the case of civil liability in private contractual 
transactions. Here the government's coercive presence is certainly not as patent as in the 
former case, but it is still quite substantial and important. If one of the parties to a contract 
refuses to honour its obligations to the other party, the latter under the government- 
supported law of contracts can enforce it to change its mind or to pay damages. To the 
extent to which it is the possibility of this "disagreeable consequence which tends to make 
the contractor do as he said he would, " it follows that all contractual transactions are 
thoroughly permeated with coercive relationships. The character of the coercion-exercise in 
this case, however, is markedly different: 
To the extent that anyone performs simply to avoid being sued, to that extent [he 
is] compel[led]. Yet apart from the exceptional cases where "punitive damages" 
are added to compensatory, no one is [really] compelled to refrain who is willing 
to pay for the losses. Subject to some qualifications, the compensatory damages 
are measured by the amount of loss caused to the plaintiff ... 
This serves ... to 
deter those defendants to whom liability for damages is more disagreeable than 
respecting [the plaintiffs interests], but not other defendants. 54 
As soon as we accept the idea that the intensity of coercion does not have to be uniform 
for all coercees, the traditional liberal theory of coercion-exercise immediately invites a 
radical rethinking. Consider again Holmes's comment that the bad man's concern always 
lies with the disagreeable material consequences. What determines the coerciveness of a 
particular regime of civil liability for the Holmesean bad man is exclusively the amount of 
damages he would have to pay in the event of non-compliance. If he can afford to pay the 
established sum easily, then, from the functionalist point of view, he is not sufficiently 
53 Hale, supra n. 45,149-50. 
54 Id., 161-2. 
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compelled to honour his contractual obligations to his counterpart. If he cannot afford, 
then he is. Remove now the external shell of that transaction and focus on its internal logic: 
the dynamics of the social relationship that determines the prospects of the bad man's 
compliance with his contractual obligations, if we think of it in structural terms, is 
effectively established by the interplay of the following four elements: (i) a legal/y established 
(ii) sum whose (iii) size induces the potential transgressor (iv) to adopt or to refrain from a 
particular course of action. Keeping this in mind, let us examine now other transactional 
patterns involving the transfer of material wealth. The first thing that is likely to attract our 
attention here is that the exact same structure is also present in the case of taxation: 
[when] a tax [is imposed] on a course of conduct[, although t]his does not render 
the conduct illegal [] one who persists in it and pays the tax is doing nothing 
legally wrong [] the freedom to engage in the conduct taxed ... is quite as 
effectively subjected to a compulsory restraint as if it were ... sanctioned by a 
fine or a liability to pay damages. 55 
Moreover, if we go back to our original example with the private contract between the bad 
man and his counterpart, we can observe that the same type of coercive structure can also 
be detected on another level of the contractual transaction, not the one that is linked to the 
enforcement of the civil liability in the event of the violation, but the one which concerns 
the possibility of entering the transaction in the first place: 
When people desist from conduct in order to avoid payment of a tax on it, they 
desist under compulsion; so do they also when the payment which the law 
requires is called a "price. " If a government water monopoly exacts a certain price 
per gallon, not only are the payments which it receives compulsory (sanctioned 
by the penalty of doing without water), but some people are compelled to refrain 
from consuming all the water they would like, under penalty of paying the price. 
The same thing is true if the payments which the law requires to be paid for a 
service are made not to the government itself but to a private company or 
55 Id., 163-4. 
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individual[, for] desistance is no less compulsory when motivated by a desire to 
avoid a price imposed by private groups. 56 
In the end, of course, every instance of such kind of compulsion is grounded not in any 
kind of special force wielded by these private groups, but in the government's promise to 
come to their help, i. e. in their capacity to mobilize the RSA. As our earlier example with 
the shoe-factory owner and the grocer showed, the buyers, thus, refrain from seizing the 
product they cannot pay for not because it is the sellers themselves who can threaten to use 
force and violence against them (although that too can happen by way of self-defence), but 
because if they do so, the sellers are going to be in the position to mobilize the police, the 
judiciary, the sheriffs, and so on: 
[t]he owner of property has [the] power to continue to subject [every non-owner] 
to the duty to abstain from its use, or to release him from that duty. ... 
If the use 
of the property is something vital to the other person's livelihood, he has only a 
choice "between the rock and the whirlpool. " [But if he] should attempt to use 
the property without complying with the conditions, the owner may ... call on 
the judicial machinery to impose ... sanctions. 57 
If the non-owner does not comply with the judicial sanctions, the owner will then be able 
to call the police who will apply violent force to end the trespass. In the end, thus, there is 
nothing mysteriously special about the source of "privately" ordered coercion. Like 
government-directed compulsions, it is ultimately rooted in the repressive order practices 
operated through the RSA. In one case, the use of the RSA is more immediate. In another 
56 Id., 168. This is a very important point. In modem Western jurisprudence, Hale was the first legal theorist 
to place such a consistent emphasis on the fact that legitimately exercised coercion is not solely the province 
of the public authorities. An immediate consequence of that insight, of course, was the categorical 
undermining of the public/private distinction (see HORWITZ, supra n. 29,196-7,208; Duxbury, supra n. 41, 
434). 
57 Hale, supra n. 45,174-5. 
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case, the chain that links the two ends is more extended. On both occasions, though, the 
person "on the receiving end of it" experiences the same kind of subjection. " 
That said, there still remain some very important differences in the operation of the 
two scenarios and it would not be amiss to emphasize this fact as forcefully as possible. In 
the case of the public compulsion scenario the locus of the decision-making rests 
exclusively with the public authorities. It is the government that essentially decides when, 
to what extent, and on what basis the RSA dynamics is going to be mobilized. In the case 
of the private compulsion, on the other hand, before and above the government 
involvement one constantly finds an instance of the private choice: for the coercive 
dynamics of the RSA to become mobilized in support of a breached contract, for example, 
the aggrieved party must, as a rule, agree to bring the suit against the violator. Without it, 
there will be no actual coercion. 
Naturally, at the end of the day, without the underlying possibility of the RSA 
mobilization this private option becomes effectively meaningless: in the absence of an 
RSA-involvement, there can be no compulsion in the Halean understanding of the term. 
Furthermore, like every other category of private choice, the choice to bring or not to bring 
a civil suit, when all is said and done, will always ultimately reveal itself as a product of an 
essentially coerced decision. Put differently, from the point of view of formal logic, every 
private compulsion scenario, after some unspecified number of syllogistic removes, always 
returns to the same single premise: the original practice of the publicly controlled RSA. 
But in the realist universe, of course, the life of the law is never governed by logic 
alone. From the socio-theoretical point of view the number of the effective removes 
standing between the immediacy of the given transaction and the reality of the RSA- 
provided coercion is not in any sense unimportant. The more mediated the practical 
application of the RSA becomes in the given instance by the structure of the intervening 
private options, the more the historico-causal dynamics of that transaction becomes 
overdetermined by the logic of private decision-making, the more the "mixed government" 
logic starts to replaces the "public government" logic in the given area of social relations, 
58 For the development of the same argument, see also THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF 
CAPITALISM 263-331 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937). 
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the more decentralized, as a result, turns the corresponding plane of political practices, the 
more democratic, by implication, becomes the corresponding political regime. 
The importance of this last insight for the purposes of the present inquiry can 
hardly be overstated. Consider rerunning the argument sequence in the opposite direction 
but precede it first with the commonplace observation so frequently made in the 
mainstream scholarship that the foundational framework of the modem international 
society is, in essence, a variation of direct democracy. 59 What will come out as a result is 
essentially the following two-pronged thesis: (1) the international political order may be 
decentralized but that does not mean there is no such thing as a global RSA; (2) indeed, the 
fact that there is no centralized mechanism for the dispensation of violence in the 
international arena can easily be an indication that the "public government" logic of 
international political ordering has been replaced in favour of the "private government" 
logic, nothing more. 
Needless to say, if this thesis should prove correct, then at the very least it will 
establish the legitimacy of. (i) suspending the traditional paradigm of the mainstream 
international law scholarship inasmuch as it has failed to recognize the existence of the 
global RSA and the organized character of the exercise of the repressive-political practices 
in the international arena; and (ii) transposing the functionalist approach into the context of 
the international legal studies, despite the fact that in its original Holrnesean definition - 
"the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the 
courtsi60 - functionalism seemed to require the existence of an elaborate system of 
compulsory adjudication to be practically operable. 
A detailed examination of the foundational documents of the international political 
order and the corresponding field of state practice later, and all our expectations are fully 
confirmed. There does exist a fully functional Repressive State Apparatus" in the 
international arena. The use of international violence is not prohibited in the modem 
international order. Resort to coercion is neither unheard of, nor, generally, considered 
59 For a typical statement of the thesis, see, e. g., Louis Henkin, "International Law: Politics, Values and 
Functions, " 216 Recueil des Cours 9 (19$9-IV). 
60 Holmes, supra n. 30,991. 
61 The word "state, " once again, is used here in the Althusserian sense. 
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illegitimate in the modem international political process. 
62 The very state of the existing law 
on countermeasures, 63 and its corollary in the law on the use of force, the law of self- 
defence, " is a clear proof of that. The same goes for the law of sanctions65 and 
international humanitarian law. ' The habitual liveliness of the various policy and scholarly 
discourses on these topics over the last several decades unmistakably suggests that a great 
deal of international law's practical attention is dedicated not to prohibiting coercion but to 
channelling and regulating its use. 
The institutional manifestation of the global RSA, as evidenced, for example, by the 
conceptual framework underlying the existing law on countermeasures, is practically 
consubstantial with the existing totality of sovereign states. This means that the field of the 
repressive-political practices in the international arena is essentially organized on the basis 
62 For the classical study of the international regulation of the use of coercion in international affairs, see 
MYRES S. MCDOUGAL AND FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE 
LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). 
63 For an overview of the law on countermeasures, see N. D. White and A. Abbas, "Countermeasures and 
Sanctions", in MALCOLM EVANS (ED. ), INTERNATIONAL LAW 505 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
For further overview of the law of state responsibility, see James Crawford and Simon Olleson, "The Nature 
and Forms of International Responsibility", id., 445; Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, The Classification of Obligations 
and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations of International Responsibility, 13 EJIL 1127 (2002); lain Scobble, The 
Invocation of Responsibility for the Breach of `Obligations under Peremptory Norms of General International IAw', 13 EJIL 
1201 (2002). See also JAMES CRAWFORD (ED. ), THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARIES (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002). 
64 For an overview of the law on the use of force in self-defence, see THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO 
FORCE 45-133 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND 
SELF-DEFENCE 159-244 (3rd edn.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). See also Christine Gray, 
"The Use of Force and the International Legal Order", in EVANS, supra n. 63,589,599-605; Michael Bothe, 
Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force, 14 EJIL 227 (2003); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of 
Force: LegalAspects, 10 EJIL 1 (1999). 
65 For an overview of the law of sanctions, see Matthew Craven, Humanitarianism and the Quest for Smarter 
Sanctions, 13 EJIL 43 (2002); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Debating the Law of Sanctions, 13 EJIL 63 (2002). See also 
White and Abbas, supra n. 63. 
66 For an overview of international humanitarian law, see YORAM DINSTEIN, TIE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES 
UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); 
Christopher Greenwood, "The Law of War (International Humanitarian Law)", in EVANS, supra n. 63,789. 
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of the "private government" logic. 67 That said, there do exist several prominent exceptions, 
each of which on closer consideration seems to bring the general rule into further relief. 
First, a casual scrutiny of the existing international arena points out a number of 
exceptional institutional arrangements, the two most symptomatic of which at the present 
moment being the UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court. The 
effective monopoly of the former over the pro-active use of armed force in international 
affairs68 and the potential capacity of the latter for the pro rzo motu enforcement of certain 
international crimes in circumvention of the statal apparatus69 can be effectively considered 
as rudiments of the public government" logic in these areas of international relations. 
Second, a close examination of the practical patterns of the recent use of force in the 
international arena suggests that the locus of the main default instrumentality for the 
enforcement of international law in recent years has shifted from individual states to the 
so-called "coalitions of the willing" (or, to be more precise, coalitions of the concerned and 
the capable), apparently spontaneous groupings of states organized by the common pursuit 
of a particular coercive project, often exclusively on an ad-hoc basis, whose functional 
patterns of activity closely resemble those of a self-appointed people's militia. 70 
c. Law and the Construction of the Coercive Order~ from Hale (back) to Hohfeld (and back again) 
One of the first questions about coercion that arises from the point of view of political 
theory is: what should be done about it? In the Halean understanding of the question, the 
answer seems to be fairly straightforward. 
67 Once again one can detect a clear echo between the Halean tradition and Kelsen. For Kelsen, the main 
means of enforcement in international law was self-help. 
68 For further discussion, see Gray, supra n. 64,606-10; DINSTEIN, supra n. 64,253-82; DAN SAROOSHI, THE 
UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE DELEGATION BY THE UN 
SECURITY COUNCIL OF ITS CHAPTER VII POWERS (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999). 
69 For further discussion, see Antonio Cassese, "International Criminal Law", in EVANS, supra n. 63,721,730- 
3; Monroe Leigh, The United States and the Statute of Rome, 95 AJIL 124 (2001). Generally on the enforcement 
structure of international criminal law and the ICC's role in it, see also William W. Burke-White, A Community 
of Courts: towards a System of International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 Mich. J. Intl L. 1 (2002); Daryl Mundis, 
New Mechanisms for the Enforcement of International Humanitarian Lain, 95 AJIL 934 (2001). 
70 The same pattern holds true in most other areas of international law, from the enforcement of the existing 
rules on the making of reservations to multilateral treaties to the regulation of international trade. 
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First of all, not all forms and instances of coercion occurring in the modem society 
are equally destructive or equally "painful. " If the access to the good in question is not part 
of a person's vital needs, the power of the public authorities or his private counterparts to 
withhold that good from him does not put him under any kind of genuine duress. Nor do 
those prices, fines, and penalties imposed on his activities which he can afford to pay. 71 
Secondly, because it is an inevitable side-effect of large-scale socialization, it follows that, 
even if we decided that all forms of coercion were inherently repugnant, it would still be 
impossible to root all of them out, since, ultimately, "some sort of coercive restriction is 
absolutely unavoidable. "' As a result, Hale concludes, since it cannot outlaw all possible 
forms of social coercion, every body politic must, in one way or another, legitimize some of 
them. The basic means by which that legitimization is done is what, consequently, has to be 
understood as the Holmesean institution of law. 
Approached from this perspective, it follows that in a Halean understanding the 
idea of law essentially represents that region of the social space-process (or, to use the 
Althusserian vocabulary, the order of the State) within which the given body politic 
identifies and articulates those forms of practical coercion which it understands to be 
legitimate distinguishing them from those which it does not. Those forms of coercion that 
are identified as legitimate, consequently, become invested with the mana of the social 
approval (including the permission to use the violent potential of the corresponding RSA). 
Given such a direct link between law and coercion, it furthermore follows, 
concluded Hale, that because coercion is ubiquitous, in the grand scheme of things the 
field of law must be ontologically coextensive with the field of the social space-process as a 
whole. Or in other words, there can be no such thing as a gap in the effectively existing 
juridical order: because everyone can be coerced in one way or another and every form of 
coercion has to be either legitimized or delegitimized by the body politic in question, it 
follows that the juridical instance in fact, even if not in name, reaches everywhere where 
71 See Hale, supra n. 48,492: "the rich man will always be in a position to satisfy his wants more completely 
than the poor man. " C£ Hale, supra n. 50,586-9. 
72 Hale, supra n. 48,470. 
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there exists any form of social intercourse. There is, to put it differently, no possibility of a 
social life outside the cover of the law. 73 
A very similar insight several years earlier had been developed by another early 20`h 
century American jurisprude, a Yale law professor, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld. Indeed, 
some scholars have recently suggested that Hale's jurisprudential theory may have been 
directly inspired by Hohfeld. 74 Although it is not a view commonly shared by all Hale's 
commentators, on its merits it seems very compelling. Hale's understanding of the 
completeness of the legal order, in any event, appears to be very similar to Hohfeld's. 75 
In the eyes of most legal scholars today, Hohfeld's contribution to the development 
of the modern legal thought is primarily limited to his work on the theory of rights and the 
two semiotic squares consisting of jural correlatives and jural opposites. 76 In fact, of course, 
73 Because of its focus on the bargaining background, this argument about the completeness of the legal order 
is slightly different from the more traditional (from the perspective of the international law discipline) 
Kelsenian argument. According to Kelsen, what makes the (international) legal order complete is the idealist 
(liberal) presumption that whenever the law remains silent, the legal subjects are free to act as they please. See 
HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF NORMS 131-2,326,366 (transl by Michael Hartney; Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991). For a further reflection on the logic of the Kelsenian argument, see MARTTI 
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 45 et 
seq. (rev. edn.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). That said, there is a lot in common between 
the Halean understanding of the legal order and Kelsen's. Kelsen too has emphasized the coercive dimension 
of the legal order's factuality. Unlike Hale, however, he was a deductivist (in the sense of the Vienna circle- 
style logical positivism) and spent what from the legal realist point of view was an inordinate amount of time 
and effort on elucidating the difference between "is" and "ought, " "law" and "morality, " etc. For the realist 
position on that question, see Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Col. L. Rev. 
809 (1935). 
74 Kennedy, supra n. 41,91, n. 8. 
75 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L. 
J. 16 (1913); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 Yale L. 
J. 710 (1917). Both articles were later included in WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL 
CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (ed. by Walter Wheeler Cook; New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1919). 
76 It must be noticed that the two semiotic squares (see below) by which Hohfeld's theory of the eight 
fundamental legal conceptions is often presented nowadays were not a form proposed by Hohfeld himself. 
They were constructed later. 
198 
his legacy was far richer than that. " That part of it which interests us here is his reflection 
on what in the modem terminology could be described as regulatory dynamics of legal 
lacunae. Hohfeld's basic position on this question, in fact, was very positivist. In an 
interesting twist of events, this allowed Hale's understanding of the legal order several 
decades later to come very close - at least in this instance - to that of Hans Felsen. 
Hohfeld's basic proposition on the matter was astonishingly simple. Even when the 
existing legal order says nothing about a particular social transaction, proposed Hohfeld, it 
still remains the case that the transaction in question is in fact governed by the body of law 
in question in the sense that the law, in effect, allows all the involved parties to pursue their 
respective interests against one another in the given context freely, while at the same time 
directing the rest of the body politic to accept as legitimate every possible outcome 
produced as a result of their such interaction and, depending on the exact terms of the 
law's silence, to renounce as illegitimate any attempt to restrain the parties' freedom. " 
It is striking to think now how simple (and even austere) Hohfeld's reasoning was. 
Yet, at the time those theories were first announced, none of them probably looked as 
commonplace as they do today. Indeed, even today many jurists would probably fail to 
recognize the full scope of their epistemological implication. 
As a modem-day commentator put it, one of the main reasons why people tend to 
ignore the regulative power of lacunae 
is that we don't think of ground rules of permission as ground rules at all, by 
contrast with ground rules of prohibition. This is Wesley Hohfeld's insight: the 
legal order permits as well as prohibits, in the simple-minded sense that it could 
prohibit, but judges and legislators reject demands from those injured that the 
injurers be restrained.... 
Right Privilege Power Immunity 
Duty 
X 
No-Right Liability Disability 
77 See further, e. g., J. M. Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. Miami L. Rev. 1119 (1990). 
78 The immediate source of that observation can be found in HoHFELD, supra n. 75,46-8, in particular, in 
footnote 59. For a different illustration, see also Wesley N. Hohfeld, The Need of Remedial Legislation in the 
California Law of Trusts and Perpetuities, 1 Cal. L. Rev. 305,314 (1912-13). 
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The invisibility of legal ground rules comes from the fact that when 
lawmakers do nothing, they appear to have nothing to do with the outcome. But 
when one things that many other forms of injury are prohibited, it becomes clear 
that inaction is a policy and that the law is responsible for the outcome, at least in 
the abstract sense that the law "could have made it otherwise. "79 
Against this background, Hohfeld's basic insight reappropriated by Hale for the purposes 
of his theory was that 
[w]ithin this category of legal permissions, perhaps the most invisible is the 
decision not to impose a duty to act on a person who is capable of preventing 
another's loss or injury or misfortune.... It is clear that lawmakers could require 
almost anything. When they require nothing, it looks as though the law is 
uninvolved in the situation, though the legal decision not to impose a duty is in 
another sense the cause of the outcome when one person is allowed to ignore 
another's plight. 80 
The gist of Hale's jurisprudential contribution, thus, can be effectively described as a 
felicitous merging of, on the one hand, the basic Hohfeldian observation that the space of 
the legal order must be ontologically co-extensive with the rest of the social space with, on 
the other hand, the classical Holmesean thesis that the essence of the legal process 
ultimately lies in the direction of the socially approved, RSA-supported compulsion. 
d. Bringing Functionalism and Structural Conjunctural Analysir Together 
All bargaining situations, explains Hale, involve the production of social balances 
(equilibria). The term "balance" in this context, of course, should not be understood to 
suggest the condition of perfect social harmony; rather, any empirically realized pattern of 
power and welfare distribution, by the very fact of its realization, constitutes a "balance" (if 
it had not done that, it would not have been realized). Not all balances, obviously, are 
79 Kennedy, supra n. 41,90-1. 
80 Id., 91. 
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equally appealing to all people; nor, of course, are all balances equally stable and sustainable 
- some power arrangements tend to last for decades 
(think, for instance, of the Cold War), 
others only for days (the so-called "Missile Crisis" was a also a balance of power) - but 
neither the former nor the latter criterion can detract anything from their "balanceness. " A 
balance is what a balance does. And what balances do is embody historico-ontologically 
possible correlations of social positions and interests, or, to translate back into the 
Althusserian vocabulary, the structure of the complex whole. Lazy from the perspective of each 
social balance, then, is efectivel i that- and only, that -part of the social structure in which the terms of the 
RSA 's knowable-in-advance involvement in the given social balance are determined. 
Some knowledge about that involvement - and thus an understanding of the 
functional contours of one's bargaining position - as Hale pointed out, can be derived 
quite immediately. All one needs to do is analyze the existing structure of legal injunctions, 
i. e. the regime of outright legal requirements and prohibitions. That knowledge, however, 
in itself will always be incomplete. To obtain a genuinely complete understanding of the 
contours of one's regime of compulsion, we must remember that bargaining positions can 
also be affected by the proportionate responsibility regimes (damages payment schemes) as 
well as licensing, taxation, procedural requirements, the legally recognized rights of others, 
and so on; and that all these factors will always have only a relative weight, dependent on 
our ability to pay the requisite price. 
In other words, insofar as the functional understanding of the Holmesean bad man 
is concerned, the actual shape and content of the legal order can never be fully 
comprehended in abstracto. Every knowledge of the legal regime has to be contextualized in 
order to be complete, and what contextualization means here is that every person's 
subjectedness to the legal order can be understood only in reference to the currently 
existing structure of the socially approved RSA-supported constraints imposed on his 
immediate bargaining position. Given the transactional character of every bargaining 
context, such constraints, once again, include not only the actual limitations imposed by the 
society (through the instrumentality of the state) on the person's ability to inflict different 
kinds of compulsion on others but also the various socially supported permissions given to 
these others to inflict their compulsions on that person. 
The parallels between the Halean and the Althusserian traditions are quite 
immediate. Both traditions: 
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(1) accept that the essence of every legal subject's social position is best understood 
by focusing on the relations of coercion imposed on him by the socially approved order; 
(2) are characterized by their general acceptance of the determination in the last 
instance thesis: for Althusser, it is the development of the relations of production which 
determines the index of structural causality; for Hale, what makes the role of law in the 
modern society so considerable is the fact that the modem society lives under the reign of 
the principle of the inevitability of social co-operation; 
(3) insist on the causal importance of the legal order with regard to the rest of the 
social space, while at the same time recognizing the fact that the shape and the contents of 
that order are ultimately determined by the course of the broader social development. In 
Althusser's works, these ideas take the shape of the doctrines of the relative autonomy of 
the superstructure(s) and structural overdetermination. In Hale, the two corresponding 
points are the doctrine of law as the determiner of the limits of socially permissible 
coercion and the economist's understanding that the ultimate impact of every legal sanction 
is determined by the sanctioned individual's relative paying power; 
(4) rely on an ontologically expanded conception of the State (and correspondingly 
government): for Althusser, the factuality of the State is co-substantial with the organizing 
power logic that holds the given social formation together and the scope of State 
apparatuses is not exhausted by those formally controlled by "public authorities"; for Hale, 
the State is that organizational entity that gets implicated in the distribution of all power 
and welfare stakes in the society even those that, on the surface of it, are distributed 
through voluntary "private" transactions and in which coercion is exercised by "private" 
parties; 
(5) maintain the necessity of a relentlessly situational investigation of the studied 
object: for Althusser, every object exists only within the immediate conjuncture framed by 
its interaction with other objects; for Hale, the content of the legal order can only be 
understood with reference to concrete bargaining situations involving mutually dependent 
participants; 
(6) stress the inescapably contextual nature of meaning: for Althusser, the only 
appropriate mode of interpretation is that which recognizes the validity of the parallax 
theory; for Hale, one can never know the contours of one's bargaining position without 
also understanding, in the context of the given transaction, the contours of the bargaining 
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positions of one's counterparts and - the path dependence argument - one's general 
wealth, for the law does not deter those who are willing to pay its penalties; 
(7) issue more or less the same set of methodological injunctions for jurisprudential 
inquiries: the epistemological mechanism produced by the Halean combination of the 
Hohfeldian insight into the normative character of law's lacunae and the Holmesean 
injunction to study law in terms of its effects mirrors directly the Althusserian mechanism 
of symptomatic reading. 
e. Extending the Functionalist Analysis into International Law: the Challenge of Political Realism and 
the Effectivity of the Legal & irres in the Context of the International Political Process 
It is a rather common practice in modern international studies, especially among those 
commentators who in one way or another associate themselves with the tradition of 
"political realism, " to routinely downplay the role of legal regimes in the determination of 
the bargaining outcomes. 8' Stripped of all its verbal niceties, the typical argument advanced 
by "political realism" essentially boils down to the suggestion that the legal profession has 
grossly overestimated the importance of legal rules in the constitution of the social process. 
What really determines the outcome of every social interaction, according to this argument, 
is a set of factors that ultimately have nothing to do with either the legal rule or the legal 
process. The factors that are usually identified in this context include: the bargaining skills 
of the involved parties; the scarcity of the various goods and benefits they control which 
are needed by others and which may not be obtainable elsewhere; the degree of their 
domination over the respective markets or sets of opportunities; the structure of the 
benefit-producing chains of each of the parties and the nature of interference each of them 
81 In the context of international law, see famously HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (2nd edn., New York: Alfred Knopf, 1954); GEORGE F. KENNAN, 
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951). See also Jack L. 
Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Ctestomary International Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113 (1999); Eric A. 
Posner, A Theory of the Laws of War, 70 U. Chi L. Rev. 297 (2003). For the classical pattern of response by 
mainstream international law scholarship, see Myres S. McDougal, Law and Power, 46 A. J. I. L. 102 (1952); Ian 
Brownlie, The Reality and Ef cacy of International Law, 52 B. Y. I. L. 1 (1981). 
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can effect in these chains; the depth of their bargaining resources; the breadth of their ally 
circles, and so on. S2 
A question arises at this stage: where does the Halean tradition stand with regard to 
this argument? Does it refute it or does it recognize its validity? As Duncan Kennedy has 
pointed out, by and large, the Halean tradition is inclined to agree with most of the 
contentions advanced by the "political realists. " It does not, for example, challenge their 
suggestion "that all these factors are profoundly important. " On the contrary, it 
wholeheartedly accepts it and can even be said to turn it into its starting point. 83 What it 
does not accept, however, is the background assumption on the basis of which that 
statement is usually formulated in the "political realist" discourse, the assumption which 
holds that all or any of the abovementioned factors can be imagined to possess a constant 
"inherent" value independent of the shape and content of the legal regime. 
From the Halean perspective, the basic point which the "political realists" seem to 
miss "is that each [of the listed factors] has significance in practice only within the 
framework of legal rules, and the rules affect each factor's `value' to the parties. " 84 There 
simply are no inherent "values" for any type of political resource. " No "price" is natural 
outside the context of the supply-demand relationship. No supply-demand relationship is 
possible without a background structure of property rules outlining the conditions under 
which the owners of the various resources can be assured of retaining their resources if 
their selling price is not met by the buyers. 6 
If Ruritania is prohibited by international law from using a particular type of 
weapons in its war with Arcadia, the size of its ammunition stocks for these weapons is 
largely irrelevant. If the Security Council can order an enforcement action against Arcadia 
for failing to abide with its resolutions, the depth of its political alliance resources outside 
the list of the Permanent Five does not matter, or at least does not matter as much as it 
would have, had Article 42 not given the Security Council such far-reaching powers. If the 
82 Kennedy, supra n. 41,87-8. 
83 Id., 88. 
84 Id. 
85 This is a typical institutional economics argument (and it bears mentioning Hale was an institutional 
economist; see Duxbury, supra n. 41,429-30). 
86 See further Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, urith Special Reference 
to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Maryland L. Rev. 563,578 (1982). 
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Arcadian nation is not recognized as "a people" under international law, it is essentially 
beside the point how favourably the CNN discusses the Arcadian self-determination cause. 
If a particular canal is declared an international canal, it does not really matter how 
completely the Freedonian Navy controls its entry points, other states' ships will still be 
able to pass through it freely. 
What is the common conclusion that suggests itself through all these examples? 
Law is not the only factor that determines the outcome of the bargaining process; however, 
it is far more important than the "political realist" tradition acknowledges it to be. It affects 
the availability and "weight" of all other factors whose totality determines the development 
of the social situation and structures the terms of their relative functionality vis-ä-vis one 
another. It provides a basic frame of reference within which the social space is constituted 
and defines the dynamics of the bargaining process occurring on its basis. It determines the 
general conditions under which different components of the bargaining power can be 
utilized and sets the boundaries within which the bargaining conduct can be performed. It 
supplies that foundational starting point from which the bargaining process starts and 
without which the bargaining positions could never be calculated. 
A question arises at this stage: how exactly does law do all this? In what particular 
way does it make its contribution to the constitution of the social process? 
f. Mapping the RSA Factuality of Legal Regimes 
According to the Halean tradition, there are two basic ways in which the legal order affects 
the dynamics of the bargaining process. 87 In the first instance, the legal order determines 
the structure of strategic alternatives available to the involved parties. What the law does at 
this level, in other words, is basically (i) outline the range of the general scenarios available 
to each participant if they decide to withdraw from a particular bargaining situation; and (ii) 
determine the degree of each scenario's desirability. A classical example to illustrate the 
point would be the famous Resolution 1541 of the UN General Assembly. ' 
87 See Kennedy, supra n. 41,87. 
88 Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called 
for underArticle 73e of the Charter, U. N. G. A. Resolution 1541 (XV), 15 December 1960, U. N. Doc. A/4651, 
205 
Every member of the United Nations entrusted under Chapter XI of the Charter 
with the administration of a non-self-governing territory is obligated under Article 73e of 
the Charter to transmit to the UN, at a regular interval, a set of prescribed data concerning 
the development of the respective territory, in order to enable the Organization to keep 
track of the territory's "evolution and progress towards a `full measure of self- 
government'. " The basic function of Resolution 1541 against this background is to set out 
in an orderly fashion a list of basic conditions under which that obligation ceases. 
According to Principle VI of the Resolution, there are in general three such conditions: (i) 
the emergence of the territory in question "as a sovereign independent State"; (ii) the "free 
association" of the territory in question with another "independent State"; and (iii) the 
"integration" of the territory in question into another "independent State. " 
Seen from the functional perspective, what Resolution 1541 thus does is, 
essentially, delimit the range of strategic alternatives awarded by international law to the 
non-self-governing polities finding themselves on the verge of reaching formal 
independence. Depending on their citizens' wishes, by the end of the Article 73e reporting 
period, such polities are allowed to enter into any one of the three designated political 
trajectories. Whatever choice they may make between the three, the final decision would be 
considered completely legitimate by the international community (subject to the 
observance of the respective procedure). Moreover, in case any third party would decide to 
interfere with the exercise of that decision, the polity in question would be allowed to use 
whatever self-help would be proportionate to repel such interferences and, at least in 
theory, would be in the position to attract the support of the international community's 
RSA. Outside the list of these three alternatives, however, there is nothing a non-self- 
governing polity can legitimately expect from international law. 
How desirable each of the available alternatives may be vis-ä-vis the other two is, of 
course, a question that can never be answered in abstracto. In every case there would have to 
be "organized" a careful balancing exercise, the relevant factors at play being, among 
others, the geopolitical potential of the polity in question, its capacity for a self-sustaining 
economic development, its historical ties with other polities, as well as its interest in 
obtaining a certain position within the international community. The latter, in its turn, 
would be further conditioned, among other things, by other rules and institutions of 
international law, including not least Article 1(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
206 
Political Rights89 that provides an equal degree of protection to all polities that qualify as 
"peoples" and Article 2 of the Charter that provides a far greater degree of protection 
against external interference to a polity formally organized as an independent state than to a 
polity formally incorporated into another polity's state. 90 
The second way in which the legal order affects the dynamics of the bargaining 
process is by regulating the terms of the bargaining conduct permissible under each of the 
strategic alternatives, i. e. by structuring each of the available model scenarios from within. 
At this level, the basic function of the law, according to Hale, is to determine what 
particular types of coercion can be used by the bargaining participants against one another. 
If the first instance at which the legal order got implicated in the course of the 
social process thus came at the level of the delimitation of strategic alternatives, the second 
instance comes at the level of defining the range of permissible tools, techniques, and 
89 Article 1(2), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966,999 U. N. T. S 171: 
"2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice 
to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual 
benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. " 
90 Article 2, Charter of f the United Nations, 1945,59 Stat. 1031: 
"The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance 
with the following Principles. 
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members. 
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall 
fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter. 
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international 
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. 
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations. 
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the 
present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is 
taking preventive or enforcement action. 
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance 
with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the present Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII. " 
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tactics of coercion prescribed for each particular bargaining situation. Some tactics can be 
regulated explicitly in the form of express permissions and prohibitions. Many, however, 
can also be regulated indirectly, through an accretion of background norms, including those 
that take the shape of lacunae. The most reliable way to track the dynamics of law's 
structuration of the social process on this level, consequently, would be by applying the 
Hohfeldian theory of fundamental jural relations, keeping a particular emphasis on 
Hohfeld's remarks about the essential differences between rights and privileges91 and 
Holmes's remarks about the complex relationship between rights and remedies. 92 
Thankfully, the basic rules on the latter front turned out to be quite simple. If the 
cumulative effect of the legal order's implication in a particular bargaining situation leaves a 
given party in the position where it can advance its subjective interests over those of its 
counterparts, the party in question can be said to have a legal entitlement. Different legal 
entitlements are marked in the legal order with different degrees of hierarchical precedence. 
An interest protected by a "fundamental right" always trumps that protected by a lower- 
level right, and so forth. Every legal entitlement, thus, is effectively a sign -a coded 
message, if you will - that informs the participants in the bargaining process to what extent 
the body politic in question considers the corresponding interest worthy of protection and 
to what extent, consequently, it is ready to throw its weight (RSA) behind its holder when 
his pursuit of it clashes with the pursuit by his counterparts of their interests. 
In addition to the hierarchical status, entitlements can also be distinguished 
according to their functional forms. Essentially, all legal entitlements can be said to come in 
two different forms: 93 rights (rights-claims) and privileges (liberties). " Rights give their 
91 See HOHFELD, supra n. 75,36-50. 
92 See Holmes, supra n. 30,993-4. See also Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism - Responding to Dean 
Pound, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222,1244 (1931). 
93 Although Hohfeld proposed eight fundamental legal conceptions, I agree with the suggestion that the 
second semiotic square - power, immunity, 
liability, disability - is analytically superfluous. See on this 
further 
ANDREW HALPIN, RIGHTS AND LAW: ANALYSIS AND THEORY 27 et seq. (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997). 
94 "It is 
... clear ... that ... a privilege or 
liberty 
... might very conceivably exist without any peculiar 
concomitant rights against `third parties' as regards certain kinds of interference. Whether there should be 
such concomitant rights (or claims) is ultimately a question of justice and policy-, and it should be considered, 
as such, on its merits. ... 
It would therefore be a non sequitur to conclude from the mere existence of such 
liberties that `third parties' are under a duty not to interfere, etc. " HOHFELD, supra n. 75,43. 
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holders a greater degree of protection than privileges. A right can be said to exist whenever 
the legal order in question burdens the given subject's counterpart in the corresponding 
bargaining situation with an actual duty to satisfy the subject's demand. A privilege is said to 
exist whenever the legal order burdens the counterpart only with an obligation not to 
prevent the subject's exercise of her entitlement through the instrumentality of the legal 
system and not to "complain" whenever her intervention with the subject's exercise of her 
entitlement is successfully thwarted by the latter's actions. Another way of putting it is to 
say basically that a privilege exists whenever there are present simultaneously an absence of 
a duty on the part of the holder to refrain from pursuing the corresponding interest and an 
absence of a right on the part of the holder's counterpart to prevent her from such 
pursuit. 45 A right accompanied by a centrally provided remedy, furthermore, provides a 
greater degree of protection to its holder than a right accompanied by the permission to 
resort to self-help (countermeasures) in case of a violation. (Indeed, for practical purposes, 
the latter is often indistinguishable from a privilege. )) The absence of recognition as either a 
right-holder or a privilege-holder before the eyes of the legal order, finally, signifies the 
lowest level of protection available within the legal domain, as it is effectively tantamount 
to a total exposure to one's counterparts' discretion (all damage sustained in such situations 
will come under the heading of damnia absque injuria). 
Continuing furthermore with the question of the legal technique, there seem to be, 
as already indicated, at least two different modalities of affecting the course of a bargaining 
conduct through the instrumentality of the legal rules. Firstly, the rules in question can 
address the terms of the bargaining behaviour directly. A good example here would be 
Article 12 of the UN Charter, " which effectively states that the General Assembly has a 
95 Another way to understand the basic difference between rights and privileges is to analyze the dynamics by 
which a damnium (practical infliction of harm) translates into injuria (legally prohibited damage). In a 
relationship governed by the entitlement of privilege, a damnium inflicted by the privilege-holder on his 
counterparts will never lead to the recognition of an injuria. In a relationship governed by the entitlement of 
right, a damnium inflicted on the right-holder will always give rise to an injuria. 
96 Article 12, Charter of the United Nations 
"1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it 
in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute 
or situation unless the Security Council so requests. 
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legal privilege to issue its recommendations with regard to any international dispute or 
situation within the ambit of the Charter so long as the Security Council does not deal with 
it at the moment. When the Security Council seizes a dispute or a situation, the General 
Assembly may begin to address it only after the Council expressly requests it to do so. To 
ensure that the General Assembly remains abreast of which disputes and situations the 
Security Council is dealing with at the moment the Secretary-General is obliged to inform 
the General Assembly about all such matters, with the consent of the Security Council. 
The second way in which legal rules can become implicated in the outcome of the 
bargaining process is slightly less direct. As we saw earlier, very often the law tends to 
affect the distribution of the bargaining power between the involved parties by addressing 
various background factors involved in the constructability of their bargaining positions. 
Consider, for instance, Principle III of the Final Act of the CSCE Helsinki Summit: ` 
The participating States regard as inviolable all one anther's frontiers as well as 
frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the 
future from assaulting these frontiers. 
Accordingly they will also refrain from any demand for, or acts of, seizure 
and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State. 98 
What we have here, in effect, is a legitimization of a particular status quo (map of Europe 
as of 1 August 1975) accompanied by a simultaneous delegitimization of a particular 
scenario of its change (change effected through the use of force). Considering the historical 
context in which the Final Act was produced, the distributive dynamic created by this twin 
regulation can be consequently diagnosed more or less as follows: 
2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each 
session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt 
with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United 
Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such 
matters. " 
97 On the legal character of the OSCE documents, see Section Two below. 
98 The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co operation in Europe, Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations 
between Participating States, 1sß CSCE Summit of Heads of State or Government, Helsinki, 1 August 1975; 
available from httpi/ /u-\vw. osce. org/ documents/html/pditohtml/4044 en pdf html . 
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(i) in the context of those polities that struggle for secession from the occupying 
powers which had incorporated them into their domestic sovereign space, the most 
immediate impact of Principle III is to decrease the bargaining power of the former and 
increase the bargaining power of the latter by depriving the secessionist movements of any 
access to external military help - examples: the Baltic Republics, Western Ukraine, and the 
Soviet Union; 
(ii) in the context of those historical polities that are currently divided into two or 
more different states which seek to be reunified, the most immediate impact of Principle 
III is to increase the relative strength of those domestic elements within these polities that 
seek a peaceful reunification of the respective states over those elements that seek an 
essentially military resolution of the problem - examples: the FRG and the GDR, Romania 
and Moldavia, Albania and Kosovo; 
(iii) in the context of those polities that act as the leaders of the opposing global 
camps, the most immediate impact of Principle III is to free up a certain part of their 
political resources on a number of fronts (including protection of the post-World War II 
zones of influence) and to increase the relative bargaining power of those domestic 
elements within them that are inclined to preference peaceful conduct of foreign policy 
over belligerent - examples: the Soviet Union and the United States. 
The analysis can be continued further. The basic regularity that is emerging, 
however, is going to remain the same: (i) depending on the particular arrangement of the 
background historical factors, a facially neutral normative regime can produce a 
substantively disparate political-distributive effect, empowering some actors more than 
others, by creating an intricate web of legal entitlements and burdens; (ii) a legal rule that 
does not even appear to recognize the existence of a particular category of subjects can end 
up affecting their most immediate interests in a very fundamental way. 
With this as our working knowledge, then, let us turn now to the next stage of this 
inquiry. 
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Section Two 
Finding the Shape of the New ILTMC Regime 
a. Previous Attempts to Map the IL1MG Kegime: Achievements, Shortcomings, and the Ghost of f Legal 
Formabrm 
The main methodological injunction of the Halean tradition, as we saw in the previous 
section, is to "discover law" by looking out for the coercive limitations it produces and to 
do so from the situational perspective of those subjects that are immediately affected by it. 
Transposing this idea into the context of the present inquiry, it appears that if we want to 
understand the exact shape and content of the new ILTMC regime as a body of law, and if 
we want to do this in a way that would allow us to empathize with the practical experiences 
of the minority communities it addresses, we must first of all start taking stock of all those 
international legal rules which in the course of their normal application have the capacity' 
to affect the bargaining positions of the minority communities. By putting these rules 
together into a single, although not necessarily uncontradictory, whole, we can then start to 
flesh out the actual body of the new ILTMC regime that currently remains submerged 
under a plethora of ideological appearances and verbal facades. 
Before proceeding anywhere further with this, however, it behoves us to consider 
briefly the pattern of some previous attempts to tackle the same challenge. How have other 
new ILTMC studies approached this question? What were their main achievements? What 
were their shortcomings? How did they construct their investigative paradigms? What 
prevented them from realizing its analytical potential? The first thing that needs to be 
noticed in this regard is that, for better or worse, on the most fundamental level, the 
methodological formula outlined in the previous paragraph is not, in fact, all that novel in 
contemporary international law scholarship. Although he never identified it explicitly, 
Patrick Thomberry seems to have followed more or less the same methodological principle 
99 The frequency of the capacity's realization does not matter. See further Kennedy, supra n. 41,107: "It is 
clear that background rules maybe important even if never invoked[; ] the mere frequency of invocation doesn't 
mean much. " 
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in his seminal International Law and the I-ghts of Minorities. 10° So apparently did Nathan Lerner 
in his Group Rights and Dzs nmination in International Law. 101 So, indeed, had several years 
before them, in a generally comparable context, Paul Sieghart with his International Law of 
, ghts. 
102 The latter, seeking to identify the boundaries of the then still mostly latent Human Ri 
international human rights code, for instance, admitted that the logic which had guided him 
in his exercise had not been to follow the nominal designations adopted in the then 
international law discourse, but to look out instead for whatever rules of international law 
actually had the capacity to affect the bargaining positions of individuals in their dealings 
with their governments: 
What all these treaties have in common, and what makes the legal code which 
they collectively constitute unprecedented in international law, is that ... they 
define and create specific rights for the individuals over whom ... 
States are able 
to exercise power, but who are not themselves parties to those instruments. '03 
Where this brought Sieghart in the end, we all know: a brilliant account of the field that 
included in its scope of vision not only the self-evident International Bill of Human Rights 
and its regional equivalents but also the far less noticeable at the first sight Convention on 
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, "' the ILO 
Convention concerning Employment Policy, 105 and the Convention on the International 
Right of Correction. 106 
The methodological approach advocated in Lerner's study followed the same basic 
lines. The starting objective of the enterprise was to identify the shape of a currently 
submerged body of international law, the law relating to the protection of racial, ethnic, 
religious, linguistic, and cultural groups. The analytical procedure proposed to that effect 
10() Supra n. 1. 
101 NATHAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 
1991). 
102 PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). 
103 Id., 16. 
104 Id., 205. 
105 Id., 217. 
106 Id., 337. 
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was to distil those international rules which concerned or could in one way or another 
affect the positions of these groups in the context of national and world politics and to put 
them into a single code. 167 Armed with this understanding, Lerner managed in the end not 
only to identify a list of the relevant material sources, which included, among others, the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, the 1989 ILO Convention concerning Indigenous 
and Tribal Populations or Peoples, the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE, and the 1990 
CSCE Copenhagen Document, "' but also in fact draw a tentative catalogue of group rights 
recognized under international law. lo9 
Similarly, for Thornberry, the main objective of the exercise was formulated as the 
search for a "synchronic picture of international law related to minorities""' or, more 
straightforwardly, a "picture of what international law offers to minorities. 27111 
Starting with a brief investigation of various previous attempts on that front, 
Thomberry conveyed the gist of his methodology by implicitly equating the past ILTMC 
regimes with "protective treaties concluded for the benefit of specific groups, " "the treaty 
[being] the paradigmatic instrument recognizing the right of minorities to fair treatment. ); 112 
Transposing the analytical procedure constructed on that basis into the present context and 
recognizing that "[f]ormally speaking, minorities as such as holders of rights and duties are 
almost ignored in international law, i113 he then concluded that, firstly, the legal reality of 
minority protection in international law in "the greater part ... 
is given over to individual 
rights, " and that, secondly, as a result of that, the international legal regime of minority 
protection had to be conceptualized in "substantive and indirect, not formal and direct" 
terms. 114 Proceeding against this background, Thornberry went on to construct a vision of 
a legal regime which in substantive terms consisted of the right to existence, the right to 
107 See LERNER, supra n. 101,23-4. 
108 Id., 17-9. 
109 Id., 34-6. 
110 See supra n. 1,6. 
111 Id., 396. 
112 Id., 25. 
113 Id., 394. 
114 Id., 396. 
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identity, the right not to be discriminated against, and the rights of indigenous peoples - 
"[t]he rights [that] provide at least the minimum forms of protection" to members of 
minority communities115 - and which included the Convention on genocide, various 
provisions on non-discrimination from the general and regional human rights law, Articles 
1 and 27 of the ICCPR, the Convention on racial discrimination, the UNESCO convention 
against discrimination in education, some ICJ caselaw, the 1957 ILO convention on the 
protection of indigenous peoples, as well as the Helsinki Final Act. 
It is difficult to overestimate the practical importance of these works for the 
development of the ILTMC studies. At the time when so few other international lawyers 
sought to engage with the question of the international law's response to the treatment of 
minority communities with the same degree of attention, the intellectual intensity of these 
studies not only helped to revive a theoretical interest in a topic otherwise forsaken but also 
sponsored an enormous amount of critical self-reflection in the ILTMC practice, inspiring 
as a result a whole series of genuinely insightful investigations and scholarly studies. As 
every path-breaking work, however, each of them turned out, in the end, to be as much an 
integral part of the old approach from which they tried to break free as it was a part of the 
new approach which their scholarly practices tried to beget. 
The first step can never effect a complete rupture. Caught up in the same orthodox 
dogma which they struggled to terminate, both Thornberry and Lerner ended up eventually 
succumbing to its stultifying embrace. Yet even that setback has carried in itself a valuable 
lesson for the next wave of the ILTMC scholars, a lesson, alas, that none of them in the 
end seems to have heeded with enough attention-"' 
Put simply, the most fundamental shortcoming of Thornberry and Lemer's 
epistemological approach, - despite their energetic profession of allegiance to the logic of 
interdisciplinarity - lay in its unreflective residual loyalty to the formalist jurisprudential 
tradition. 117 Still dominant over much of mainstream international law scholarship, that 
115 Id., 392, 
116 There may be several partial exceptions, however. Consider, for instance, Geoff Gilbert's attempt to 
reconstruct an aspect of the ILTMC regime in Geoff Gilbert, Autonorrry and Minority Gmups: a Right in 
International Lznv? 35 Cornell Intl L. J. 307 (2002) (moving significantly beyond the traditional scope of 
formal sources of international law). 
117 See also SIEGHART, supra n. 102,39. 
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tradition basically holds that the practical limits of the international legal order are 
ultimately determined by the scope of forms inscribed in the "original" list of sources given 
in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute-118 Historically, the most articulate formulation of that 
tradition in international law came in the works of Hans Kelsen and the scholarly projects 
derived from the intellectual legacy of German logical positivism. In ideational terms, 
however, the apogee, of the tradition as it is seen now, has come not so much with Kelsen, 
as with Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. The particular occasion in point was Fizmaurice's famous 
1956 article on the foundations of international law's authority published in Modern Lax 
Review. 11' Fitzmaurice's main thesis there - the same thesis, incidentally, that later provided 
the ideological foundation for the notorious but highly symptomatic South West Africa Cases 
(Second Phase) judgment12° - was essentially this: what makes a particular norm part of the 
"legal order" is not the effects it produces in the social fabric at the point of its application 
but only the fact of its origination in the foundational decision about what should count in 
practice as the recognized sources of justice. " Whatever can be proved through a chain of 
syllogistic arguments to have the same basic form as one of the ideal items on the "original" 
list of sources through which the foundational decision established justice could be 
achieved in practice, counts as law; whatever cannot be proved, does not. ' 
118 Statute of the International Court of justice, 1945,59 Stat. 1031. For further sources, see n. 7 in Chapter II 
above. 
119 See G. G. Fitzmaurice, The Foundations of the Authorzy of International Law and the Problem of Enforcement, 19 
M. L. R. 1 (1956). 
120 South West Africa Cases (Second Phase) (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), I. C. J. Reports 1966,6. 
121 For Kelsen's view on this question, see further Hans Kelsen, On the Basic Norm, 47 Cal. L. Rev. 107 (1959). 
See also KELSEN, supra n. 73,252-65. What sets Kelsen apart from Fitzmaurice is his principled insistence 
that in order to be valid, a legal norm must also be effective, ie. it must be observed in practice (see id., 138- 
41). Beyond the special case of customary international law, Fitzmaurice roundly rejects that suggestion (see 
supra n. 119,2). Most mainstream international lawyers today, it seems safe to guess, would join Fitzmaurice 
over Kelsen. For further elaboration of Kelsen's logical positivism and his theory of the basic norm as the 
normative expression of the foundational decision about what should count as law in practice, see also HANS 
KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 31,198-201 (transl. by Max Knight; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1978). For Kelsen's qualms about the relationship between "law" and "justice, " see Hans 
Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law andAnalytical Jurisprudence, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 44,44-9 (1941). 
122 This logic underwrites the liberal theory of legal formality. See, further, Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 
J. Leg. Stud. 351 (1973). 
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In the Halean tradition, of course, the factuality of the legal regimes can never be 
understood in such terms. For the functionalist approach, the frame of reference for 
understanding the factuality of international law cannot ever be set in terms of the logical 
comparisons of forms and deductive elaborations of a decisionisticaly established 
"original" list. It is the social approval of the application of coercion that provides the 
general background against which the contours of the legal order should be made 
out. ' Whatever process determines which of the various constraints effectively 
imposed on the different freedoms of the participants of the international political 
process to act as they please are legitimate is the international legal process. 
Whatever code brings together all the legitimate constraints permitted in the 
international arena is the code of the international legal order. The cognition of 
every international legal regime, on this view of things, must thus always start with 
the identification of the effective dynamics by which coercion is legitimized in the 
international arena. Anything else would be a return to the practises of 
"transcendental nonsense. "'4 
That said, a principled rejection of legal formalism seem to form a very important 
part of what characterizes most of the mainstream ILTMC scholarship today in its own 
eyes. It appears to be a rather common feature among the mainstream ILTMC writers to 
pride oneself on one's ability to transcend the narrow-minded habits of the formalist 
mindset and pay attention to those international norms that would not usually pass the 
muster of an Article 38 test. 125 In reality, however, most of these self-allegations appear to 
123 In contemporary international law scholarship this view is often associated with the New Haven school 
approach. (The immediate point of reference at hand is usually Myres S. McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests 
and the InternationalL au, of the Sea, 49 A. J. I. L. 353,354 (1955). ) In fact, however, as we have seen earlier, it is a 
profoundly Halean thesis. That international lawyers should constantly overlook this fact is ultimately 
understandable. Unlike McDougal, Hale never wrote anything about international law, and, in a way, the New 
Haven tradition was a direct offshoot of legal realism. (As far as offshoots go, however, it was certainly a 
rather crooked one. No loyal student of Cohen, Frank, or Hale would ever come up with a "policy science" 
or the kind of Porphyrian tree of hypostatized phases, ossified functions, and mysteriously self-justifying 
values that McDougal and Lasswell developed in the fifties and sixties. ) 
124 See Cohen, supra n. 73. 
125 For a highly symptomatic example, see, e. g., PATRICK THORNBERRY AND MARIA AMOR MARTIN 
ESTEBANEZ, MINORITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE 18 (Strasbourg. Council of Europe Publishing, 2004): "a great 
deal can be achieved in minority protection through methods other than the `hard law' approach. " See also 
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be at best naive and at worst misguided: as things stand, there have been as yet no real 
functionalist accounts of the established ILTMC problematic. The methodological 
sensibility traditionally understood in mainstream ILTMC scholarship as a species of legal 
realism comes, in fact, nowhere near that, and, ultimately, one should hardly be surprised 
by that. Halean sensibility has never gained much popularity among modem international 
lawyers. Partly, of course, this can be explained perhaps by the lingering dominance of the 
formalist sensibility. To a significant extent, however, this may also be due to international 
lawyers' traditional failure to engage with the theoretical legacy of the socio-legal studies as 
well as the rather peculiar political situation of the international law discipline. 126 
Nevertheless, in recent years there have been a number of important advances on 
this front that deserve a few comments. 
b. The Question of "Soft Law" 
Initially, it seems, it was mostly those international relations scholars who were associated 
with the regimes theory approach who first started to drift towards a general equivalent of 
the Halean/functionalist paradigm. Where they had led, others soon followed. The easiest 
way to track the intellectual achievements of the regimes theory scholarship, it seems, is by 
considering its approach to the question of the so-called "soft law. " 
GAETANO PENTASSUGLIA, MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 199-208 (Strasbourg Council of Europe 
Publications, 2002). 
126 While the invisible college has never had any significant material or organizational power base to lean on 
politically - there is no international law bar, no global ministry of international justice, no global system of 
international judiciary - it has always had to defend its political projects against relentless assaults from every 
possible corner and direction. From Austinian positivists to Morgenthavian "political realists, " the Bible-belt 
conservatives to the Third World anti-imperialists, the First-World feminists to 'il popolo di Seattld' - every 
theoretical school and ideological movement with any kind of universalistic pretensions in the last hundred 
years has taken its opportunity to revile the international legal order and to scorn its disciples at some point or 
another. The common pretext on almost every occasion has been the invisible college's failure to get realistic 
about the certainties of international life. With a past record like that, how surprising is it really that an 
overwhelming majority of the invisible college have not yet found the idea of legal realism particularly 
appealing? 
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Whichever perspective one looks at it from, the concept of "soft law" is certainly a 
rather paradoxical one. 12' At its core seems to lie the idea of "international prescriptions 
that are deemed to lack requisite characteristics of international normativity, but which, 
notwithstanding this fact, are capable of producing certain legal effects. "" A typical 
example of a soft law regime - and one that concerns the object of this inquiry directly - 
on this reading of the term would be the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The accepted view in the 
mainstream scholarship today is that, despite the fact that it is drafted in a language very 
similar to that of contemporary international treaties, the Helsinki Final Act does not in 
fact constitute a regular international law treaty in the sense in which that term is used in 
the 1969 Law of Treaties Convention, and that the obligations entrenched in it are not, 
therefore, legally binding on its participants. lz9 
The general theory on which this argument is based tends to place the primary 
emphasis on the concluding paragraph of the Helsinki Final Act which explicitly states that 
the Act's signatories do not in fact intend to register it with the UN Secretariat under 
Article 102 of the UN Charter. 13o Taking into account the fact that all treaties concluded by 
the UN members are normally expected to be registered under Article 102, it is commonly 
argued that if the signatories of the Act decided to include such a statement in its text, then 
it must be because they certainly intended not to create any formal legal obligations. 131 
127 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 Mich. J. Irlfl L. 420,420 (1991). 
128 Gunther Handl, Remarks, 82 A. S. I. L. Proc. 371,371 (1988). A parallel theory holds that "softness" is, in 
fact, an attribute of the norm's content, ie. that the concept "softness" is effectively synonymous with the 
concept of "formal realizability. " (Dupuy entertains this view at some length in supra n. 127,429-31. ) That 
theory has been generally rejected in recent years, probably because there are not that many mainstream 
international lawyers today who would want to see some of the most fundamental components of the 
modern-day international corpusjuris relegated into the category of soft law. On formal realizability, see further 
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private LawAdjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685,1687-8 (1976). 
129 Jane Wright, The OSCE and the Protection of Minority Rights, 18 HRQ 191,192-3 (1996). 
130 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, 1 August 1975, Helsinki 
"The Government of the Republic of Finland is requested to transmit to the Secretary- General of the United 
Nations the text of this Final Act, which is not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, with a view to its circulation to all the members of the Organization as an official document 
of the United Nations. " 
131 Wright, supra n. 129,193. 
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That said, the argument usually continues, no one should, nevertheless, doubt that 
the Act and the documents adopted in its wake were in fact intended to produce a series of 
internationally binding commitments: 
[as] Van Dijk correctly states: "A commitment does not have to be legally binding 
in order to have binding force; the distinction between legal and non-legal 
binding force resides in the legal consequences attached to the binding force, " 
not in the binding force as such. 132 
Now, from the perspective of the regimes theory approach, drawing this kind of 
distinctions would normally appear a rather suspicious analytical operation. 
What use can it be, practically speaking, to insist on calling one set of obligations 
"soft law" and another set of obligations "hard law, " if. (i) the procedures for compliance 
in both cases are normally very similar, or at any rate a sufficient number of "hard law" 
regimes are accompanied by a compliance procedure far less robust and rule-driven than a 
considerable number of "soft law" regimes, and the members of the international 
community seem to be perfectly comfortable with that; "' (ii) the logic of norm-making in 
both cases is almost completely the same; 134 (iii) the patterns of enforcement and voluntary 
observance do not at all coincide with the analytical division between the hard-law and the 
132 Id., 193 (quoting Arie Bloed). 
133 Alberto Szekely, A Commentary on the Softening of International Environmental Law, 91 A. S. I. L. Proc. 234 (1997). 
C£ Bruno Simma, Remarks, 82 A. S. I. L. Proc. 377,379 (1988). 
134 FRIEDRICH KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS 200-3 (Cambridge: University Press, 1989). It 
is generally believed that the formal procedure for soft-lawmaking is different from that for hard-lawmaking, 
but then again this statement looks far more certain when entertained as an item of faith than an empirically 
falsifiable contention. Especially after the Nicaragua decision (ICJ Reports 1986,14), a lot of customary 
lawmaking, particularly in the area of the international human rights law, has become difficult to distinguish 
from the "classical" soft-lawmaking processes. See further on this Dupuy, supra n. 127,432-3. See also more 
generally Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law. - a 
Reconciliation, 95 A. J. I. L. 757 (2001); Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law. - Custom, 
Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 Aust. Yb. Intl L. 82 (1988-89); Frederick L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding 
Scale, 81 A. J. I. L. 146 (1987); Robert Y. Jennings, `Identification of International Lau", in BIN CHENG (ED. ), 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: TEACHING AND PRACTICE 3 (London: Stevens & Sons, 1982). 
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soft-law instruments; 135 (iv) the degree of concreteness of a normative provision does not 
necessarily increase as one moves from the soft-law end of the spectrum to the hard-law 
end; 136 and (v) "[a]fter all, the most severe psychological pressures ... in the international 
arena [tend to] result from unilateral but vague policy commitments which need not 
necessarily qualify as either a moral imperative or a direct legal obligation' )p137 
Against an empirical background so unambiguous and clear, how reasonable can it 
be to insist on retaining the concept of soft law as an analytical heuristic? What purpose 
does it serve from the point of view of practical knowledge when it comes to explaining 
the logic of the international political process? 
Over time, most of the empirical criticisms made by the regimes theorists were 
gradually received into the mainstream international law scholarship. On the one hand, it 
was acknowledged, soft law instruments "in many cases concretize[j abstract notions 
embodied in hard-law provisions[, ] especially in a field like international human rights 
where the use of soft law for defining the precise content of hard law is more the rule than 
the exception. " 138 On the other hand, it was recognized that "if one looks to the reality of 
what states actually are doing, ... when they are concluding a soft 
law instrument[, they] in 
many ways behave precisely as though they were concluding a treaty. i13' Despite many 
parallels between them, however, the pattern of the soft-law debate in the mainstream 
international law discourse did not, ultimately, proceed along the same lines as it did in the 
regimes theory scholarship. All the empirical recognitions notwithstanding, the basic 
question of the practical value of the analytical category of "soft law" was never explicitly 
raised by the mainstream international law scholarship. 14° 
Consider, for example, the highly symptomatic treatment of the subject by 
Professor Gunther Handl. From the regimes theory point of view, the starting observations 
all seem quite familiar: 
135 KRATOCHWIL, supra n. 134,206; Martha Finnemore, Are Legal Norms Distinctive?, 32 N. Y. U. J. Intl L. & 
Pol. 699,703 (2000). 
136 Szekely, supra n. 133,234-41. 
137 KRATOCHWIL, supra n. 134,206. 
138 Simrna, supra n. 133,380. 
139 Christine Chipkin, Remarks, 82 A. S. I. L. Proc. 389,389 (1988). 
140 Compare ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS & PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT 10 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
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We are all, of course, familiar with examples of formal international law such as 
treaties, whose ineffectiveness relegates them to the ranks of nonlegal norms, or, 
if you will, soft norms, notwithstanding their formal status. And vice versa, there 
is an abundance of, formally speaking, nonnormative documents such as 
resolutions and declarations of international organizations or conferences, which 
have proved to be highly effective internationally and must be deemed part and 
parcel of the international normative order. The frequency with which this 
discrepancy between formal status and legal significance is being encountered is 
decidedly on the rise. 141 
But where does Handl's argument go after this? Faced with the realization of the practical 
dysfunctionality of the established heuristic, Handl correctly concludes that 
[t]he fundamental question here is [nothing less than] whether we, as 
international lawyers, approach this possibly bewildering normative scene with 
appropriate tools, with an adequate theory about law; whether we understand the 
[new] nature of international law as a process of communications, and whether 
we are able to distinguish between signals indicating international normativity and 
those that do not. '42 
So far, so good. The logic of the argument up to this point seems to be generally sound and 
quite unfaultable. But only so far. 
At the next stage of his reasoning, having just about admitted that the theoretical 
machinery constructed around the conceptual opposition between "hard law" and "soft 
law" is completely ineffective for the task of explaining and describing the reality of the 
international political process, Handl suddenly performs a logical somersault, turning the 
argument on its head and concluding that the main challenge confronting the international 
law scholar at this point - instead of discarding completely the morally bankrupt frame of 
141 Handl, supra n. 128,372. 
142 Id. 
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reference - is simply to study the 
factuality of the soft-law phenomena ever more 
attentively. 143 
One is reminded at this point of the medieval scholastic theologians who, 
reportedly, 144 would have endless heated debates about how many individual angels could 
normally fit on the top of a needle. Some thought the number was very high; others 
believed it was higher. To every suggestion that the analytical framework of their debate 
might actually be totally incommensurate with what could be practically verified, both 
parties normally responded with an invitation to try and improve the framework, which 
most of the time simply meant making the terms of argument even more complex. Nobody 
seemed to be willing to acknowledge that the most reasonable thing to do was to abandon 
the starting framework altogether. At any rate, nobody went on record admitting as much. 
Now, the reason why I decided to mention this is that medieval scholastic theology, 
of course, provides a typical illustration of all that is wrong with discursive formalism. The 
defining feature of every species of discursive formalism, as Fitzmaurice's example shows, 
is the unshakeable belief in the existence of a basic set of foundational axioms from which 
all necessary knowledge can be directly and logically deduced. (Euclidean geometry and 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus are two classical illustrations of discursive formalist systems. ) The 
basic criterion of truth in all formalist discourses, thus, is ultimately derived from the 
investigation of logical compatibility: a tested statement is supposed to be valid whenever it 
fits, on the ground of formal logic, with the accepted set of foundational axioms. If it can 
be shown to link up to the foundational axioms through a chain of formal-logical 
deductions, then the idea behind it must be truthful; if not, then it is false. Any arguments 
derived expractica are simply dismissed as theoretically irrelevant. The foundational axioms 
are understood to embody all the truth about the studied object that can ever be obtained, 
which basically means there is no need ever to go back to the messy world of practice: if 
there can be no valid truth beyond what is already contained in the starting axioms, why 
look at the practical reality at all? 
143 "In concluding, then, I would like to stress again that the fault-line of the changes experienced in the 
international legal system runs straight through the sources of international law. Indeed, soft law epitomizes 
the shifting characteristics of the international legal order. To understand soft law requires an understanding 
of this larger context. " (Id., 373. ) 
144 Although, as Felix Cohen suggests, the reports have not been confirmed. See Cohen, supra n. 73,810, n. 4. 
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The parallels between Euclid and Fitzmaurice are simply impossible to overlook. So 
are, of course, the differences. Euclid never claimed to know the answer to the problems of 
conflict and cooperation in the international arena. 
The historico-materialist approach to the interpretation of the social reality absolutely 
rejects every instance of formalist sensibility. According to the historico-materialist method, 
there can be no meaningful understanding of the logic of juridical relationships without a 
rigorously practice-oriented investigation of the juridical processes. The reality of the 
juridical instance does not exist outside the context of its dialectical interaction with other 
components of the social whole. The only "site" in which the factuality of the juridical 
order can be validly perceived is the totality of all those effects which it produces in the 
objective disposition of the social process, or, to use the Halean terminology, the structure 
of the bargaining situation. For that reason, if a close historical examination establishes the 
view that the conceptual distinction between the two entities called "hard law" and "soft 
law" is unsupported by the objective dynamics of the practical social process and is, 
therefore, irrelevant for the accurate understanding of the practical functionality of the 
international legal order, then it must inevitably follow that the analytical category "soft 
law, " at least at this stage of the discourse, must be discarded completely and categorically. 
c. The Patterns of the ILTMC RSA Functionality 
A question inevitably arises at this point: how can we then begin to know what the 
contents of the international legal order really are? How can we identify the objective 
practical effects of the juridical instance in the space-process of the complex whole? 
Taking into account everything that has been said earlier about the difference 
between the discursive process of knowledge and the practical processes of the external 
reality cognized through it, it would be extremely foolish, of course, for anyone to assume 
at this point that it should be possible to gain an immediate access to the "truth" of the 
legal reality. Facts never arrive "neat and pure, " cleaned from the traces of their cognitive 
production. Every act of cognition is rooted in some sort of perspective. Perspectives, in 
their turn, are all products, in one way or another, of pre-discursive framings. A framing is 
an outcome of a process requiring a set of starting points and a productive formula by 
which they must be connected. The formula in question in our case has been provided 
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already by Althusser and Hale. The central concern facing our inquiry at the present stage, 
consequently, must be: where should we obtain the starting points of our analysis? 
To answer this question correctly, let us return once more to the theory of the 
parallax view. In the historico-materialist theory of cognition, as Karel Kosik correctly 
pointed out, "5 every starting point is always, of necessity, relative. There is no single right 
starting frame for the interpretation of the reality of the social process. Every studied 
phenomenon must necessarily be studied from several different angles at once. It is only 
through their complex dialectical combination and continuous cross-illumination that a 
more or less reliable practical understanding of it can be constructed. 
Transposing this theory into the present context, it seems to follow that while we 
certainly can recognize what angles of empirical examination would be definitely wrong for 
the purposes of our investigation, we can never insist that there should be only one angle 
for the examination of the contents of the new ILTMC regime. Moreover, recalling 
Ilyenkov's comments about the logic of permissible abstractions, whatever angles we do 
end up selecting in our examination, the first and the most pressing task will always be to 
justify those choices. Only an abstract approach based on a conjuncturally justified 
abstraction can supply valuable insights. 
What follows, then, is a sequence of three separate but interconnected takes on the 
factuality of the hard law-soft law divide in the context of the new ILTMC project's 
practice. Each of the three takes produces a story situationalized on its own terms. Each 
offers its own perspective and supplies its own bit of information that can be then 
"plugged" into the Halean algorithm. The basic logic underlying the selection of the three 
perspectives was dictated by the immediate structure of the practical bargaining situation: 
the first account corresponds to the delivering perspective of the new ILTMC project; the 
second to the perspective on its receiving end; the third to the perspective of the authors of 
the outside discourse dedicated to its description. 
The background understanding of what has to be examined and analyzed from the 
point of view of each of the selected perspectives was derived on the basis of what 
appeared to be the most typical patterns characteristic of the corresponding experience 
fields. Considering the nature of the issue, that particular choice was made largely for want 
145 See Chapter II, Section 2, at p. 153, above. 
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of a more optimal framing alternative. It is offered here without any prejudice to the 
general resolution of the question. '46 
Cl) The Practice of the New ILTMC Project: the View on the Delivering End 
A detailed examination of the formal attitude patterns adopted by the most noticeable 
producers of the new ILTMC project unmistakably indicates that in the eyes of the new 
ILTMC's RSA operators the differences drawn by the mainstream formalist scholarship 
between "hard law" and "soft law" are effectively totally irrelevant. Moreover, judging by 
the recent patterns of its evolution, the chief driving force behind the new ILTMC regime 
appears to operate predominantly through the instrumentality of soft-law mechanisms. Any 
attempts to make the suggestion that in the practical functionality of the ILTMC project 
146 From the formal theoretical perspective, it could, of course, be said that the introduction of these 
background understandings will, nonetheless, predetermine the course of the subsequent discussion inasmuch 
as depending on which sets of initial data each story is going to focus on, one may obtain a range of 
completely different understandings of the studied field, which in its turn may then inspire a range of 
completely different methodological implications for the purposes of this study. From the functionalist 
dialectical perspective, however, this argument simply does not hold. First, there can be no such thing as 
presuppositionless thought. Every discussion is always predetermined by at least some kind of pre-framing. It 
is simply impossible to find a starting condition that is free of that kind of pre-determination. Since it is 
impossible to achieve that, it follows that it simply does not make sense to invalidate an analytical project for 
the sole reason that its cognitive course may have been predetermined by some sort of formal pre-framing. If 
one gets that radical about the purity of reasoning, there will be nothing left to reason about. After all, how 
does one know one is not simply imagining things? (As Bertrand Russell said, none of us can produce a 
guarantee that the universe was not invented fifteen seconds ago. ) Second, if pre-framings are epistemically 
inevitable, then it necessarily follows that the only thing we can do to ensure we retain the required level of 
rigour in our subsequent analysis is to select only those pre-framings which on a prima facie empirical 
inspection would seem to be less likely to fall outside the "core meaning" area. Clearly, making that choice 
can never be a matter of "exact science, "; nevertheless, however agnostic one may be about the whole 
ILTMC question, it is difficult to imagine that either the FCNM or the HCNM will not usually find 
themselves at the core of what should be understood as the field of the new ILTMC project. Besides, to the 
extent to which the question asked of each account presented below is "how effective have the hard-law 
ILTMC sources been in structuring the minority-majority bargaining processes in the ECE region? ", the task 
we are facing does not seem to be particularly tricky. The rules for identifying hard-law sources in 
international law, after all, have all been long defined. 
226 
the soft-law instruments may be anyhow deficient are, thus, completely and categorically 
misguided. 
Indeed, even the most casual empirical survey would immediately point out that 
not only are there very few "proper" treaties in the ILTMC field - if we discount all 
bilateral traite-contrats147 and the general human rights treaties that touch on the ILTMC 
problematic only in passing, such as the ICCPR or the European Convention on Human 
Rights, there would appear to be left only two148 "proper" international treaties directly 
concerned with the traditional ILTMC problematic (the 1992 European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages149 and the 1995 FCNM) - but that they also (i) establish no 
robust enforcement mechanisms;... and (ii) are essentially identical in terms of their 
contents with the main pre-existing soft law instruments, in particular, the CSCE 
Copenhagen Document. Furthermore, despite the famous declaration by the Badinter 
Committee that the rule requiring the demonstration of respect for the "rights of 
minorities" has now become part ofjus cogens, 151 it also remains doubtful how much of the 
141 As Max van der Stoel quite correctly observed, in the area traditionally covered by the ILTMC project 
bilateral treaties have been far more a monument to political compromise than an instrument of legal 
regulation. See Max van der Stoel, "Political Order, Human Rights, and Development", in ZELLNER AND 
LANGE, supra n. 19,71,75-6. 
148 The formal status of the 1994 Central European Initiative Instrument for the Protection of Minority Rights (reprinted 
in PENTASSUGLIA, supra n. 125,299) is rather unclear. In any event, its practical causal impact on the 
development of the ILTMC RSA functionality appears to be negligible. 
149 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML), 1992, LETS No. 148; reprinted in 
PENTASSUGLIA, supra n. 125,272. 
150 Both the FCNM and the ECRML are enforced by the COE Council of Ministers aided by respective 
advisory committees. Although the committees are authorized to examine periodic state reports and to solicit 
and receive further information from non-governmental sources, they are expressly mandated not to act as 
judicial bodies. Cf. V. Crnic-Grotic: "The Committee is not a judicial body; it is not authorized to bring 
judgments on State Parties. It is authorized [only] to monitor the implementation of the Charter and receive 
information to that end. " (quoted in THORNBERRY AND ESTEBANEZ, supra n. 125,156). 
Cf. Article 26, FCNM: 
"1. In evaluating the adequacy of the measures taken by the Parties to give effect to the principles set out in 
this framework Convention the Committee of Ministers shall be assisted by an advisory committee, the 
members of which shall have recognised expertise in the field of the protection of national minorities. 
2. The composition of this advisory committee and its procedure shall be determined by the Committee of 
Ministers within a period of one year following the entry into force of this framework Convention. " 
151 See infra n. 213. 
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new ILTMC regime has actually made its way into general international law. Certainly, as 
late as the early 1990s, it was still possible to claim that even the right reflected in "Article 
27 [of the 1966 ICCPR] appears to be a right granted by a treaty without wider 
repercussions in customary law. ""' In more recent times the general scholarly opinion 
seems to have become slightly more enthusiastic. Nevertheless, even on the most 
optimistic reading the general consensus today hardly seems to go beyond the view that it 
is only the "[b]asic aspects of protection under Article 27, such as the right to the equal 
enjoyment of one's culture, and, in particular, to assert and preserve it free of any attempt 
at assimilation against one's will [that] enjoy nowadays [sufficiently] wide support from the 
international community" to be "arguably, ... considered as strong candidates for 
customary law. ""' The brunt of the regulatory burden, however one goes about it, from 
the perspective of the ILTMC's producers and executors, thus, falls mostly on the 
"shoulders" of the soft law instruments. 
The same pattern seems to hold true also when one considers the scope and the 
weight of the practical contributions made by juridical (hard-law) and political (soft-law) 
bodies. Thus, while the actual impact of the European Court of Human Rights on the 
development of the new ILTMC project has been generally insignificant, "' the impact left 
by the OSCE HCNM and the EC organs, 155 through their implementation of the 1993 
Copenhagen criteria for EU accession, "' has been truly colossal . 
15' 
152 THORNBERRY, supra n. 1,246. 
153 PENTASSUGLIA, supra n. 125,111. 
154 For further discussion, see Geoff Gilbert, The Burgeoning Minority Rights Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights, 24 HRQ 736 (2002). 
155 Although the Community institutions have never developed a substantive ILTMC policy of their own, 
they have been very active in upholding, borrowing, and relentlessly promoting the ILTMC regimes created 
by other international organizations. For further discussion, see THORNBERRY AND ESTEBANEZ, supra n. 125, 
19-20; PENTASSUGLIA, supra n. 125,145. 
156 The 1993 criteria for accession to the EU membership established by the Copenhagen European Council 
established the "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities" as one of the main pre-requisites that have to be fulfilled by the candidate 
states. As with the subsequent association agreements, the practice related to the implementation of the 
Copenhagen criteria clearly and unequivocally indicates the EC's adoption of the CSCE/OSCE minority 
protection regimes as its practical litmus test. For further overview of the question, see id., 154-5. 
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That said, the general situation is not as straightforwardly black and white. 
If one considers closely the practice of the various ILTMC bodies, such as, for 
instance, the COE Advisory Committee on the FCNM, a decidedly non-judicial organ 
created to act as only a monitoring body, 158 it will quickly become clear that, regardless of 
their formal status as juridical or political organs, in their regular discourse such bodies 
frequently tend to adopt linguistic and discursive conventions most commonly associated 
with juridical practice. Furthermore, a close reading of the Advisory Committee's 
statements, for example, suggests that in its pronouncements on the member states' 
compliance patterns, the Committee is as likely to make regular references to formal hard- 
law sources, such as, for instance, the FCNM itself, as to the explicitly soft-law instruments, 
such as the Recommendations of the COE Committee of Ministers, "' sui generis political 
agreements, 160 or even the recommendations of the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture. 16' The structure of the language formulas used - "the Committee 
urges, " "the Committee welcomes, " "the Committee stresses, " "the Committee considers it 
essential" - implies the adoption of the same attitude for all prescriptions issued by them, 
157 Even before the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria were adopted, the EC had been very influential in the 
promotion of the new ILTMC project. The 1991 EC Guidelines on the recognition of new states and the 
authoritative statements issued by the Badinter Commission on their basis have, arguably, done more for the 
advancement of the ILTMC regime in the ECE region than the ICCPR and the FCNM taken together. As in 
the case with the Copenhagen criteria, the sole ILTMC provision in the text of the Guidelines refers in fact to 
the normative regime created within the framework of the CSCE. For further information on the drafting of 
the Guidelines, see T. M. Franck, "Postmodem Tribalism and the Right to Secession", in CATHERINE 
BRÖLMANN ET AL (EDS. ), PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3,24-5 (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993). 
158 Alan Phillips, "FCNM: From Analysis to Action", MRG Briefings, September 2002, at 2. 
159 See, e. g., Opinion on the "former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", 27 May 2004, 
ACFC/INF/OP/I(2005)001, ýý55,78 (mentioning Recommendations (97) 20 and (2000) 4) and ý29 
(expressing dissatisfaction in the context of discussing compliance with Article 4 of the FCNM with the 
decision of the Macedonian government not to comply with the recommendations of the European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance). 
160 Id., ýý10,12,13,49 (mentioning the 2001 Ohrid Agreement signed by the Macedonian government and 
the representatives of Macedonia's all main political parties and countersigned by the special envoys of the 
European Union and the United States in Macedonia). 
161 See, e. g., id., ý53 
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regardless of the formal origin (hard law or soft law) of the underlying normative 
provisions. The same pattern also holds true for the OSCE HCNM. 1Cý 
Outside the FCNM context, the source of most COE activities on the front of 
minorities policy has been the Parliamentary Assembly an organ that has purely 
consultative rather than legislative functions. 161 The second most influential COE structure, 
in terms of showing influence on the development of the ILTMC policies, has been the 
European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) established 
in 1990 as a partial agreement of 18 COE members. The Commission is composed of 
independent experts, mostly senior academics with extensive background in constitutional 
and international law. Most of the Commission's policy-making activities take the shape of 
advisory opinions and unbinding reports. In practical terms, however, it has been extremely 
influential, having supplied much of the ideological content of the 2001 Ohrid Agreements 
in Macedonia, the 1999 Rambouillet Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in 
Kosovo, and the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro and having effectively 
adjudicated a series of important infra-regional disputes, including not least those involving 
Hungary's infamous 2001 Act on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries. 164 
(ii). The Practice of the New ILTMC Project: the View on the Receiving End 
A detailed examination of the common experiences of the principal addressees of the new 
ILTMC project in the ECE region essentially confirms the correctness of the regimes 
theory critique of the general formalist position on the question of soft law: the degree of 
the "source-hardness" of any given normative standard has no actual bearing on the 
effective patterns of its observance. From the point of view of the ECE states and the 
respective ethnic communities, the involvement of the international RSA functionality in 
the structuration of the interethnic bargaining processes has been most immediate and 
intensive in cases involving decidedly soft-law normative instruments. At the same time, 
the soft-law nature of the original sources notwithstanding, if one looks closely at the tone 
162 See the discussion in sub-section (iii) below. 
163 THORNBERRY AND ESTEBANEZ, supra n. 125,22. 
164 Id., 24-5. See also DIACOFOTAKIS, infra n. 193,90-2. 
230 
of the rhetoric and other discursive patterns of that involvement, it will appear that on 
many occasions they have retained an essentially juridical (hard-law) appearance. 
Consider the cases of Latvia and Estonia. 165 One of the central factors in the 
constitution of the polity-forming dynamics in the Baltic States in the last twenty years has 
certainly been the question of the minority/majority language policy. Prior to the 
dissolution of the USSR, it has provided one of the most important points of reference for 
the organization of the indigenous nationalist movements. Following the attainment of 
independence in 1991, in two cases out of three it became a central criterion for the 
definition of the citizenship base, turning in the ensuing years into a principal instrument 
for the distribution of the inter-ethnic power balance, ensuring, on the one hand, a direct 
"isolation of the Russian -speaking community from politics, " and, on the other hand, 
providing a means for the exercise of "ethnic control" over it in the areas of social security, 
labour market, "' and even, to some extent, property market. "' A great deal of the language 
legislation provisions adopted in Latvia and Estonia over the last seventeen years have thus 
had a direct and immediate impact on the political and economic well-being of the 
respective Russophone minority communities, whose proportionate shares in the total 
165 For background information, see further Vello Pettai and Klara Hallik, Understanding Processes of Ethnic 
Control. Segmentation, Dependency and Co-optation in Post-Communist Estonia, 8 Nations and Nationalism 505 (2002); 
Vadim Poleshchuk, "Legal Aspects of National Integration in Estonia and Latvia", ECMI Report No. 33, 
September 2002; Aadne Aasland and Tone Flotten, Ethnicity and Social Exclusion in Estonia and Latvia, 53 Eur. - 
Asia Stud. 1023 (2001); Boris Tsilevich, Development of the Language Legirlation in the Baltic States, MOST J. 
Multicult'l Soc. Vol 3/2 (2001), http: / /www. unesco. org/most/-vl3n2tsileyich. htm; GRAHAM SMITH ET AL., 
NATION-BUILDING IN THE POST-SOVIET BORDERLANDS (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); 
Geoffrey Evans, Ethnic Schism and Consokdation of Post-Communist Democracies: the Case of Estonia, 31 Comm. & 
Post-Comm. Stud. 57 (1998); Jeff Chinn and Lisa Truex, The Question of Citizenship in the Baltics, 7 J. of Dem'cy 
133 (1996); Lee Kendall Metcaff, Outbidding to Radical Nationalists: Minority Policy in Estonia 1988-1993,2 
Nations and Nationalism 213 (1996); GRAT-IAM SMITH (ED. ), 
THE BALTIC STATES: THE NATIONAL SELF- 
DETERMINATION OF ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994); Raivo Vetik, 
Ethnic Conflict andAccommodation in Post-Communist Estonia, 30 J. Peace 
Res. 271 (1993). 
166 Pettal and Hallik, supra n. 165,513-4,516-8. 
167 See Erik Andre Andersen, The Legal Status of Russians in Estonian Privatisation Legislation 1989-1995,49 Eur. - 
Asia Stud. 303 (1997). 
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population of these countries at the beginning of the 1990s constituted, according to the 
most conservative accounts, at least between 25% and 33%. 168 
Rather unsurprisingly, considering the fact that even the most liberal 
representatives of the two titular nations in question accepted the view that the domestic 
language policies adopted by their governments served in fact to isolate and disempower 
the Russophone population, 169 many of these policies have been frequently described to 
run counter to the central tenets of the established hard-law ILTMC canon . 
17' After several 
years of anxious hand-twisting, the restrictive provisions were finally eased to some degree 
in the early years of the new century, allowing the representatives of the ethnic Russian 
communities to regain some of the political and economic rights removed from them 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Considering the general patterns of those 
communities domestic passivity, it would appear, the achievement of such an outcome to a 
significant extent must be attributed to the role of the various international factors. A close 
examination of the available record, however, unequivocally indicates that whatever 
international pressure may have been applied to ensure the achievement of this concrete 
outcome at this concrete stage, virtually without exception came either from the European 
168 See Kees Groenendijk, Nationality, Minorities and Statelessness: the Case of the Baltic States, 4 Helsinki Monitor 
13 (1993). Cf. Aasland and Flotten, supra n. 165,1023: "barely two-thirds of the Estonian population are 
ethnic Estonians, while little more than half of the Latvian population are ethnic Latvians. " 
169 On the isolation and disempowerment of minorities in Estonia and Latvia generally, see id., 1046: 
"Belonging to the Slavic minorities in Estonia and Latvia means more often lacking the rights associated with 
citizenship such as voting rights in national elections and being able to hold leading public positions. 
Furthermore, it seems the Slavic population also faces lack of integration into several other arenas in society 
more often than the titular groups. They are less integrated and feel less secure in the labour market, they 
participate less often in civil and political activities and they more often report that economic hardships 
restrict them from participating in social activities. " The authors then go on to observe that "[e]ven though 
there is a significant relationship between ethnicity and different forms of social exclusion, and the presence 
of cumulative exclusion, the most important variable to explain social exclusion seems to be education. 
People with a low level of education are more often excluded along all the dimensions studied here. " (Id. ) On 
the restrictive measures concerning the use of the Russian language in education, see further Tsilevich, supra 
n. 165, §ý7.1-7.9; Poleshchuk, supra n. 165, passim. 
170 A fact duly, if somewhat belatedly, recognized by the Human Rights Committee in Antonin Ignatane v. 
Latvia, Communication No. 884/1999, CCPR/C/72/D/884/1999 (2001). 
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Community's organs acting within the parameters of the Copenhagen criteria or the OSCE 
l'1 structures. 
Extending the scope of the scrutiny to the rest of the region, the same common 
pattern can also be detected in the cases of Romania, "' Slovakia, 173 Hungary, 171 Ukraine, ' 
171 Cf. Tsilevich, supra n. 165, §5.1: "The language laws of all three Baltic states prescribe obligatory 
proficiency in the state language for employees in certain fields. Provisions enshrined in the earlier versions of 
Latvian and Estonian language laws caused protracted controversy in that the new laws extended the 
application of the language requirements to include employees working in the private sector. Only after the 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the European Commission became actively involved, 
was a compromise achieved. " Id., §8.10: "Thus far, internal dialogue has often been replaced with dialogue 
with, on the one hand, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the European Union, and with the Russian 
Federation on the other. " Further on the impact of the OSCE HCNM on the formation of Estonian 
minorities policy, see Margit Sarv, "Integration by Refraining Legislation: Implementation of the 
Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to Estonia 1993-2001", CORE 
Working Paper No. 7,2002; Li Ann Thio, Developing a Peace and Security' App roach towards Minorities' Problems, 52 
ICLQ 115,143-4 (2003); Sergey Khrychikov and Hugh Miall, Conflict Prevention in Estonia: the Role of the Electoral 
System, 33 Security Dialogue 193 (2002). 
172 The central ILTMC-related question in Romania in the post-Cold War era has been the status of the 
Hungarian minority, in particular in Transylvania. The immediate catalyst for the eruption of the minority- 
majority tensions in many cases was the issue of the Hungarian-language University in Cluj. For further 
review of the general patterns of international contribution to the shaping of the Romanian position on this 
front, see the impressively comprehensive Istvän Horväth, "Facilitating Conflict Transformation: 
Implementation of the Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to 
Romania 1993-2001", CORE Working PaperNo. 8,2002. 
173 Like in Romania, the central ILTMC-related question in Slovakia is the status of the Hungarian minority. 
Further on the international contribution to the shaping of the Slovak domestic minority communities 
regime, see Georrey Pridham, The European Union's Democratic Conditionality and Domestic Politics in Slouzkia: the 
Mebar and D. Zurinda Governments Compared, 54 Eur. -Asia Stud. 203 (2002); Geoffrey Pridham, Complying with the 
European Union's Democratic Conditionality: Transnational Party Linkages and Regime Change in Slovakia 1993-1998,51 
Eur. -Asia Stud. 1221,1223-6 (1999). For further 
background information, see Pal Czäky, Experiences from Co- 
operating with the OSCE HCNM: the Case of the Slovak Republic, 8 Intl J. Min & Gr. Rts 21 (2001); Martin Brusis, 
Ethnic Rift in the Context of Post-Communist Transformation: the Case of the Slovak Republic, 5 Intl J Gr. Rts 3 (1997); 
Sarlota Pufflerovä, National Minorities in Slowkia, 5 Helsinki Monitor 52 (1994). 
174 Hungary, of course, presents a slightly more difficult case than other ECE states. First, its very detailed 
minorities legislation was adopted quite early on following the end of the Cold War (the preparatory work 
had begun already in 1989) and has been little changed since. Second, its famous 1993 Act LXXVII on the 
Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities does not seem to have been influenced by any concrete 
international sources and, indeed, in several crucial aspects appears to strike a completely different note from 
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and Macedonia. "' Whenever any substantial international contribution to the development 
of the domestic minorities question policy was felt in any of these states, it almost always 
came as a result of a soft-law pressure issuing from the political institutions of the OSCE, 
the European Union,. " and, to a lesser extent, the NATO and the so-called international 
civil society. Although formally speaking the hard-law influence has not been entirely 
absent,. '' in the large scheme of things, the contribution of the international apparatuses 
the one usually replicated in the main ILTMC instruments. See further Timothy William Waters and Rachel 
Guglielmo, "Two Souls to Struggle With ... 
": the Failing Implementation of Hungary's New Minorities Law and 
Discrimination against Gypsies, 9 Harv. Hum Rts. J. 297,301-2 (1996). The common understanding on the issue, 
however, seems to be that the Hungarian minorities legislation was essentially passed "for foreign policy 
reasons" (id., 300,312) with a view to preparing the requisite moral-political ground for the transnational 
mobilization of the Hungarian diasporas in the neighbouring states and simultaneously earning the approval 
of the international community for its progressive stance (id., 312). See on this further Michael R. Geroe and 
Thomas K. Gump, Hungary and a New Paradigm for the Protection of Ethnic Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, 
32 Col. J. Transn'l L. 673,688-9 (1995); Gwyneth E. Edwards, Hungarian National Minorities: Recent Developments 
and Perspectives, 5 Intl J. Min. & Gr. Rts 345,349 (1998); Andrea Krizsän, The Hungarian Minority Protection 
System: a Flexible Approach to the Adjudication of Ethnic Claims, 26 J. Ethnic & Migr. Stud. 247,249-50 (2000); 
Ferenc Eiler and Nora Koväcs, "Minority Self-Governments in Hungary", in KINGA GAL (ED. ), MINORITY 
GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE 173,175 (Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2002). For background information 
on the Hungarian diasporas, see also generally Edwards, op. cit; Krizsän, op. cit. 
175 The two main bones of contention in Ukraine on this front have been the question of the Russian- 
speaking minority and the question of the Crimean Tatar autonomy. For further discussion of the 
international contribution to the resolution of these two questions, see Volodymyr Kulyk, "Revisiting a 
Success Story: Implementation of the Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities to Ukraine 1994 2001", CORE Working Paper 6,2002 (esp. at pp. 127-8); Oxana Shevel, Crimean 
Tatars and the Ukrainian State: the Challenge of Politics, the Use of Law, and the Meaning of Rhetoric, 1(7) Krimskii 
Studii 109 (2001); John Packer, "Autonomy within the OSCE: the Case of Crimea", in MARKKU SUKSI (ED. ), 
AUTONOMY: APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 295 (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998). 
176 See further Farimah Daftary, Conflict Resolution in FRY Macedonia: Power-Sharing or the `Civic Approach'? 12 
Helsinki Monitor 291 (2001); Arie Bloed, New High Commissioners on National Minorities Commences His Activities, 
12 Helsinki Monitor 220 (2001). 
177 For a further discussion of the soft-law influence exercised on the ECE states by the EU political 
institutions, see also Geoffrey Pridham, "The European Union, Democratic Conditionality and Transnational 
Party Linkages: the Case of Eastern Europe", in J. GRUGEL (ED. ), DEMOCRACY WITHOUT BORDERS 
(London: Roudedge, 1999). 
178 Several minorities-related cases from the region came before the European Court of Human Rights. See 
further Gilbert, supra n. 154. 
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enforcing the execution of hard-law sources-derived standards has been effectively 
negligible. 
An attentive examination of the bilateral ILTMC treaties produced in the region 
throughout the examined period similarly indicates that on most occasions their production 
and execution was directly determined by the impact of the international soft-law 
instruments. Article 15 of the 1995 Slovako-Hungarian treaty on good-neighbourly 
relations"' provides in this regard a particularly telling illustration. "' 
179 For further discussion of the treaty, see Bart Driessen, A New Turn in Hungarian-Slowk Relations? An 
Overview of the Basic Treaty, 4 Int'l J. Min. & Gr. Rts. 1 (1997). On the Treaty's incorporation of the 
international soft-law instruments, see id., 9-13. 
180 Article 15, Treaty on Good-Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Cooperation between the Republic of 
Hungary and the Slovak Republic, 1995 (available from 
httl: //www. htmh. hu/en/? menuid=06&country id=Slovakia&id=212) : 
"(2) The Contracting Parties, in protecting the national minorities and the rights of persons belonging to 
those minorities, are guided by the following principles: 
(a) Membership of a national minority shall be a matter of free personal choice and no disadvantage shall 
result from the choice of such membership; 
(b) All persons belonging to a national minority shall be equal before the law and have equal protection 
of the law. In this respect, any discrimination based on belonging to a national minority shall be prohibited; 
(c) Persons belonging to national minorities shall have the right, individually or in community with other 
members of their group, to freely express, maintain and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious 
identity and to maintain and develop their culture in all its aspects; 
(d) Reaffirming the aims of their general integration policy, the Contracting Parties shall refrain from 
policies and practices aimed at assimilation of persons belonging to minorities against their will, and shall 
protect these persons from any actions aimed at such assimilation. The Contracting Parties shall refrain from 
measures that would alter the proportions of the population in areas inhabited by persons belonging to 
national minorities and which aim at restricting the rights and freedoms of those persons that would be to the 
detriment of the national minorities; 
(e) Persons belonging to national minorities shall have the right to establish and operate, in conformity 
with their respective legislation and with the objective of maintaining, development and transfer of their 
identity, their own organisations and associations, including political parties and educational, cultural and 
religious organisations. Both Governments shall create legal conditions to this effect; 
(f) persons belonging to national minorities shall have the right to take part effectively at the national, 
and where appropriate, at the regional level, in the decisions affecting the minorities or the regions inhabited 
by the minorities, in the manner which is not incompatible with domestic legislation; 
(g) persons belonging to the Hungarian minority in the Slovak Republic and those belonging to the 
Slovak minority in the Republic of Hungary shall have the right to use freely, individually or in community 
with other members of their group, orally or in writing, their mother tongue in public or private life. They 
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shall also have the right, in conformity with the domestic law and with the international commitments 
undertaken by the two Contracting Parties, to use their mother tongue in contacts with official authorities, 
including public administration, and in judicial proceedings, to display in their mother tongue the names of 
municipalities in which they live, street names and names of other public areas, topographical indications, 
inscriptions and information in public areas, to register and use their first names and surnames in this 
language, to have - without prejudice to the learning of the official language or the teaching in this language - 
adequate opportunities in the framework of the State educational system for being taught their mother tongue 
or for receiving instruction in their mother tongue and the right of access to public mass media without 
discrimination and the right to their own media. The Contracting Parties, in accordance with their 
international commitments, shall take all the necessary legal, administrative and other measures for the 
implementation of the aforementioned rights unless their respective domestic law already contains such 
provisions; 
(h) in accordance with point (c) of this paragraph they shall create the necessary conditions enabling the 
persons belonging to national minorities to preserve their material and architectural memorials and memorial 
sites constituting their cultural heritage, history and traditions. 
(4) The Contracting States declare 
(a) that as regards the regulation of the rights and obligations of persons belonging to national minorities 
living within their respective territories they shall apply the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities adopted and signed by the Contracting Parties on 1 February, 1995, as from the date of 
ratification of the present Treaty and of the above Framework Convention by both Contracting Parties, 
unless their respective domestic legal systems provide a broader protection of rights of persons belonging to 
national minorities than the Framework Convention, 
(b) that without prejudice to the content of the previous paragraph (a), they shall apply, in defending the 
rights of persons belonging to the Hungarian minority in the Slovak Republic and the Slovak minority in the 
Republic of Hungary, the norms and political commitments laid down in the following documents as legal 
obligations: 
- Document of June 29,1990 of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference of Human Dimension of 
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe; 
- Declaration 47/135 of the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities; 
- Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, respecting 
individual human and civil rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. 
(5) Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity or perform any 
act contrary to the fundamental principles of international law and in particular of the sovereign equality, 
territorial integrity and political independence of States. 
(6) The Contracting Parties shall co-operate to assist one another in following the implementation of the 
content of this Article. They shall therefore consider the manner by which they can, in the framework of their 
mutual co-operation, and on the basis paragraph (1) of Article 5 of the present Treaty and in the spirit of 
mutual understanding and confidence, exchange information about, and experience with, questions relating to 
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(iii) The Practice of the New ILTMC Project: the View of the Outside Observer 
Reviewing the field of the contemporary scholarship dedicated to the study of the new 
ILTMC project similarly leaves no room for doubt about the practical relevance of the 
hard-law/soft-law distinction in the implementation of new ILTMC project. 
For Gaetano Pentassuglia, for example, it appears beyond doubt that "[i]n fact, 
beyond the language of `hard' or `soft' law in the mould of which minority rights norms 
have been, or may be, cast, lies the deeper aspect that compliance seems most directly 
linked to the existence of effective and independent scrutiny, " and that of the many 
available scrutiny mechanisms in the ILTMC area the most typical example of one "with 
teeth" is not a juridical (hard-law) mechanism of the European Court of Human Rights but 
the completely political (soft-law) mechanism for the manipulation of the EU 
conditionality criteria assessment. 181 
A telling pattern also emerges in a recent magnum opus by Patrick Thomberry and 
Maria Amor Martin Estebanez, entitled Minority Rights in Europe. 182 From the opening 
section on "The new awareness" through to the last chapter on the COE Human Rights 
Commissioner, the study eschews drawing any practical distinctions between hard law and 
soft law sources. The discussion in the introductory chapter of the UN practice, for 
instance, explicitly brings under a single heading, revealingly labelled "United Nations 
Standards, " both hard-law (ICCPR) and soft-law instruments (1992 Declaration), refusing 
to distinguish between them in terms of their formal standing under the ICJ Statute. " 
the application of the present Article. To this end, they shall set up an intergovernmental joint commission, 
entitled to make recommendations, consisting of section whose composition will be determined as they deem 
necessary. In monitoring the implementation of their commitments in the field of protection of national 
minorities, the Contracting Parties shall apply the rules of the Council of Europe and the Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe that are binding upon both Contracting Parties. " 
181 PENTASSUGLIA, supra n. 125,253-5. For a different argument tending towards the same general 
conclusion, see John Packer, "The Contemporary Protection of Minorities", in MORTEN BERGSMO (ED. ), 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE FOR THE DOWNTRODDEN 470,480-3 (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2003) 
(observing that the hard-law supervisory mechanisms in the ILTMC field have been largely ineffective and 
that "notwithstanding the limits and peculiarities of his mandate, the HCNM has been the most active 
instrument for the protection of minorities in Europe and, indeed, in the world"). 
182 Supra n. 125. 
183 Id., 12-6. 
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Departing from the UN context, the authors move in a single breath from a consideration 
of the 1989 ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (a typical hard-law 
instrument) to a detailed summary of the OSCE documents and the programmatic policy 
statements of the European Commission (all unmistakably soft-law instruments), " 
observing along the way that not only is it true that, "as the experience of the OSCE 
shows, a great deal can be achieved in minority protection through methods other than the 
`hard law' approach, i185 but that it also was the "OSCE standards concerning minorities" 
that "clearly influenced the drafting of UN and Council of Europe texts""' and set the 
plank in virtually every area of the new ILTMC dogma, from the question of the 
relationship between official and minority languages to the question of the minority 
communities' right to territorial autonomy, any "departures from which may provoke 
controversy. ""' 
Turning directly to the experience of the OSCE structures, in a recent study 
published in the NYU Journal of International Law and Pofitics, Steven Ratner asserts that on 
the basis of the evidence he collected during a year-long in-field investigation, it clearly 
appears that a key factor behind the brilliant record of OSCE achievements in the field is 
its rather promiscuous approach to sources-invocation: 
the [OSCE HCNM] routinely cite[s] a spectrum of norms in his communications 
with governments and minorities. These range from the harder ICCPR and the 
European Convention on Human Rights to the softer OSCE documents and the 
U. N. Declaration on Minorities. [From the start of his involvement in the field] 
the High Commissioner has avoided giving any particular attention in his letters 
and discussions to positivism's legal/non-legal distinction. Instead, he has relied 
upon the notion of "international standards" as a sort of umbrella to describe the 
... the accumulated 
body of law and policy ... regardless of the authority of the 
body promulgating the standard to make law. 188 
184 Id., 16-20. 
185 Id., 18. 
186 Id., 17. 
187 Id., 17. 
188 Steven R. Ratner, Does International Lam) Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict? 32 N. Y. U. J. Intl L. & PoL 591, 
659 (2000). 
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Reflecting on Ratner's observations, two basic points immediately seem to spring to 
attention. First, in the eyes of an outside observer trained both in the disciplines of 
international law and international relations, the HCNM's practice clearly appears to ignore 
all the basic differences between hard law and soft law. Second, from the same perspective, 
the HCNM also comes across as someone who is not even trying to cover up the fact that 
he pays no attention to the questions of mandate/source/institutional competence when 
considering which "international standards" should be applied as part of his international 
contribution. Both observations, on reflection, suggest an effective absence in the HCNM's 
practical paradigm of any awareness of the soft-law problematic as well as indicate the 
presence of a deep-seated belief: (i) that not only the procedure by which the given state 
may have consented to a given norm, but also the fact of the provision of the state consent 
itself are not actually important; 189 (ii) neither the degree of transparency nor the 
procedural rigour followed in the adoption of the given standard ultimately has any bearing 
on deciding how appropriate it is to invoke it. Or, in other words, what matters is what the 
HCNM thinks about the substance of the standard, not its normative pedigree -a typical 
symptom of a technocratic/standards-are-an-embodiment-of-objective-expertise 
sensibility. 
Of course, observes Ratner, whenever the state in question turns out to be a party 
to a binding treaty that addresses the issue at hand directly, the HCNM's "practice suggests 
he will make his argument in terms of the treaty. i"' Nevertheless, "while he might note, in 
the context of citing a convention, that a state is party to it, he often and without 
qualification makes arguments based on treaties to which a state is not party or treaties that 
have not yet entered into force. i"' At the end of the day, concludes Ratner, it remains 
quite clear that in his practice the HCNM has an unmistakable propensity to marshal 
"whatever arguments [he] can muster" to support his points, which basically means that 
189 Indeed, continues Ratner, it is not unusual to discover in the HCNM's communications and formal letters 
addressed to the OSCE member states and the corresponding minority communities side by side with 
references to the ICCPR references to documents issued by the OSCE, the COE Parliamentary Assembly, 
and even the COE Higher Education and Research Committee (see id., 660). 
190 Id. 
191 Id., 659. 
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whenever he is pressed to do so, the HCNM will cite all "international standards he can 
find to back up his position, even if, in effect, in some cases they may only be standards 
because he says they are. i192 
If all that were not enough, the final straw arrives in a recent monograph written by 
Yeorgios Diacofotakis, a Greek diplomat. Reviewing the patterns of the HCNM's norm- 
entrepreneurial practice, Diacofotakis observes: 
while his tools may be political, his blueprints are based on international legal 
standards. He regards them as the minimum level of acceptable behaviour 
towards persons belonging to national minorities and as general principles, 
guiding both governmental policies and his own involvements in states faced with 
inter-ethnic problems. In fact, he always refers to and compares them with 
existing state practices. Besides, he further elaborates on them to arantee the 
unimpeded development of the minority identity, beyond minimum requirements. 
His everyday toolbox contains the Copenhagen Document, the UN Declaration 
on the rights of persons belonging to minorities and the Framework Convention 
of the Council of Europe. He considers their full and effective implementation an 
essential prerequisite for lasting peace and stability in Europe. What really matters 
for him is the spirit of the international standards, whether political or legal and 
not their letter alone. 193 
The spirit of the law, of course, is a rather notorious animal, all claims of familiarity with 
which in a secular environment have always been treated as symptoms of an essentially 
legislative sensibility. And that, of course, concludes Diacofotakis, is often exactly the kind of 
sensibility which the HCNM's institutional practice exhibits: 
192 Id., 661 (emphasis added). 
193 YEORGIOS I. DIACOFOTAKIS, EXPANDING CONCEPTUAL BOUNDARIES: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON 
NATIONAL MINORITIES AND THE PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS IN THE OSCE 28 (Athens: Ant. N. 
Sakkoulas Publishers, 2002) (emphasis added). Cf. Thio, supra n. 171,148 (observing that the HCNM 
certainly "contributes to the development of the pool of soft norms. Where references to vague notions such 
as `autonomy do not provide much guidance, he makes suggestions, sometimes stemming from general ideas 
or the other states' practice to elaborate on these concepts. "). On the real weight of the HCNM's suggestions, 
see further Chapter 1, Section 2, p. 34, above. 
240 
The work of the HCNM shed light on ambivalent or little defined notions. He 
gave meaning to words and, thus, he put together theory on and practice of 
minority rights. Being a de facto standard-implementing instrument, he expressed 
his thoughts in speeches, statements and recommendations to states. The non- 
binding character of the OSCE commitments became then more and more 
binding through many of his activities and initiatives. His recommendations to 
states contained specific measures and described the tasks ahead. They could 
hardly be termed as non-binding. Besides, his well-founded policy-oriented 
arguments, both political and legal, were backed by the Permanent Council and 
the other OSCE organs and institutions. 194 
In short, 
[t]he whole process and its outcome leads to the conclusion that a) the HCNM's 
involvement had an effect on the states concerned, b) states were invited to 
seriously consider to apply his advice, and c) monitoring of the states' subsequent 
steps and compliance with his recommendations was done by the HCNM, the 
OSCE and its member-states. In brief, states concerned were shown a concrete 
path to follow, which was based on international standards and common sense, 
having due regard of the political realities in all circumstances. 195 
What more needs to be said? 
If the totality of norms created through the Article 38 sources is, indeed, what 
constitutes the international corpus jurir, then, perhaps, Pashukanis was right after all, when 
he wrote of the inevitable withering away of the law. 196 Perhaps, the era of the hard-law-making 
- by formal treaties and state consent - 
is now over in international law, and a new 
mechanism of international standard-setting has emerged to replace it, one in which former 
Dutch foreign ministers, using their common sense and theories of what might be the spirit 
194 DIACOFOTAKIS, supra n. 193,141 (emphasis added). 
195 Id. (emphasis added). 
196 See generally E. PASHUKANIS, SELECTED WRITINGS ON MARXISM AND LAW (ed. by Piers 
Beinre and 
Robert Sharlet; transL by Peter B. Maggs; London: Academic Press, 1980). 
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of the law, are entrusted to make up whatever "international standards" they desire the 
"states concerned" to follow, have them elevated to the rank of international "expertise" of 
"good governance practices, " getting all of that duly backed up by all the sticks and carrots 
that the OSCE Permanent Council can muster, encouraged by whatever dubious 
"coalitions of the willing" may be lurking in its shadows, waiting for the green light to be lit 
for another diplomatic demarche against another recalcitrant East European prime- 
minister. Perhaps, all this is only the beginning of something far greater and more far- 
reaching. Perhaps. Or perhaps not. In any event, what matters for the purposes of the 
present inquiry at the present stage does not yet require answering any of the grand 
questions haunting this paragraph. 
The common refrain of the three accounts presented above delivers a single, clear 
bottom-line message confirming the utter irrelevance of the traditional distinction between 
hard-law and soft-law sources adopted in the legal formalist discourse and pointing out the 
basic outlines of the new ILTMC's RSA functionality, the practical foundation of the 
effectively existing new ILTMC regime. 
d. Mapping the New ILTMC. " the Concept of the Minority Community 
No question provides a better introduction to the functional logic of the new ILTMC 
regime than the way it conceptualizes the social factuality of the minority communities. To 
start with the obvious, there is no official definition in the existing international legal order 
of what exactly it tends to understand under the rubric of "minority community. 27197 The 
absence of a formal definition, as the classics of liberal political theory suggest, usually 
tends to indicate the presence of what Schmitt described as the "sovereign decision"198 and 
Beccaria simply called tyranny. 199 Or, in other words, whoever gets to operate an RSA 
197 For further discussion, see PENTASSUGLIA, supra n. 125,55 et seq.; Packer, supra n. 15. 
198 See CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY 5-10 (transL by George Schwab; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1985). 
199 See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 12-3 (transL by David Young Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1986). 
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functionality without being bound by a publicly known formula setting out the limits of 
that functionality's applicability is where the sovereignty (supremapotestas) effectively resides. 
In the case of the new ILTMC regime's application in the ECE, the sovereignty 
resides with the international civil servants, such as, for instance, the OSCE HCNM, and 
the various international experts employed by them. Recall once more Diacofotakis's 
observations about common sense: "Even though I may not have a definition of what 
constitutes a minority, I would dare to say that I know a minority when I see one. "zoo 
From the substantive point of view, of course, this is not at all a novel position in 
the general ILTMC practice. The same sensibility, one will recall, had been lurking, for 
instance, in the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee as far back as the early 
1980s. Then, having picked up on the Permanent Court of International justice's famous 
dictum that the membership of a minority community is ultimately always "a question of 
fact and not one of intention, ""' the Committee famously pronounced, in the Lovelace case, 
that the decision of the Canadian authorities to exclude the applicant in question from 
enjoying some of the rights accruing to the Native American communities under the then 
Canadian domestic legislation had led to an unquestionable breach of the applicant's rights 
under Article 27 of the ICCPR because, despite the fact that the applicant had previously 
moved out from the Tobique Reserve and thus left the respective minority community for 
a number of years, she still continued to remain "ethnically a Maliseet Indian, " which 
meant, therefore, that she was fully entitled "to be regarded as `belonging' to this 
minority. , 202 Without providing any actual explanation for the socio-theoretical reasoning 
which it used to justify this finding of facts - what was it exactly that made the applicant a 
member of the respective community? the fact that she was registered at birth as "Maliseet 
Indian"? the fact that she grew up on the Tobique reserve? why were the Maliseet 
traditional views on the matter not made the main criterion for resolving the membership 
dispute? why was the tribal council's decision to decline the applicant's request to rejoin the 
tribe ignored? - the Committee, effectively, sent out a message to all the Covenant's parties 
200 Max van der Stoel, "Case Studies on National Minority Issues: Positive Results", in ZELLNER AND LANGE, 
supra n. 19,45,45. 
201 fights ofMinorities in Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), 1928, PCIJ, Series A, No. 12,32. 
202 See ý14 of Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No. R. 6/24, UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40), 166 
(1981). 
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indicating that so long as its members' common-sense judgment of an individual's position 
suggested that she was a member of a protected minority group, the Committee would not 
allow itself to be deterred by the absence of any formal definition of the concept of 
minorityhood in the text of the Covenant itself, even if one of the main customary 
principles of international law (reiterated famously in the Lotus judgment) had long been 
that, unless clearly stipulated otherwise, all ambiguities in the applicable international rules 
had to be interpreted in a way allowing the greatest measure of freedom for sovereign 
states 203 
An expression of an aspiration on the part of an international civil servant to act as 
a Schmittian sovereign on the account of protecting the spirit of the ILTMC project, thus, 
is not, in itself, a novel phenomenon. 204 What is novel, however, is the scale of the 
aspiration and the reach of the aspirant's self-aggrandizement. At no point before had 
anyone attempted to get as much mileage out of their alleged expertise in knowing "what 
minorities really need. " 
The silent bottom-line message inscribed in the patterns of the HCNM's practice - 
the issuance of the countless "country recommendations, " the continuous promulgation of 
"thematic expert recommendations, " the pursuit of numerous policy interventions, keynote 
addresses, and topical press releases, all the while no official definition binding on the 
Commissioner in the elaboration of the most central aspect of his mandate has ever been 
produced - says more, perhaps, about the functional nature of the new ILTMC project 
than any number of its official self descriptions ever could. For a legal realist ear, it says 
exactly what one needs to know in order to begin producing a Halean map of the new 
203 See Chapter I, Section 2, p. 39, above. 
204 For other examples of the HRC's Schmittian tendencies in the application of Article 27, see, e. g. Ivan Kitok 
v. Sweden, Communication No. 197/1985, CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985 (1988), in which the Committee 
declared, firstly, that although it had no standing to intervene with "the regulation of an economic activity, " 
"where that activity is an essential element in the culture of an ethnic community, its application ... may 
fall 
under article 27" (ý9.2), and, having failed to leave in the process any meaningful clues as to how the 
"essential elements" ought to be identified in practice, that, secondly, "the right to enjoy one's own culture in 
community with the other members of the group cannot be determined in abstracto but has to be placed in 
context, " thus effectively indicating that, in the end, it is pretty much up to the Committee itself to decide 
what exactly should be included under the heading of "minority culture" (§9.3). 
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ILTMC regime. It gives the answer to the question every Holmesean bad man always wants 
to have answered more than any other: where exactly does the buck stop? 
With this as our next point of departure, let us turn now to the main task of this 
chapter itself. 
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Section Three 
a. The Portrait 
The Real New ILTMC Regime 
As the old saying puts it, a picture is worth a thousand words. A close examination of the 
practical patterns of the new ILTMC's RSA functionality identified in the previous section 
suggests that the new ILTMC regime's portrait can be essentially reduced to the following 
diagram. 
The fTectiyely Existing Legal Regime Established by the New ILTMC Project in the ECE Region 
7 
S 
Pan-European organizations, 
' "co riztivns of the willing" 
International Community 
............................................................................................................................ 
3 
F 
State/Government ID 
A 
B 
International 
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Community E 
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b. The Addressees of the Nev ILTMC Regime (Participants of the Bargaining Situation) 
(i) Minority Community, Majority Community, and State/Government. The first thing that 
has to be said about the legal status of minority and majority communities is 
that in the eyes of the currently existing ILTMC regime, they are not recognized 
as legal subjects. Even though its provisions directly affect the bargaining 
interests of both minority and majority communities, by the terms of its 
functional organization the new ILTMC regime addresses itself exclusively to 
sovereign states 205 As a result of such a state of affairs, the amount of the 
bargaining "boost" the two types of communities receive from the international 
legal order qua communities is radically diminished. Where other political 
subjects (e. g. trade unions) may be strengthened in their relative bargaining 
positions thanks to different international remedies, minority and majority 
communities are essentially abandoned by international law to their own 
devices and left to fend for themselves. With the exception of several situations 
where a set of remedies may accrue through an indirect jurisdictional effect (as, 
for instance, would be the case when the members of a minority community act 
in pursuit of its interests under the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination20. or Article 27 of the ICCPR)'207 all their 
interests qua communities are relegated into the category of potential damnia 
absque injuria, which means that almost any outcome their bargaining 
counterparts may achieve in the course of their open and sublimated conflicts 
with the communities in question will be effectively legitimated by the 
international legal order. Thus, even though from the narratological point of 
view both types of communities are clearly present in the body of the regime's 
205 Technically, of course, only states, not governments, are subjects of international law. However, the 
general ideological dynamics operated by the new ILTMC project, especially in situations involving the 
alleged violations of the ILTMC standards, regularly tends to seek to decouple the concept of the "state" 
from that of the "people, " thus in effect reducing the ontological plane occupied by the former to the entity 
commonly identified in the domestic arena as "government" 
206 International Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1966,660 UNTS 195. 
207 See also Opinion 1 of the Badinter Committee, infra n. 213, which through a linguistic imprecision can be 
interpreted to have made certain minority communities into beneficiaries of ajus cogens norm. 
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discourse actantiall ? °8 and sometimes may even be invoked in it directly (as 
background references used to contextualize, for instance, the general 
requirement to preserve a cultural balance), 2°9 neither of them receive any 
bargaining support from the international juridical instance. There are no 
centrally provided supranational remedies created for the protection of either 
type of community interests. The only RSA-use potentiality left available, 
consequently, is communal self-help. The terms of the existing regional regimes 
on the use of force, terrorism, and non-intervention in internal affairs, however, 
indicate that neither minority nor majority communities residing in the ECE 
area may ever resort to self-help involving the use of armed violence, especially 
when acting on a transnational scale 210 The scope of permissible tactics left by 
the new ILTMC regime within the communities' reach is thus very severely 
limited. 
International Community, Pan-European OrraniZations, and "Coalitions of the Willz'ng. " 
Even though a close actantial analysis of the regime's discourse suggests 
otherwise, "' there is, in fact, no such participant as "international community" 
within the plane of the new ILTMC regime. All its effective rights and 
functions are exercised immediately by the totality of pan-European 
organizations with their bodies of international civil servants (most notably the 
OSCE HCNM) and their constituent member states acting as their executive 
organs. Whenever the interest of the "international community" is, thus, at 
stake, it is they in fact who act in pursuit of its enforcement, either through the 
instrumentality of international bureaucracy (e. g. periodic reporting procedures, 
country recommendations) or the various "coalitions of the willing, " as was, for 
instance, the case with the 1999 NATO campaign in Kosovo and the various 
diplomatic demarches organized by the United States and a number of West 
208 On actantial presence, see Chapter 1, Section 2, p. 57, n. 129, above. 
209 See, e. g., Article 12.1 of the Framework Convention: 
"The Parties shall, where appropriate, take measures in the fields of education and research to foster 
knowledge of the culture, history, language and religion of their national minorities and of the majority. " 
210 This particularly affects the bargaining position of the Roma. 
21! From the Paris Charter onwards, all provisions of the new ILTMC regime in one way or another are 
ascribed to the will/values/and spirit of the international community. 
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European states in support of the OSCE HCNM's position on Slovakia. In 
effect, one can, thus, think of the international community as either a functional 
equivalent of the Spinozist absent cause that is present only in the form of its 
effects (i. e. its representatives: the pan-European organizations and the 
"coalitions of the willing"), or as a primitive ruse concocted for ideological 
reasons. In any event, it would still seem to make ample sense not to omit 
Figure F from the diagram, since (i) it is in the name of the international 
community that the unquestionable curtailment of the sovereign rights of D 
and the autonomy/self-determination rights of C and E is carried out; (ii) as the 
Badinter Committee's212 opinions213 made it abundantly clear, at least within the 
European context, the norm requiring D and C to show a bona fide respect for 
the foundational norms of the new ILTMC is a norm ofjus cogens. 21a 
(zz) International Experts. Using, on the one hand, the ideological capital supplied by 
the theory of international-law-as-the-technocratic-replacement-of-politics215 
and on the other hand, the reasoning pattern suggested by the Badinter 
Committee's generous use of the language of jus cogens and the 1991 Geneva 
Meeting's observation that "[i]ssues concerning national minorities ... are 
matters of legitimate international concern and consequently do not constitute 
212 The Arbitration Committee of the International Conference on Yugoslavia, also known as the Badinter 
Committee (after its chairman, Robert Badinter), was created in August 1991 by the decision of the 
Extraordinary Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the then European Community. 
213 See in particular Opinion 1, reprinted in 3 EJIL 182 (1992) (declaring that "the peremptory norms of 
general international law and, in particular, respect for the fundamental rights of the individual and the rights 
of peoples and minorities, are binding on all the [newly independent states]") and Opinion 2, id., 183 
(observing that "the - now peremptory - norms of international law require states to ensure respect for the 
rights of minorities"). Neither opinion specifies which particular rights in question are included in this scope. 
214 The traditional definition of jus co ens is provided in Article 53 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
1969,1155 UNTS 331: 
"Article 53. Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (jirs cogens) 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international 
law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law 
having the same character. " 
215 For further discussion, see Chapter I, Section 2, above. 
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exclusively an internal affair of the respective State, i216 the representatives of 
the "international community" have de facto expropriated from D all 
lawmaking and law-applying powers that would normally accrue to it under 
general international law. Because of the internal logic of the technocratic 
theory, however, the ideological condition of the new ILTMC project did not 
allow a direct appropriation of these powers by any "coalition of the willing. " 
Nor did it provide full support for their exclusive assignment to the 
international civil servants themselves. As a result an intermediate body of 
assignees -a functional equivalent of a board of trustees - was set up, dubbed 
in accordance with the logic of the technocratic masterplot "international 
experts. " Within the plane of the established legal regime, "international 
experts" is presented as an ontologically separate body, discursively 
autonomous and politically independent both from the pan-European 
organizations and the "coalitions of the willing. " In reality, however, the former 
have an unlimited power of appointment and dismissal over all international 
experts, "' free from the restraint of any sort of judicial review, just as the latter 
216 See id., p. 28. 
217 None of the available accounts of the selection of experts for the HCNM-endorsed sets of "expert 
recommendations" sheds light on what procedure might have been followed and to what extent the decisions 
made on its basis were public, transparent, and based on objective criteria (the fact that ten of the eighteen 
experts consulted on the question of what constitutes "good governance" practices in the area of ethnic 
governance and how the patterns of inter-ethnic democracy can be practically optimized were university- 
based legal academics strongly suggests they were not). What is clear, however, is that none of these decisions 
were subject to challenge or could be appealed. 
The experts who sit on the Advisory Committee established under Article 26 of the FCNM are 
appointed by the COE Council of Ministers "at its pleasure": 
"1. In evaluating the adequacy of the measures taken by the Parties to give effect to the principles set out in 
this framework Convention the Committee of Ministers shall be assisted by an advisory committee, the 
members of which shall have recognised expertise in the field of the protection of national minorities. 
2. The composition of this advisory committee and its procedure shall be determined by the Committee of 
Ministers within a period of one year following the entry into force of this framework Convention. " 
Consider, furthermore, ALAN PHILLIPS, THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
NATIONAL MINORITIES: A POLICY ANALYSIS 4 (London: MRG International, 2002): "The members of the 
[Advisory Committee] are unpaid, with expenses covered by the CoE. Consequently, this can limit the 
availability of candidates. " 
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have full and complete political control over the former. Despite its continuous 
reliance on them as an ideological element, the new ILTMC regime grants 
international experts no autonomous bargaining power in their relations with 
the "international community" or states/governments. 
c. The Patterns of the Nev) ILTCM Regimes Distributive Impact: the Unseen Dimensions 
By the logic of its repressive-political functionality, the new ILTMC regime produces a 
direct distributive impact on at least four different transactional contexts. The official 
discourse of the new ILTMC project, however, recognizes this fact with regard to only one 
of them: the bargaining interaction between the minority community, the majority 
community, and their state/government. Because of that, several important dimensions of 
the new ILTMC's political functionality tend to go effectively unnoticed by the 
international law community. The contribution made by the new ILTMC project to the 
formation of the post-Cold War pan-European space-process, consequently, continues to 
remain radically underappreciated, its political impact being unrecognized and essentially 
misdiagnosed. 
In order to rectify these fundamental shortcomings, it appears necessary to begin 
our analysis of the new ILTMC regime's practical RSA functionality precisely with a 
consideration of these three unrecognized contexts. For the purposes of this inquiry, they 
are: (i) the bargaining interaction between the state/government as the addressee of the 
ILTMC obligations and the rest of the international community as the ultimate 
instance/source in whose name and on whose authority these obligations are imposed; (ii) 
the interaction between the minority community as the alleged beneficiary of the new 
ILTMC regime and the international community as the ultimate authority seeking to 
safeguard the minority community's interests; (iii) the interaction between the majority 
community as the indirect addressee of the ILTMC obligations and the international 
community as the ultimate source of these obligations. 
(1) 
Transactional context- State's interaction with the International Community. 
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Transactional structure: State/Government, International Experts, Pan-European 
Organizations/"Coalitions of the Willing" (triangle DBA). 
Main issue at stake: practical sovereignty (exercise of supreme authority in 
governance/decision-making matters). 
Pattern of distributive impact: At the first sight, it would seem that even despite the 
Geneva Meeting's pronouncement and the Badinter Committee's findings about the 
peremptory nature of some aspects of the new ILTMC regime, both of which, of course, 
continue to remain "good law" for the new ILTMC project's purposes, the ultimate locus 
of sovereignty remains with the state/government. 21' A more accurate examination of the 
RSA practice, however, suggests that both the lawmaking and the law-interpreting powers 
with regard to the new ILTMC canon have been long removed from state/government to 
international experts acting as the de facto front for what used to be considered the 
Western bloc of the CSCE, and which in the context of the new ILTMC's functionality has 
become the "coalition of the willing, " at whose full pleasure the international expert body 
serves. 21' It is the representatives of that bloc whose ideological input transmitted by way of 
international expertise underlay the gist of the Hague, Oslo, and Lund Recommendations 
and the jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee and the Advisory Committee 
218 The argument about the formal relationship between sovereignty and international law made by judge 
Anzilotti in the Customs Regime case continues to hold true. See individual opinion of judge Anzilotti in 
Customs Regime between Germany and Austria, 1931, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 41, ý3: "It follows that the legal 
conception of independence has nothing to do with a State's subordination to international law. " 
219 Since the nature of the expertise-based decision-making is such that the experts are always understood to 
act impartially (unless they are challenged*) and because the remit of the experts' power is determined 
exclusively by their objective competence, the practice of expert-appointment does not follow the same 
pattern as the practices of appointment to other types of decision-making bodies. In the present case, 
although their candidatures are sometimes subject to the negative (veto) control by the representatives of the 
member states, all experts in question are de facto appointed at the discretion of the civil and political officers 
of the pan-European organizations. Compare that with the traditional practice of international 
arbitration/litigation in which both of the involved parties (in our case, A and D) would have the right to 
appoint their candidates. 
* There is no established clear and transparent procedure for challenging the competence/impartiality of an 
international expert under the new ILTMC regime. 
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of the FCNM. It was they also who in the same fashion came to rule22° what exactly "the 
rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the commitments 
subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE" mentioned in the 1991 EC Guidelines on 
the recognition of states221 - that seemingly innocent soft-law instrument purportedly 
addressing a completely non-legal issue whose practical role, however, was to serve as 
both the king, the judge, and the kingmaker for all newly-independent entities emerging 
from the rubble of the socialist federations, deciding which of them and under which 
procedures would stay on as independent states" and which would have to "go back" to 
whatever larger entity they tried to secede from" - meant5 It was they, finally, who 
220 For examples of the actual arguments presented by the international experts in justification of such self- 
aggrandizement, see, e. g., Interlocutory Decision (Opinions 8,9, and 10) of the Badinter Commission, 
reprinted in 4EJIL 84 (1993). 
221 Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union (16 December 
1991), reprinted in 4 EJIL 72 (1993). 
222 The traditional position on the question of recognition in international law states that the acts of 
international recognition take place exclusively in the domain of politics, not law. Increasingly, however, there 
seems to be some room for the argument that by virtue of the new customary law, formed, inter alia, on the 
basis of the 1991 EC Guidelines, the practice of recognition is rapidly returning within the pale of legal 
regulation. For an introductory overview of the question of recognition in international law, see, e. g., IAN 
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 86-96 (5th edn.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998); Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood. - the Montevideo Convention and Its Discontents, 37 Col. J Trans'l L 403 
(1999) (in particular, at 441-4, observing at some point: "The Guidelines indeed reached a broad audience of 
operative decision-makers -diplomats, politicians, and writers. The frequency of reference to them during 
the Yugoslav recognition crisis suggests that they might well have informed international practice. "). 
223 Compare what happened to Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the one hand, 
and Republica Srpska, Kosovo, and Transdniestria, on the other. See, in particular, Opinion 2 of the Badinter 
Committee, reprinted in 3 EJIL 183 (1992). 
224 Again, the traditional view on the matter is that the act of international recognition, being an exclusively 
political act, can only be declaratory, and never formally constitutive, of the legal fact of statehood. A close 
functionalist examination of the actual patterns of international practice unencumbered by the weight of such 
smokescreen wisdom, however, tends to indicate that this is not at all the case, especially when one takes into 
account the various examples of failures to attract the sufficient number of recognitions: Republic of China 
(Taiwan), Southern Rhodesia, Transkei, Republic of North Cyprus, Manchukuo, Transdniestria, etc. Cf. 
Grant, supra n. 222,446-7: "Most writers today assume that recognition itself does not create statehood. State 
practice continues to suggest, however, that recognition in certain situations can be important in the process 
of state creation. Recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the European micro-states are possible cases. " 
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supplied the ideological contents for the relevant parts of the CSCE Copenhagen 
Document and Recommendation 1201 of the PACE, on the basis of which all subsequent 
international treaties, i. e. those documents which afforded the states /governments of the 
ECE region their only real opportunity for the exercise of formal sovereignty, were 
adopted. Every effective attempt on the part of the state/government that is not part of 
the "coalition of the willing" to challenge the opinions of the international experts will lead 
to immediate pressure on the part of the pan-European organizations and the respective 
coalition. 
Effectively existing Hohfeldian structure: (i) A holds an effective right to dictate to D its 
obligations under the rubric of the ILTMC; (ii) D is under an effective duty to respect A's 
will and to comply with A's decisions under (i); (iii) B serves at the pleasure of A and is its 
delegate under (i). 
Remedies (enforceability of the n hts structure and the RSA-trzggering potential available to the 
n&-holder): Although a number of centrally provided remedies exist, none of them would 
be available to D if it decided to protect its bargaining interests against A. For reasons of 
legal standing, justiciability, and conflict of interest, it would not be able to bring a legal suit 
or to bring the matter at hand before a global international organization. As regards the 
possible use of self-help, the existing regime does not provide it with any new bargaining 
powers. To affect a change in the A's course of conduct, D would thus have to resort 
either to the tools of general diplomacy or try to initiate a constitutional reform of the pan- 
European organization in question. Neither option, from a realistic point of view, appears 
particularly promising. On the other hand, whenever D violates the effective duties it owes 
to A, the existing legal regime allows the latter both to invoke a series of centrally provided 
remedies (e. g. bring the matter before the UN Security Council) and to resort to various 
forms of self-help, whose tactical manifestation may range from public denunciations (e. g. 
diplomatic demarches against the Meciar government in Slovakia) and targeted withdrawal 
of large-scale subsidies in a situation of intense competition (e. g. Slovakia's relegation to 
225 The task on that occasion fell to the Badinter Committee (after December 1991, Commission). See, in 
particular, Opinions 4-7, reprinted in 4 EJ1L 74-84 (1993). C£ Grant, supra n. 222,440-1 (overviewing the 
Conunission's "Judgment" on Bosnia's suitability for independent statehood). 
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the back of the EU-accession queue)" to pro-active use of armed force (e. g. 1999 NATO 
campaign in Kosovo). 
`ZZ) 
Transactional contexi: Minority Community's interaction with the International Community. 
Transactional structure: Minority Community, State/ Government, International 
Experts, Pan-European Organizations/"Coalitions of the Willing" (quadrangle EDBA). 
Main issue at stake choice of ends and means in the pursuit of minority nationalism 
(struggle for greater communal autonomy) 
Pattern of distributive impact International law does not award minority communities 
any protection in their relations with the pan-European organizations and the "coalitions 
of the willing" when it comes to the latter's interference in their pursuit of communal 
autonomy. Under the existing ILTMC regime, the representatives of the "international 
community" are free at their discretion to receive any communications from the aggrieved 
minority communities and to bring them up later in their interaction with the relevant 
states/governments. They are also free to ignore them completely. More importantly, as 
the very fact of the new ILTMC project shows, the existing legal regime also entitles the 
pan-European organizations to dictate and determine the exact choice of means used by 
minority communities in their pursuit of communal autonomy. The judgments passed by 
the international civil servants and the international experts on the legitimacy of minority 
community's demands/requests/actions in this context are final and not subject to any 
kind of review. The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply, and there seems to be very little 
consistency in the patterns of their recent practice beyond the obvious certainty that in 
their relationship with the ECE minority communities the representatives of the pan- 
European organizations are free to act any way they please. Thus, while some recent cases 
involving an aggrieved ECE minority community (Kosovo, Transylvania) have seen the 
pan-European organizations take a very pro-active pro-minority stance, others (most 
notably the Baltics) bear witness to a completely different approach' Furthermore, in a 
226 See Chapter I, Section 2, p. 34, n. 89, above. 
227 As one commentator observed, "[t]he investigation of Estonia's laws [as of 1995] has not revealed any 
systematic violation of [minority rights]. None of the major international fact-finding missions that have in a 
255 
significant number of cases the officers of the pan-European organizations and Western 
diplomats representing the states most commonly participant in the "collations of the 
willing" seem to have turned a complete blind eye to every attempt by the minority 
great number visited Estonia in the recent time has come to a different conclusion. " (Manfred H. Wiegandt, 
The Russian Minority in Estonia, 3 Int'l J Gr. Rts 109,133 (1995). ) 
Meanwhile, immediately after the dissolution of the USSR, by virtue of the new law on nationality 
which linked the automatic reception of Estonian citizenship to the ability to demonstrate a direct sanguine 
descent from a full-righted citizen of the pre-1940 Estonian republic, more than 400,000 people (ca. 40% of 
the country's total population) permanently domiciled in Estonia at the time of independence, an 
overwhelming majority of them of ethnic Russian origin, were summarily relegated into the category of 
stateless aliens. The strict naturalization procedures established by the new legislation, including the national 
language proficiency requirements, over the course of the next three years have meant that less than 50,000 of 
them were able to claim Estonian citizenship (Wiegandt, op. cit., 124). Several years later, the situation had 
hardly changed. In the meantime, in line with the established international standards, citizenship under the 
new Constitution was declared a formal pre-condition not only for the enjoyment of all voting rights (with 
the exception of those pertaining to local government elections, participation in which was opened to some 
categories of resident aliens in 1993) but also for the right to form and join any kind of political parties. What 
this meant in effect, thus, was that more than a third of the country's permanent population was excluded 
from all forms of immediate participation in the democratic political process, a development most vividly 
illustrated by the fact that "[w]hereas during the March 1991 independence referendum 1,144,309 people 
(irrespective of citizenship) had been eligible to vote, during the June 1992 referendum this number (citizens 
only) dropped to some 669,100 -a decline of around 475,000, or 42 per cent" (Vello Pettai and Klara Hallik, 
Understanding Processes of Ethnic Control: Segmentation, Dependency and Co-Optation in Post Communist Estonia, 8 
Nations and Nationalism 505,513 (2002)). Other pieces of legislation adopted around the same time further 
restricted the aliens' rights with regard to the ownership of land, travel, privatization of state-owned and 
municipal property (including state enterprises), and post-independence share of privatization vouchers, as 
well as effectively tying their prospects of forceful expulsion to their ability to retain permanent employment 
(see Erik Andre Andersen, The Legal Status of Russians in Estonian Privatisation Legislation 1989-1995,49 Eur. - 
Asia Stud. 303 (1997). ) 
The common position adopted by the various representatives of the "international community, " at the 
same time, was to describe Estonia as "the shining star of the Baltics" (1999), include it in the first wave of 
the EU eastward enlargement (1995), and close down the OSCE's country mission in Tallinn on the premise 
that the local authorities have proven themselves sufficiently competent to deal successfully with all problems 
within the ambit of the Organization's interest without its continuous presence (2001). Only occasionally did 
anyone pay some residual lip-service to the idea of advocating the need for a gradual relaxation of the 
naturalization procedures. 
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communities in question to protect their internationally recognized communal interests, 
thus openly reneging on their earlier promises issued on that front. ' 
Effectively existing Hohfeldian structure. (i) E has no right to demand A's assistance in its 
pursuit of communal autonomy; (ii) A has a privilege of using the information received 
from E at its discretion; (iii) A also has a privilege of prescribing the limits of permissible 
behaviour for E; (iv) B serves at the pleasure of A and is entrusted with the procession of 
information it receives from E and the articulation of A's will in its interaction with E; (v) 
D has a duty to comply with A's decisions under (ii) and (iii). 
Remedies: There are no centrally provided remedies that E can use against A, 
Moreover, if one considers the matter closely, the existing legal regime also appears to have 
severely curtailed E's rights to resort to any kind of self-help. Whatever coercive tactics E 
may decide to apply against A to compel it to change its course of conduct in its 
relationship with E, it will do so completely at its own risk. International law does not 
afford E any potential grounds for complaint against a mistreatment by A. What is more, it 
expressly threatens E with severe political sanctions in case it exceeds the boundaries of A's 
goodwill. E has no right to blackmail the "international community" other than in the 
mildest possible way. Any resort to measures involving the threat or the use of armed 
violence, under the existing legal regime, will be immediately classified as acts of 
"terrorism, " rising potentially to the level of a "threat to international peace and security. " 
The remedies available to A in such cases will range from the privilege to trigger the 
internal RSA mechanism of the respective state/government in which E resides by 
228 Consider again the case of Estonia. In July 1993, two local referenda were held in the towns of Narva and 
Sillamae. In both cases, an overwhelming majority of those who took part (97% and 99% respectively - 
Khrychikov and Mall, supra n. 171,196), having followed the established procedure, expressed their support 
for the creation of a Russian national territorial autonomy in the two towns concerned. Several days later, the 
Estonian Supreme Court declared both referenda null and void, apparently on the account that they had been 
organized without Tallinn's prior approval (although, it must be noted, the Tallinn authorities, despite 
receiving a sufficient notice of the referenda, did not try to stop them from taking place). The official reaction 
of the representatives of the "international community, " led by the newly established CSCE HCNM, was to 
welcome the Court's decision with some degree of enthusiasm and to urge the parties involved to resolve all 
their differences at the negotiating table. C£ 535 of the Copenhagen Document: `The participating States will 
respect the right of persons belonging to national minorities to effective participation in public affairs, 
including participation in the affairs relating to the protection and promotion of the identity of such 
minorities. " 
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ordering/sanctioning the use of police action against a recalcitrant minority community (cf. 
the internationally sanctioned government campaign against the Kurdish community in 
South-Eastern Turkey) to the privilege to direct an armed intervention on behalf of the 
"international community" (e. g. NATO peace-restoring campaign against the Albanian 
minority in Macedonia in 2001). 
Ni) 
Transactional context. Majority Community's interaction with the International Community. 
Transactional structure: Majority Community, State/Government, Pan-European 
Organizations/"Coalitions of the Willing, " International Experts (quadrangle CDAB). 
Main issue at stake: choice of ends and means in the pursuit of majority nationalism 
(enjoyment of position of communal domination) 
Pattern of distributive impact: Unless it qualifies as a "people" for the purposes of the 
law of self-determination (as manifested, for instance, in Article 1 of the ICCPR), " for 
which, however, there is no established procedure, the majority community will not be able 
to receive any bargaining "boost" from international law when it comes to its relations with 
the pan-European organizations or the "coalitions of the willing" in the course of its 
enjoyment of its position of communal dominance ms-ä-vis other cultural communities 
residing in the same state. Moreover, even when it does manage to pass the threshold of 
Article 1, the majority community will hardly be able to obtain any additional protection 
against the representatives of the "international community" if the latter decide to 
intervene in its exercise of self-determination, unless such intervention clearly and 
unequivocally would lead to colonialism, alien domination, or some other form of overt 
229 A minority community cannot, by definition, qualify as a people in the eyes of Article 1 of the ICCPR. See 
further CASSESE, infra n. 230,339; PENTASSUGLIA, supra n. 125,162 et seq. Furthermore, not all communities 
that qualify as "peoples" for the purposes of some part of the international legal order necessarily also qualify 
as "peoples" for the purposes of Article 1 of the ICCPR. Indigenous and tribal peoples, famously, are not 
automatically considered to be "peoples" entitled to self-determination. See Article 1(3) of Convention concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 1989,72 ILO Off. Bull. 59: "The use of the term `peoples' 
in this Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to 
the term under international law. " 
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political subjugation of the majority community. 23° Even then, it remains completely 
unclear what exactly the majority community could claim from international law in its 
struggle against the pan-European organizations. Moreover, since from the formal point of 
view virtually all existing ILTMC provisions and procedures are addressed to other subjects 
(state /government and "persons belonging to the minority community"), a majority 
community will not be normally in the position to show, even if it could find a forum 
competent and capable to take/sanction any remedial action, that the pan-Euroepan 
organizations' actions have had a frustrating effect on its ability to pursue its legally 
protected interests. Not only that, however, but also, as the adoption of the Lund 
Recommendations, for instance, makes clear, on a number of fronts the new ILTMC 
regime has in fact given a bargaining "boost" to the pan-European organizations and their 
representatives in their dealings against the ECE majority communities, insofar as it de 
facto clothed them with an authority to lay down the exact codes of conduct within which 
an ECE majority community must enjoy its process of communal self-determination. 
Effectively existing Hohfeldian structure: (i) if it passes the threshold established by the 
law of self-determination, C has a formally recognized right to self-determination 
consisting, on the one hand, of a Hohfeldian privilege to achieve a position of communal 
dominance and, on the other hand, of a Hohfeldian right not to be subjected in the process 
to overt political subjugation; (ii) A has a privilege to prescribe the choice of means for C's 
pursuit of its right of self-determination; (iii) A has a residual duty not to subject C to overt 
political subjugation; (iv) C has no right to resist A's curtailment of its ability to enjoy its 
position of communal domination; (v) B serves at the pleasure of A and acts as its delegate 
under (ii); (vi) D has a duty to comply with A's decisions under (ii). 
Remedies: The new ILTMC regime does not afford C any remedies it did not have 
already. At the same time, it empowers A to use a wide range of remedies - formally 
against D, but in reality against C- if C decides not to comply with A's prescription of the 
limits of its permissible behaviour, including the pro-active use of force (e. g. 1999 NATO 
campaign in Kosovo). In short, the bargaining position which C enjoys in its relationship 
with A follows more or less the same lines as the position enjoyed by D but is at the same 
230 On the content of the effectively existing right of self-determination under contemporary international 
law, see further ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERNUNATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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time substantively worse than that by several registers, essentially thanks to the fact that C 
is not a recognized subject of international law. 
**ýý 
A very interesting picture begins to emerge when one considers at length the general 
patterns of the distributive impact produced by the new ILTMC regime in these three 
generally overlooked contexts. To most students of the ILTMC subject, it will look 
probably quite strange and unfamiliar. Indeed, it is not one that can be normally glimpsed 
from within the plane of the new ILTMC's official discourse or the mainstream scholarship 
dedicated to its discussion. Indeed, one may even say, it tends to be consistently covered up 
by the new ILTMC producers as much as possible. 231 On closer reflection, such state of 
affairs, however, should not, perhaps, be surprising, especially if one considers that the 
basic story which this picture tells us about the actual state of the post-Cold War European 
political order, however strange it might seem to the latter-day students of the new ILTMC, 
would probably look quite familiar to the students of the mid-19th century history. For it is 
a story, in effect, of a new concert of Europe, a new family of nations, the standard of 
civilization, and armies of foot-soldiers marching across the continent left and right to put 
down any rebellion threatening to destroy the stability of the established order. The only 
major difference between then and now seems to be that the foot-soldiers have mostly 
given way - in some cases to foreign experts, in others to NATO pilots. " The rest has 
largely - and eerily so - remained the same. 
And so, inevitably, a series of uncomfortable questions starts to emerge. Why has 
this picture been so carefully covered up by the producers of the new ILTMC project? Had 
they agreed to admit at least partially the existence of all those distributive impacts which 
they so clearly seem to prefer not to discuss, what would have happened to the new 
ILTMC regime? Would it have retained its integrity, success, and ideological coherence? 
Would it have lost its legitimacy, crumbled, and disintegrated? 
231 Consider any representative sample of the existing mainstream works on the new ILTMC project (see, e. g., 
Chapter I, Section 1, n. 1 at p. 4). Not a single one of them spends any significant amount of time on analyzing or 
recording the distributive impact patterns produced by the newly established ILTMC regime in these three 
transactional contexts. The whole problematic of the ILTMC's practical contribution to the political 
structuration of these bargaining situations does not even seem to have been noticed by any of these authors. 
232 But some of them still remain in demand: SFOR, KFOR, and all other regional peacekeepers, of course, 
are ground-troops-based armies. 
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A close symptomatic reading (lecture . yrrrptomale) of the official discourse 
accompanying the new ILTMC regime clearly indicates that the official fiction underlying 
the new ILTMC project has been formulated in such terms which make its continuation 
essentially incompatible with an effective acknowledgement that the new ILTMC regime 
may in fact perform any other functions than those presupposed by the ideas of regional 
peace and security and the theory of liberal multiculturalism. Any identification of an in- 
built structural bias (achieved, for instance, through a demonstration of a consistent pattern 
of power distribution) that serves causes other than these, especially if they turn out to be 
of an essentially imperialist character, would be a de facto anathema for the new ILTMC 
project as a whole. 
The bottom-line message imparted by the legal realist analysis of the new ILTMC 
regime's RSA functionality in the three transactional contexts reviewed above provides 
exactly that. 
d. The New ILTMC Regime and Its Impact on the Social Contract: the Real Face of "Good 
Governance" 
Less than a year after his appointment, delivering a keynote address to the CSCE Human 
Dimension Seminar in Warsaw, Max van der Stoel announced: 
Some people are of the opinion that if the requirements of a democratic 
framework and those of the general observance of human rights are met, nothing 
else needs to be done concerning minorities. I tend to disagree with this sweeping 
assumption.... To be sure, ... the protection of minorities starts with the respect 
of general human rights which are applicable to all people including persons 
belonging to national minorities. 
However, there are many different situations where minorities are 
concerned and each case has to be assessed in the light of its particular aspects and 
circumstances. Moreover, as I said in the introduction of my statement, minorities' 
questions are so intimately connected to issues which go to the heart of the 
existence of states that an approach based exclusively on human rights aspects 
would be very incomplete and therefore insufficient.... 
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[As the CSCE HCNM, I believe the m]inorities policy ... 
ha[s] to be the 
result of a balanced and equitable approach which reconciles the interest of the 
minority and the majority on the one hand and the interests of human being 
(individually or collectively) and the state on the other hand. Very often, such a 
policy will entail a combination of three elements. Firstly, in its policies the state 
should observe non-discrimination on grounds of belonging to a certain minority. 
Secondly, the state should make efforts to promote tolerance, mutual acceptance 
and non-discrimination in society. For both these elements applies that "equality in 
fact" should accompany "equality in law". Thirdly, persons belonging to minorities 
should dispose of appropriate means to preserve and develop their language, 
culture, religion and traditions without this leading to discrimination of persons 
belonging to the majority. 233 
In a nutshell, this has remained the basic summary of the new ILTMC project's official 
story about its standard-setting programme ever since. The same themes which were 
outlined by van der Stoel in 1993 have remained the gist of what the new ILTMC's 
project's producers present as the most accurate portrait of the new ILTMC regime to this 
day. 
Theme One. The regulatory effect achieved by the general human rights and 
democratization project has not been enough to meet the objective challenges raised by the 
minorities question. A separate regulatory project is required to be set up. That project is 
what the new ILTMC ultimately had to become. 234 
233 Van der Stoel, supra n. 200,46-7. 
234 Compare WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 2-5 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995): "Various efforts have been made historically to protect cultural 
minorities, and to regulate the potential conflicts between majority and minority cultures. ... 
After World War 
II, it was ... 
hoped that the new emphasis on `human rights' would resolve minority conflicts. Rather than 
protecting vulnerable groups directly, through special rights for the members of designated groups, cultural 
minorities would be protected indirectly, by guaranteeing basic civil and political rights to all individuals 
regardless of group membership. ... 
[Over time, ] however, it has become increasingly clear that minority 
rights cannot be subsumed under the category of human rights. Traditional human rights standards are simply 
unable to resolve some of the most important and controversial questions relating to cultural minorities.... 
The problem is not that traditional human rights doctrines give us the wrong answer to these questions. It is 
rather that they often give no answers at all. ... 
To resolve these questions fairly, we need to supplement 
traditional human rights principles with a theory of minority fights. " 
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Theme Two. Although it is a separate project from the general human rights 
project, the new ILTMC project, nevertheless, forms its integral part. A successful 
execution of the latter presupposes a full compliance with the requirements set by the 
former, 235 
Theme Three. The new ILTMC project addresses issues that are more immediately 
related to the organization of statehood and government than the general human rights 
project. These issues involve the balance of political interests between the minority 
communities, the majority, the individual, and the government. The main pillars of the new 
ILTMC regime are, consequently, the preservation not only of equity, but also of 
balance. 23' The main principles at the heart of the new ILTMC regime, consequently, are (i) 
the prohibition of any form of discrimination against the members of the minority 
communities; (ii) active promotion of tolerance and mutual acceptance; (iii) the 
advancement of the substantive equality in fact over the formal equality in law; (iv) the 
provision of various forms of communal autonomy required to ensure an adequate 
development of the minority community's culture and collective identity subjected to the 
requirement of preventing every form of de facto discrimination of the members of 
majority. 
All these themes, as one can immediately recognize by inspecting their ideological 
pedigree, are ultimately the themes of the classical liberal multiculturalist theory. 237 The four 
main principles, for instance, can all be traced directly to Rawls's Theory of Justice. 2 Every 
other aspect of the proposed programmatic vision finds close parallels in the works of 
Rawls's modern-day successors, such as, most notably, Will Kymlicka and Yale Tamir. 239 
235 See also id., 6. Cf. Packer, supra n. 181,472-3. 
236 For a lengthy investigation of the traditional ideological justifications of the ILTMC project, see generally 
ATHANASIA SPILIOPOULOU AKERMARK, JUSTIFICATIONS OF MINORITY PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (London: Kluwer Law International, 1999). 
237 See supra nn. 234-6. 
238 See further JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 266-7 (rev. edn; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
239 See supra n. 234; Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). For 
further discussion of the relationship between the liberal mu'lticulturalist theory and the new ILTMC project, 
see, e. g., Bill Bowring, "Multicultural Citizenship: a More Viable Framework for Minority Rights? ", in 
DEIRDRE FOTTRELL AND BILL BOWRING EDS. ), MINORITY AND GROUP RIGHTS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 
1 (The Hague: Kluwer, 1999). 
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The multiculturalist themes intertwine closely with the new-security-challenges mantra. 240 
Together they delimit that ideological foundation around which the new ILThIC project 
claims to organize itself and on which it stakes the legitimacy of all its standard-setting 
exercises. 
The basic question that remains to be answered now, consequently, is: to what 
extent is this portrait of the new ILTMC project really accurate? Or, to put it slightly 
differently, how much does the official self-image of the new ILTMC project contribution 
to the bargaining context involving the minority and majority communities correspond to 
the effectively existing reality established on the basis of its RSA functionality? How much 
does are the four main principles observed in the new ILTMC's functional reality? 
a. The Contents of the Effectively Existing International Legal Regime Governing the 
Position of the Minority Community in Its Interaction with the Government and the 
Majority 
The transactional structure of the fourth transaction context directly affected by the 
distributive impact of the new ILTMC regime involves in reality not three, but five 
different players: minority community, state/government, international experts, pan- 
European organizations/"coalitions of the willing, " and majority community (pentagon 
EDABC). 
From the perspective of the minority community, the factuality of the new ILTMC 
project in this context effectively appears in the shape of the following general regime 241 
240 See further Chapter I, Section 2a, above. 
241 For the original sources, see further the FCNM; Copenhagen Document, Hague Recommendations Oslo Oslo 
Recommendations, Lund Recommendations, Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or 
Linguistic Minorities, UNGA Resolution 47/135,18 December 1992, UN Doc. A/47/49; Asbjorn Eide and 
Erika-Irene Daes, "Prevention of Discrimination against and the Protection of Minorities: Working Paper on 
the Relationship and Distinction between the Rights of Persons Belonging to Minorities and Those of 
Indigenous Peoples, " UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/2000/10. See also WALTER A. KEMP (ED. ), QUIET 
DIPLOMACY IN ACTION: THE OSCE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON NATIONAL MINORITIES (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 1998); COUNTRY RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE HIGH COMMISSIONER (available at 
http: / /www. osceorg/hcnm/docu nents. litml? lsi=true&. limit=1O&grV 44). 
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(1) There are no centrally provided remedies under international law available 
for minority communities to protect their legal entitlements as 
communities. With the exception of the rights protecting them against 
genocide and, possibly, apartheid, all minority community interests in the 
ECE region are protected on the international legal plane exclusively 
through the instrumentality of individual rights accruing to their members. 
Since there is no formal definition of what constitutes a particular type of a 
minority community - national, ethnic, religious, or linguistic - there is no 
guarantee every member of a minority community will necessarily be able to 
enjoy that protection. 
(2) The only internationally provided juridical remedies for the protection of 
the interests of minority communities residing in the ECE region are those 
created and sustained within the framework of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and its additional protocols, none of which incorporates 
any minority rights in excess of the residual right to equal treatment. All 
other internationally provided remedies are of a political character and are 
provided at the discretion of the corresponding institutions. There is no 
right of individual access to the OSCE HCNM. 
(3) Minority communities are prohibited from resorting to violence as a 
measure of self-help. 
(4) States are obliged to protect minority communities against "assimilation. " 
Promoting "integration" and insisting on the civic obligations owed to the 
majority community, however, is allowed. There is no clear guidance as to 
the practical difference between "assimilation" and "integration. " The 
decision on the matter, in the final analysis, belongs to "international 
experts. " 
(5) Members of the minority communities enjoy the same level of human 
rights protection as the members of the majority community. They have no 
affirmative action rights. Whatever affirmative action regimes may be 
created in their favour, will be created at the discretion of the respective 
states /governments. An affirmative action regime may not result in the 
creation of an undue burden on the members of the majority community. 
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What counts as an "undue burden" will normally be decided by the 
state/government itself, subject to review by the "international experts. " 
(6) Although they may be obligated by the state/government to learn the 
language of the majority community and to pass a formal test to prove their 
knowledge, members of minority communities enjoy an unlimited right to 
use their mother tongue in private and, subject to considerations of 
legitimate public interest, for business purposes. What counts as "legitimate 
public interest" is again decided by the state/government, subject to review 
by the "international experts. " 
(7) Where they consider it appropriate, legitimate, and in line with their 
national security considerations, states /governments are obliged to take 
general measures with a view to promote the conditions contributing to the 
protection and development of minority communities' cultural identity, 
provided such development does not endanger the promotion of the general democratic and 
human rights values. The subject-matter areas in which the "international 
community" normally expects such measures to be taken include education 
(more identity-promoting measures at the level of primary education, less at 
the level of secondary education, virtually none at the level of tertiary 
education), broadcasting (more measures) and print media (less measures), 
and participation in public life (more measures on the front of organizing 
consultative bodies, less on the front of proportionate representation). 
(8) Minorities have no right to secession, territorial autonomy, proportionate 
representation, or any extensive form of communal self-governance. If any 
of these may be awarded, it is solely at the discretion of the 
state /government. 
(9) Members of minority communities are generally allowed to setup minority- 
language schools and various kinds of educational, religious, and cultural 
centres, but exclusively at their own expense. They are allowed to seek and 
attract external funding and apply for funds from the state budget, but they 
are not guaranteed any share of public spending. 
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b. The Difference between the Official Portrait and the Reality 
Clearly, the effectively existing ILTMC regime is nowhere near the shiny portrait of it 
painted by the official ILTMC discourse. 
The first and the most important difference, of course, concerns the immediate 
logic of the legal protection dynamics. The official portrait couched in terms of minority 
rights suggests the existence of what in Halean terms has been described as the "private 
government" dynamics. As our observations in point (2) indicate, however, there only 
genuinely exists a "public government" dynamics, by the means of which the 
representatives of the "international community" at their discretion enforce the provisions 
of the new ILTMC regime against individual states/governments. 
The second observation that immediately invites itself to be made is that, if we look 
at the actual patterns of the effective legal functionality behind the facade of the new 
ILTMC regime, it will immediately become clear that neither the minority communities 
themselves, nor their individual members enjoy a genuine equality in fact and in law with 
the members of the majority community. Consider, for instance, the question of minority- 
language education (point (9) above). The official discourse of the existing ILTMC regime 
suggests that by providing the members of the minority communities with a possibility of 
establishing privately-funded schools the new ILTMC project has eectively guaranteed them 
an equal footing with the members of the majority. Private schools, however, are a very 
expensive business to run. Where are the funds required to sustain them going to come 
from? Article 13 of the FCNM leaves no uncertainties in this regard: even though "persons 
belonging to a national minority have the right to set up and to manage their own private 
educational and training establishments, " "the exercise of this right shall not entail any 
financial obligations" for the signatory states. Put differently, it may be entirely legitimate 
for an ethnic Arcadian living in Ruritania to want to send her children to an Arcadian- 
speaking primary school. But it is also entirely legitimate for the Ruritanian government not 
to contribute any budgetary funds to enable her to realise that aspiration while continuing 
to spend all the available budgetary funds on setting up Ruritanian-speaking schools 
without giving the Arcadian family in question any kind of commensurate tax relief. 
If the 
members of the Arcadian community intend to protect the cultural 
identity of their 
children, it follows then that, in effect, they will have to pay twice: the first time to the actual 
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private school to which they will send their children, the second time to the state budget to 
finance a publicly-provided education system their children will not use. The sole reason 
for the heavier financial burden imposed on the ethnic Arcadians in these circumstances, it 
appears, will be the fact of their difference from the rest of the Ruritanian population in 
"their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage. i242 How such a state of affairs can 
be reconciled with the notion of a "full and effective equality between persons belonging to 
a national minority and those belonging to the majorityi243 or the idea that "no 
disadvantage shall result from the choice [to be treated as a person belonging to a national 
minority] and the exercise of the rights which are connected to that choice"Z" eludes any 
immediate understanding. 
Law, let us recall Hale's observation, always gets implicated in the structuration of the 
power distribution pattern, even when it remains silent on a given issue. The ILTMC's 
consistent failure to extend the principle of minority differential treatment to the fields of 
tax collection and budgetary expenditure has a clear distributive impact on the relative 
bargaining positions of the two communities. By legitimising the ethnic Ruritanians' 
propensity to oppress the ethnic Arcadians through taking advantage of their weaker 
bargaining power (there simply are not enough ethnic Arcadian MPs to veto the 
objectionable budget when it passes through the Ruritanian parliament), the new ILTMC 
regime not only does not remain substantively neutral and promote a state of effective 
equality between the two communities, but also, in fact, throws its weight on the side of 
the (already winning) majority community. 
The third observation that invites itself to be made is that, despite all its claims to the 
contrary, the new ILTMC regime is not in fact a regime designed to protect the cultural 
diversity of the respective polities but, rather, a regime designed to determine the limits 
within which the project of cultural uniformization of the same polities can be carried out. 
By subordinating every measure designed to protect and promote minority identity to the 
overarching requirement of promoting the general democratic and human rights values 
(point (7) above), the new ILTMC regime in effect prohibits the development of all 
cultures opposed to the modem mainstream liberal tradition. 
242 Article 5.1 of the FCNM. 
243 Article 4.2, id. 
244 Article 3.1, id. 
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The fourth observation relates to the fact that the general pattern of the actual 
formulation of its provisions prevents the new ILTMC regime from being able to provide 
an adequate level of protection to the general interests of the minority communities. As the 
modern scholarship on the practice of collective action has long shown, the dynamics of 
the realization of a general group interest in many cases tends to be very different from the 
cumulative dynamics of the realization of the particular interests of the group's individual 
members. 2a5 Put differently, there will always be insufficient incentivization on the part of 
the individual members to secure the goods required by the community as a whole. 
Moreover, some community projects involve such considerable transaction costs that they 
can only be carried out when the project is executed by community in question acting as a 
single agent. By only recognizing individuals as legal subjects and not minority communities 
(point (1) above), the new ILTMC regime, thus, effectively "chills" the latter's capacity for 
a meaningful protection of their legitimate communal interests. 246 
The fifth observation relates to the conclusion that, in a functionalist perspective, 
that part of the new ILTMC regime which is reflected in point (8) above is effectively 
indistinguishable from the 18"' century theory of awarding legal protection against 
competitive injury. Consider the following passage from Morton Horwitz classical first 
volume of The Transformation ofAmerzcan Law. 
In an underdeveloped society, with little available private capital, a policy of 
encouraging development required that the legal system provide legal 
arrangements that guaranteed private investors certainty and predictability of 
economic consequences. Perhaps the most important of these guarantees was 
protection against ... competitive 
injury. To accommodate this policy, courts 
promulgated rules reflecting a view of property as essentially exclusive and 
245 For a classical introduction to the topic, see further MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
246 There do, of course, exist a number of very good reasons for not awarding the status of legal subjects to 
non-incorporated collective bodies. None of them, however, tends to be so absolute as to warrant the 
conclusion that one must insist on a complete refusal of all claims to legal personality in the case of minority 
communities. For further development of the argument, see James W. Nickel, "Group Agency and Group 
Rights", in IAN SHAPIRO AND WILL KYMLICKA (EDS. ), ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 235 (New York: 
NYU Press, 1996). 
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monopolistic, so that every attempt to draw business away from an existing 
enterprise was usually treated as an injury to property itself. [As] Justice Story in 
his Charles River Bridge dissent [put it], there was [believed to be] `no surer plan to 
arrest all public improvements, founded on private capital and enterprise, than to 
make the outlay of that capital uncertain, and questionable both as to security, and 
as to productiveness. '247 
As the general level of economic welfare increased, the 
expectations that had grown up in a static and underdeveloped society [started to] 
giv[e] way to a conviction that ownership of property in a dynamic and changing 
environment necessarily entailed many risks and uncertainties for which the law 
could offer no protection. 248 
What came out eventually from that conviction was the doctrine of the free market and the 
basic blueprint for the anti-trust theory. 
Seen against this background, the existing ILTMC regime, one could say, still 
inhabits the world of justice Story. Although it clearly conceives of minority communities 
essentially in the same way in which one would normally conceive of a tennis club or some 
other voluntary public association 249- what with all these suggestions that "[t]o belong to a 
national minority is a matter of a person's individual choice"'-' - it still perceives the 
context of the bargaining situation between minority communities and majority 
communities as one in which the statal/nation-building project undertaken by the latter 
deserves an ever-increasing protection against any sort of competitive injury delivered by 
the former. 
The sixth observation is the reverse side (or a logical continuation, if you will) of 
the fifth. Its ultimate point of reference is the failure of the new ILTMC regime to create a 
right to a system of proportionate representation for minority communities. With its 
247 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 111-8 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1977). 
248 Id., 131. 
249 John Packer is a notorious advocate of that sensibility. See supra n. 15. 
250 ý32 of the Copenhagen Doarment. See also Article 3 of the FCNM. 
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effective consecration of the majoritarian-democratic model of government, the new 
ILTMC regime has, in fact, given a new lease of life to the ideology of the 19" century 
classical economics. 
The two foundational assumptions of the 19th century classical economic thought 
251were that: (i) the general structure within which the economic process takes place has to 
be orgainized in the shape of a free market; and (ii) the general characteristic of the 
economic process is that "people labor to produce objects desired by others. The labor 
imparts market value. Each person then freely exchanges the products of his labor for the 
products of the labor of others. "252 The economic actors are thus free "both to produce 
anything they want and to sell it for whatever price it will bring in the market. i253 Because 
everyone is free in this way and because the invisible hand aligns every supply dynamics 
with every pattern of demand, the relative prices are directly commensurate with the 
relative labour costs expended by each economic actor, which is another of saying everyone 
gets out of the game exactly what they deserve - "all incomes reflect[] the labor 
contribution of the income recipient to the social process of production"254 - i. e. the game 
is structurally fair. Whoever can pay more deserves to obtain the goods he pays for because 
the capacity to pay more is itself deserved. You prosper only inasmuch as you earned it 
with your contributions. 
Consider now the ideal image of the ideal political process inscribed in the theory 
of majoritarian democracy. All the political actors are citizens of the given polity. 255 All 
citizens participate in the political process solely in the exercise of their freedom. Whoever 
does not want to participate in the political process does not have to. Nobody can force 
251 For further overview of the classical economic thought, see generally ERNESTO SCRIPANTI AND STEFANO 
ZAMAGNI, AN OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT (transi by David Field; Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993); MARIAN BOWLEY, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THEORY BEFORE 1870 
(London: Macmillan, 1973); ERIC ROLL, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT (London: Faber and Faber 
Ltd., 1962). 
252 Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Late in Economic Thought. Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 939,943 (1985). 
253 Id., 944. 
254 Id., 943. 
255 Refugees, migrants, and stateless people are present in the IHRL only as unfortunate aberrations. They are 
temporary phenomena that, if everything goes well and according to plan, the IHRL-guided politics will soon 
put an end to. 
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anyone to join any political party or show up at the regional elections. Everyone is free to 
engage in whatever legitimate politics he wants to and form whatever alliances and blocs 
that politics enables him to form in the context of his body politic. Because everyone is 
free in this way and because the structure of the political field is a majoritarian democracy, 
the size and the intensity of the personal contribution to the political process are 
guaranteed to be directly commensurate with the size and the intensity of the acquired 
political power. If a rival political party commands more weight in the parliament than 
yours, then it absolutely deserves to form the government because this shows that more 
citizens have given their political capital to it in the exercise of their freedom. The political 
process is a process of market-like meritocracy. Even political ideologies are said to operate 
in a kind of a marketplace. 256 
Now, one of the central characteristics of the classical economic thought, famously, 
was that it took an extremely austere view on the subject of wealth redistribution. Anyone 
who ends up losing out in the course of the economic competition, declared the classics, 
essentially deserves that. If you had not been sloppy at readjusting yourself to the structural 
terms of the market, which are all fair and just, you would not have been where you are 
now. 
Once you adopted the background assumptions of the classical economic theory: 
[i]t followed that collective attempts to make particular groups better off could 
succeed only by depriving some people of the products of their labor and 
bestowing those products on others. Such an unnatural course could be 
accomplished only by restricting the freedom either of production (state enforced 
monopolies of manufactures and labor unions) or of exchange (protective tariffs, 
minimum wage, or maximum hours legislation) or both. It would be unjust 
because it would be indistinguishable from theft. It would lead to suboptimal 
output because it would destroy, as theft always destroys, the incentive to 
work. 257 
256 The term originally comes from Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616,630 (1919). 
257 Kennedy, supra n. 252,947. 
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Transferring this logic to the question of proportionate representation, it follows that, from 
the point of view of the majoritarian-democratic theory, what makes proportionate 
representation so undesirable is that it tends both to be essentially unjust and to "chill" the 
democratic momentum by rewarding the less talented political entrepreneurs at the expense 
of the more talented ones. As far as the majoritarian-democratic theory is concerned, a 
system of proportionate representation creates an essentially suboptimal political regime by 
allowing minority parties to obtain a disproportionately greater presence in the parliament 
than the patterns of their democratic support would otherwise allow them. 
The basic problems with elevating that kind of sensibility into the rank of an 
ILTMC policy should not be that difficult to identify. Firstly, not "all [political] incomes 
reflect the [political] labour contribution of the income recipient. " Secondly, all people 
deserve to be treated equally, and equality, as the new ILTMC regime itself admits, means 
something more than simply having the same set of formal opportunities as those who are 
in a better position to realize them. Thirdly, the political market is different from the 
economic market. When you lose out as an entrepreneur in the market for legal services, 
you can still usually requalify and become a law librarian. You cannot do the same when 
you lose in a political competition. And if you lose it because the minority party which you 
support is also a party of a minority community, and you realize that the voting patterns in 
the elections were based not on the objective logic of political supply-demand but on racial, 
religious, or ethnic prejudices, you are very unlikely to come to the conclusion that it is a 
just and equitable outcome and that all your woes are solely the product of your own 
sloppiness. And when that happens, chances are, some of you may decide you should lose 
more than just your goodwill. " 
The listing of critical comments could go on for far longer. But the general message 
that emerges from the constantly repeating patterns is already sufficiently clear. First, the 
objective reality of the new ILTMC project is not what its official self-portrait claims it to 
be. As far as the ECE minority communities are concerned, it is certainly far darker and 
more sinister. Second, if we take on board Hale's point about the practical impact of 
normative gaps (permissions to injure) and recall Hohfeld's point that damnia absque injuria 
258 What may happen next can be learned from Amy Chua's recent book on the link between ethnic conflicts, 
economic reform, and democratization. See AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE (London: William Heinemann, 
2003). 
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never just happen, they are always brought about by a conscious decision, we could say that 
the practical effect of the new ILTMC regime is such that not all of the existing minority 
communities in the ECE region will be allowed to survive in the "new Europe" world 
brought about by its producers, but only those whose existing political, cultural, and 
economic resources are sufficiently big to enable them to absorb all those blows which the 
respective majority communities with the tacit approval of the pan-European organizations 
can legitimately throw at them. 
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In Lieu of an Afterword 
In its own eyes, the story of the mid-19th century concert of Europe, whose several traces, as I 
have shown in this work, we can regularly find today behind the elaborately mystified facade of 
the new ILTMC project, was, of course, a story of a bright utopia. It articulated a vision of 
freedom, prosperity, and universal values, expressing it in the confident profession of faith in 
the inexorable march of progress and the unquestionable virtues of benevolent paternalism. 
The same basic ideological elements, as I have shown in the previous pages, can also be found 
today in the official discourse of the new pan-European project so candidly called "the new 
Europe. " So can, of course, the various undersides they so carefully seek to hide. In the mid- 
19th century Europe these undersides included the rising gap in the distribution of wealth and 
power between the rich and the poor; the growing disenchantment of the disenfranchised 
masses; the cruel stifling of every political project capable of mounting an effective challenge 
to the existing status quo. One and a half centuries later, how much of an overstatement would 
it really be to claim a sense of a dßä vu? 
But if there is anything we should have learned from Althusser here, it is, of course, 
that no historical conjuncture can ever be entirely like any other. The mechanisms of the post- 
Cold War pan-European RSA functionality compare to those of the mid-19th century concert 
of Europe like heaven compares to earth. No more can we find a plain paternalism of direct 
interventions uncaring about the formalities of international sovereignty. The new regime of 
regional imperialism is built on an unending exaltation of the equal rights and duties of all 
states; it is the latter, indeed, that so often enable it to advance ever further. 
No more can we find also a group of easily identifiable tsars and chancellors 
commanding and ordering about the continent. The archetypal examples of the power elites 
behind the "new Europe" project are the faceless Eurocrats, international experts, and - what 
a wonderful euphemism! - the Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs. 
' No more are there left 
I For a lengthy discussion of the OSCE HCNM as a transnational norm entrepreneur (TNE), see Steven R. 
Ratner, Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Confkct?, 32 N. Y. U. J. Intl L. & Pol. 591 (2000). For the 
development of the concept of the TNEs, see further Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 
Hous. L. Rev. 623,647 (1998). A noteworthy fact TNEs are sometimes also described as "transnational moral 
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any traces of an open order of threat and suppression. The new imperial technology is the 
technology of the Foucauldian discipline, ' replete with its elaborate mechanisms of 
observation' (European Commission, ODIHR, HCNM, FCNM Advisory Committee) and 
grids of spatial distribution' (the Schengen zone, the EMU, the COE area, the OSCE area, 
association agreement zones, the groups of accession), routine collective exercises' (pointless 
periodic plebiscites and high-level summits) and regular confessions6 (reporting procedures 
under international regimes), elaborate time-tables (implementation of acquis) and "collective 
and obligatory rhythms"7 (cyclic assessment reports). It is a system of governance that has 
methodically substituted the use of the normalizing judgments' (good governance benchmarks, 
soft-law international standards, world-best practices) for the imposition of condemnatory 
ones9 (violation of hard-law obligations). No more a project of straightforward restriction and 
unadorned oppression: from the media spotlight of the Charter of Paris to the archival 
obscurity of Ambassador Monteira's statement, 10 the new pan-European vision has been an 
entrepreneurs" (Ratner, op. cit., 657). Depending on one's perspective, this, of course, can be seen to cast the 
matter in a completely different dimension, as it seems to raise, on the one hand, the spectre of the missionary 
activity and, on the other hand, considering the strength of the historical links between the Western European 
missionary movement and the spread of European imperial project, the spectre of indirect imperialism. 
2 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (transl. by Alan Sheridan; New 
York Vintage Books, 1995). 
3 Id., 170-7. 
4 Id., 141-7. 
5 Id., 152-3. 
6 On the significance of confession in the exercise of disciplinary power, see further MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE 
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 17 et seq. (transl. by Robert Hurley, New York Vintage Books, 
1990). 
7 See further FOUCAULT, supra n. 2,149-52. 
8 Id., 177-80. 
9 Id., 182-3: "p1he art of punishing, in the regime of disciplinary power, is aimed neither at expiation, nor even 
precisely at repression. 
10 See Chapter I, Section 2, above, at pp. 24-7. 
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enterprise directed at training and production, a moulding of a new and better European polity. " 
Certainly, as the numerous symptomatic events from Kosovo to Narva have shown, the new 
imperial regime is a system of power that "can also be direct, physical, pitting force against 
force, bearing on material elements, "12 but what characterizes it far more exhaustively than all 
that is the fact it "is not exercised simply as an obligation or a prohibition on those who `do 
not have it'. "" Of course, its actual "technology is [quite] diffuse, rarely formulated in 
continuous, systematic discourse; it is often made up of bits and pieces; it implements a 
disparate set of tools or methods, " but it is not for all that any less real - it does exist, it is 
constantly felt by those on whom it turns its attention, even if it is not always recognized for 
what it is - or weak or emasculated. 
It is a system of imperial domination that has a very clear territorial tone on its 
receiving end, but none on its delivering one. There are no real traces of any of those 
nationalist sensibilities that were such a common feature of the classical 19"' European imperial 
project. The new imperial system lodges directly in the international space-process - in this case, 
the space-process of the "new Europe" project - but its effectiveness is not for all that limited 
only to the international arena. Its reach is ubiquitous, its arsenal of tactics is breathtakingly 
wide, and it extends into every fibre of the modern social space down to its very last bottom, 
not stopping at the frontier between the nation-state and the international community or at the 
fig leaf of popular sovereignty. It is a truly awesome system of government - and the original 
meaning of "awesome, " let us remember, is "appalling and dreadfuli14- and in the last decade 
and a half the new ILTMC project described and analyzed in these pages has been one of the 
many facade structures serving to cover it up, conceal the fact of its existence, and give it, by 
this induced twilight, an ever greater opportunity to spread, mature, and grow. 
' I' The chief function of the disciplinary power is to `train', rather than to select and to levy ... 
It `trains' the 
moving, confused, useless multitudes of bodies and forces into [an organized] multiplicity of individual elements. " 
(FOUCAULT, supra n. 2,170. ) 
12 Id., 26. 
13 Id., 27. 
14 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2006); available from http: : dictionary. oed. com 
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A slightly more charitable conclusion would be perhaps that the main thing that has gone 
wrong with the new ILTMC regime was that its producers have failed to separate their 
subjective dreams from their socio-theoretical diagnoses. Too many ideologues and architects 
of the new ILTMC regime over the last twenty years have been haunted by the stubborn belief 
that the liberal democratic polity portrayed by the disciples of Rawls and Kymlicka was in fact 
both a reliable description of what the North Atlantic West has become in practice and an 
accurate portrait of what the Hegelian telos - the final end of perfect becoming, the ideal state 
of political being after reaching which history will end and the future will become the same as 
the present - was in theory. 
Against this background, one of the central merits of legal realism, as well as of the 
historico-materialist method in general, has been precisely the fact that in dealing with such 
questions it has managed to thrust aside all the grand chimeras of the liberal political 
philosophy, from classical economics to liberal individualism, with all their self-confirming 
prophecies that "simply regurgitate the stale terminology of the most traditional spiritualist 
metaphysics. i15 True, from the pages where its main problematic was first posed to its actual 
resolution this thesis has taken a very long way. But it seems it would be quite short-sighted to 
propose that it was an unjustified delay. Perhaps, the main reason why so much of the 
mainstream ILTMC scholarship these days has become so irretrievably lost within its own 
daydreams is not because there has been some deliberate ruse or ill-will on the part of its 
producers, but because not enough attention was paid to the questions of method, 
epistemological conventions, and the need to appreciate the dialectical complexity of the 
conjuncture. 
For the genuine problems are too serious and complex to be resolved by pompous 
and ultra-simplistic generalizations that have never succeeded in explaining anything 
whatsoever. 16 
15 Nicos POL¢LANTLAs, STATE, PowER, SOCIALISM 20 (transl. by Patrick Camtller; London: Verso, 2000). 
16 Id., 21. 
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